This is a reprint of the English Translation of the *Nyāya Sūtras* of Gautama by Mm. Dr. Ganganatha Jha, the versatile Sanskrit scholar who will ever be remembered for his dedicated and selfless pioneer work and immense contribution in the field.

The work was first published serially in the *Indian Thought* (Vols. IV-XI), a quarterly journal devoted to Sanskrit learning, over a period of eight years from 1912 to 1919.

Dr. Jha's translation covers a large field and includes, besides the original *Sūtras* of Gautama, the *Bhāṣya* of Vātsyāyana and the *Vārtika* of Uddyotakara in full as well as relevant notes from Vācaspatimiśra's *Nyāyavārtika-tātparyaṭīkā*, Udayana's *Tātparyapariśuddhi* and Raghūttama's *Bhāṣyacandra*. The work naturally became enormous in bulk and it is not surprising that it took for its completion so many years and so much energy of the author and as many as 1800 pages in print.

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THE NYĀYA-SŪṬRAS OF GAUṬAMA

THE NYĀYA-SŪṬRAS OF GAUTAMA

WITH THE BHĀṢYA OF VĀṬSYĀYANA AND THE VĀRṬIKA OF UḌḌYOṬAKARA

Translated into English

With notes from Vāchaspaṭi Mishra's 'Nyāya-Vārṭika-Ṭāṭparyaṭīkā', Uḍayana's 'Parishuḍḍhi' and Raghūṭṭama's Bhāṣyachandra

by

MAHĀMAHOPĀḌHYĀYA

GAṄGĀNĀṬHA JHĀ

Vol. III

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The question to be considered is—Is the Soul (which is spoken of as 'I') only an aggregate of the Body, the Sense-organs, the Mind, the Intellect, and Sensations? or is it something different from these? "Whence does such a doubt arise?" *It arises from the fact that Designation is found to be of both kinds.*‡ By 'Designation' here is meant the expressing of the relationship of the Agent with the Action and with the Instrument of that Action. This Designation is found to be of two kinds—(1) In one we have the Composite Whole designated by its component parts—*i.e.*, 'the tree stands by the roots,' 'the house stands by the pil-

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* It is doubtful whether or not the connotation of the term 'Soul' is the same as that of the term 'Āṭman.' But we retain the ordinary term 'Soul,' as it is more intelligible to the English reader, who applies the term 'when reference is made to continuity of being beyond the present,' in such ordinary expressions as 'the Immortality of the Soul.' 'Spirit' or 'Self' would perhaps be a more apt rendering of '*Āṭman*.'

† The Soul is foremost, because it is the most important, and also because it is the most loved by man; 'it is for the sake of the Soul that all things are dear'—says the Upaniṣad; and lastly because in the Enumeration also (in Sū. 1-1-9), it is Soul that is mentioned first; hence in the Examination also it is taken up first.—*Bhāṣyachandra.*

The *Tāṭparya* remarks—Though it is stated here that Soul is going to be examined, it is the *definition* or differentiating characteristics of the Soul that is going to be examined. This will be clear as we proceed.'

‡ That this sentence was regarded, by some people, as a Sūṭra is indicated by the *Parishuḍḍhi*, which remarks that this sentence is *Bhāṣya, not Sūṭra.*

lars' [where what is spoken of as the Instrument, *i.e.*, the *Roots* or the *Pillars*, is a component part of the Agent, the Tree or the House]; and (2) in the other, we have a thing designated by something totally different from it; *i. e.*, 'one cuts the tree with the axe,' 'he sees with the lamp' [where the instrument, Axe or Lamp, is something entirely different from the Cutter or the Seer]; —now with regard to the Soul there are such designations as, 'he sees with the eye,' 'he cognises with the mind,' 'he ponders with the intellect,' 'he experiences pleasure and pain with the body'; and in connection with this, it is uncertain whether in these we have the designation of the Aggregate or Composite of Body, Intellect &c. by means of its components [*i.e.*, the Body &c. spoken of as Instruments are only the component parts of the *Experiencer*, *Seer* &c., which is thus only an Aggregate of the Body &c.], or the designation of one thing (the *Seer* &c.), by means of things different from it [*i.e.*, the Body &c., spoken of as Instruments are different from the Experiencer, Seer, &c.]

Our opinion is that in these expressions we have the designation (of the Agent) by something different from itself [*i.e.*, the Soul is different from the Body &c.].

"Why so?"

[The answer is supplied by the Sūṭra (1)].

Vārṭika.

Introductory to Sū. (1).

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The 'Objects of Cognition' having been mentioned next after 'Instruments of Cognition,' now begins the *examination* of those Objects; so that we are going to examine now those things, the mistaken notions in regard to which brings about Birth and Rebirth, and the right knowledge of which becomes the cause of the cessation of Birth and Rebirth. Of these things Soul being the foremost, it is Soul that we proceed to examine. "What is there to examine in regard to the Soul?" What is to be considered is whether the Soul is, or is not, something different from Body, Sense-organs, Mind and Intellect.

"No such enquiry is called for; as the thing itself is something unknown. Difference and Non-difference (from Body &c.) are qualities; and a quality can subsist only in an object; and in the present case we find that the *object* in question is absolutely unknown; and so long as the Object is unknown, we cannot have an enquiry into its qualities. Hence before proceeding with the inquiry, it behoves you to establish the existence of the Object itself."

There is no necessity of establishing the existence of the Soul;—*firstly*, because this has already been done under Sū. 1-1-10; *i.e.* it has been proved under Vār. P. 339. that Sūtra that there *is* such a thing as Soul; and this having been already established, the subsequent enquiry (as to its being different or otherwise from Body) should follow as a matter of course;—*secondly*, because there is no diversity of opinion on the point; there is no one who denies the existence of the Soul; the difference of opinion arises only in regard to the particular character of this Soul;—such opinions being held as 'the Body only is the the Soul,' 'Intellect and the rest are the Soul,' 'the Aggregate of Body &c., is the Soul' and 'the Soul is something entirely different from these'; certainly such diverse opinions could not be held except by persons who admit the existence of the Soul; hence (this being already admitted) it is only right that the enquiry as to its character and qualities be proceeded with;—and *thirdly*, there is not the least chance of any proofs being put forward in support of the view that 'the Soul does not exist'; there is no proof in support of the non-existence of Soul; and it is for this reason that there is no diversity of opinion on that point.

"What you say is not right. For some people have positively declared that 'there is no Soul, because no such thing is produced; their argument being—'There is no Soul, because no such thing is ever produced,—it being exactly

like the Hare's Horn (which being not produced, does not exist)."

Our answer to this argument is as follows :—

The two terms '*āṭmā nāsṭi*' ('there is no Soul') are mutually contradictory; that is, this term 'Soul' as co-ordinated with the term 'is not' does not express the fact of Soul being an absolute '*non-entity*'; and what is the reason for that? The reason is simply this :—The term Soul' denotes an entity, something existing, and the term 'is not' denotes the denial of it; now whenever and wherever the existence of a thing is denied, it clearly means that it exists elsewhere; *e.g.*, when the term 'jar' is co-ordinated with the term 'is not,' it does not mean that the jar has no existence at all; all that the expression 'there is no jar' means is to deny its existence only at a particular time and place; the meaning being either that it does not exist at a particular place, *in the house* for instance; or that it does not exist at a particular time, *at present*, for instance; so that any such denial, as 'it is not before a certain thing' or 'it is not above a certain thing,' cannot proceed except from persons who admit the jar to be an *entity*. Similarly, as regards the denial, 'there is no Soul,' does it deny the existence of the Soul at a particular point in space? or at a particular time? If the former, then such denial can not be right in regard to the Soul, for the simple reason that the Soul does not occupy any space at all; so that a denial in regard to any point in space cannot deny the existence of the Soul. If what you mean is that 'the Body is not the Soul,'—then, we ask, who is the person that holds the Body to be the Soul, against whom you urge the denial? "The denial is in the form that *there is no Soul in the Body*." Who says that the Soul is in the *Body* against whom that denial could be urged? "Where, then, *is* the Soul?" The Soul is *nowhere*. "Then does it *not exist* at all?" Certainly, it is not that it does not

Vār. P. 340. exist at all; specially because the denial you have urged is in a specific form ['there is no Soul' being, as shown above, only a denial of the Soul in regard to a particular time or place]. "What then does all this mean—the Soul is not in the Body, it is not in anything else, and yet it is not that it does not exist?" The meaning is simply this: We speak of a thing as it exists; and as the Soul exists in nothing, we speak of it so.* Nor again, is it right to deny the Soul in regard to any point of time; because none of the three points of time has any bearing upon the Soul; inasmuch as the Soul is an eternal entity, none of the three points of time can bear upon it.† That the Soul is eternal we shall prove later on under Sūtra 3-1-19. From this it follows that there can be no denial of the Self with regard to any point in time.

Further, one who puts forward the denial of the 'Soul' has to explain what is denoted by the word 'Soul' (that he uses); we do not find a single word which is without some denotation. If you understand the word 'Soul' as denoting the Body, etc., even so the inner contradiction involved in your assertion does not cease. "How?" Because in that case your assertion 'there is no Soul' would mean that 'there in no Body, etc.' "What we mean by our denial is that there is no such thing as that which you assume as *Soul*." But as a matter of fact, we do not *assume* any such thing as the 'Soul;' a certain thing is said to be 'assumed,' when it is regarded as something which

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* There is no such Universal Law that whatever exists must exist at some point in space; so that the denial of the Soul with regard to any points in space does not necessarily imply its absolute non-existence.—*Tātparya*.

† We can speak of a thing as *past*, only when it does not exist at present; we can speak of a thing as *future*, when it does not exist in the present; and we can speak of it as being *present*, when its previous non-existence has ceased, and future non-existence has not arrived. As none of these three conditions is applicable to the Soul, it cannot be spoken of as either 'present,' or 'past' or 'future.'—*Tātparya*.

it is not, on account of its being similar to that something, and hence having the properties of this latter imposed upon it; and certainly we do not regard the Soul as any such thing. Consequently, when you make use of the phrase, 'that which you assume as the Soul,' you lay yourself open to the question—in what way do we assume the Soul? Do we assume it as an *entity* or as a *non-entity*? If we assume it as an *entity*, what is the resemblance between 'entity' and 'non-entity' (which according to you, is what the Soul is), by virtue of which there is such an assumption of the Soul?* If you point out any resemblance between the 'Soul' and the 'Not-soul,' you admit the existence of the 'Soul;' as there can be no resemblance between 'entity' and 'non-entity.' "The notion of 'I,' which really pertains to the *Body, etc.*, you assume as pertaining to the *Soul*; and it is in this that you are wrong. [This is what we deny when we say 'there is no Soul']." Even so, inasmuch as you admit the existence of something different from Body &c. as being the object of the notion of 'I,' the inner contradiction in your assertion does not cease.

If (in order to escape from all this difficulty) you assert that—"it is by no means necessary that every individual word must denote an entity; as for instance, such words as '*Shūnya*' '(Void)' and '*Ṭamas*' (Darkness)† (do not denote any entity)";—this also will not be right; as this does not save your assertion from the 'inner contradiction;' [the words you cite are not without denotation]; the denotation of the word '*Shūnya*' (Void) is as follows: a substance that has no one to guard or pro-

Vār. P. 341.

* The Soul, which *ex-hypothesi* is a non-entity, must resemble the entity, before it can have the character of the latter imposed upon it, and hence be assumed as an 'entity? Now what is that resemblance or similarity?

† At first sight it would seem that throughout this paragraph, '*ṭamas*' should be read as '*nabhas*;' but from l. 3 on P. 341, and ll. 11 *et. seq.* on P. 346, it is clear that '*ṭamas*' is the right reading.

tect it becomes 'fit for dogs,' and hence comes to be called '*Shūnya*,' which etymologically means '*shvabhyo hitam*,' 'fit for dogs;'—as regards the other word '*Ṭamas*' (Darkness), it denotes such substances, qualities and actions as are characterised by non apprehension [*i.e. non-apprehended* substance, quality and action]; that is to say, in a place where there is absence of light, [and substance, etc., are not apprehended], the word '*ṭamas*,' 'Darkness,' is used, as denoting those Substances, etc. Further, when you assert that the word '*ṭamas*' does not denote anything, you go against your own (Bauḍḍha) doctrine, according to which *Ṭamas* (Darkness) is *that which comprises the four entities* (Colour, Taste, Odour and Touch). From all this we conclude that there is no word that does not denote something.

Then again, when you assert that 'there is no Soul'—you make an assertion contrary to your own doctrine. "How so?" [The following passage occurs in your own scriptures] "O! Bhaḍanṭa, Colour is not 'I,' nor are Sensation Faculty, Cognition, I, O Bhaḍanṭa; similarly Colour is not you; nor are Sensation, Faculty, and Cognition 'you.'"—In this passage, the '*Skanḍhas*' or 'States' mentioned are denied as being the object of the notion of 'I;' and this denial is a qualified one (pertaining to a particular phase of that notion), and not a general (unqualified) one of the notion completely; one who does not admit the Soul should put forward an unqualified denial, in the form 'there is no *I*, there is no *you*' (and not that 'this and that is not I' etc. etc.) "By denying each of the *Skanḍhas* one by one, it is implied that the notion of 'I' pertains to the *Aggregate* of these." In that case it behoves you to point out what is that 'Aggregate' apart from Colour and the other *Skanḍhas* or 'States', to which (you say) the notion 'I' pertains. If you admit of the 'Aggregate' as something distinct from the 'States' themselves, then it becomes a mere difference of names; what we call 'Soul' you call 'Aggre-

gate.' If, on the other hand, the 'Aggregate' is non-different from the 'States,' then it is not possible to conceive of it in the singular form 'I,' as we never find a singular word applied to several things. As a matter of fact, Colour and the other 'States' either severally or collectively are not the 'Soul;' hence the notion of 'I' as applied to them, comes to be the conception of a thing as what it is not. "Well, let it be a wrong notion (*i.e.* the conception of some thing as what it is not); what harm does that do us?" Why does it not harm you? As a matter of fact, also 'wrong notions' bear the semblance of some 'right notion' [hence if the notion of 'I' in regard to the 'States' is *wrong*, it must be right in regard to something else; and this something else is the Soul]. Further, one who does not admit the Soul can never make any sense out of the Bauḍḍha philosophy. Nor can it be said that in the Buḍḍhist philosophical literature there is no passage (asserting the existence of the Soul); because we find it distinctly mentioned in the *Sarvābhisamayasūṭra*. Thus it is clear that when the Bauḍḍha asserts that 'there is no Soul' he goes against his own doctrine. The *Sūṭra* speaking of the Soul is as follows:—' O ye mendicants! I am going to point out to you the burden as well as the carrier of the burden: the five 'states' are the *burden* and the *Pudgala* is the *carrier of the burden*; he who holds that there is no Soul is a man with false notions.'

Vār. P. 342.

As regards the reason, 'because it is not produced' (which has been put forward by the Opponent on P. 339, L. 6, as proving that there is no Soul),—what it does mean is the denial of something totally different (from the existence of the Soul; as it denies only the fact of its *being produced*). Further, 'produced' and 'not produced' are properties of things; now what thing is it that is 'produced' and what is that which is 'not produced'? That thing is 'produced' whose existence is due to a cause; and that thing

is 'not produced' whose existence is not due to a cause. [So that all that your premiss 'because Soul is not produced' means is that the existence of the Soul is not due to a cause, and not that there is no existence of it]. "Why (should the term 'not produced' be taken to mean this)?" For the simple reason that the negative particle denies *production*; in the term 'not produced' all that the negative particle signifies is the denial of 'being produced,' the meaning of the whole term being that the thing spoken of has no production or birth; so that the statement 'the Soul is not produced' does not deny the Soul (but only its 'being produced'); just as the expression 'this vessel is without water' (does not deny the *vessel*, but only 'its containing water'). If the term 'not produced' means the denial of the very *existence* (of the Soul), then the premiss becomes the same as the Proposition [the Proposition being that 'there is no Soul' and the Premiss meaning that 'the Soul has no existence']. Further, 'being not produced' is a property; and no property, except *Samavāya* or Inherence,' * can exist by itself; and the only thing in which it can subsist (according to your Premiss) is the Soul. Hence your Premiss becomes 'contradictory' [indicating the *existence* of the Soul, and hence contradicting your Proposition that 'there is no Soul']. Even if you hold that "though the Property (*being not produced*) is there, the thing with that property does not exist,"—even then you do not escape from the incongruity that a property can never subsist by itself. Then again, what is the meaning of the expression 'because it is not produced'? If it mean that *there is no birth*, then the said premiss becomes impossible; as the Soul has its birth. "What is the 'birth' of the Soul?" The 'birth' of the Soul consists (even according to the Bauḍ-

* *Samavāya* is admitted to subsist by itself, because if a subtratum were necessary for it, it would subsist in that substratum only by the Samavāya-relation; so that there would be an endless series of 'Samavāyas'?

dha) in its becoming connected with a fresh aggregate* of Body, Organs, Intellect and Sensation. "What we mean by the Soul being 'not produced' is that it has no cause." In this case, it may be that you do not go against any of your own doctrines; but the premiss becomes 'Contradictory' (proving the contrary of your Proposition); as the thing that has no cause is *eternal*; so that in setting about to prove the *non-existence* of Soul you prove its *eternality*; hence your premiss becomes 'contradictory.' In fact the Premiss itself is contrary to the Proposition: Your Proposition means that 'there is no Soul,' and your Premiss asserts the *permanent existence* of the Soul; hence, inasmuch as one asserts the *non-existence* of the Soul, and the other its *existence*, there is clear contradiction between your Premiss and your Proposition.

Vār. P. 343.

The above reasonings also serve to reject all premisses (put forward in support of the Proposition that 'there is no Soul'), such as—(*a*) 'because it has no *hēṭu*,' (*b*) 'because no cause of its birth can be pointed out,' (*c*) 'because it is not an effect,' (*d*) 'because it has no cause,' and so on; all of which are open to objections similar to those urged above (against the premiss 'because it is not produced').

Now as regards the example that you have cited—"like the Hare's horn," this also is an example that is impossible (not applicable to the case in question). "Why so?" The term 'hare's horn' denotes a relationship (subsisting between the Hare and the Horn); so that when you deny the existence of the 'hare's horn,' it means the denial of that *relationship*, and not that of the Horn. "We can have for our example *the relation of the Hare and the Horn*." That also will not be right (*i.e.*, it will not suit your reasoning); as

* The term '*Nikāya*,' translated here as 'aggregate,' has been explained by the *Ṭāṭparya* as a technical term standing for each corporeal encasement of varying grades, as those belonging to gods, men, animals and so forth.

at sometime or other it may be possible for the Horn to have some sort of relation to the Hare.* "But this will be contrary to all popular notions." You mean that the assumption that there is Horn on the Hare will be opposed to all popular notions; but in reality there is no such opposition; what the popular notion denies is the relation of cause and effect; what people mean is that the Horn is neither the *cause* nor the *effect* of the Hare; that is to say, between the Horn and the Hare, there is no such relation of cause and effect as there is between the Horn and the Cow; † and certainly the denial of the relation of cause and effect does not mean the denial of the very *existence* (of the Hare's horn); for when one thing is neither the cause nor the effect of another thing, it does not mean that the thing does not exist; for instance, 'Ḍēvaḍaṭṭá's *jar*' [which *exists* and is yet neither the cause nor the effect of Ḍēvaḍaṭṭa]. Then again, when one asserts that "the Hare's horn does not exist," he should be asked—is this meant to be an Universal Negation, or only a particular negation? If it be meant to be the former, that would not be right; as no such negation is possible; that is to say, if the statement 'the Hare's horn does not exist' is a universal negation (the negation of *all* Horns, in relation to the Hare), then it would mean that the Horns of the Cow and other animals also do not exist; and this would be absurd; as certainly the Horns of other animals are not non-existent.‡ If, on the other hand, the statement be meant to be a particular negation, and what is meant be that some

* When the Horn of some other animal may be placed upon the head of the Hare, the Horn will have the relationship of *Conjunction* with the Hare.

† If the Horn were a part of the Hare's body, then it would be the constituent cause of the Hare; if on the other hand it were only an excrescence, like the wool and nails &c., then the Horn would be the effect or product of the Hare.—*Ṭāṭparya*.

‡ The denial of all Horns in relation to the Hare would mean that the Hare has no sort of relation with any horns; and this would not be right; as between the Hare and the Horn of the Cow, there *is* at least this relation that both exist at the same time.

particular Horn is denied in relation to the Hare,—so that what the denial means is that there does not exist any Horn of which the Hare is the *effect*, and of which the Hare is the cause ; * and it is this relation of cause and effect (between the Hare and the Horn) that is denied ;—the meaning of this would be that the relation of cause and effect, *which has been seen elsewhere*, is now denied ; and this would thus not be an example in support of *absolute non-existence*.

These same arguments also serve to set aside such examples as the 'Sky-flower' and the like.

Vār. P. 344.

Another argument put forward by the Atheist is—'there is no Soul, because no such thing is apprehended'; but this also is open to those objections against the Proposition and the Example that have been urged against the above-discussed argument ['there is no Soul, because no such thing is born, as we find in the case of the Hare's Horn']. [As the Proposition and the Example are the same in both cases]. Then as regards the Premiss, 'because no such thing is apprehended,'—this also is not right; it is not true that the Soul is not apprehended, because as a matter of fact the Soul *is* actually apprehended by means of Perception and other Instruments of Cognition. The Soul is apprehended by means of Perception.—"How so?"—The cognition of 'I,' which is independent of the remembrance of the relation of any major or minor terms, and which varies with the variations in the character of its object (Soul), must be regarded as *perceptional*, just like the Cognition of Colour and such things. In the case of a Cognition in regard to which you yourself are in no doubt as to its being 'perceptional,' when you are called upon to explain why it is 'perceptional,' the only explanation that you can

* Both editions read यस्य शशो न कार्यं तस्य शशस्य न कारणम् ; which means that that of which the Hare is not the effect, is not the cause of the Hare. But we have adopted the reading यस्य शशो न कार्यं यस्य च शशो न कारणम्.

give is that it is a Cognition *independent of the remembrance of the relation of any major and minor terms* and which apprehends its own object. You will perhaps argue that—"though the said Cognition of 'I' is there, its object is not the Soul." O! if that is so, then please point out what is the object of that Cognition. "Colour and such things are the *objects* of that Cognition." If you mean by this that—"Colour and such things are the objects of the cognition of 'I' in accordance with the declaration that things are called *Āṭman* (Soul) because they are the originators (*lit.* the cause of the origination) of the Cognition* of 'I,' "—this can not be accepted; as it is not true, and also because it has been denied (by your own teacher); as a matter of fact, it has been denied by your teacher that the notion of 'I' pertains to Colour &c, in the passage—'O Bhikṣu, neither I nor you are this Colour.' Hence it follows that Colour &c., can not form the objects of the notion of 'I.' Nor have we ever found the notion of 'I' appearing in regard to Colour and such things; there never is any such notion as 'I am Colour,' 'I am Sensation,' and so forth. "But there *are* such notions as 'I am fair,' 'I am dark' [where the notion of 'I' appears in regard to the Body]." There are no such conceptions, we reply. "What do you mean?" What we mean is that when one has the conception 'I am fair,' it does not mean that the observer looks upon his *fair complexion* as his 'Soul'; in fact the statement '*Aham gauraḥ*', 'I am fair,' denotes *possession* [standing for '*Aham gaurarūpavān*' or '*Mama rupam gauram,*' the possessive ending being dropped.* "But how do you know that it is as you say,

* The *Ṭāṭparya* explains the term '*Ālambana*' as *Ālambyaṭē anēna;* hence equivalent to *jñāna*, 'Cognition.'

† The *Ṭāṭparya* notes that the *Bhāṣya*, in its introductory remarks to Adhyāya III, has spoken of the conception 'I am fair,' in the sense that *fairness* is attributed to the *Soul*; and the present denial of the conception by the *Vārṭika* would appear to be contrary to the *Bhāṣya*. But the fact of the matter is that the *Bhāṣya* has not cited the conception as a right one, or as proving the difference of the Soul

and that the conception ('I am fair') is not true in its literal sense?" What your question means is—"what are the grounds for regarding the conception as signifying possession, and as also having dropped the possessive ending?" We have a ground for so regarding it in the fact that the conception represents the 'I' co-extensive with the 'my'; that is to say, in the conception 'I am fair,' the term 'I' is found to be used in reference to that (Body) which is also regarded as 'my' [*i. e.*, we speak of the 'Body' as 'mine'; and the conception 'I am fair,' applies the term 'I' to the 'Body']; and from this co-extensiveness of 'I' with 'my,' it follows that the term 'I' has dropped the possessive ending [and really stands for 'my'; so that the expression 'I am fair' is equivalent to 'my body is fair.'] "But in actually usage we have found the term 'I' used as co-extensive with 'my,' even though the two refer to really different things,—where one is a great benefactor of the other; that is to say, when one person is a great benefactor of another (and as such fit to be spoken of as '*my* benefactor,' 'he is *my* friend'), we find the latter using the expression 'he is what I am,' where 'I' is co-extensive with ['he' who should be spoken of as] 'my.'" Our answer to this is that we have already explained that the

Vār. P. 345.

from the Body. The applying of the term 'I' can be explained either as in the possessive sense, or in a figurative sense. As regards the notion of 'my Soul,' where the Soul appears as distinct from 'I,' it is explained on the analogy of the notion of 'Rāhu's head,' where the head is not-different from Rāhu. The *Parishuddhi* adds that though we have both kinds of conceptions—(*a*) 'I know' (where the 'I' appears as the *knower*), and (*b*) 'myself' (where the Self or Soul appears as different from 'I'), yet we are justified in accepting the former as true in its literal sense, and in regarding the latter as true only in a figurative or indirect sense; because in the case of the former, we never find any subsequent notion sublating it; that is, we never have any such notion as that the knower is different from the 'I'; while as regards the notion 'myself,' there is this against it that, the Self or Soul is different from the 'I,' that 'I' also may be spoken of as 'my' by another; and so on and on, there would be an endless series of 'I's'. In view of this undesirable contingency, we are justified in regarding the notion 'my-Self' as only indirectly or figuratively true.

notion of 'I' appearing in reference to the five 'states' of Colour and the rest, is a *wrong notion*, apprehending one thing as what it is not.

Thus it is established that the Soul, being the object of the notion of 'I,' is something apprehended by direct Perception itself.

How again the Soul is apprehended by means of Inference has been explained under Sūtra 1-1-10. There is Authoritative Word also (in the shape of scriptural texts declaring the Soul to be a real entity).

Thus it is found that all these three Instruments of Cognition, combining to point to the same thing, establish the existence of the Soul. And any valid source of cognition to the contrary * there is none. Hence the premiss—'because the Self is not apprehended'—is absolutely untrue.

Further, the premiss—'because the Self is not apprehended'—is *doubtful* also; because 'non-apprehension' may be due to three causes; there are three causes to which the 'non-apprehension' of a certain thing may be due; it may be due to the (absence of the) *Apprehender*, or to that of the *Apprehension*, or to that of the *Apprehended Object*; so that whenever there is 'non-apprehension' of a certain thing (of the Soul, for instance), it is always doubtful to whose absence it is due. If you say that it is due to the absence of the *Object* (Soul), then your premiss turns out to be the same as your Proposition; and † certainly the Proposition cannot

* That is to say, we do not know of any source of valid cognition providing a cognition contradicting and sublating the notion 'there is Soul'; this notion, vouched for by all three Sources of Knowledge, could be sublated only if a fourth more authoritative source of knowledge gave rise to the notion that 'there is no Soul'; inasmuch there is no such source of knowledge, the validity of the cognition 'there is Soul' remains unshaken.—*Parishuḍḍhi.*

† You seek to prove your proposition 'there is no Soul' by the premiss 'because Soul is not apprehended'; and you now say that this 'non-apprehension of the Soul is due to the *non-existence of the Soul*'; hence your premiss—'because the Soul is not apprehended' means the same as 'because the Soul does not exist'; and your reasoning thus resolves itself into the following form—'there is no Soul, because there is no Soul.'

prove itself; hence your premiss does not prove anything. Further, you are putting forward 'non-apprehension' as the Probans proving the *non-existence* of the Soul (the Subject of your syllogism); but what is the substratum of this 'non-apprehension'? If you admit that the Soul is its substratum, [as you should, in view of the fact that the Probans, to be effective, must subsist in the Subject], then you stultify yourself; holding that the 'Soul *is the substratum*' and yet that 'it does not exist'! If, on the other hand, the Soul be not the substratum of the 'non-apprehension,' then, what would be the use of your *Probans*? Certainly a Probans without a substratum can not prove anything at all. "But *non-apprehension* also does not exist [*i.e.*, it is a negative quality, and as such, need not have a positive entity for a substratum, which can be necessary only for a positive quality]." In that case (if 'non-apprehension' does not exist), what is the meaning of the premiss 'because of non-apprehension'? Certainly that which does not exist cannot be a *probans*. * "The non-apprehension (is a real entity, and) is a property subsisting in the Soul, *which is assumed*." It behoves you to explain in what form the Soul is *assumed*? Do you assume the Soul *as a nonentity*? Or *as an entity*? If you assume it *as an entity*, then 'non-apprehension' cannot belong to it; for example, when the *Post* is assumed to be the *man*, the properties of the Post are not perceived. [Hence when the *non-existent Soul* is assumed as an *existing thing*, there can be no conception of its 'non-apprehension,' which is a property only of the non-existent thing]. If, on the other hand, you hold that 'non-apprehension' is the property of the Soul which is assumed *as a non-entity*,—then it is true that you succeed in proving the 'non-apprehension' as the property (of a positive entity), ; but your theory of 'assumption' is

* Both editions read नह्यसाधनमभवितुमर्हति. But the right reading is नह्यसद् साधनम्भवितुमर्हति ।

rendered futile. "Why so?" For the simple reason that 'assumption' is always false; that is, 'assumption' always represents a thing as what it is not; hence when you say that the Soul *is assumed as non-existent*, it means that in reality it is *not non-existent*; and if the Soul is really *not non-existent*, your propounding of the 'assumption' becomes frustrated. Then again, for what purpose is the Soul *assumed to be non-existent?* If it is so assumed for the purpose of (providing a subtratum for) the Probans ('Non-apprehension'), then, it may be that the Probans, for whose purpose it was assumed, becomes provided with a substratum; but the desired conclusion is not established; for when a man assumes, in the Man, the qualities of the Post, and then puts forward those qualities as his 'Probans' (for proving the *Man* to be the *Post*), the fact of the Man being the Post is not proved thereby.* Thus it is found that 'because it is not apprehended' also is not a valid premiss.

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[The Siddhāntin puts forward an argument in proof of the existence of the Soul].—The term 'Soul' must have for its denotation something distinct from the denotations of the terms 'Colour-state' ('Name-state,' 'Sensation-state' and 'Cognition-state'),—because it is a single term, and not the same as the terms 'Colour-state' and the rest,—like such words as 'Jar' and the like. The same holds good regarding the notion of 'I.'† "In this reasoning the Instance cited is

* You *assume* the existent Soul to be *non-existent* and then put forward 'non-apprehension,' which is a property of the *non-existent* thing, to prove that the Soul is *non-existent*. This is just like the case where one assumes the man to be the Post, and then puts forward some quality of the Post to prove that the Man is the Post.—*Tātparya*.

† The *Parishuddhi* formulates this reasoning thus :—The notion of 'I' must pertain to an object distinct from Colour &c.,—because it is a notion of a character distinct from that of the notions of 'Colour' and the rest,—like the notion of the 'Jar' and such other things.

not true." * We have already answered this argument by pointing out that the thing possessed of the quality must be something different from the quality itself. [So that the Jar, which is possessed of the quality of 'Colour,' cannot be the same as 'Colour']. "But your premiss is vitiated in view of such terms as 'Darkness' and the like." You mean by this as follows—"The term 'darkness' is a single word, and also not the same as the terms 'Colour-state' and the rest, and yet it does not denote anything; and the same may be the case with the term 'Soul';"—this however is not right; as it involves a self-contradiction on your part: When you say that the term 'Darkness' does not denote anything, you contradict your own doctrine, under which 'Darkness' is the 'container' or '190mpriser' (of Colour, Taste, Odour and Touch).† So far as we are concerned, we do not accept the view that the term 'Darkness' does not denote anything [so that this cannot vitiate our premiss]. "If you regard the term 'Darkness' as denoting a certain thing, then you contradict the (*Vaishēṣika*) Sūṭra, which declares that 'Darkness' is mere *negation of light*, because it is entirely dissimilar in its nature to Substance, Quality and Action' (Vai. Sū. 5-2-19)." ‡ There is no force in this objection, we reply; as you have not grasped the meaning of the Sūṭra quoted; what the Sūṭra means is that

* That is to say, according to us, Bauḍḍhas, the 'Jar' is not anything distinct from Colour &c.' all objects being only manifestations of the 'State' of 'Colour,' 'Sensation' &c. Hence if the case of the term 'Soul' is analogous to that of the term 'Jar,' the Soul cannot be something different from the said 'States' of Colour &c.

† The reading is उपादाय, as found in both editions and also in the *Ṭāṭparya*; but the latter points out that उपादाय stands for उपादेय. See in this connection, above Text, P. 341, where also a reference is made to the same Bauḍḍha doctrine.

‡ The Opponent urges this objection under the impression that, when the *Siḍḍhānṭin* asserts that the term 'Darkness' denotes a certain thing, he means that the term denotes a *positive entity*; and this certainly would be contrary to the Sūṭra quoted, according to which Darkness is only a negative entity, mere negation of light; *i.e.*, negation of all connection with such light as is endowed with manifested Colour.

'what are denoted by the word Darkness are such Substance, Quality and Action as are devoid of all connection with light.'* Thus there is nothing in our theory that goes against the Sūṭra.

Others again, having stated the Proposition in the form—'the living body is not with Soul'—put forward, in support of it, such premisses as 'because it exists' and the like. This also is not right; because none of the alternatives possible under this is admissible. For instance, what is the meant by the Living Body being 'not with Soul'? (*a*) If it means that the Body does not serve any useful purpose for the Soul, then there can be no corroborative instance (such as would be accepted by both parties); as (according to us) there is nothing that does not serve a useful purpose for a Soul. (*b*) If again, the meaning is simply the denial of the Soul, the meaning of the Proposition being that 'the Soul is not the Body,' then our answer is—who is there that regards the Body as the Soul? [*i.e.* We also do not hold the Body to be the Soul; so that the denial is futile]. Then again, the negative preposition '*nis*' [*not* in the term '*Nirāṭmakam*,' 'not with Soul'] signifies the negation of what follows it [*i.e.*, 'not with Soul' means the negation of something *with Soul*]; so that it behoves you to explain what is that which is 'with Soul'; for in no case do we find the negative preposition '*nis*' prefixed to a term denoting a non-entity; for instance, in the term *Nirmashakam*' [the preposition '*nis*' is prefixed to the term '*Mashaka*,' which denotes a *positive* entity, the *mosquito*].

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* Hence there is nothing in the Sūṭra to justify the view that the term 'Darkness' denotes nothing.

The *Ṭāṭparya* remarks—It would have been a much simpler answer to the Opponent's objection to point out—(1) that even as denoting a negative entity, the term 'Darkness' cannot be said to denote nothing, and (2) that when we say that the term denotes a certain thing, we do not necessarily mean that it denotes a *positive entity*. But the *Vārṭika* has met the Opponent or his own ground, thereby shaking his vanity.

(c) If again the statement 'the Body is not with Soul' is meant to deny the Soul *in the Body*, then the reasoning proves what is already admitted by all; for who is there who holds that the Soul subsists *in the Body*? (*d*) If then, the statement means that 'the Body has no connection with Soul', then, there can be no corroborative instance; [as, according to us, there is nothing that is not connected in some way or other, with the Soul]. Lastly, all the aforesaid four cases would mean the denial of a particular character in regard to the Soul; and this would imply the admission of the Soul itself, in a general way; so that what was sought to be denied becomes admitted!

[Another argument put forward by the Atheist is]—"'The term 'Soul' denotes something transient,— because it is composed of letters." * But, in the first place, in view of the term 'eternal' (which is composed of letters and yet denotes something *not transient*), the premiss of the above reasoning is found to be untrue; and secondly [the term 'Soul' in your reasoning, can stand either for the Body &c., or for something other than Body &c.]. If the term 'Soul' stands for the Body &c., then your argument becomes superfluous [as it proves only that *the Body &c., are transient*, which, as admitted by all parties, does not require any proof]; and if the term 'Soul' stands for something other than the Body &c., and your Proposition declares it as denoting something transient, then the existence of something other than the Body &c., becomes admitted; and this goes against your doctrine [by which there is no entity apart from the Body &c.]

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* The argument is thus stated in the *Ṭāṭparya*—"Every word composed of letters denotes something transient; as we find in the case of such words as 'Jar' and the like'; and if the Soul is something transient, it must be a mere *Idea*; so that the argument proves that the word 'Soul' stands for *Idea*, and not for any lasting entity. This therefore comes to be a denial of the Logician's 'Soul.'

Thus it is found that the more we examine the doctrine of there being no such thing as Soul, the more incapable we find it of bearing the force of reasoning.

[One of the main arguments in support of the existence of the Soul is the one put forward in *Sāṅkhyakārikā*, that, inasmuch as all composite objects are found to be for the sake of something other than itself, and as the Body is a composite object, the Body must be for the sake of something other than itself; and this something is the Soul: Against this the Opponent raises an objection].—"Inasmuch as the Eye and the other organs are composite objects, they must be for the sake of something other than themselves; as we find in the case of such composite things as the *Bedding*, the *Seat*, and the like: but even so the said organs also must exist for the sake of some other *composite* object [and not for any such non-composite and immaterial substance as the 'Soul']." If you mean by this that—"it is true that composite things exist for the sake something other than themselves; but it is only some other composite thing for whose sake composite things are found to exist; as we find in the case of such composite things as the Bedding, the Seat &c. [which exist only for the sake of the Body that uses them, and the Body is only another composite substance]," —our answer is that the very admission of the 'Composite' (as distinct from the *component*, Colour &c.) involves a self-contradiction on your part: You (Bauḍḍhas) do not admit of any 'composite' apart from the 'states' of Colour and the rest; and unless some 'other composite' is admitted, it cannot be asserted that 'composites exist for the sake of other composites'; while if such a 'composite' is admitted, it goes against your doctrine. "All that we mean by putting forward the reasoning is to point out an undesirable element (invalidating factor) in the argument of our Opponent (who tries to prove the existence of the Soul by the premiss that 'Composites exist for the sake of

others ')." If you mean by this that—" We do not admit of another 'Composite'; all that we mean to point out is that the premiss of our Opponent is open to the objection that one Composite is never found apart from another Composite; and in fact whenever a thing is found to exist for the sake of something else, this something else is always a composite substance,"—our answer in that case is
Vār. P. 348. that this is not true,—(*a*) because it involves self-stultification, and (*b*) because what has been urged is not admitted. That is to say, in the first place, (*b*) according to the philosopher who holds the Soul to be something distinct (from the Body &c.), no composite substance serves the purposes of another Composite Substance, [*e.g.*, the Bedding serves the purpose, *not* of the *Body*, which is a composite substance, but of the Self ensouling that Body]; and the pointing of an invalidating factor can be effective only when what is pointed out is accepted by both parties;—and secondly, (*a*) what has been urged implies self-stultification also: that is to say, when a reasoning is put forward in words intended to convey a certain sense, if it were really invalidated by imposing upon it a sense entirely at variance with what the words were originally meant to convey, then, such a process would put an end to (and invalidate) all Inferential Reasoning. "Why so?" Because in this way, even that inferential reasoning which is accepted (by the Bauḍḍha) would become invalid; *e.g.*, even the premiss 'because it is a product,' urged in proof of the proposition that 'Sound is non-eternal,' would become invalidated. "How? 'Being a product,' being invariably concomitant with 'non-eternality,' *proves non-eternality*; and it also proves the character of 'being something devoid of pain'; and just as it proves this character of 'being something devoid of pain,' it also proves the character of 'being not apprehended by the auditory organ'; so that (by imposing all this import upon the premiss 'because it is a product'),

one might put forward the reasoning 'Sound is not apprehended by the auditory organ, because it is a product, like the Jar &c.', [and this will be regarded as really shaking the validity of the original valid inference 'Sound is non-eternal, because it is a product like the Jar &c.'] ! * "But in the last reasoning put forward, ['Sound is not apprehended by the auditory organ &c. &c.,'] the Proposition itself is opposed to a fact of Perception ; † so that no premiss put forward in support of that Proposition can ever be valid [and as such reasonings cannot invalidate any inferential reasonings, the method adopted by us can not put an end to the entire inferential process]." Well, in that case, the proposition that 'the Eye &c., are for the sake of other *composite* things,' (put forward by the Bauḍḍha) is opposed to Inference and Scripture;—and further, when you postulate the 'other composite' (for whose sake the Eye &c., according to you, exist), that also remains a *Composite*; so that that also should exist for the sake of another (third) 'Composite' thing; and so on and on, there would be an unending series (of 'Composites'). And as no one can justify the assumption of such an infinite series of 'Composites' (and it is necessary to postulate a point where the series comes to an end), that point where the series comes to an end would

* When the Logician makes the statement 'the Eye &c. are for the sake of others,' all that he means to prove is that the 'Composite' consisting of the Body, the Organs, Sensation and Cognition is for the sake of something distinct from these; and *not* that they are for the sake of another Composite. So that when he puts forward his premiss, it must be taken in the sense in which he intends to take it; and there is no doubt that when taken in that sense the premiss does prove the proposition it is meant to prove. If however, his opponent imparts to the premiss a meaning not intended by the propounder himself, and then finds in it elements of invalidity,—and this were taken as really invalidating the original premiss, then all influential reasoning would come to an end, as by imposing upon the premiss a meaning that is not intended, any number of invalidating factors may be found in every reasoning.

† The text uses the term '*Anumāna*'; but what is meant is a fact of Perception;—that Sound is perceived by the auditory organ is a fact of perception, and this is contradicted by the Proposition that 'Sound is *not* apprehended by the auditory organ.'

be a 'non-composite' thing. It follows from this that if there is no 'non-composite' thing, then in the absence of the 'non-composite' thing, it is not possible to account for the existence of the 'Composite'; [as, in the manner shown above, the postulating of the 'Composite,' without a 'non-composite' involves the assumption of an infinite series of 'Composites']; so that the denial of the 'non-composite' involves a self-stultification on your part; as without admitting a 'non-composite,' it is not possible to admit the 'Composite.'

If the Opponent should take up the position that he does not admit of Inference [if every instance of it is liable to rejection in the manner shown above],—he should be asked why he does not admit of Inference. If he says that "there can be no Inference, because every Inference is found to be sublated by Inference,"— he puts himself beyond the pale of reason, and is also himself confronted by an Inference.* Then again, if there is no Inference, how is there a Cognition of things beyond the reach of the senses?

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That is, if there is no Inference, by what means is a supersensuous thing to be cognised? It will not be right to assert that "Supersensuous things are cognised by means of Scriptures;" because there are many such things as are not dealt with by Scriptures. "How so?" There are several things which form the subject of Inference, and which are not dealt with by Scriptures; for instance, we *infer* the cause of the rumbling of clouds; and there is neither Perception nor Scripture bearing upon (affording any idea of) such cause.

It has been proved that there is such a thing as Soul. Now, in regard to this Soul, *there arises a Doubt from the fact that Designation is found to be of both kinds* (*Bhāṣya*, p. 127, ll. 4-5). "What is this *Designation*?" *By*

* Inference—either of Composites, or of the existence of Prāṇa &c., says the *Tātparya*.

'*Designation*' *here is meant the expressing of the relationship of the Agent with the Action and with the Instrument of that Action*—says the *Bhāṣya*. The 'action' is of *Seeing*, the 'instrument' is the *Eye*; and relationship of these—action and instrument—is designated by the expression 'he sees with the Eye.' Such designation is of two kinds:—(A 1) *In one we have the Composite whole designated by its component parts*; *e.g*, '*the tree stands by the roots*'; the term 'Composite whole' stands for the *Tree*; which is made up of several component parts;—(A 2) in some cases we have the designation, by one part, of other parts; that is, in the case of a thing which is composed of several heterogeneous component parts, the perception of one part leads to the cognition of the other parts, we have such designation as 'the house stands by its pillars.' *—(B) We have designation also of *one thing by something totally different from it*; *e.g.*, 'he cuts with the axe'; where the *Axe* is the 'instrument,' *cutting* is the 'action'; and the relationship of these with the Agent is expressed by the words 'he cuts with the axe.'—Now, we have such a designation as 'he sees with the eye'; and in connection with this there arises the doubt as to whether it is the designation of one thing by something totally different from it (B), or of the composite whole by its component parts (A 1), or of one part by other parts (A 2). Or, the 'designation' meant may be that of the relationship of the Agent with the 'action,' the 'instrument' and the 'objective'; as we find in the expression 'he sees the tree with the Eye';—and such designation also we have (in regard to the Soul)—'he experiences pleasure and pain with the body.' And in regard to all such designations also there arises a doubt as to what is the truth. The truth is

* To the examples cited in the Bhāṣya this has been added with a view to include the case of the designation 'the house stands by its pillars,' where the house is not a 'composite whole,' in the true sense of being composed of homogeneous parts; composed, as it is, of heterogeneous pillars; and heterogeneous things cannot constitute any single composite whole.

that *in these expressions we have the designation of one thing* (*the Agent*) *by something different from it*—says the *Bhāṣya*.

"Why so?"

[The answer is given in the next Sūṭra].—

Sūṭra (1).

BECAUSE THE SAME THING IS APPREHENDED BY SIGHT AND BY TOUCH.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (1).

[P. 128, L. 2 to L. 11].

[As a matter of fact, we find that it often happens that] one thing having been apprehended by Sight, that same thing is apprehended by Touch also; [the idea in the mind of the perceiver being] 'that thing which I saw with my eyes I now touch with the organ of touch,' or 'that which I touched with the organ of touch I now see with my eyes'; which means that this latter idea recognises, or recalls, the two perceptions as apprehending one and the same object and having (belonging to) one and the same Agent;—and this one agent cannot be either the *Composite* or *Aggregate* [composed of the Body and the Sense-organs] or the *Sense-organ*.* Hence that Agent,—who is the apprehender (perceiver) of the said one thing by Sight and by Touch, and who (in the manner shown above) recognises the two perceptions as apprehending the same object, as having an Agent and as brought about by different Instruments,—is something† entirely different (from the Composite or the Sense-organ); and this is the *Soul*.

"Why cannot the two perceptions be regarded as having their 'one Agent' in the shape of the *Sense-organ*?"

A Sense-organ can recognise or recall only that apprehension which has been brought about by itself, and not the apprehension of another thing, brought about by another Sense-organ.

* 'Because the Agent must be different from the Instrument'—says the *Bhāṣya-chandra*. That is to say, the Sense-organ, being the Instrument in the perception, cannot be the Agent of that perception; nor can the Composite or Aggregate be the Agent; as the Sense-organ, which is the Instrument, forms a component of that Composite, and the Instrument must be quite different from the Agent.

† 'Something,' '*bhūṭa*,' here stands for a *real thing*, something vouched for by Valid means of cognition.—*Bhāṣyachandra*.

"Why cannot the two perceptions be regarded as having their 'one agent' in the *Composite* or *Aggregate*?"

As a matter of fact, the Agent must be one who remains the same, while cognising (recalling) two such perceptions as have been brought about by two different Instruments (*i.e.*, Sense-organs), and belong to (*i.e.*, have been accomplished by the Agency of) that same Agent himself; and certainly the *Aggregate* cannot be such an Agent.

"Why?"

Because what we urged above in connection with Sense-organs—that 'one sense-organ cannot recall the apprehension brought about by another Sense-organ'—does not cease to apply, with equal force, to the case of the *Aggregate* also.*

Vārṭika on Sū. (1).

[P. 350, L. 2 to P. 351, L. 18].

Because the same thing is apprehended by Sight and Touch [we conclude that in the expressions referred to we have the designation of one thing by something different from it].

The term '*ḍarshana*' (Sight) in the Sūṭra stands for that *by means of which one sees, i.e.*, the organ of Sight, the Eye; similarly '*Sparshana*,' 'Touch,' stands for that *by means of which one touches, i.e.*, the organ of Touch. Having perceived a thing by Sight, one recognises when he perceives it again by Touch; the the recognition being in the form 'I am *touching* what I had *seen*,' or 'I am *seeing* what I had touched,'—here we find that two perceptions of the same thing are *recalled*; a thing is said to be 'recalled' or 'recognised' when it is found to be *perceived* and *remembered* at the same time.†

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An objection is raised:—"Sight and Touch bear upon such things as the Jar and the like; hence the reason set

* The 'Composite' is only a name given to several things combined together; and what is 'several' cannot be *one*.—*Bhāṣyachanḍra*.

† In the case in question having *seen* the thing previously, when one comes to touch it subsequently, and at the same time remembers it as having been *seen* on a previous occasion, he has the 'recognition' of the thing.

forth is irrelevant." If you mean by this that—"the perceptions of sight and touch pertain to (have for their objects) such things as Jar and the like,—and hence they can not prove the fact of the Soul being different (from the Composite of Body &c.), for the simple reason that what is brought forward as the reason does not subsist in (has no connection with) it (the Soul),"—then our answer is that what you say is not right, as you have not understood the meaning of our *Sūṭra*: What the Sūṭra means to put forward is the fact of the perceptions of Sight and Touch having the same Agent (and not of their having the same *Object*); and such being the case, there need be nothing wrong if the said perceptions are regarded as proving the difference (of the Soul) from its qualities,—this following as a necessary corollary [from the fact of the Self being the Agent (in the shape of *Body* &c.,) of both perceptions]. But it is not true that the thing is different from its qualities." We have already shown that the object endowed with qualities is something different from the qualities themselves.

[Another objection is raised against the original argument]—"The *recalling* or *recognition*, may be regarded as due to the relation of cause and effect [*i.e.*, the Composite of Body &c., that does the *touching*, comes after, and is the product of, the Composite that has done the previous *seeing*; and it is for this reason that the two perceptions are recognised as belonging to the same agent]."

This has already been answered by us under Sū. 1-1-10 [where it has been pointed out that there is no such *recognition* of two things as being the *same*, in cases where the causal relation between the two is quite clear; *e.g.*, we never have such *recognition* as 'the cloth is the same as the yarns']. Further, as a matter of fact, we do have *recognition* in cases where there is no sort of causal relation at all; and hence your premiss is not true.

Or again, the Sūṭra may be taken as putting forward the fact that every *act* requires an *actor*; the sense being that 'sight,' the *act of seeing*, and 'touch,' the *act of touching*, being perceptions of the nature of *actions*, indicate the existence of the Actor (the Perceiver); for we never see an act without one in which it subsists. "But the *object* (seen and touched) might be the required substratum of the acts; just as we find in the case of the action of *being born* (which subsists in the *thing born*, and not in that which gives it birth)." This however is not right; for we find certain *acts* even in the absence of their *objects*; *e.g.*, there is the *act of remembering*, where the *object* (remembered) is non-existent; and certainly what has ceased to exist cannot be the substratum of an act. Hence we conclude that that which forms the substratum of the acts (of *seeing* and *touching*) is the *Soul*.

Vār. P. 351.

[Another objection to the *Sūṭra*]—"As a matter of fact, the perceptions of sight and touch have for their objects *Colour* and such other qualities, and not the Jar and such things [so that it is not correct to say even that they have the same *object*, and all the less so to say that they have the same *Agent*]."

This is not right, we reply. Because in actual experience we find that, even though there is no perception (by Sight or Touch) of any such qualities as Colour and the rest, there *is* perception of things possessed of those qualities; for instance, when one perceives a thing without perceiving its qualities, he has the perception of the thing possessing those qualities,*—*e.g.*, when a piece of rock-crystal is placed over the blue colour, even though there is no perception of the blue colour, [as the reflection of the colour in the crystal does not fall in the line of vision], there *is* perception of the crystal itself; and similarly when a line of cranes flies along in the

* Read तद्विशिष्टप्रत्ययः for तद्धिशिष्टप्रत्ययः

sky at night, even though their white colour and such other qualities are not perceived, yet there does arise the perception of their being 'birds.' Similarly then, we can have the perception of the Jar without the perception of its Colour &c. And because there is 'recognition' (of the thing as being the *same*, though the perceptions are different, in a case where the Jar, on the former occasion, was *seen*, and on the latter occasion, is *touched*), it follows that the *Agent* must be different (from the perceptions, the thing perceived &c.); but there can be no doubt that the *object* of the two perceptions is one and the same; for there could be no such 'recognition' if the objects of the perceptions were different;—as a matter of fact, we do have such 'recognitions' as, 'I am now touching what I had seen,' or 'I am seeing now what I had touched'; hence we conclude that the two perceptions have one and the same object.

It will not be right for the Opponent to argue that—"the two perceptions of Sight and Touch have the Composite (of Body &c.) for their Agent [so that even though it may be admitted that the perceptions have the same Agent, it does not follow that this Agent is something different from the Body &c.]". Because there is nothing to contravene the notion that the Composite is *diverse* (and not *one*); the 'Composite' is made up of 'Components,' and the 'Components' are certainly *diverse*; and it cannot be right to regard what is itself *diverse* as the cause or basis of 'Recognition' (which must be based on *unity*); for the simple reason that in actual experience we never find any 'recognition' in connection with such cognitions as have more than one *Agent* or more than one *object*. "But the two cognitions may be regarded as proceeding from one Sense-organ (which would account for the said recognition." If you mean by this that—"the Sense-organ which is the instrument of the perception of Touch is the same as that

which is the instrument of the perception of Sight"—then our answer is that this is not right; as one cannot be the object of the other; that is, the Organ of Sight can 'recognise' only what is perceptible by itself; the recognition that could be brought about by the Eye could only be in the form 'this thing is the same as what I had *seen*'; and it cannot bring about any recognition in regard to Touch, as Touch is perceptible by an entirely different organ (and not by the Eye). [So that any single Sense-organ could not bring about any such recognition as 'I am seeing now what I had touched']. If such recognition (by a single Sense-organ) were possible, then there would be no need for any other Sense-organ (save that one); that is to say, if any single Sense-organ were capable of recognising several objects, then there would be no need for the creating of several Sense-organs (for the perceiving of the several objects; the single Sense-organ being capable of providing the perception of all)! *

Sūṭra (2).

[Says the Opponent]—"WHAT HAS BEEN PUT FORWARD IN THE PRECEDING SŪṬRA IS NOT RIGHT; FOR THERE IS RESTRICTION AS TO OBJECTS." † (Sū. 2).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (2).

[P, 129, L. 2 to L. 11].

"The intelligent perceiver need not be something different from the Composite of body &c.—'Why?'—*Because* "*there is restriction as to objects.* That is, the Sense-organs

* According to the *Ṭāṭparya* and the *Parishuḍḍhi*, the portion of *Vārṭika*, p. 352, l. 16 to p. 353 l. 8 printed in both editions at the end of Sū. (3), should come here.

† 'Sū. (1) has put forward the fact of 'Recognition' as proving the conclusion that the perceiver is the Soul, something different from the Body and the Sense-organs &c. In this Sūṭra, the Opponent, while admitting the fact of Recognition, demurs to the conclusion; the sense being that, Recognition does not necessarily prove the existence of something different from the Sense-organs; for even if such a Soul were

"are restricted in their scope of things (perceived by their "instrumentality); *e.g.,* Colour is not perceived without "Visual Organ, while it is perceived when the Visual Organ "is there; and when between two things it is found that one "appears while the other exists, and does not appear when "the other does not exist—it follows that one is of (belongs "to) the other *; hence the perception of Colour must be "regarded as belonging to the Visual Organ; that is, *it is the* "*Visual Organ that perceives the Colour.* Similarly in the case "of the Olfactory and other organs. Thus then, inasmuch "as it is the Sense-organs that perceive their respective "objects, these (and not anything else) should be regarded "as the *Intelligent Perceiver*; for the simple reason that the "presence and absence of the perception of objects is found "to be in strict accordance with the presence and absence of "the Sense-organs. Such being the case, what is the use of "postulating a distinct Intelligent Being (in the shape of "Soul')?"

† The answer to the above is that the premiss put forward being doubtful, the reasoning becomes fallacious. What has been put forward is the fact of the presence and absence of perceptions being in accordance with the presence and absence of the Sense-organs; but it is open to doubt whether this fact is due to the Sense-organs being the intelligent perceivers, or to their being mere instruments belonging to another Intelligent Perceiver, and thus being the causes of the said Perceptions; the said fact can certainly be accounted for

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there, it would not be omniscient, it could perceive only a few things, not all; and as such it would be limited in its scope in the same manner as the Sense-organs are. What advantage then can be gained by postulating a distinct entity in the shape of 'Soul,'—*Parishuḍḍhi.*

This is somewhat different from the explanation in the *Bhāṣya.*

* So that in the case in question when it is found that perception appears while the Sense-organs exists, and does not appear that while the organs does not exists,—it follows that the Perception belongs to the Sense-organ; *i.e.,* the Sense-organ is the *perceiver.—Ṭatparya.*

† The *Parishuḍḍhi* remarks that this answer is of the *Pūrvapakṣa* argument presented in the *Bhāṣya*; the answer to the argument in Sū. 2 is given in Sū. 3. The *Bhāṣyachanḍra* says that this is the Bhāṣyakāra's own answer to the Pūrvapakṣa argument.

also as being due to the Sense-organs being *causes* of Perceptions, even though only as *Instruments* belonging to an Intelligent perceiver.*

Vārṭika on Sū. (2).

[P. 352, 2 to L. 10].

It is not right, as there is restriction as to objects, says the " Sūṭra. That is to say, it is the Sense-organs that should be " regarded as intelligent (agents), *because there is restriction* " *as to objects*; the meaning of this last clause being—be- " cause the connection between *objects* and *instruments* is " restricted; as we find that there is perception of *Colour* (the " object) when the *Visual Organ* (the Instrument) is present, " and there is no perception of Colour when that organ is " not present; and *when between two things it is found that one* " *appears while the other exists and does not appear while the* " *other does not exist, it follows that one is of (belongs to) the* " *other* (Bhāṣya); so that when we find that the perception " of Colour appears only when the Visual Organ exists, we " conclude that the perception belongs to this organ. Simi- " larly in the case of other Sense-organs. Such being the " case, what is the use of positting an intelligent agent, " distinct from these organs?"

[The answer to this argument, given by the *Bhāṣya* is as follows]—This cannot be accepted; as the premiss put forward being doubtful, the reasoning *becomes fallacious*; the doubt being as to whether the said ' restriction *as to objects*' is due to the Sense-organs being the intelligent agents, or to the fact of these organs being instruments belonging to some intelligent agent. The said 'restriction' is possible also on the basis of the postulate that the Sense-organs are

* All that the fact of the presence and absence of one thing being in accordance with the presence and absence of another thing, proves is that the latter is the *cause* of the former; and it cannot prove any such conclusion as that the latter is the *intelligent agent* of the former, or that there can be no other intelligent agent.—*Bhāṣyachandra.*

only instruments belonging to some intelligent Agent; as we find in the case of the Lamp, that (at night) there is perception of Colour when the Lamp is present, and not when it is not present, and yet the perception of Colour does not belong to the Lamp [simply because the Lamp is not itself intelligent, but only the instrument in the hands of some intelligent Agent].

Bhāṣya on Sū. (3).

[P. 129, L. 11 to P. 130, L. 7].

As regards the argument urged (in Sū. 2)—" because there is restriction as to objects"—the answer is—

Sūṭra (3).

IT IS BECAUSE THERE IS RESTRICTION AS TO OBJECTS THAT THERE MUST BE A SOUL; HENCE THIS CANNOT BE DENIED.* (Sū. 3).

If there were no 'restriction' in regard to the objects perceived by any single Sense-organ [and that alone were to perceive all objects], this would mean that that Sense-organ apprehending all objects is the omnisicent and intelligent Perceiver; and (under the circumstances) who could ever infer the existence of any intelligence apart from the said organ? So that, it is because there is restriction as to objects apprehended by the several Sense-organs that we are led to infer the existence of an intelligent Agent, distinct from the Sense-organs, who is free from the said 'restriction as to objects,' and (hence) omniscient, (*i.e.*, capable of perceiving the objects perceptible by all Sense-organs). We now put forward instances representing the functioning of the Intelligent Agent, which irresistibly point to the said conclusion (that the Intelligent Agent is distinct from the Sense-organs)† :—(*a*)

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* There is restriction as to objects;—one organ brings about the perception of only a few objects, not of all;—this shows that the organs must be *non-intelligent*; this therefore renders it necessary to postulate the existence of the Soul as the intelligent agent, operating on the organs. Hence what has been urged by the Opponent in proof of the organs being intelligent agents, points to a conclusion entirely to the contrary.—*Ṭāṭparya Bhāṣyachandra.*

† The printed text reads प्रत्यभिज्ञानम्, which does not suit the context; the *Ṭāṭparya* and the *Bhāṣyachandra* both read अभिज्ञानम्. The *Ṭāṭparya* construes the two clauses तत्रेदमभिज्ञानमप्रत्याख्येयम् and चेतनवृत्तमुदाह्रियते as one sentence; this is

The Intelligent Agent, on perceiving Colour (of a certain fruit for instance) infers the Odour and Taste which he has perceived in the past; or on perceiving its Odour, he infers its Colour and Taste; and so on in regard to other objects; —(b) then again, having (at one moment) seen the Colour, he smells (at another moment) the Odour; or having smelt the Odour, he sees the Colour; all which goes to show that the Perceiver recalls (and reviews) the perception of all objects, without any fixed order of sequence; and all this perception subsists in (belongs to) one Intelligent Agent,* and not to anything else (in the shape of the Body or the Sense-organs &c.); and [and this is so not only in connection with perception through the senses, but] the same Perceiver also recalls and recognises various such cognitions as *Perceptional*, *Inferential*, *Verbal* and *Doubtful*, bearing upon several objects; *e.g.*, (1) he hears the Scriptures, which bear upon all things,—and apprehends the meaning (of the Scriptures), which is not perceptible by the Auditory Organ (by which he hears the syllables pronounced in a certain order),—(2) he reviews and recognises the syllables as forming words and sentences,—(3) and he recalls the laws bearing upon the denotation of the words;—which shows that the single Perceiver cognises a number of several objects which are not capable of being apprehended by any single Sense-organ. Now this 'absence of restriction as to the objects apprehended,' which points to a single Perceiver of all things, cannot be turned aside (to prove the intelligence of Sense-organs) † Thus it is found that the assertion— 'the Sense-organs being the intelligent Agents, what is the use of postulating a distinct intelligent Agent?'—is not right.

Bhā. P. 130.

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what we have followed in the translation. The *Bhāṣyachandra* takes the two separately; according to this, the translation would run thus: What has been just said irresistibly points to the conclusion that the Soul is something quite distinct; and we now proceed to cite an instance of the functioning of the Intelligent Agent.'

* As is shown by such well recognised notions as—"I, who had seen the Colour, now smell the Odour.'—*Bhāṣyachandra*.

† The *Bhāṣyachandra* reads व्यवस्था for अव्यवस्था and explains it as 'distinctive feature'; the passage in that case would mean that the aforesaid distinctive feature of the all-perceiving Agent cannot be attributed to the Sense-organs.

Vārṭika on Sū. (3).
[P. 352, L. 10 to P. 353, L. 8].

Further, the reason put forward—because there is restriction as to objects—proves a conclusion quite contrary to what it has been put forward to prove; and it is with a view to show this contrary conclusion that we have the Sūṭra—*It is because there is restriction as to objects that there must be a Soul, hence this cannot be denied* (Sū. 3). That is, just because the Sense-organs are restricted as to their objects, it is necessary that there be something, distinct from them, which is *not* so restricted; if there were any single Sense-organ capable of apprehending several kinds of objects, and it were not restricted as to its objects, then, who could have any justification for infering the existence of an intelligent Agent other than that organ ?

* As a matter of fact, (*a*) Intelligence must belong to the Soul,—because being independent, it is not, like the Visual and other Sense-organs, restricted as to objects;—(*b*) the Soul cannot be non-intelligent,—because if it were so, it would, like the Visual and other organs, not be independent † "These arguments cannot be right, as they are not based upon any affirmative premiss." If you mean by this that—"the reasoning does not state anything to indicate the positive concomitance (with the Probandum, *Intelligence*) of the *absence of restriction as to objects*, which has been put

* According to the *Ṭāṭparya* and the *Parishuddhi*, the whole of this paragraph should be at the end of Sū. (1). But we have retained it here, as both editions print it here, and the arguments here put forward are connected with the 'restriction of objects,' which forms the subject-matter of Sūṭras 1 and 3.

† The *Ṭāṭparya* states these arguments as follows :—(*a*) That should be regarded as intelligent which is actually found to be connected with, to permeate through, all kinds of Cognitions, Right, Doubtful, Wrong and Reminiscensial,—because it is only such an entity that is independent and unrestricted as to objects,—all that is non-intelligent is found to be *not* independent and restricted as to its objects,—as we find in the case of the Visual and other organs.(*b*) (Which is based upon *independence* only)—The Soul,—that is, the one entity found permeating through all kinds of Cognition—cannot be non-intelligent &c.

forward to prove the Soul to be the intelligent agent,—and that in the absence of: positive concomitance, it cannot be a right Probans,"—then our answer is that what you say is not right; as in the reasoning put forward what is meant to be

Vār. P. 353. the infallible or invariable indicative is the negative concomitance; that is to say, the Probans put forward is a negative, and not a positive, one; and the force (capability to prove the conclusion) of the negative Probans consists in the infallibility or invariable character of its negative concomitance (*i.e.*, the universality of the negative concomitance between *Intelligence* and *Restriction as to objects*); and this Universality of the negative relation is clear from the fact that everything that is *non-intelligent is found to be restricted as its object.* " But in that case *being Odorous* might be put forward as proving the *Eternality of Earth.*" If you mean by this that —" if even in the absence of positive concomitance, a purely negative Probans were really effective, then, why could not we have *being Odorous* as an effective probans in the proving of the *eternality of earth?* [as in this also we would have the true universal negative concomitance in the fact that everything,—Water, Air &c., that is *not odorous*, is found to be *not-eternal*]," —our answer to this is that such a probans could not be valid, as it is precluded from both; that is, *Odorousness* is precluded from (*i.e.*, not invariably concomitant with) *eternality* as well as *non-eternality* [hence it cannot prove either]; such however, is not the case with the *non-restriction as to objects* (which we have put forward as our *probans*); hence while *non-restriction* is a valid probans (in proving the *intelligent character* of the Soul), *Odorousness* is not so in the proving of *Eternality* of *Earth*).

End of Section (1).

Section (2).

[Sūṭras 4-6].

The Soul is distinct from the Body.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (4).

[P. 130, L. 7 to P. 131, L. 3].

* For the following reason also the Aggregate of Body &c., is not the Soul; the Soul is something different from these:—

Sūṭra (4).

[IF THE BODY WERE THE SOUL, THEN] THERE WOULD BE NO SIN ACCRUING FROM THE BURNING (KILLING) OF A LIVING BODY.†—(Sū. 4).

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* The *Parishuḍḍhi* introduces this section as follows:—The first *section* having established the conclusion that the Soul is something distinct from the Sense-organs, some people might urge the following argument.—"We admit that, being restricted as to their Objects, the Sense-organs cannot be regarded as *intelligent*; but the Body could very well be regarded as the intelligent Agent, because there is no such restriction in regard to the Body; as is vouched for by such notions as '*I, who am fat and fair*, am, now in my old age, touching what I had seen in my youth' [where *fatness*, *fairness*, *oldness* and *youth*, all belong to the *Body*], which shows that the Siḍḍhānṭa argument put forward in Sū. (1) is applicable to the Body."

It is with a view to meet these people that the Author proceeds with this second *section*.

† The *Bhāṣyachanḍra*, construes the Sūṭra thus—(*a*) the term *Sharīradāhē* may be taken to mean *the burner of body*; *Sharīradāh ikē*; or as *Sharīradāhe saṭi ṭaṭkarṭari*, 'on the burning of the body, to the person doing the *burning*'.

The *Parishuḍḍhi* remarks that 'burning' here stands for *destroying*, *killing*, and 'sin' for all such qualities as would be capable of producing their results in the future; the sense of the argument being that if the Body is the Soul, then there can be no such things as *Virtue* and *Vice*, qualities which are believed to subsist in the Soul, only with a view to account for the experiences of our present life, which are believed to be the results of the Virtue and Vice accummulated by us during our previous existences; if the Body were the Soul, it must perish at death; hence it can have no such qualities attaching to it as would continue in future lives, when the time for the retribution of those qualities would come; and thus the theory that the Body is the Soul would do away with all notions of Virtue and Vice.

The *Ṭāṭparya* adds that this argument can have no force against the thorough-going Materialist, who admits of no Virtue and Vice; but it will be effective against the Bauḍḍhas, who, while denying the Soul, do admit of Virtue and Vice.

The term 'Body' here stands for the 'living creature,' the Aggregate of Body, Sense-organs, Intellects and Sensations. When this 'Body' of a living creature is burnt by a person, there accrues to him the 'Sin' of killing a living creature; and it is this sin that is called (in the Sūṭra) '*pāṭaka*.' Such 'sin' there could not be, as there could be no connection between such 'sin' and the Agent who did the act,* and what the 'Sin' would be connected with [*i.e.*, to whom its results would accrue] would not be the Agent who did the act. For (according to the Opponent) the Agent being nothing more than an Aggregate or Composite, a series of (momentary) Bodies, Sense-organs, Intellects and Sensations, the Composite or Aggregate that is destroyed (disappears) at one moment must be totally different from that which appears at the next; and inasmuch as you regard the 'series' as consisting of mere appearances and disappearances, you cannot get rid of the fact that (according to you) there is a difference (between the two Aggregates in the series); as the Aggregate of Body and the rest [which appears later] would be the substratum of difference [from that which has gone before]; † for (according to you) this later Aggregate is held to be quite different (from the preceding Aggregates).‡ Such being the case

That the above is the sense of the arguments propounded in the Sūṭra is clear from what follows in Sū. 5 *et. seq.* If Sū. 4 had stood alone, it would have been much simpler to explain it as—'If the Body were the Soul, then the burning of the dead body would involve a sin; but as a matter of fact it does not; hence the Body cannot be the Soul;' or as—'the body having been burnt away after death, nothing in the shape of Virtue or Vice could remain behind to lead to re-birth'.

* As the Body, which is the only Agent, has, according to the Opponent, ceased to exist the very moment that the act has been done; so that it does not exist at the time that the 'sin' manifests itself or its results. The results of sin accrue to a person after death, or at a time other than that at which the act has been done; according to the Opponent, the Body being the only Agent, and it having only a momentary existence, to whom could the sin or its results accrue? Hence the 'sin' cannot be regarded as subsisting in the Agent; this, says the *Bhāṣyachandra*, is what is meant by the phrase 'there could be no sin.'

† That which appears later being that to whom the Sin and its results would accrue, and that which has gone before being that by which the act was done.—*Bhāṣyachandra.*

‡ The *Bhāṣyachandra* reads अनन्यत्वाधिष्ठा etc., according to which the passage would mean—'Though such is your view, yet as a matter of a fact, the Aggregate to whom the results accrue is actually recognised to be the substratum of *non-difference*

(according to your view), that creature, consisting of the Aggregate of the Body &c., who does the *killing*, does not have any connection with the result of that killing, and what is connected with the result is not that by whom the killing was done.* So that, the two (the *doer* and the *experiencer of results*) being entirely different, it comes to this that one (the preceding 'Aggregate') who did the act becomes dissociated from what he did (and from its consequences), while one (the later Aggregate) who did not do the act becomes saddled with it (and its consequences). And if the said 'Creature' is one that is liable to birth and destruction [as it must be, being only an Aggregate of the Body &c], the birth of such a 'creature' could not (according to the view of the Opponent) be due to his past actions; † and

Bhā. P. 131. this would mean that there can be no point in leading the life of a 'Religious Student' for the purposes of Release (from birth and rebirth).‡

Thus then it is found that if the living creature were only an Aggregate of Body &c. there would be no sin accruing from the killing of a living body; and this certainly is most undesirable; from which it follows that the Soul must be something different from the Aggregate of Body &c.

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from the preceding Aggregate.' But by the interposing of this remark, the connection between the presentation of the Opponent's views and the contingency urged in the Sūṭra and pointed out in the next sentence of the Bhāṣya—एवं सति &c.—becomes lost.

* This, says the *Vārṭika*, is put forward, not as a proof of the Soul, but only as indicating the objectionable feature in the theory of those who deny the Soul.

† The only plausible explanation of the birth of man and the diversity of his conditions during life is that all this is due to the necessary consequence of his acts during previous lives. If the 'man' is only a 'bundle of body, organs etc.,' this explanation would lose its value; as this 'bundle' &c., is found to perish entirely at death; so that one to whom the conditions of next birth would accrue would not be that same 'bundle' which did the acts leading up to those conditions.

‡ According to the Bauḍḍha, if one wishes to be released from rebirth he should lead the pure life of the Religious Student. But if the man is nothing more than the bundle of body &c., his existence would naturally come to an end with his death; and this would be a total Release from Rebirth; as the Body &c., born subsequently will, in no case, be the same as the preceding ones. Why then should one undergo the rigorous discipline of the Religious Student?

Vārṭika on Sū. (4).

[P. 353, L. 9 to P. 357, L. 16]

For the following reason also the Soul must be something different from the Body &c.; it cannot be the mere Aggregate of these—'there would be no sin accruing from the killing of a living Body.' The term 'body' here stands for the 'living creature,' the Aggregate of Body, Sense-organs, Intellects and Sensations; when this 'Body' of a living creature is burnt by a person, there accrues to him the 'sin' of killing a living creature, and it is this sin that is called 'pāṭaka'; such 'sin' there could not be, as there could be no connection between such 'sin' and the Agent who did the act, and what the 'sin' would be connected with would not be the Agent who did the the act. (Says the *Bhāṣya*). "Why so?" Because according to the person who does not admit of the 'Soul' as something distinct, the Aggregate of Body, &c., that does the act is different from that which experiences the results of that act; and thus this theory involves the absurdity that for the person who did the act, it becomes completely lost (its results not accruing to him), while it falls upon one who had nothing to do with the act; and this would certainly be a most undesirable contingency. Hence it must be held that that one entity which is both the *doer*—(of the act) and *experiencer* (of its results) is the 'Soul'.*

This Sūṭrā is meant to point out an objection against the view of those persons who do not admit of the Soul; it is not meant to put forward a proof for the existence of the Soul.

[The Opponent says]—"[In the case of the Body being "regarded as the intelligent Agent] the conceptions of "of 'doer' (of acts) and 'experiencer' (of their results) "with regard to it can be explained as being due to the fact

* The *Ṭāṭparya* remarks that though in some cases the results of an act do accrue to a person different from one who did the act,—*e. g.* the results of the *Shrāḍḍha* rites performed by the Son accrue to the Father,—yet the common rule is that it is the doer of an act who experiences its results.

" that there is the relation of cause and effect (between the " preceding Body which did the act and the succeeding Body " which experiences the results); just as we have in the case " of Remembrance. That is to say, in the case of Remem- " brance it is found that there is a single series of conceptions " wherein one conception is the cause of the other,—and

Vār. P. 354. " in this same series we have [the perception], " the resultant impression, as also the subsequent " Remembrance [and yet the whole forms a single *Series*]; " and exactly in the same manner, there is single Series of " of 'Body and Mind' (which consists of a number of bodies " and minds in which one is the cause of the other), and in " this same Series we have the Body that does the act as " also that which experiences its results; so that both the " *doinj* and the *experiencing* belonging to the members of " the same 'Series', our theory does *not* involve the absurdity " that 'for the person who did the act it becomes completely " lost, while it falls upon him who had nothing to do with " it.' There would have been such a contingency, (a) if the " act brought its results to a 'Series' different from the " 'Series' that did the act,—or (b) if you were able to prove " that the *experiencer* is actually *the same individual* (and not " the *Series*) as the *doer*. As a matter of fact, neither of " this is found to be the case. Hence our theory cannot be " said to involve the said absurdity."

There is no force in all this; as the answer to it has already been given. We have already pointed out that the mere fact of there being a Series does not get did of the fact that the individuals constituting the Series are *different* from one another. Then as regards the assertion (of the Opponent) that *doing* and *experiencing* are not found to belong to the *same individual*, we have already proved this (in Sū. 1) by the fact that the the 'recognition' of several cognitions (by the same Agent) can be explained only on the basis of those

Cognitions actually belonging to that same Agent. "But it might be as in the case of the Paddy and its seed."—The meaning of your argument is as follows:—"In the case of the Paddy-seed it is found that when the sprout grows out of the seed, there is destruction of the original Seed, and the appearance of the sprout, the stalk and so forth, due to the favourable effects of several things (the earth, water &c.), all which leads (ultimately) to the appearance of the Seed again (in the shape of the corn growing out of the plant); in this case there is no *one* individual thing permeating through the entire Series of phenomena (from one seed to the other); and yet there is this restriction that the paddy-seed can grow only out of the sprout that grows out of the paddy-seed [and the former seed is the cause of the latter seed]; exactly in the same manner (in the case of the doing of acts and experiencing of their results) we have a 'Series' of causes and effects, and the act having been done by one member of the 'Series',—this is followed by certain modifications in the inner mind (which also forms a member of the Series),—from which follows the result of that act [so that even though there be no single entity permeating throughout this Series, yet we may have the restriction that the result belongs to a member of that same Series which also includes the *doer* of the act]." This is not right; as there is continuity of the constituent particles of the Seed. What we mean is that the analogy of the paddy-seed is not applicable to the case in question; as what happens in the case of the paddy-seed (growing into the plant) is that the constituent particles of the same Seed renounce their former composition or arrangement, and take up another composition; and in this modification of the form of composition, what happens is that the particles of earth (in which the Seed has been planted), combining with the water-particles, and heated by the internal heat, bring about a certain juice; and this juice, operating upon

and along with the constituent particles of the Seed, becomes modified into the form of the sprout &c.; so that there *is* a continuity of the particles of the Seed throughout; and it is not right to say that—"from the seed that has been *entirely destroyed* there grows out the sprout &c., and yet there is recognition &c. &c." "But the fact of the matter being that the Seed is reduced to atoms, what has been urged against your view still remains in force." Your meaning is as follows:—"Even admitting that the Seed renounces its former composition and takes up another,—what happens is that the Seed is reduced to atoms, and all that remains of it are only atoms; and certainly the atoms of one kind (of Seeds) do not differ from those of another kind; *e. g.* the atoms of the barley seed do not in any way differ from the atoms of the paddy-seed; so that even though the atoms (to which the paddy-seed has been reduced) are not possessed by any distinguishing peculiarities (that would differentiate them from the atoms of the barley-seed), yet, by reason of the fixity pertaining to their causal relations, they become the precursors of, and bring about, the sprout of paddy only (and not that of the barley); and exactly in the same manner, in the case in question also, the fixity (of the 'recognition of perceptions' belonging to the same 'Series' of Bodies) will be due to the relation of cause and effect (as holding between the present Body and the Body into which it becomes modified at the next moment."—This is what you mean; but it is not right; as what you have urged is not admitted; we do not admit that the seeds in sprouting are reduced to atoms; because as a matter of fact, seeds (when sprouting) are actually perceived by us in all forms and conditions What we find is that starting with the initial swelling of the seed (by moisture) ending up to the condition just preceding the appearance of the subsequent crop of

Vār. P. 355.

seeds (in the plant that has grown out of the former seed), there is a whole series of products of the growing seed (in such forms as the sprouting, growing of the stem, leaves &c.), and not a single one of these products is found to be in the form of atoms; for if the seed had ever been reduced to atoms, there would be some point (during the growth of the seed into the plant) at which it would be imperceptible (as atoms cannot be perceived by us). "If what you say is true, and things are never reduced to atoms (and are not built up out of atoms), them, inasmuch as at the beginning of creation the whole Universe is in the form of atoms, there would be no creation of things at all; for at the time that the Universe is in the form of atoms, there do not exist any such particular classes as the 'paddy' and the like; and as regards the bringing about of such particular classes, it will have to be admitted that they grow out of the atoms (which alone exist at the beginning of Creation); and just as at the time of Creation, so on all future occasions also, it must be the atoms to which the sprouting seed has been reduced (out of which the next crop of seeds grows).'"* This argument has no force; as it is answered by what we have already said: the answer to this also is that as a matter of fact, there is perception of the growing seed in all forms and conditions through which it passes. At the beginning of Creation what bring about the particular classes or kinds of things like the paddy-seed &c. is a particular Unseen Force; this Unseen Force (in the shape of the Destiny of the beings going to be born) brings about the paddy and other things for the benefit of the beings; through this Unseen Force, God brings about the combination of the Atoms in such a manner that various kinds of compounds, in the shape of the paddy etc, come into existence. This same explanation applies also to such (compound)

* This argument of the Opponent is based upon the misconception that what the Siddhantin has urged is that things can never grow out of atoms.

objects as the Jar &c. What we lay stress upon is that (later on) seeds (in growing) are *not* destroyed and reduced to atoms; and one reason for this is that we actually see the seed (growing into the plant) in all forms and conditions (through which it passes). "But it is impossible that modification should set in at an intervening stage."* If you mean by this that—"whenever substances, that are found in the form of constituent causes or finished products, undergo a modification, this modification cannot set in them at an intervening stage, for the simple reason that the heat that brings about the modification, cannot get at the entire substance at that stage [only the points at the upper surface coming into contact with heat, which therefore, could have Var. P. 356. no effect upon the inner particles],"—our answer is that this is not right; as there is nothing to prevent (the entering of the heat-particles into the innermost parts of substances). What you have urged would have affected our position if the compound substance (the finished product, as distinguished from the component atoms in their uncombined state) had obstructed the entering of heat-particles; as a matter of fact it does not obstruct it; so that, not being obstructed, the heat can enter the innermost parts of the substance [and bring about its modification, without reducing it to atoms]. "But there is nothing to show that compound substances are not obstructions." It is not true that there is nothing to show this; we actually perceive such to be the case in the percolating Jar: when we see the entire Jar with water percolating through its pores, we find that the Jar does not offer any obstruction to the fluidity (of the water), and this fluidity, brings about the flow of water, without obstruction; this a fact that we actually see with our eyes. If the entering (of the Fluidity) into the

*This objection comes from the philosopher who holds that when a thing undergoes modification, the modification sets in in the atoms themselves, and these modified atoms then combine and bring about the modified product.

component parts of the Jar were to bring about the destruction (disruption of the component atoms) of the Jar, then it would not be possible for us to see the percolating Jar (which, *ex-hypothesi*, would have been destroyed); and the percolating jar having been destroyed, all the water contained therein would cease to be held by it.* Further, if compound substances were destroyed, the perception of things obstructed and unobstructed would be simultaneous; that is to say, if one thing (Heat or Fluidity) entering into another thing were to destroy the latter, then at the time when the rays of light emanating from the Eye enter into the rock-crystal, or such transparent objects, (through which objects on the other side of the crystal are seen), that transparent object should be destroyed, and (this intervening object having disappeared) the thing on the other side of (obstructed by) the crystal should be perceived at the same moment as the thing on this side of (not obstructed by) it [which is absurd]. For these reasons we conclude that the analogy of the *Paddy-seed* does not hold good in the case under discussion.

[A further argument against the Opponent's theory is put forward]—Under the theory of the philosopher according to whom a new set of *skandhas* or 'states' appear simultaneously with the destruction or disappearance of the preceding 'states'—the appearance of the new set of 'states' cannot be said to be due to '*karma*,' the acts (of the preceding entity); and if the appearance or birth of entities be not due to their acts, then there would be no point in regarding acts as bringing about good or evil (to the doer of the act). "But the act would be done with the notion of being happy [the

* While according to the view that the water enters into the pores of the jar and does not destroy it, only that much of water trickles out as enters those pores; so that in this manner all the water would flow out in this case also, but only after a long time; while if the jar were destroyed, all the water would flow out at once.—*Tātparya.*

idea in the mind of the doer being 'may I be happy by this act']." * If you mean by this that "the entity itself does the act with the idea, that he may, by the act, be happy and freed from unhappiness,"—this cannot be right; as (by your theory) the happiness is not experienced by the entity that does the act. As a matter of fact, when some one entity has actually experienced pleasure (resulting from a certain act), and that same entity also remembers the relationship (of cause and effect) between the pleasure and what had produced it,—then alone can that same entity take up or employ (at some future time) that which had brought about the pleasure; when however [the entity itself has but a momentary existence, and] the impressions of the entity are such as undergo destruction in a moment, the entity can have no remembrance of the connection between the pleasure and what brought it about; so that it is not possible for such an entity to undertake an act with the motive of deriving pleasure from it. Nor, under this theory, would it be possible for any effort being put forth for Final Release;' as such 'Release' will have been accomplished without any effort; † that is to say, the entity naturally becomes 'released' (by reason of its existence having entirely ceased) the very moment that it comes into existence; and hence it would be entirely futile to lead the life of a religious student (as laid down in Buddhist scriptures) for the purpose of obtaining 'Release'; nor is there any need of 'catechism,' such as we find in the Buddhist scriptures,
Vār. P. 357.
where the Buddha is describd as questioning the mendicants)—'I expect you have been duly instructed by

* The Bauddha view being that though the 'Aggregate of States' which does the act speaks of itself as 'I,' it is in reality a plurality of momentary entites,—yet under the glamour of ignorance and illusion, it regards itself as a single entity, and expects that by doing a certain act it would be happy or free from some unhappiness.—*Ṭāṭparya.*

† When the entity is destroyed in a moment, it is *released* from all future experience.

me,'—when they answer—'we have been duly instructed'; because the reformation or the refinement (due to training) cannot accrue to the past, present, and future entities (which, according to the Bauddha, are what constitute every 'person'); the said reformation cannot accrue to the future entities, simply because they do not exist at the time (that the instruction takes place); similarly with the *past* entities; then as regards the *present* entities, it is impossible for them to undergo any reformation; for the very character of the 'present' is such that the present thing cannot be affected by any reformation; as (according to the Bauddha theory that everything perishes as soon as it comes into existence) there can be no point (of time when the thing actually exists), at which the reformation or refinement could accrue to it. "But the refinement would be possible by reason of the two things, the *refiner* and the *refined*, coming into existence at the same moment." This also is not right; as if the two things came into existence at the same moment, there could be no restriction as to which is the *refiner* and which the *refined*; that is to say, between the two things there would be nothing to determine that 'this one must be the *refiner* and that one the *refined*.' "What happens is that, through the help of the *refiner* the *refined* thing is enabled to bring about a particular kind of effect; and it is this capability of bringing about a particular kind of effect that is called 'refinement.'" This also cannot be accepted; as the very name 'refined' being impossible (for you), how could you assert that this is the 'refiner' and that the 'refined'? Unless one thing produces a peculiarity in another thing, the former cannot be called 'refiner,' nor the latter the 'refined' [and no such producing of peculiarities is possible unless the thing continues to exist during a certain time.] If it be held that,—"what the instruction (of the Teacher) does is to bring about the non-production (non-appearance) of such (worldly) tendencies as had

not come into existence (were still in the future),"—this also cannot be right; as the 'non-appearance' of what has not come into existence is already there; that is to say, the said non-appearance of such evil tendenceis as have not come into existence, being already there (i.e., not non-existent), what is there of it that could be brought about (by the instruction)? * From all this it follows that it is not right to say that "the leading of the life of the Religious Student is for the purpose of Final Release." Such is the objection against one who does not admit of the *Soul* as something distinct (from the Body &c.).

Sūṭra (5).

[*The Opponent says*]—" EVEN ON THE BURNING OF THAT [AGGREGATE OF BODY ETC.,] WHICH IS ACCOMPANIED BY THE SOUL, THERE COULD BE NO SIN; AS THE SOUL IS SOMETHING ETERNAL." (Sū. (5).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (5).

[P. 131, L. 5 to L. 8].

"Even for him, according to whom what is born is the " Body endowed with a Soul, no sin could accrue, from the "act of burning, to the burner. "Why?" Because "the Soul (postulated by him) is eternal; and certainly no " one can ever kill what is eternal. If it could be killed, it "would not be eternal. So that, while according to one " theory (that there is no such thing as Soul) the *killing* "(not being sinful) does not lead to anything,—according "to the other (that there is such a thing as Soul, and it is " eternal), *killing* is impossible."

Vārṭika on Sū. (5).

[P. 357, L. 18 to P. 360, L. 19].

" *Even on the burning of that &c.*,—says the Sūṭra. The " meaning is that the philosopher who holds that there is such

* At the time that the tendencies have not come into existence, their *non-existence* is already there; and we do not need any instruction to bring about this *non-existence*.

" a thing as Soul and it is eternal,—for him also there can be " no *killing* and (hence) no *results* from killing. There can be no " *killing*, for the simple reason that the Soul is eternal; nor can " any results accrue to the Soul, because (by its very nature) " the Soul is something that is not modifiable (by
Var. P. 358.
" anything accruing to it). People quote the follow-" ing verse, which embodies the same idea:—'By rain and heat " what effect can there be on the *Ākāsha*? It is leather on which " their effect falls; if the Soul is like leather, it is not eternal; " while if it is like the *Ākāsha*, then results cannot accrue to " it.'—So that we find that, *while according to one theory* " *the killing does not lead to anything, according to the other* " *killing is impossible* (Bhāṣya).

" 'But,' the upholder of the Soul says, '*killing* is possible, " under the theory of the *Sāṅkhya* (who do admit the Soul);* " as according to them *Buḍḍhi* is modifiable; so that for them " the Body, which is only an aggregate of causes and effects " (in the shape of Buḍḍhi, Ahaṅkara &c.), being modifiable, " is liable to destruction; and it is this same aggregate that " experiences the results (accruing from the sin of killing a " body,) as it is in this that the results become manifested. " [So that according to this theory, the *killing* is quite pos-" sible, and so also is the accruing of the results of that " killing to the agent that did the killing].'

" This is not right, we reply; as there is no abandoning " of the preceding condition; that is to say, just as the Soul " does not abandon its preceding condition, and on that ac-" count the results of actions are not held to appear in it,—so " the Buḍḍhi (of the *Sāṅkhya*) also, being eternal, can not " abandon its former condition [so that the results of actions " cannot appear in this either]; if you say that *Buḍḍhi* does " abandon its former conditions, then (our answer is that)

* The *Tāṭparya* remarks that the author introduces this discussion for the purpose of showing that on this subject the *Sāṅkhya* is in the same boat with the *Naiyāyika*.

" this would be incompatible with its *eternality*; *i.e.*; the " 'abandoning of former conditions' cannot be compatible with " 'eternality.' With a view to escape from this difficulty, you " may say that what you mean is that there is variation in the " conditions (of Buḍḍhi; and not in the Buḍḍhi itself). But " even so the 'Self-contradiction' or 'inconsistency' will not " cease; as a thing is not different from its 'condition'; so " that there being no difference between the 'conditions' and " the thing to which the conditions belong, variation in the " conditions would mean variation in the thing itself [so that " the Buḍḍhi, by undergoing variations, would cease to be " eternal]. Hence inasmuch as this theory involves " the notion of momentary modifications (of *Buḍḍhi*), it is " open to all the objections that can be urged against the " *Buḍḍha* theory of '*Samskāras*,' 'Impressions,' which " undergo destruction every moment. 'But it is like " *straightness* and *curvature*.' What you mean is that " —'when the finger is curved and again straightened, " even though there is difference between the straightness " and the curvature, yet the finger remains the same; and " they are not something different from the finger; in the " same manner, even though the conditions might vary, the " Buḍḍhi would remain the same.' But what you say is not " true; as the two are entirely different; that is to say, the " *straightness* and *curvature* are something entirely different " from the finger; and it is only natural that while one thing " (the Straightness or Curvature) undergoes variation, a " totally different thing (the Finger) remains the same. As " regards the case in question on the other hand, there is no " such difference between the thing (Buḍḍhi) and its own " conditions. Hence the analogy (of the Finger) does not " hold good. Then again, what is 'Straightness' and what " is 'Curvature'? The 'Curvature' of the Finger is the quality " of its being contracted, and 'Straightness' is that of b ing " extended again; and it has already been shown that qualities

Var. P. 359. " are something different from the Substance to " which they belong. [Hence there can be no doubt " as to 'straightness' and 'curvature' being something different " from the finger]. 'The same is the case with Buḍḍhi " also.' If you mean by this that when the conditions of " Buḍḍhi undergo modifications, the Buḍḍhi remains the " same, while the conditions go on changing, and Buḍḍhi is " something different from the conditions,'—our answer is that " this is not right; as it goes against your doctrine; according " to your tenets there is no difference between the property " and the thing possessed of the property; so that when you " assert that there *is* difference (between Buḍḍhi and its " conditions), you renounce the said tenet. From all this " it follows that, just as you decline to attribute Pleasure and " Pain to the Soul, on the ground that, being eternal, the " Soul could not really experience pleasures and pains,*— " in the same manner Buḍḍhi being eternal, Pleasure and " Pain cannot be attributed to it, for the simple reason that " the ground of 'eternality' is the same."

[*Having thus disposed of the Sāṅkhya, the Opponent next puts the following question to the Naiyāyika*]—" What is it that is done for the *eternal* Soul, by Virtue and Vice (morality and immorality)?"

Answer.—They bring Happiness and Unhappiness.

Question.—" What do these latter do for the Soul?"

Answer.—They bring about cognition; that is, there appear in the Soul the cognitions of Happiness and Unhappiness; and it is this cognition that may be said to be brought

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* The Sāṅkhya view is that, there being no difference between a thing and its properties, if Pleasure and Pain really belonged to the Soul, there could be no variations in them, as the Soul itself is something eternal and hence not variable; so that we could not account for the apparent diversity in the pleasures and pains experienced; and for this reason Pleasure and Pain should be regarded as belonging to, and being the modification of, Primordial Matter, *Prakṛti*, which is, by its very nature, modifiable.

about by them; and it is such 'cognition' that goes to constitute the Soul's 'experience.' *

As regards the argument urged (p. 358) by the Opponent in the verse beginning with—'What effect of rain and heat is there on the *Ākāsha*,'—our answer is that rain and heat do to the *Ākāsha* exactly what they do to leather. What do they do to the leather? They bring about its connection with themselves; and the *Ākāsha* also becomes connected with the rain and heat in the same manner as leather is. "But if the *Ākāsha* is connected with rain and water, in the same manner as leather is, then, like the leather, it should be non-eternal". If you mean by this that—" *Ākāsha* should undergo modifications by being connected with (under the influence of) heat and rain, in the same manner as leather is changed by connection with heat and rain",—our answer is that this cannot be, as the premise (urged by you) is not true; what is connected with rain and heat (in the case of the leather) is only the atom (composing the leather), and certainly the atom is something eternal. † Further, when you call the leather 'non-

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* Virtue and Vice belong to the Soul, and are something distinct from it, and variable; and they bring about Happiness and Unhappiness, which also are properties of the Soul. The sense of all this is as follows:—The 'help' that can be accorded to an eternal thing can consist only in the bringing about in that thing of some variable properties; and not in the producing of some change in the thing itself; as this would be incompatible with its eternal character. There is no doubt that the property is something different from the thing to which it belongs; and is not of the same nature as this latter. And in ordinary experience we find that though there is as much difference between Smoke and Fire, as between Smoke and Camel, yet there is causal relation between Fire and Smoke, and not between Fire and Camel; and this is due to the very naure of things; similarly, even though there is as much difference between Soul and Virtue-Vice, as between Soul and *Ākāsha*, yet there is the relation of *quality and qualified* between the Soul and Virtue-Vice, and not between Soul and *Ākāsha*, nor between *Ākāsha* and Virtue-Vice.—*Ṭāṭparya*.

† The *Ṭāṭparya* remarks that this answer has been given by the *Vārṭika* from the point of view of the Naiyāyika himself; it has no force against the Bauḍḍha, who does not admit of the *eternal Atom*. Hence he puts forward another answer, in the next passage.

eternal', do you mean that it is destroyed by connection with rain and heat, or that there is destruction of its substratum due to the disruption of its causes (in the shape of the component particles)? What *we* say is that it is destroyed by reason of the disruption of the component particles of which it is composed; and as there are no such component particles in the case of *Ākāsha*, there is neither 'disruption of particles' nor 'destruction'. Then again, even in the case of things that are connected with rain and heat (and are made up of component particles) [such as stone, for instance] we find that they continue to exist (even under the influence of rain and heat); so that it is not right to regard the connection (of heat and rain) as a cause of destruction; if the connection of rain and heat were the cause of destruction, things under their influence could never continue to exist; and yet such things do continue to exist until there appears some other cause of destruction. If

Vār. P. 360.

(by bringing forward the case of leather) you mean that—"while in the leather, rain and heat bring about its expansion and contraction, they do not do so in *Ākāsha*,"—our answer is that this also is not right; as none of the alternatives possible is really acceptable: For instance, what is the meaning of the expression 'expansion and contraction of the leather'? Does it mean (*a*) that it becomes *large and small*? Or (*b*) that it undergoes conjunctions and disconjunctions? (*a*) It cannot be the former; 'expansion and contraction' cannot mean becoming *large and small*; for the dimension of a thing must remain the same so long as the thing lasts. So that so long as the thing (the leather) remains the same, its dimension (whatever it is) cannot change [so that any amount of rain or heat cannot alter the dimension of the leather, which cannot become larger or smaller]. (*b*) If on the other hand, the 'expansion and contraction' of the leather be regarded as 'conjunctions and disjunctions,' this also cannot be right; as the leather is

a single thing, and there can be no conjunctions and disjunctions in a single thing [*i. e.*, unless there are two things at least, there can be no conjunction or disconjunction]. "Why is it then that people speak of the leather undergoing expansion and contraction ?" Well, (when the leather is said to 'contract') what actually happens is this :—when heat is applied to the leather, its component parts, without losing their character of 'product' (*i.e.*, without being reduced to atoms), combine among themselves, but even though these combinations finally settle down to the form of an object, this object is not anything different from the leather ; so that the new combinations really subsist in the component parts, which have combined among themselves ; and they are attributed to the leather only indirectly,—this attributing being due to the fact that the leather subsists in (is made up of) the same thing (*i.e.*, the same component parts) in which the combinations inhere ; and it is in view of this figurative attribution that people speak of the 'contraction of the leather' ; though in reality it is not the leather that contracts. Similarly, when by the contact of water there is disjunction among the component parts of the leather,—but which do not lose their form of the product substance,—this disjunction among the parts comes to be spoken of as the 'expansion of the leather.' Then again, there is no instance of modification ; that is to say, there is no instance of a thing undergoing 'modification' without being destroyed ; in fact the very term 'modification' means the appearing of a different thing (in place of the thing said to be modified). If however you call that 'modification' when a thing changes its colour and such other qualities,—when for instance, the Jar changes its colour (from black to red), if you regard the Jar as having undergone 'modification,'—then such 'modification' appears in the Soul also ; for in the Soul also, there is disappearance of *Happiness* followed by the appearance of *Unhappiness* or the disappearance of the *Cognition of Happiness* followed by the

Cognition of unhappiness [and Happiness and Cognition are only qualities of the Soul].

Thus it is established that the experiencing of Happiness and Unhappiness belong to the Soul, which is itself eternal (unchanging).

Sūṭra (6).

[*The answer of the Siddhānṭin to the Pūrvapakṣa argument in Sū.* 5]—NOT SO; (A) BECAUSE THE 'KILLING' IS OF THE RECEPTACLE OF EFFECTS AND OF THAT WHICH BRINGS ABOUT THOSE EFFECTS. [(B) OR BECAUSE THE 'KILLING' IS OF THE RECEPTACLE OF EFFECTS, WHICH IS WHAT BRINGS ABOUT THESE EFFECTS].*—Sū. (6).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (6).

[P. 131, L. 10 to L. 24].

(A) What we say is, not that 'Killing' consists in destroying the eternal entity, but that it consists in the destroying of the 'receptacle of effects'—*i.e., Body*—and of 'that which brings about those effects,' in the shape of the apprehension of their respective objects—*i.e.*, the *Sense-organs*,—both of these (Body and Sense-organs) belonging to a living

* The *Bhāṣya* has supplied two explanations of the Sūṭra, the difference being due to the different ways of construing the compound कार्याश्रयकर्तृ. Under (A) it is treated as a Ḍvanḍva, which gives the meaning '*the receptacle of effects*'—*i.e.*, the Body—*and that which brings about the effects*—*i.e.*, the Sense-organs; while under (B) the compound is treated as *Karmadhāraya*,—the sense being—'the receptacle of effects, *which* is what brings about those effects,'—the Body.

The *Nyāyasūṭravivaraṇa* reads the Sūṭra as कार्याश्रयकर्तृबाधात्—and explains it to mean that the killing of the body does not do away with the Unseen Force; 'effect' in the Sūṭra standing for the 'Unseen Force of Merit and Demerit,' the 'receptacle' आश्रय and 'bringer about' कर्तृ of that Force is the Soul; and there is बाध—*i.e.*, *non-destruction* of that Soul. It adds that the Sūṭra cannot mean that 'It is not right to say that there can be no sin even on the 'Killing of the Body with a Soul; as there is Destruction of the Soul, which is the bringer about, कर्तृ, of the connection, आश्रय of the Body, कार्य.

Vishvanātha accepts the second (B) explanation given in the *Bhāṣya*.

entity which by its very nature, is indestructible; and this 'destroying' takes the form of *striking* or *causing pain, i.e., disorganising*, by bringing death or by *tearing it out of its bearings*.* 'Effect' here stands for the *feeling of pleasure and pain*; and of this the Body is the 'receptacle,' *i.e.*, the abode, the substratum;—and the Sense-organs are 'those that bring about' the apprehension of their objects;—and it is the destroying of both these (as belonging to the Soul) that constitutes 'Killing;' and not of the eternal Soul itself. Consequently what has been urged by the Opponent in Sū. 5—that "there could be no sin even on the burning of that which is accompanied by the Soul, as the Soul is something eternal"—is not right.

It is only the person holding the view that 'Killing' consists in destroying the entity itself that is open to the charge that his theory involves the absurdity of an act being destroyed (ineffective) for him who did it, and falling upon him who did not do it (as urged in the *Bhāṣya* P. 130, L. 16).

In regard to the point at issue there are two alternative theories—viz. (a) the 'Killing' consists in the total destroying of the entity itself, or (b) 'that it consists in the destroying of the 'receptacle of effects and that which brings about the effects,' these two belonging to the entity which is itself indestructible;'—there can be no third alternative. Of these the view that there is destruction of the entity itself has been negatived; what remains is the other view, which has been found to be true (in ordinary experience).

(B) [The Bhāṣya puts forward a second explanation of the Sūṭra]—We can also construe the term '*Kāryāshraya-kartṛivadhāt*' as follows—'*Kāryāshraya*,' 'the receptacle of effects,' is *the aggregate made up of the Body, the Sense-organs and Intellect*'—because it is in this aggregate that the eternal Soul feels pleasure and pain; it forms its *abode* 'receptacle,' because it is only in the said Aggregate, and in nothing else, that the feeling appears;—this same aggregate is also regarded as the '*Kartṛi*,' the 'bringer about,' of

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* 'Bringing death' refers to the Body; and 'tearing it out of its bearings' to the Sense-organ. '*Prabanḍhochchhēḍaḥ* is explained by the *Bhāṣyachanḍra* as 'destroying its connections,' *sambanḍhochchhiṭṭiḥ*; and the *Ṭāṭparya* adds that one causes pain by striking the Body, as also by tearing the Eye out of its sockets.

the feeling; as it is by reason of, through, the said Aggregate,—and never without it—that the feeling comes about;—and it is the striking or causing pain or disorganising of this Aggregate that constitutes 'Killing,' and not the destroying of the eternal Soul. Hence what has been urged in Sū. 5—that "there could be no sin even on the killing of the body accompanied by the Soul, because the Soul is eternal"—is not true.*

Vārṭika on Sū. (6).

[P. 360, L. 19 to P. 362, L. 1].

The Opponent has said:—"Inasmuch as the Soul is eternal, there can be no answer to the objection that no killing is possible."—But this is not right; as the 'killing' can be explained in a different way: That is to say, even though the Soul is eternal, the possibility of 'killing' can be otherwise explained. In order to show this explanation we have the Sūṭra—*Not so, because the killing is &c. &c.*—*What we say is, not that 'killing' consists in destroying*
Vār. P. 361.
the eternal entity, but that it consists in the causing pain to, disorganising, bringing death to the Body and the particular Sense-organs that are the instruments of the feeling of pleasure and pain,—both of these (Body and the Sense-organs) belonging to the Soul, which is, by its very nature, indestructible.

[The Opponent, the Bauḍḍha, holding the view that, so long as it is possible to take the term 'killing' in its ordinarily accepted connotation, there can be no justification for imposing upon it an indirect or figurative connotation, asks]—"How is one to know this (that the term 'killing' means as described,?"

Well, it follows from the fact that both parties admit of the 'killing and the experiencing of its results'; as a matter

* The Aggregate of Body &c. is called the 'receptacle' in the sense that it is as favourable to the appearing of the feeling as the very container of the feeling. It is called '*Karṭṛi*' the bringer about, of the feeling, in the sense that it forms an agency in the bringing about of the feeling.—*Bhāṣyachanḍra.*

of fact, both parties admit that there is 'killing' (of things) and that the results of the act of killing have to be experienced; and such 'killing' can be explained only on one hypothesis (of an eternal entity, in the shape of *Soul*). As regards the other hypothesis, whereby there is nothing but *momentary impressions* (sensations),—under such hypothesis, what *is* there that could be 'killed'? And (under this hypothesis) the destruction of all things is spontaneous, (everything being destroyed the very moment that it comes into existence), and does not stand in need of any cause to bring it about; so that whose operation would be required (who could be regarded as doing the *killing*)? "But one is said to *kill* another when he becomes the cause of his appearing in a form entirely different from his former form."* Even so the use of the term 'killing' is only figurative or indirect, and not in its direct connotation, since you apply it to the *birth* of another form [and certainly *birth* is very far from being *killed*]. "This argument has no force, as it is equally applicable to both of us; as under your hypothesis also the principal thing (Soul) † is not killed." True; for me also the 'killing' is of the 'receptacle of effects' and of 'that which brings about these effects' [and this use of the term is purely figurative]; but there is this difference (between us) that under my hypothesis, the Soul that undergoes the experience of the effects of an act is the same that brought about its own body &c., and did the act; so that this does not involve the absurdity of anyone undergoing the effects of what he had never done; while under your hypothesis [as there can be no one entity having any continued existence], it must involve both absurdities—that of the

* The Nihilist, for whom everything has a momentary existence, the only form of 'killing' possible is when one thing becomes the direct cause of the other thing losing its one momentary form and taking of another.

† '*Pradhāna*' may be taken as standing for the *Sāṅkhya* 'prakṛiṭi,' Primordial Matter. But from what follows, it appears better to take it as above.

effects of an act being lost to one who did the act, and that of their falling upon one who had nothing to do with it. For these reasons the only alternative left to us is to admit that 'killing' is possible only under the hypothesis that there is such an eternal entity as the 'Soul.'

In the *Sūṭra*, the term 'receptacle of effects' stands for the *Body*, as it is through the Body that experiences are undergone;—'those that bring about the effects' are the *Sense-organs*, as it is through the instrumentality of these that experiences are brought about. Or, taking the compound as a *Karmaḍhāraya*, we may take the *Body* itself as denoted by both the terms—'receptacle of effects' and 'that which brings about the effects'? In reality, Soul is the real *doer* (of acts) and *experiencer* (of their effects). "What do you mean by *being the doer* or by *being the experiencer*?" One is regarded as the 'doer' (of an act) when the *knowledge*, the *wish to act* and the *effort put forth*, all three subsist in him; and he is called the 'experiencer' when there inheres in him the feeling of pleasure and pain. And as neither of these can apply to the Body, it is called 'doer' only because it is through the Body, that the Doer acts.

Vār. P. 362.

Section (3). (Sūṭras 7-14).
Refutation of the View that the Visual Organ is one only.

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* There is much confusion in regard to this section. As a matter of fact, up to Sū. 27 we have the same *prakaraṇa*, dealing with the Soul, and proving, by a number of reasonings, that the Soul cannot be the same as either the Body, or the Sense-organs, or the Mind, or a mere aggregate of all these. But Commentators have made sub-divisions of the *prakaraṇa*, in view of the nature of the arguments put forward. Hence the *Nyāya-sūchīnibanḍha* makes one *prakaraṇa* of Sūṭras 7-14, wherein it is shown that the Visual Organ is not *one*, but *two*, and hence the Soul, which is *one*, cannot be this or any other organ. So also the *Ṭāṭparya* and the *Bhāṣyachanḍra*; though the latter is not very precise as to its *prakaraṇa*-divisions, and deals with the whole subject of the Soul being distinct from the Body &c. as under a single *prakaraṇa*; but in its explanations it accepts the same stages as the *Nyāya-sūchīnibanḍha* and the *Ṭāṭparya*.

Bhāṣya on Sūṭra (7).
[P. 131, L. 24 to P. 132, L. 6.]

For the following reason also the Soul must be regarded as something different from the Body &c. :—

The footnote in the printed Bhāṣya-text asserts that the *Vārṭika* does not accept the *Bhāṣya* interpretation of this *prakaraṇa* ; it says'that the fact of the Soul being something different from the Sense-organs having been already established, there would be no point in introducing the same subject over again ; hence it offers another explanation—taking Sūṭras 7 to 11 as embodying the view that *the Visual Organ is one only*.

The *Bhāṣya* proceeds on the basis of the assumption that the organs are two ; while the Vārṭika denies this at the very outset. It is clear the *Bhāṣya* has been led to proceed on the said assumption, by reason of the ease with which it supports the argument in favour of a single Soul operating though several organs. According to this view, Sū. 7 embodies the argument that when we see a thing with one eye on the first occasion, and then subsequently with the other eye, we have the *recognition* of the thing as being the same as that seen on the previous occasion ; which shows that there has been a common *perceiver*, and this is *Soul*.—This is answered by the Opponent in Sū. 8 by the argument that the Eye is one and the same in the two sockets ; hence on both occasions perception being by the same Eye, it is only natural that there is *Recognition*.—This is answered in Sū. 9, which tries to show that the fact urged in Sū. 7 can not be explained otherwise than on the basis of a single intelligent Soul.—Sū. 10 contains the Opponent's rejoinder.—This is finally disposed of in Sū. 11, where it is concluded that the Eyes are *two*, not one, hence the argument of *Recognition* remains unshaken.

The Vārṭika and Vishvanāṭha's Vṛiṭṭi take Sū. 7 as embodying only the argument based upon Recognition in general, and then object to its introduction on the ground that this matter has already been dealt with in the foregoing Aḍhikaraṇa.

The *Vārṭika*, and with that the *Vṛiṭṭi* of Vishvanāṭha, takes Sūṭra 7-11 as put in for the purpose of demolishing the view that the existence of Soul is proved by the fact (urged in Sū. 7) that there is recognition by the right eye of what has been seen with the left eye ; and in course of the refutation of this view there comes in the subject of the Visual organ being one or two. Sūṭra 7 is explained, by the Bhāṣya, as also by the Vārṭika, as embodying the argument that the existence of Soul is proved by the Recognition urged in Sū. 7 ; but while the Bhāṣya and the *Ṭāṭparya* and the *Bhāṣyachanḍra*, accept it as Siḍḍhānṭa, and so carry on the Prakaraṇa to Sū. 15 [and this appears to be the rational interpretation of the Sūṭras as they stand],—the *Vārṭika*, holding to the view that the Visual organ is one only, could not accept this interpretation of Sū. 7-11. Hence it regards the argument propounded in Sū. 7 as put forward simply for being refuted. The *Vārṭika* propounds this refutation from P. 362, L. 7 onwards. In course of this refutation, the unity of the Visual organ being put forward, the opponent asks (P. 363, L. 5) what explanation there is of the ordinary idea that there are two eyes.—In Sū. 8,

Sūṭra (7).

BECAUSE THERE IS RECOGNITION WITH THE OTHER EYE OF WHAT HAS BEEN SEEN WITH THE LEFT EYE. * (Sū. 7).

When one applies to, or connects with, the same object, two Cognitions, which appear at different times (one appearing ofter the other),—there is what is called 'Recognition'; this 'recognition' appearing in the form 'I *see* now what I had cognised (seen) previously', 'this is that same object'; and there is such 'recognition' in a case where the former cognition was with the left eye and the subsequent one with the right eye,—the recognition being in the form 'that same thing which I saw on the previous occasion (with the left eye) I am now seeing (with the right eye).' Now if the Sense-organ itself were the intelligent perceiver, no such 'recognition' would be possible, for what is seen by one cannot be recognised (or remembered) by another. There is no doubt however that there is such 'Recognition'. Hence it follows that the intelligent perceiver is something different from the Sense-organs.

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the *Siḍḍhānṭin* explains this.—This explanation is objected to in Sū. 9.—The real answer to this objection is given by the *Vārṭika* in P. 363, L. 16| *et. seq.*—Sū. 10 is explained as the answer given by 'some people' to the objection urged in Sū. 9; and then Sū. 11 is explained as refuting this answer of 'some people' as also the original *Pūrvapakṣa*.

The weak points in this interpretation of Sūṭras 7-11 by the *Vārṭika* and the *Vṛiṭṭi* are as follow—(1) Nowhere else do we find the Sūṭra starting a section with a gratuitous argument in support of the Siḍḍhānṭa view,—simply for refuting it; and (2) according to this explanation, the author of the Sūṭra fails to answer the Opponent's argument in Sū. 9; and the only answer that he puts forward (in Sū. 10) he himself refutes in Sū. 11.

From the above it will be seen that on Sūtras 8-11 there can be no agreement between the *Bhāṣya* and the *Vārṭika*. Hence we are not placing the Vārṭika on each of these Sūtras below its *Bhāṣya*; we shall place the whole Vārṭika on Sūtras 8-11 after the *Bhāṣya* on these.

* The conclusion derived from this 'because &c.' is that there is a Soul who is the agent of the *seeing* and the *recognising*. But according to the *Nyāyasūṭravivaraṇa* the conclusion deduced is that the Visual Organ is one only. See preceding *note*.

Vārṭika on Sū. (7).

[P. 362, Ll. 2-6.]

For the following reason also the Soul is something distinct from the Body &c.—*Because there is recognition &c &c.* (says the Sūṭra). What the Sūṭra means is that a man recognises with his right eye what he has previously seen with the left eye. This *recalling of cognition* or Recognition must proceed from (be preceded by) remembrance; from which it follows that the several cognitions involved in it (the first perception, the second perception, the remembrance of the former perception, and the recognition of the object of the latter perception as being the same as that of the former) must belong to one and the same agent, [and this one agent is the *Soul*].

[This argument is not sound, according to the *Vārṭika*, as is clear from its Introduction to the next Sūṭra.]

Sūṭra (8).

[*Says the Opponent*]—"THE ABOVE REASONING IS NOT RIGHT; FOR THE ORGAN (IN REALITY) IS ONE ONLY, AND THE NOTION OF DUALITY ARISES FROM THE ONE ORGAN BEING DIVIDED BY THE NASAL BONE."—(Sū. 8).*

Bhāsya on Sū. (8).

[P. 132, Ll. 9-10.]

[Says the Opponent]—"As a matter of fact the Visual Organ is one only; it is divided by the nasal bone, and when the two ends (parts) of the organ, thus divided, are perceived, it gives rise to the notion that there are two organs; just as it happens in the case of any long object (like the Bamboo for instance).

*The *Ṭāṭparya* says—'This Sūṭra objects to the reasoning of Sū. 7, on the basis of the view that the Visual Organ is one only.'—The *Bhāṣyachanḍra* says—'What the Opponent means to urge in Sū. 8 is as follows—'What has been urged in Sū. 7 would be right if there were two distinct visual organs; but according to our view it is not so; for the visual organ is one only.'

Sūṭra (9).

[*Answer.*]—THE ORGAN CANNOT BE REGARDED AS ONE ONLY ; AS (WE FIND THAT) WHEN ONE (EYE) IS DESTROYED, THE OTHER IS NOT DESTROYED (SŪ. 9).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (9).
[P. 132, Ll. 11-12.]

As a matter of fact, we find that even when one eye is destroyed, or taken out of its socket, the other eye remains intact, as is clearly indicated by the perception of things (with the remaining eye).* From this it is clear that it is not right to say that a single organ is divided (by the nasal bone).

Sūṭra (10).

[*The Opponent's rejoinder.*]—"THE ARGUMENT PUT FORWARD HAS NO FORCE ; AS EVEN ON THE DESTRUCTION OF A PART THE WHOLE IS STILL FOUND (EFFECTIVE)."

Bhāṣya on Sū. (10).
[P. 132, Ll. 14-15.]

"The reasoning,—that 'because one eye is not destroyed on the destruction of the other eye (therefore the two eyes must be distinct)',—is not right;—because, as a matter of fact, we find that even when some branches of the tree are cut off, the tree itself is actually found standing. [Similarly, on the theory that the Visual Organ is one only, even when one part of it, in the shape of the one eye, is destroyed, the Organ itself will remain intact and effective]."

Sūṭra (11).

[*Answer*].—INASMUCH THE EXAMPLE CITED IS NOT TRUE [OR, INASMUCH AS THE OPPONENT'S VIEW IS CONTRARY TO PERCEIVED FACTS], THE DENIAL (IN SU. 10) CANNOT BE RIGHT.

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* All Mss. reads विषयग्रहणलिङ्गम्, which has been adopted in the translation. The Vārṭika reads विषयग्रहणे लिङ्गम्, which means that the remaining Eye is the लिंग the instrument, of the perception of things.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (11).

[P. 133, L. 1 to L. 9.]

[The Bhāṣya supplies two interpretations of the Sūṭra]—(A) [The Opponent has urged, in Sū. 10, that the fact of the Visual Organ continuing to be operative even on the destruction of one Eye may be regarded as analogous to the case of the whole tree continuing to remain even when one of its parts, a branch, has been cut off]—As a matter of fact however, it is not true that the Composite Product continues to exist even when there is disruption of its component particles; for if it did, then it would have to be regarded as eternal (which is absurd). [What really happens in the case of the *Tree*, cited in Sū. 10, is that] in a case where there are several *composite wholes* (making up a composite object), those wholes are destroyed whose component particles are destroyed, while those continue to exist among whose component particles there is no disruption. *

(B) Or, we may explain the term '*ḍriṣṭānṭavirodhaḥ*' of the Sū ra to mean *being contrary to* (*incompatible with*) *a perceived fact*: that is to say,—(a) In the case of the dead man's skull we find that there are two holes, separated from each other by the nasal bone, in the places where the eyes existed; and quite distinct from each other; this should not be so if there were a single eye simply bifurcated by the nasal bone;—(b) *secondly*, as a matter of fact, as it is found that there is no certainty as to the destruction of one eye (necessarily leading, or not leading, to the destruction of the other), the two must be regarded as entirely distinct; and inasmuch as the two eyes have their own distinct obstruction and destruction (and the obstruction and destruction of one does not necessarily mean the obstruction and destruction of the other), it follows that they are distinct things;—(c) *thirdly*, when one eye is pressed with the finger there is a divarication or aberration in the contact of the perceived object with the rays of light

* Several composite wholes go to make up the Tree; when a branch is cut off, there is disruption of the component parts of this Tree; hence the Tree cannot but be regarded as destroyed; what remains behind is only a part of the Tree—one of the several composites that made up the Tree; it is recognised as the same Tree, and not only as its part, because of its similarity to the original tree.—*Bhāṣyachanḍra.*

Hence the case of the Tree does not meet the *Siḍḍhānṭa* argument put forward in Sū. 9.

emanating from the eyes, and (as a consequence) we perceive a diversity in the object; this could not be the case if there were only one Visual organ; specially as on the cessation of the finger-pressure the object is again perceived as one only.* From all these well-known facts it follows that it is not right to regard the organ as one only, simply bifurcated (by the nasal bone).

Vārṭika on Sūṭrās (8-10).
[P. 362, L. 7 to P. 364, L. 9].

[Sūṭra 7 has been explained to mean that, inasmuch as there is recognition with the right eye of what has previously been seen with the left eye, it follows that the several cognitions have a single Agent]—This however cannot be accepted as right; since this has already been established before (in the foregoing sections), there was no need for taking it up again. Under Sū. 1 it has already been established that the Soul is something distinct; and as this has been already established, there was no need for resuming the same subject again.

[There may be two answers to this objection]. (*a*) Some people point out that the present section is intended to prove that the Soul is something distinct *from the Sense-organs*;

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* The meaning of this passage, according to the *Bhāṣyachandra* is as follows—'When we close one eye and press the other with our finger, we see the object, the lamp, as *two*; and when the pressure is removed, we perceive the object as one only or we have the recognition in the form 'what I saw as two is one only'.

But the case meant to be cited appears to have nothing to do with the closing of any eye. It refers to the well-known phenomenon that when we look upon a thing with both eyes open in the usual way, we perceive it as *one*, but when we press one eye with the finger, we perceive the thing as two; this is due to the fact that in normal vision the rays of light emanating from the eyes coalesce when they fall upon the perceived thing, and this provides a single image of the thing, which comes to be perceived as *one*; but when one eye is pressed with the finger, the rays of light from that eye become diverted from their natural course, and hence fail to coalesce with the rays proceeding from the other eye; so that the light from the eyes not coalescing, there are two images of the thing, and it is perceived as two. All this cannot be explained except on the basis of the theory that the two eyes constitute two distinct Visual organs.

they declare that the present section serves to show that the Soul is different from the Sense-organs. But this explanation is not right; as this also follows from the same section; that is, it has been established in the foregoing sections that the Soul is something distinct from the Body and the Sense-organs. (*b*) Others put forward the answer that the present Sūṭra is intended to be cumulative; they explain that 'recognition with the right eye of what has been by the left eye' is put forward (in the present Sūṭra) as an additional argument (in support of the conclusion arrived at in the foregoing section that the Soul is something distinct from the Sense-organs).

As a matter of fact however, though other kinds of cumulative proof may be possible, what is said in the present Sūṭra is not so admissible; as it involves an incongruity. That is, one who would put forward 'the recognition with the right eye of what has been seen with the left' (as a reason for regarding the Soul to be different from the Sense-organs) would be contradicting (going against) reason. "What incongruity, or going against reason, is there?" It is this:—If the organ in question is several (as the argument pre-supposes), it is not possible for both to be controlled by (or connected with) anything (in the shape of Mind or Soul) simultaneously. That is to say, the Mind is atomic in its nature and one only; and if there are two Visual organs, both these organs could never be connected with the single atomic Mind at one and the same time; and if one of the Visual organs could apprehend things even without such connection (of the Mind), [as Sū. 7 presumes], then it would imply that the other organ operates (is effective in apprehending things) without being connected with the Mind; and this would mean that the connection of the Mind is not essential; and if the organ is operative without such connection or control, then it ceases to be an instrument at all;

for no instrument is ever found to be operative unless controlled or directed (by something else). Further, if what is said is true, then the seeing of things would be precisely of the same kind, whether it be brought about by a complete (perfect) Visual organ, or by an incomplete (imperfect) one ; * that is, inasmuch as no uncontrolled organ can be operative, and the controlling Mind is one only,—it is only one of the two Visual organs that would at any time be connected with the Mind; so that the seeing of things with one eye should be of the same degree as that with both eyes. Lastly, the view put forward would be contrary to what has gone before; it has been declared, in a preceding section, that the number of Sense-organs is *five* only; so that, [if it is now asserted that there are *two* Visual-organs, it would make the number of Sense-organs *six*, and] that conclusion becomes contradicted (by what is said now). It may be asked—"If then the Visual-organ is one only, how is it that it is actually seen as two?" The explanation of this perception of duality in connection with the Visual organ is supplied by the following Sūṭra (8).

Var. P. 863.

The Organ is one only &c.—says the Sūṭra. As a matter of fact, the organ is one and the same, but with two substrata (physical bodies). 'What do you mean by the *substrata* of the organ?' What is meant is that the Visual-organ, which is fiery (or luminous) in its nature, is affected by the benefiting and hurting of the black pupil (or retina) which is earthy in its nature; it is found that when there is some beneficial effect on the pupil, the Visual organ is also benefited, or when there is some hurt inflicted on the pupil, it reacts upon the organ also; that is, it continues to exist and see things (according to the effects produced on the pupil); and it is in view of this fact that the pupil is called the 'substra-

* While as matter of fact we know that the man with one eye, or with his eyes closed, is unable to see things as clearly as the man with both eyes open.—*Ṭāṭparya.*

tum' (of the Visual organ). This is what has been explained under Sū. 1-1-11. When the two ends of the same organ are perceived, they give rise to the notion of Duality; just as in the case of a long object intercepted by something in its middle, when one sees its two ends, he mistakes it to be two objects.

Vārṭika on Sū. (9).
[P. 363, L. 15 to L. 20].

The Opponent raises the following objection in Sū. (9)—

"*The organ cannot be regarded as one only &c.*—Says the Sūṭra (9). That is, *when one eye is destroyed, or taken out of its socket, the other eye remains intact,* still capable of serving as the instrument of the perception of things."

This is not right, we reply; as the fact put forward is capable of another explanation. In fact no person actually perceives that the second organ remains intact; all that we know is that Visual Cognition still takes place; and certainly this can be explained as brought about by means of the remaining substratum (the second physical body of the organ); * this substratum (or physical body) is not the *Organ*; the Organ (of Vision) is that one thing which operates through this or that physical body. The case is analogous to that of a room with several windows, where one window being closed things are seen through the other window. [Similarly in the case cited, what happens is that one physical outlet of this organ being destroyed, the vision takes places through the other outlet].

To the Opponent's objection (in Sū. 9) some people have offered the answer that *even on the destruction of a part the whole is still found effective* (Sū. 10). But this answer cannot be accepted as the right one, for reasons given in the next Sūṭra (11): That is, *inasmuch as the example cited &c.*

* The Visual organ is really one only, but it operates through two physical bodies, the two eyes; so when the one-eyed man can see, what happens is that, though one

Says the Sūṭra, the meaning of this is as follows:—As a matter of fact, no composite product remains when its component causes (parts) are destroyed. If it does not remain then how is it that the composite is actually perceived, even after the components have been destroyed?" Who says that a composite is actually perceived? What happens is that of the several composites (of which a certain object consists), that one is destroyed of whose component particles there is disruption, while that, of whose components there is not disruption, (continues to exist, and) is perceived.

The rest is clear in the *Bhāṣya*.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (12).*

[P. 133, L. 9 to L. 14.]

That the Intelligent Agent is something distinct from the Aggregate of the Body &c. is also inferred—

FROM THE EXCITATION APPEARING IN ANOTHER SENSE-ORGAN (THAN THE ONE THAT BROUGHT ABOUT THE PRECEDING PERCEPTION) (Sū. 12).

When a person has tasted a sour fruit and found that its taste is concomitant with a certain colour and smell,—if, at some future time he happens to perceive its colour or smell, by means of a sense-organ (of vision or odour,) there appears an 'excitation' in the *organ of Taste*, which is totally different (from the organ that has apprehended the colour or smell) : that is to say, there is remembrance (through association) of the Taste of the fruit, which gives rise to a longing for that taste, which brings about the flowing of the liquid (saliva) from the roots of the teeth. This phenomenon would not be possible if the Sense-organs themselves

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of the two bodies of the organ has been destroyed, it still works through the other body. So that the phenomenon put forward does not prove that the number of the organ itself is more than two.

* According to the *Bhāṣya*, *Varṭika*, *Ṭāṭparya* and *Bhāṣyachandra*, the Sūṭra resumes now the subject-matter of proofs for regarding Soul as something different from the Body &c. The *Ṭāṭparya* goes on to remark—'Having proved, on the

were the Intelligent Agent; as an agent can never remember (or recall) what has been perceived by another.*

Vārṭika on Sū. (12).

[P. 364, L. 11 to P. 365, L. 4.]

That the Intelligent agent is something distinct from Body &c., is also inferred *from the excitation* &c., (Sūṭra). When a person has tasted a sour fruit and found that its taste is concomitant with a certain colour and smell,—if he happens to perceive the colour or smell, by means of a sense-organ, there appears an excitation in the organ of Taste. "What is *excitation?*" Following on the remembrance of the Taste, there appears a desire, a longing, for that Taste,—and this longing brings about in the organ of Taste a flow, or connection, of the liquid from the teeth; and this 'flow of liquid' is what constitutes the 'excitation'

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strength of Recognition, the soundness of the notion of Soul as something distinct (and also having, by the way, refuted the theory that the said Recognition can be explained on the basis of the conception that there is only one Visual organ operating through the two sockets), the Author now proceeds to put forward inferential reasonings in support of the same theory. It should be borne in mind that the Author has, in Sū. 7-11, put forward the phenomenon of recognition in support of his view, simply for the purpose of convincing the opponent; in reality the existence of Soul is proved by ordinary cognitions by inference &c.

The *Nyāyasūṭravivaraṇa*, which took Sū. 7-11 as putting forward the view that the Visual organ is one only, takes Sūṭras 8-15 also as dealing with the same subject; and according to this the present Sū. (12) means that "what happens in the case of men who have lost one eye, is that his former Visual organ, which operated through two physical bodies, is destroyed and another organ is produced, operating through a single opening."

* The whole process of inference involved here is thus explained by the *Ṭāṭparya*—

The man perceives the colour and smell,—he remembers the Taste which he has associated with such colour and smell—he then desires to experience the Taste thus remembered—this desire excites the organ of Taste,—this excitation appearing in the form of the flow of saliva;—on seeing this excitation appearing in the mouth of a certain person, we infer from this that the man has been moved by a desire;—and, from this desire we infer that the man has had a remembrance (of the Taste). This remembrance would not be possible, unless there were a single Agent, perceiving things through the several sense-organs.

referred to. Now, the 'remembrance' herein involved would not be possible if the Sense-organs themselves were 'intelligent agents,' because the impression (left by perceptions through the Sense-organs) having but a momentary existence, [and hence it being impossible for any impressions to continue from the moment of perception to the moment of remembrance,] any such remembrance would mean that what has been originally *perceived* by one (organ) is *remembered* by another (organ); and this is impossible.

[An objection is raised against the inferential reasoning put forward in the Sūṭra]—"The *excitation of the other Sense-organ* is a property subsisting in that 'other organ'; and not subsisting in the 'Soul;'—how then can it prove the 'Soul being different'?" *

What brings about the inference of the *Soul being different* is not the 'excitation of the other organ,' but the Remembrance (involved in the said phenomenon of excitation). No Remembrance is possible unless there is a single Agent concerned with the original *perception* (and the subsequent *remembrance*); the reasoning therefore is that Remembrance being an *act*, must stand in need of an *actor* (agent), just like the act of *being produced*. And inasmuch as, without Remembrance the said 'excitation' is not possible,— this directly perceived 'excitation' has been put forward (in the Sūṭra),—the premiss actually intended (by the mention of the 'excitation') being in the form 'because there can be no excitation in the organ of a person who has not originally perceived the Taste'; and this is an entirely valid negative premiss.

Var. P. 365.

* The *Smoke* perceived as subsisting in the *Mountain* proves the existence of *fire* in that same *Mountain*; it cannot prove the existence of anything in something different from the Mountain. Hence in the present case, the 'excitation' perceived in the *organ of Taste* can prove the existence of something in that same organ; it cannot prove anything—the character of *being different*, for instance,—in regard to the *Soul*.

Sūtra (13).

[*Objection*]—"THE ABOVE REASONING IS NOT RIGHT; REMEMBRANCE HAS FOR ITS OBJECT THAT WHICH IS REMEMBERED."

Bhāṣya on Sū. (13).
[P. 133, Ll. 16—17].

[Says the Opponent]—"Remembrance is a quality and proceeds from a certain cause;* and its object is *that which is remembered*; and the 'excitation of the other organ' (put forward in Sū. 12) is due to the said *remembered thing*, and not to any such thing as the Soul."†

Vārtika on Sū. (13).
[P. 365, Ll. 6—9].

"*The reasoning is not right, for Remembrance has for its object that which is remembered*,—says the Sūtra. Remembrance is a property; and its object is the remembered thing; so that, proceeding from its proximity (relationship) to the *remembered thing*, Remembrance cannot prove the existence of any such thing as the Soul, whose capacity (of bringing about Remembrance) has nowhere been perceived. Just as, for instance, the Sprout, proceeding from the proximity (operation) of its own peculiar causes, does not prove the existence of any such thing as the Jar, whose capacity (in relation to the Sprout) has nowhere been perceived."

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* This cause consists in the *remembered thing*—adds the *Bhāṣyachandra*.

† 'We do not admit of the Soul as that in which the Cognition or Remembrance subsists; for us the Soul is none other than *Cognition* itself'—such is the sense of the Opponent.—*Bhāṣyachandra*.

Remembrance could be regarded as indicating the *Soul*, either as its *cause* or as its *object*; the Soul could not be regarded as the *cause*, as the cause of Remembrance is the impression left by its previous cognition; nor could the Soul be regarded as the *object*, as the object of Remembrance is the remembered thing. And further, since the 'excitation of the sense-organ' may be explained as due to the *remembered thing*, it can not prove the existence of the Soul.—*Tātparya*.

The *Nyāyasūtravivaraṇa* explains the Sūtra to mean that all that Remembrance points to is the thing remembered, and not to the fact of its being due to the same sense-organ that had brought about the original cognition.

Sūṭrā (14).

[*Answer*]—INASMUCH AS REMEMBRANCE IS A QUALITY OF THE SOUL, THE DENIAL (OF SOUL) IS NOT RIGHT. (Sū. 14).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (14).

[P. 134, L. 2 to P. 135, L. 9.]

Inasmuch as the act of Remembering is found to be such as appears only as a quality subsisting in the Soul, the existence of the Soul cannot be denied. As a matter of fact,* Remembrance is possible only as a quality subsisting in the Soul; and certainly one does not *remember* what has been perceived by another.† If then, Intelligence belonged to the Sense-organs,—inasmuch as the several apprehensions of things would be by diverse agents (in the shape of the Sense-organs), either there could be no *Recognition* at all, or even if Recognition were possible (even when Perception and Remembrance belonged to diverse agents), there could be no restriction as to objects (perceived through the Sense-organs)‡ [there is no such incongruity under the view that there is a single intelligent Agent for all cognitions and remembrance; for] the fact of the matter is that there is one intelligent agent (in whom the cognitions subsist), perceiving the several things, through the diverse instrumentality (of the several Sense-organs)§—who *remembers* the things *perceived* on some past occasion; so that the existence of Remembrance is possible only as a quality subsisting in the Soul, when perception and recognition both belong to the same Agent, who is capable of perceiving several things; and it is not possible under the contrary theory (of there being no such single Agent). And the entire business

* '*Yadi*' here signifies *certainty*.—*Bhāṣyachandra*.

† Any mere momentary 'Soul,' or the mere object '*Jar*,' cannot bring about a remembrance in itself; for perception and remembrance can not appear at the same moment of time.—*Bhāṣyachandra*.

‡ There could be no such restriction as that the Eye should apprehend *Colour only*, and not *Taste*; and yet such restriction is accepted by both parties.—*Bhāṣyachandra*.

§ The *Bhāṣyachandra* explains '*bhinnanimiṭṭaḥ*' as meaning 'subsisting in several bodies (during the several lives on Earth)'. But its appears simpler to take it as above—'through the diverse instrumentality of the several sense-organs,' which the *Bhāṣyachandra* takes as implied in '*Anēkārṭhadarshi*.'

of living beings, which is based upon Remembrance, indicates the existence of the Soul;—the 'excitation of another sense-organ' being cited only by way of illustration.

'Further [the assertion of the Opponent cannot be accepted], *because it does not take into account the real object of Remembrance*.* As a matter of fact, the assertion in Sū. 13, that "Remembrance has for its object the remembered thing,"—has been made without due consideration of what forms the real object of Remembrance.† As a matter of fact, *Remembrance*, which appears at the time when the thing (remembered) is not actually apprehended, and which appears in the form—'I knew *that* thing' or 'I had cognised *that* thing,' or '*that* thing had been cognised by me,' or 'I had a cognition in regard to *that* thing,'—has for its object, merely the *thing* alone by itself, but the thing *as previously cognised* and *as along with the notion of the cogniser*,—the above fourfold statement, which indicates the exact nature of the object of Remembrance, serves one and the same purpose; all of them comprehend the *cogniser* ('I'), the previous *cognition* ('knew before') and the *thing* ('this').‡ Then again, as a matter of fact, the Remembrance (or Recognition) that appears in regard to a perceived thing comprehends three cognitions in connection with the same thing, and all these cognitions have the same cognising agent; they do not have several

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* The printed text prints this as Sū. 15. But there is no such Sūṭra in the *Nyāyasūchīnibandha*, nor in the Sū. Mss. The *Bhāṣyachandra* also does not treat it as Sūṭra; and the *Nyāyasūṭravivaraṇa* calls it *Bhāṣyakārīyam Sūṭram*. It is only Vishvanāṭha who reads it as Sūṭra.

† Having shown above that without Soul, there can be no Remembrance, the *Bhāṣya* now proceeds to refute the Opponent's assertion that "Remembrance has for its object the remembered thing, and not the Soul."—*Ṭāṭparya*.

‡ Of the four statements, in the second—*jñāṭavānahamamumarṭham*, the Cogniser is expressed by the verbal affix in '*Jñāṭavān*;'—in the third '*ayamarṭho mayājñāṭaḥ*' the thing cognised is expressed by the verbal affix in '*jñāṭaḥ*;—in the fourth '*asminnarṭhē mama jñānamabhūṭ*' the act of cognising is expressed by the verbal affix in '*jñānam*;' and in the first, the *cogniser* is expressed by the conjugational affix in '*ajñāsiṣam*.' The Bhāṣya uses the singular number in *ēṭadvākyam*, in view of the fact that the agent in all is one and the same.—*Bhāṣyachandra*.

All serve the same purpose of indicating the *cogniser*, the *cognition* and the *cognised*.—*Ṭāṭparya*.

agents. Nor are they without agents; they all have one and the same Agent.* [The Recognition of a thing is always in the form] 'What I see now I had seen before;' in this the term 'I had seen before' implies *seeing* (in the past as also the *recalled conception of that seeing*; so that the statement 'I have seen this before' could not be made if the *seeing* referred to were not of that same person (who makes the statement); the statement 'I have seen this before' involves (as we have seen) two conceptions (the *seeing* and the recalled notion of it), and the statement 'what I see now' represents a third conception; thus the single act of Recognition, involving as it does three conceptions, cannot but belong to a single Agent; it could not belong to several Agents; nor could it be entirely without an Agent. Thus we find that when the Opponent makes the statement—'there is no Soul, because Remembrance has for its object the remembered thing,' (Sū. 13)—he denies a well-known fact, and loses sight of the real object of Remembrance (as just explained). As we have seen above, the Recognition (expressed by the sentence 'I have seen this before') is not mere 'Remembrance;' nor has it for its object the 'remembered thing' only; † in fact it involves
Bha. P. 135 a recognition or recalling of the direct *cognition* (the present *seeing*) as also of the *remembrance* (of the past *seeing*),—all this belonging to a single cogniser; that is to say, a single cogniser, being cognisant of all the factors (involved in the conception under consideration), recalls the several cognitions as belonging to (and subsisting in) himself; for instance, he it is who has such notions as—'I shall cognise such and such a thing,' 'I am cognising the thing,' 'I have cognised the thing;' and lastly, not having cognised for a long time, and having an intense desire for cognising it, he comes to have the notion 'I have

* The preceding passage having shown that the Pūrvapakṣa view is against verbal usage, the Author now shows that it is against a perceptible fact also. Here 'Remembrance' '*Smṛiti*' stands for *Recognition*; the name being applied to this latter on the ground of its resemblance to Remembrance.—*Bhāṣyachandra*.

† The *Bhāṣyachandra* explains this sentence to mean that 'the recognition is not mere Remembrance *without an object*, nor has it the remembered thing alone for its object.' But from what follows, it appears better to take the sentence as translated. *The Bhāṣyachandra* has itself pointed out that in the present context the term '*Smṛiti*' 'Remembrance' generally stands for *Recognition*. 'स्मर्तव्यमात्रविषयंवा" the reading of three Mss. and of the *Bhāṣyachandra*, gives better sense.

discovered the real character of the thing' [So far in regard to the recognition of the cognition which has been shown to be pertaining to all three points of time]. Similarly, the same Agent also recognises or recalls the Remembrance, which also pertains to all three points of time, and is accompanied by *the desire to remember.*

Now if the Being (who is the Agent in all these several cognitions and recognitions) were a mere 'series of impressions' (as the Opponent holds),—inasmuch as every 'Impression' would (by its nature) disappear as soon as it has come into existence, there could not be a single 'Impression' which could do the apprehending of the Cognition and the Remembrance,—which apprehending has been shown to pertain to all three points of time; and without such comprehending (by a signle Agent) there could be no Recognition (or Recalling) of Cognition or of Remembrance; and there would be no such conception as 'I' (*see, shall* see and *have seen*) or 'My' (*cognition is, was* and *shall be*); just in the same way as we have no such conceptions (as 'I' and 'Mine') with regard to the bodies of other persons *

From the above we conclude that there is a single Agent cognising all things and subsisting in all the bodies (with which a person is endowed during his numerous lives on Earth), who recalls numerous cognitions and remembrances; and by reason of whose absence in the bodies of other persons, there is no recalling (of the cognitions and remembrances of other persons).

Vārtika on Sū. (14).

[P. 365, L. 11 to P. 366, L. 11].

Inasmuch as Remembrance is &c.—says the Sūtra. As a matter of fact, Remembrance does not proceed from the *remembered thing* only; for if it did, then in a case where the man has the remembrance of a thing in the past, this remembrance would be entirely baseless (having nothing to subsist in, as the thing is not present at the time); and yet

* The *Bhāṣyachandra* explains '*ḍehāntaravat*' differently;—'It should not be forgotten that in the past and present bodies (of an individual) there runs the same Soul.' But it appears much simpler to take the phrase as in the translation.

it is not possible for it to be baseless, being, as it is, a quality; as a matter of fact, no quality is ever found to be without a substratum. It could not be held to subsist in the *Sense-organ*, as the original cognition was not apprehended by the Sense-organ [which, *ex-hypothesi*, being a transient thing, could not, at the time of remembrance, be the same that did the original apprehending]; nor could it subsist in the *thing*, as this also is non-existent (at the time); nor lastly, could it subsist in the *body*, because all qualities of the body are perceptible to all persons, to the person to whom the body belongs as well as to other persons [while the Remembrance of one man is not cognised by another person]. And yet Remembrance, being a quality, cannot exist without a substratum; nor can it be said that there is no such thing as *Remembrance*. From all this it is clear that the existence of Remembrance cannot be explained except on the hypothesis that there is such a thing as *Soul*.

What we have said above also answers the following question of the Opponent—"how do you know that the power of bringing about Remembrance belongs to an entity different from the Body, the Sense-organ and the Object?" Because the Soul is possessed of such power, which consists in its being the substratum of Remembrance. Remembrance, being a product, could never subsist without a substratum; every product that we see,—*e.g.*, Milk and the like—we see subsisting in a certain substratum.

This same reasoning (which proves the Soul as being the substratum of Remembrance) refutes the following *Kārikā* (of the Bauḍḍha)—"Any such entity in which

Var. P. 366.

Cognition would subsist, exists neither in the Eye (the organ), nor in colour (the thing Cognised), nor anywhere between the two; in fact it neither exists, nor is it non-existent."* Further to assert that a certain thing *neither*

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* According to the Bauḍḍha, any substratum of Cognitions is *Apratisaṅkhyēya*, *indeterminable*, you cannot determine what it is and where it is, nor whether it is an entity or a non-entity.

exists nor is it non-existent is a contradiction in terms. Nor can this *Kārika* be taken as denying the fact that Cognition is something that must subsist in something. "Why so?" Because it denies only particulars; as a matter of fact, the denial—'it does not subsist in the Eye or in Colour'—is only with regard to certain particular things. If Cognition were such as subsisted absolutely without a substratum, then any such particular denial as is contained in the statement—'it does not subsist *in the Eye &c.*,'—would be absolutely futile; for who has ever held the view that Cognition subsists in the Eye or in Colour—against whom such a denial could be addressed? In fact, when we come to consider the denial of substratum for Cognitions (as put forward in the *Kārikā*), we find that it actually proves the existence of the Soul; as the statement in the *Kārikā* can have no meaning, except on the supposition that Cognition subsists in the Soul.

Or, the Sūṭra may be taken as showing how a single entity can apprehend and recognise a number of things,—as has been explained above.

The rest is explained in the *Bhāṣya*.

Section (4).

[Sūṭras 15-16.]

The Soul is something different from the Mind.

Sūṭra (15).

[*Says the Opponent*]—"THE CONCLUSION OF THE SIḌḌHANṬIN CANNOT BE ACCEPTED; AS THE REASONS ADDUCED IN SUPPORT OF THE NOTION OF 'SOUL' ARE ALL APPLICABLE TO THE MIND.* (Sū. 15.)

* Our numbering of the Sūṭras should now be one less than that of the printed edition of the Bhāṣya; as we have not taken as 'Sūṭra,' what figures there as Sū. (15).

Bhāṣya on Sū. 15.
[P. 135, Ll. 11-14.]

"There can be no such thing as Soul distinct from the "*Aggregate* of Body, Mind and the Sense-organs, (severally "or collectively).*—Why so?—*Because the reasons adduced "in support of the notion of 'Soul' are all applicable to the "Mind.* Inasmuch as the reasons that have been put "forward in Sūṭras 3-1-1, *et seq.*, in proof of the existence "of the Soul, are applicable to the Mind,—and as a matter "of fact, the Mind is actually found capable of apprehending "all things,† it follows that the Soul is nothing different "from the Aggregate of Body, Sense-organs, Mind and "Sensation."

Vārṭika on Sū. 15.
[No. P. 866, Ll. 13-15.]

"*The conclusion cannot be accepted &c. &c.*—says the "Sūtra. The meaning is that, the reasons that have been "adduced by you in proof of the existence of the Soul are all "applicable to the Mind. Consequently it is not proved "that the Soul is something different from the Mind."

Sūṭra 16.

[*Answer*]—INASMUCH AS THE INSTRUMENTS OF COGNITION CAN BELONG ONLY TO THE COGNISER, IT IS MERELY A DIFFERENCE IN NAMES. (Sū. 16).

Bhāṣya on Sū. 16.
[P. 135, L. 16—L. 23.]

[The Siḍḍhānṭin answers]—It is a well-known fact that the *Instruments of Cognition* belong to the *Cogniser*,—a fact which is vouched for by such expressions as 'he sees with the eye,' 'he smells with the nose,' 'he touches with the tactile organ.'—Similarly the Mind also is known to be only

* The reading देहादिसंघात gives better sense, though the two Puri Mss. and the *Bhāṣyachanḍra* read simply संघात. 'Severally or collectively' has been added by way of explanation, by the *Bhāṣyachanḍra*.

† 'Internal things' like Pleasure, Pain, &c., and 'external things,' like the Jar and the rest, are all found to be amenable to the cognitive action of the Mind; without the action of Mind, no cognition of any kind is possible.

an 'Instrument,' by means of which the *Conceiver* (the Agent who does the *seeing* &c. with the Visual and other organs) does the *conceiving* of all things; and on that account this Instrument also naturally operates on all things; and it is *by means of this Mind* that the *Conceiver* does the *conceiving.** Such being the case, it appears to us that while admitting the existence of the *Cogniser*, you do not bear the idea of his being named 'Soul,' and you give him the name 'Mind';—and though admitting that there is an *instrument of conceiving*, you cannot bear its being named 'Mind.' So that it turns out to be a mere question of names,—there being no difference of opinion as to the thing, the *Cognising Soul*, itself.† If, however, you deny what has been said above, that would mean the dropping out of all Sense-organs; that is to say, if you deny that to the Conceiver of all things there belongs an instrument which brings about the *conceiving* of all things,—and hold that there is so such instrument,—then a similar denial may be made in regard to the instruments of the cognition of *Colour* &c. also, and this would mean the total denial of all Sense-organs. ‡

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* None of the readings given in the printed text is satisfactory. The best reading is supplied by the two Puri Mss.—एवम्मन्तुः सर्वविषयमतिसाधनम्मनः करणभूतं सर्वविषयं विद्यते येनायम्मन्यत इति.

The *Tāṭparya* says—The term '*maṭi*,' 'conceiving,' stands here for *remembrance* and *Inferential Cognition*; and even though the immediate cause of these consist in the impressions left by previous Perceptions, yet being *cognitions*, like the cognition of Colour, they must be brought about by the instrumentality of an organ; and as such cognitions are found to appear also while the Visual and other organs are in operation, it follows that the organ by which those cognitions are brought about is different from those organs.

The *Parishuḍḍhi* adds—Even though the term '*maṭi*' is synonymous with '*jnāna*' and '*buḍḍhi*'—all three standing for *Cognition*—yet what is meant by '*maṭi*' in the present context is *direct cognition*, such as is preceded by a *desire to cognise*; and such a cognition cannot but be brought about by the instrumentality of some operative substance in contact with the body [and this substance is the Mind, the organ of conception].

The *Bhāṣyachanḍra* takes 'maṭi,' 'conceiving,' as standing for the cognising of Pleasure and Pain, in which the Mind is the only organ concerned.

† For अर्थे, the Bhāṣyachandra and the two Mss. read आत्मनि.

‡ The *organ of vision* is postulated for the explaining of colour-cognition; the organ of smell for that of smell cognition; and similarly the Mind is postulated for the explaining of the conception of Pleasure and Pain. All these 'organs' thus standing on the same footing, if you deny one you must deny all.

Vārṭika on Sū. 16.
[P. 366, L. 17 to P. 367, L. 3]

You admit the existence of the *Cognising Agent*, and hence also that of the *Instruments of Cognition*, in the shape of the Eye and the rest; exactly in the same manner, you can admit of the existence of the *Conceiving Agent*, and hence also of the *Instrument of Conception*; and this 'instrument of Conception' is the Mind. So that it is a mere question of different names. If (with a view to escape from this) you were to hold that the *Conceiver* (which according to you is the *Mind*) does the *conceiving* without an instrument, then the *Cogniser* also could do the *cognising* without instruments; which would mean the dropping out of all Sense-organs.

Sūṭra 17.

THERE IS NO REASON IN SUPPORT OF ANY DIFFERENTIATION. (Sū. 17.)

Bhāṣya on Sū. 17.
[P. 136, L. 1 to L. 9.]

[Between the organs of Vision &c. on the one hand and the organ of Conceiving on the other] the Opponent makes a distinction: while he admits that for the *Cogniser* there are instruments or organs for the *cognising* of Colour &c., he denies that there is any instrument for the *conceiving* of all things. And there is no reason, or justification, for any such differentiation; there is no reason on the strength of which we could accept any such differentiation (between the two sets of organs). As a matter of fact, Pleasure &c. are objects (of Cognition) different from such objects as Colour and the rest; so that it follows that for their cognition there should be an organ different from the organs for the cognition of the latter; the fact that Smell is not cognised by means of the Visual Organ leads us to conclude that there is a distinct organ in the shape of the Olfactory Organ; the fact that Taste is not cognised by means of the Visual and Olfactory Organs leads us to conclude that there is a distinct organ in the shape

of the Gestatory Organ; and so on with the other organs of Perception;—exactly in the same manner, the fact that Pleasure &c. are not cognised by means of the Visual and other organs, should lead us to conclude that there is a distinct organ (for the perceiving of Pleasure &c.); and this organ is the one whose existence is indicated by the non-simultaneity of Cognitions (see Sū. 1. 1. 16); that organ which serves as the instrument of the Cognition of Pleasure &c. is that one whose existence is proved by the fact that no two cognitions appear at the same point of time; that is to say, it is only by reason of the fact that at one time the said organ is in contact with only one Sense-organ, and not with another, that no two cognitions are found to appear at the same point of time. From all this it is clear that what has been asserted in the foregoing *Sūṭra*—that 'the reasons adduced in support of the Soul are applicable to the Mind'—is not true.

Vārṭika on Sū. 17.

[P. 367, L. 5 to L. 19].

There is no reason in support of any differentiation—says the Sūṭra. The Opponent makes the distinction that 'while the act of *conceiving* is done without an instrument, the act of *cognising* is not so"; but there is no reason justifying such distinction. On the contrary, we have the following reason in support of the view that as the act of *cognising*, so that of *conceiving* also is done with an instrument:—As a matter of fact, Pleasure &c., as *objects* (of Perception), are different (in nature) from Colour &c.; so that there must be an instrument whereby the Perception of them is brought about; for it is found in the case of the cognition of such things as Colour and the rest, that no cognition of any object is ever brought about without an instrument;—[while there is this argument in support of the view that the Perception of Pleasure &c. stands on the same footing as the perception of Colour &c.] there is no reason in support of any differentiation, such as "the perceptions of Pleasure &c, are brought about without an instrument, and not so those of Colour &c."

Says the Opponent—"If every cognition should be held to have an instrument, then the cognition of the *Mind* also should have another instrument, as the Mind is the *object* (of that Cognition)."*

Our answer to this objection is—Yes, there *is* an instrument for the Cognition of Mind also. "What is that instrument?" It is that whereby the Mind is cognised. "By what is the Mind cognised?" It is cognised by (inferred from) the impossibility of cognitions appearing simultaneously.† In the case of one who has the direct perception of Mind, the instrument (of that perception) consists of the *Mind-Soul contact* as aided by certain faculties born of *yogic* practices; and the exact character of these faculties being beyond our ken, we need not stop to consider in what manner they aid the Mind (in its perception) ‡ This same explanation also applies to the

* "And it will not be right to regard the Mind itself as the instrument of its own Cognition; as no instrument is ever found to operate upon itself. If then, another instrument is postulated, then for the cognition of that instrument also we shall require an instrument; and so on *ad infinitum*. In view of all this it is best to regard the Cognition of Pleasure &c. as being without an instrument."—*Tātparya*.

† Mind is cognised, not by perception, but by *inference*, and this inference is from the fact that cognitions do not appear simultaneously (see Sū. 1. 1. 16).

When an effect is produced by the presence of the Cause, that effect brings about the cognition of the cause. Similarly when the cognition of *what indicates the Mind* (i. e. the non-simultaneity of cognitions) is brought about by the presence of Mind, the cognition of Mind obtained by means of the said *indicative* is one that must be due to the existence of Mind. Nor does this involve the contingency of the Mind operating upon itself; for Mind is not the instrument in the *existence of Mind*; nor is Mind the instrument in the cognition of Mind; and it is only in these two cases that the Mind could be said to operate upon itself. The fact is that in the Cognition of Mind the instrument consists of the *Mind along with the cognition of its indicative*; and certainly the Mind *so qualified* is not the same as the Mind alone by itself.—*Tātparya*.

‡ The *Parishuḍḍhi* is not satisfied with this explanation. It says—Some people have held the view that faculties born of yogic practices are beyond our ken. But this is not right. No amount of yogic power can relieve an absurd contingency of its incongruous character. The only difference between us ordinary men and the yogin is that while our powers are beset with difficulties and obstructed by obstacles, those

case of the *Cognition of* the Soul,—in which also Mind-Soul contact forms the instrument.

From the above it follows that the Soul exists and it is something distinct (from the Body &c.); that it is many (and not one) also follows from the same facts,—viz. (a) 'one and the same thing is apprehended by touch and vision' (Sū. 1), (b) 'What is seen by one is not remembered by another', and (c) 'There would be no sin accruing from the burning of a body';—all this becomes explicable on the theory that there are *several* Souls.

Section (5).

The Soul is eternal.

(Sūṭras 18—26.)

Bhāṣya on Sū. (18.)

[P. 136, L. 9—P. 137, L. 2].

[The question now arises]—The Soul, which has been proved to be something distinct from the Aggregate of the Body, &c.—is it eternal or non-eternal? "Why should

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of the yogin are not so obstructed; but that does *not* mean that the yogin can go against the nature of things. [Hence even with the aid of yogic powers the Mind could not serve as the instrument in its own cognition]. Other people have offered the explanation that one Mind is perceived by the instrumentality of another Mind; this is how we can avoid the contingency of an instrument operating upon itself. But this view has been clearly rejected by Vachaspati Mishra. The real explanation therefore of the cognition of Mind lies in this that in the case of ordinary men, while what forms the *object of cognition* is the Mind *by itself*, that which forms the *instrument* is the Mind *as along with the notion of its indicative*,—and in the case of the yogin also the Mind *by itself* is the *object* of cognition, while the Mind *as aided by faculties born of yoga* is the *instrument*. So that in both cases we have the same explanation that the *Mind by itself* is not the same as the *Mind as accompanied or qualified by something else*; and hence there is no operating of any thing upon itself. It further goes on to controvert the very conception that one and same thing cannot be both *object* and *instrument*. There is no incompatibility between the two: a thing is called 'instrument' when it is operated by the Agent; and it is called 'object' when there bears upon it the effect of an action not subsisting in, or belonging to, itself; and certainly there is no incompatibility between these two: a thing can very well be operated by an agent, and yet bear upon itself the effects of an action not subsisting in itself.

there be a doubt on this point?" This doubt arises from the fact that both are seen; that is to say, things known to exist are found to be of both kinds,—some eternal and others non-eternal; so that it having been proved that the Soul exists, the doubt remains (as to its being eternal or non-eternal).

The answer to the above question is that those same arguments that have proved the Soul's existence also go to prove its previous existence (prior to its being endowed with the present body),—as is clear from the modifications undergone by this body (during all which the Soul's personality is recognised to be the same);*—and this Soul must exist also after the perishing of this body. "Why so?"

Sūṭra (18).

BECAUSE THE NEW-BORN INFANT EXPERIENCES JOY, FEAR AND SORROW,—WHICH COULD FOLLOW ONLY FROM THE CONTINUITY OF REMEMBRANCE OF WHAT HAS BEEN REPEATEDLY GONE THROUGH BEFORE. (Sū. 18).

As a matter of fact, it is found that when an infant is born, he actually experiences joy, fear and sorrow, even though during his present life he has not perceived anything that could give rise to joy, fear or sorrow; and that he actually

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*'*Ḍēhabhēḍāṭ*' has been explained by the *Ṭāṭparya* as follows:—The continuity of the Soul's previous existence we deduce from the fact that during present life, while the body is seen to be changed, from childhood to youth and from youth to old age, the ensouling personality is *recognised* to be the same; so that the 'Recognition,' which has been found to supply the principal argument in support of the Soul's existence, is also found to supply the argument for its existence prior to its being endowed with the present body.

The *Bhāṣyachanḍra* offers two explanations—(1) by one it makes *prāgḍēhabhēḍaṭ* as one compound, meaning 'because the present body (in youth) is different from the one that preceded it (in childhood)'; and (2) by the second it separates '*prāk*' and takes it as qualifying '*avasṭhānam*.' The sense of the reasoning is the same in both cases; which is in keeping with the explanation supplied by the *Ṭāṭparya*. The second *ḍehābhēḍāṭ* refers to the *perishing of the Body.*

The *Parishuḍḍhi* suggests also another explanation of *ḍehābhēdāt*: 'The fact of recognition proves the existence of the Recognising Agent, *because the Body is something different* from that Agent.'

experiences these is inferred from certain clear indicatives;* —these experiences could proceed only from the continuity of remembrance, and not from any other source;†—this 'continuity of remembrance' again could not but be due to previous repeated experience; and the 'previous experience' could be possible only during a previous life;—so that from all this it follows that the personality continues to exist even of after the perishing of the body.‡

Vārtika on Sū. (18).

[P. 368, L. 1 to P. 369, L. 15].

The question arises—is the Soul, which has been proved to be something different from the Aggregate of Body &c., eternal or non-eternal? [An initial objection is raised against the whole section]—"The Author of the Bhāṣya has explained this doubt as arising from the fact that *both are seen.* But such a doubt appears to be wholly unjustifiable. The arguments that have been adduced to prove that the Soul exists and that it is something distinct also prove that the Soul continues to remain the same while the Body changes;—and this having been already established, there is no need for proceeding with the present section."§

* These 'indicatives' are in the form of 'smiling' and 'crying.' The inference being in the form—'the state of infancy belongs to a Soul experiencing joy, fear and sorrow,—because it is accompanied by smiles and cries.'

Inferred from such indications as closing of the Eyes, throwing up of arms and legs, and crying'—*Bhāṣyachandra.*

† The infant's feeling of joy can only be accounted for as being due to his remembering the pleasant experiences of his previous life.

‡ The facts adduced prove that the Soul in the infant's body is one that has had a previous life and body; so that it is proved that after the perishing of that previous body, the Soul has continued to exist.

§ "The Siddhāntin has proved that the Soul is something different from the Body, the Sense-organs, and the Mind, he has also proved that while the Body changes from infancy to youth and from youth to old age, the ensouling personality continues to be recognised as the same; and from this it follows as a necessary corrollary that even on the perishing of the Body, the Soul would continue to remain. And as this is the sole purpose of the present section, this section need not have been proceeded with at all."—*Tātparya.*

[*Answer*]—Cerainly it would not be right, not to proceed with the present section. "Why?" Because while (it is true that) the arguments adduced prove the continuity of the Soul from birth to death, they do not prove that it continues to exist also on the perishing of the Body. And it is with a view to prove this that we have the next Sūṭra—'*because the new-born infant experiences Joy* &c.

The meaning of the Sūṭra is as follows:—When the infant is just born, his sense-organs are incapable of apprehending things; and yet he is found to be experiencing joy, fear and sorrow,—these being inferred from such indicatives as smiling, trembling and crying (respectively);—these can arise only from the continuity of remembrance, and there can be such continuity of remembrance only if there has been a previous body. The 'birth' (of a person) consists in his becoming connected with Body, Sense-organs, Intelligence and Sensation,—all these appearing in an aggregated form.—'Joy' consists in the feeling of pleasure at the obtaining of a desired object after a deep longing for it;*— 'Fear' is the feeling of helplessness that one has when he is anxious to get rid of the causes tending to bring about undesirable things, and finds himself unable to do so.—When one has become separated from a desired thing, and he finds that he is unable to regain it, the feeling that he has is called 'sorrow.'—It is the *experiencing* of these feelings that is spoken of by the term '*sampratipaṭṭi*' (in the Sūṭra). There is what is called '*abhyāsa*,' 'repetition,' when there are several cognitions of either the same thing or the same form of thing; e.g., it is said 'he has had a repeated taste of paddy' [where it is not the same individual paddy that has been repeatedly

* 'The term *prārṭhanā*, '*longing*' has been added, because there is Joy, not so much at the obtaining of a desired object, as at obtaining it after one has had a deep longing for it'—*Ṭāṭparya*.

tasted, but the same kind of paddy]. We have what is called 'remembrance,' when, after direct perception has ceased, an idea appears subsequently in regard to the same thing; and it is 'recognition' when there is direct perception of the thing along with its remembrance. By 'continuity' is meant the faculty or impression which brings about the remembrance. 'Smile' consists in the joyous expression of the Eyes &c. following on the remembrance of something that has given pleasure and is considered desirable;—and 'crying' consists in a particular kind of sound accompanied by the shedding of tears, and the throwing about of the arms and legs. [These are indicative of the continued Existence of the Soul].

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An objection is raised—"Inasmuch as *Smiling* and *Crying* subsist in entirely different things, they cannot prove the desired conclusion." If you mean by this that—"*Smiling* and *Crying* subsist in *infancy* and *infancy* does not belong to the Soul, hence subsisting in a totally different substratum, *Smiling* and *Crying* cannot prove anything in regard to the Soul,"—then, our answer is that this is not right; because what is meant to be proved (by *Smiling* and *Crying*) is the presence, *in infancy*, of a Soul affected by Joy and Sorrow;—the form of the desired conclusion is—'*the state of infancy is endowed with a Soul affected by joy and sorrow, &c., because it is accompanied by smiling and crying*, and 'infancy' is a certain condition or property of age; just like 'youth.'

What has been said above applies also to the conclusion in the form that—'infancy is endowed with a Soul possessed of remembrance, faculty, previous cognitions and connection with a former body.' "How so?" Just as the presence of *smiling* and *crying* proves that infancy is endowed with a Soul affected by Joy and Sorrow,—similarly 'the presence of Soul affected by Joy and Sorrow' proves the exis-

tence of the Soul possessed of *remembrance* ;—the presence of the Soul possessed of remembrance proves the presence of Soul endowed with faculty; this latter fact proves the presence of Soul endowed with previous Cognitions; and the latter proves the presence of Soul endowed with connection with a former Body. In each of these, 'youth' serves as the corroborative Example; since Youth is accompanied by *smiling and crying* and it is also endowed with a Soul affected by joy and sorrow, &c.; and so with every other form of conclusion noted above.

Sutra (19).

[*Objection*]—"WHAT HAS BEEN PUT FORWARD IS ONLY A VARIATION (OF THE TRANSIENT SOUL), RESEMBLING THE VARIATIONS OF OPENING AND CLOSING UNDERGONE BY THE LOTUS AND OTHER FLOWERS."—(19.)

Bhāṣya on Su. 19.
[P. 137, L. 4 to L. 12].

[Says the Opponent]—"In the case of such transient things as the Lotus and the like, we find that they undergo such modifications as opening and closing; in the same manner the *transient* Soul may be said to undergo variations in the form of experiencing joy and sorrow, [which therefore cannot prove the eternality of the Soul]."

This contention is not right; as there is no reason. That is to say, it cannot be shown that—"for such and such a reason the experiencing of joy and sorrow by the Soul is to be regarded only as a variation of it, like the variations of opening and closing undergone by the Lotus and other flowers;"—in support of such a conclusion there is no Reason based upon any kind of instance, analogous or otherwise.*

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* Under Sutras 1, 1, 34—35 it has been shown that a Reason that can prove a conclusion must be based upon well-known corroborative instances,—these instances being either *per* similarity or *per* dissimilarity, and as matter of fact, in support of the assertion put forward in this Sutra, by the Opponent, there can be no Reason of either of these two kinds; and the mere citing of the example (of Lotus) cannot prove anything. [An example is effective only as pointing to and corroborating a Reason or Premiss].—*Bhaṣyachandra.*

So that, in the absence of a Reason, what has been urged can only be regarded as irrelevant and futile. Then again, the instance cited does not do away with what we have put forward as the cause of the Joy, &c.; that is to say, what has been pointed out is that in the case of every ordinary (grown-up) person it is found that in connection with objects already experienced in the past there are feelings of joy, &c., brought about by the continuity of remembrance;—and certainly this fact is not set aside by the mere citing of the case of the closing of the Lotus, &c.; and [when this cannot be set aside or denied in the case of ordinary grown-up men] it cannot be denied in the case of the new-born infant also.* Further, the 'opening and closing' of the Lotus consist only in certain 'conjunctions and disjunctions' of its petals, which are brought about by a certain action†; and action must have a cause, as is clearly inferrable from the fact that it is an *action* [similarly the action of the child's smiling, &c. must have a cause, and this cause can only be the remembering of past experiences].‡ Such being the ease, what does the citing of the instance (of Lotus, &c.) serve to set aside? [Since it is found only to *support* the view of the *Siddhāntin*].

Vārtika on Sū. (19).
[P. 369, L. 17 to P. 370, L. 16].

" *What has been put forward is only a variation, &c. &c.*—" says the Sutra. What the Sūtra means is that, inasmuch "as we find variations appearing in *transient* things also,

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* This appears to be the simple meaning of this sentence. But according to the *Bhāṣyachandra* it means as follows:—'Just as it cannot be denied that the action of closing, &c. of the Lotus is due to a certain cause, so also it cannot be denied that the infant's action of smiling is due to a certain cause.' This argument, however, is clearly put in the next sentence of the *Bhāṣya*.

† The reading of the printed text is unsatisfactory; the right reading is supplied by the two Puri Mss., which is also supported by the *Bhāṣyachandra* क्रियाजाताश्च संयोगविभागाः प्रबोधसम्मीलने.

‡ This passage is a little obscure; all manuscripts, except Puri B, read क्रियाहेतुश्च क्रियानुमेयः as in the printed text; Puri Ms. B, reads क्रियाहेतुश्चजातत्यानुमेयः which means—'that there is such cause in the shape of Action, (for the said conjunctions and disjunctions), is clearly inferred from the fact that these are actually brought about, [and nothing can be brought except by the force of an action].'

"what has been urged (in the the preceding Sūṭra, as prov-
"ing the eternality of the Soul) does not necessarily prove
"the desired conclusion. 'What is *opening* and what is
"*closing*?' When there is disjunction among the parts
"of the flower-petals, but not to the extent of total disrup-
"tion of the flower, there is what is called 'opening'; and
"when there is a conjunction among the petals, which still
"continue to constitute the flower, there is what is called
"'closing'."

There is no force in the Opponent's argument put forward (in the present Sūṭra); because none of the alternatives possible under it is admissible (as an effective argument against the *Siḍḍhānṭa*). The reasoning put forward is that 'what have been urged by the Siḍḍhānṭin are only variations of the Soul like the variations of the lotus in the shape of its opening and closing';—now is this example meant to prove conclusion (contrary to the Siḍḍhānṭa)? Or is it meant only to show that the premiss put up by *Siḍḍhānṭin* is not true? If it is meant to prove a conclusion,—the mere citing of an example cannot prove anything, unless some Reason is put forward; hence the instance cited by the Opponent cannot prove anything. If, on the other hand, it is meant to point out a defect (in the Siḍḍhānṭa argument),—then, in that case, (a) is it meant to deny a perceptible cause (for the infant's smiling &c.)? (b) Or is it meant to show that there are other causes (than the one suggested by the Siḍḍhānṭin)? (c) Or is it meant to embody an inference in support of the view that the Soul is liable to birth and destruction? (d) Or, lastly, is it meant to show that the smiling &c. (urged by the Siḍḍhānṭin) are merely fortuitous (like the opening and closing of the lotus)? (a) If it is meant to deny a perceptible cause, this cannot be right; because what the Siḍḍhānṭin

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has put forward is actually qualified as being *perceptible*; that is to say, what he has put forward is that—'inasmuch it is *perceived* in the case of the grown-up person, that whenever there are smiling and crying, there is present also the Soul affected by joy and sorrow, on the analogy of this we infer that when we *perceive* smiling and crying in the new-born infant, there must be present a Soul affected by joy and sorrow;* and certainly there is nothing objectionable in this. (b) *Secondly*, if the instance is cited with a view to show that there are other causes,—even that would not be right; for the very same reason that what has been put forward by the Siḍḍhānṭin is what is actually *seen*. (c) *Thirdly*, if the instance is cited with a view to show that the Soul is liable to birth and destruction,—that again cannot be right; for as a matter of fact, the Soul is a substance and is ever incorporeal, and as such, like *Ākāsha*, it must be without cause (*i.e.*, without beginning or end).† If (in opposition to this) it be contended that the Soul is a product, then it behoves you to point out its cause, for the simple reason that every product has a cause; all products are found to have causes. (*d*) *Lastly*, if it is meant that the opening and closing of the Lotus are fortuitous [and similarly the smiling and crying of the infant must also be fortuitous],—the answer to this follows in the following *Sūṭra*.

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* When you say that you are putting forward the case of the opening and closing of the lotus with a view to deny the perceptible cause,—you admit the presence of a *perceptible* cause; and as a matter of fact, the Siḍḍhānṭin also does point out perceptible cause. Nor can the Opponent deny the force of what is actually perceived; for this would involve a self-contradiction on his part and also self-stultification, says the Parishuḍḍhi; for if what is perceived cannot prove anything, what point is there in citing the case of the 'opening and closing of the lotus', which also is only something that is perceived.

† Inasmuch as there is this valid argument in support of the conclusion that the Soul is without beginning or end, no amount of mere examples can shake that conclusion. The inference is in the form—'The Soul must be without beginning or end,—because it is an ever incorporeal substance,—like Ākāsha.'

Bhāṣya on Su. (20).
[P. 137, L. 12 to L. 21].

If it be held that what we mean is that the opening and closing of the Lotus are variations without any cause, and similarly the Soul's feeling of joy and sorrow also;—this

CANNOT * BE RIGHT; BECAUSE AS A MATTER OF FACT, ALL VARIATIONS OF THINGS CONSTITUTED BY THE FIVE RUDIMENTARY SUBSTANCES ARE DUE TO SUCH CAUSES AS COLD, HEAT, AND THE RAINY SEASON. (Sū. 20.)

In the case of things made up of the combination † of the five rudimentary substances,—such as the Lotus &c.,—it is found that their variations appear when heat, &c., are present, and they do not appear when these are not present‡; and from this it follows that the said variations cannot be without cause (fortuitous). In the same manner, the variations of joy, sorrow &c., should follow only from a cause; they cannot appear without cause. And as a matter of fact, there can be no cause for these variations save *the continuity of remembrance of what has been repeatedly gone through before.*

Nor will it be right to infer, on the basis of the instance cited (of Lotus &c.), that there must be causes for the producing and destroying of the Soul.§

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* Puri Mss. A and B, and the *Bhāṣyachandra* make this न part of the preceding *Bhāṣya*; while Sūṭra Ms. D, Puri Sūṭra Ms. the *Nyāya-sūch nibandha* and *Vishvanāṭha* make it part of the Sūṭra.

† '*Anugraha*' of the substances, consist in the *combining* together of their component particles—says the *Bhāṣyachandra.*

‡ The Lotus opens when touched by the heat of the Sun's rays; it closes when touched by the cold of the Moon's rays; and the *Kutaja* plant flowers when the rainy season is on.—*Bhāṣyachandra.*

§ Such an inference cannot be right; as the eternality of the Soul (and hence the impossibility of its being produced or destroyed) is proved by the phenomonon of Remembrance, which cannot be explained except on the basis of the eternality of Soul.—*Bhāṣyachandra.*

The *Bhāṣya* has added this in anticipation of the following argument—"You have proved that the variations of the Lotus, and also those of the Soul, proceed from a cause, and are not fortuitous; we accept that; but what do you say to this

From the above it is clear that Joy and Sorrow &c., cannot appear without a cause; and it is not possible to attribute these to any such other causes as Heat, Cold &c., (except the Continuity of Remembrance &c.) So that the view set up of the Opponent cannot be right.

Vārṭika on Su. (20).

[P. 370, L. 19 to P. 371, L. 4.]

What the Sūṭra means is that the variations of opening and closing in the Lotus cannot be fortuitous. And hence the citing of the instance cannot be an effective denial of anything at all.

Vār. P. 371.

The term '*pañchāṭmakavikārāṇām*' (in the Sūṭra) does not mean that the Lotus is a five-fold object;* what it means is that the Lotus comes into existence when there is combination of the five rudimentary substances; and it is on this ground that it has been called '*pañchāṭmaka*'; in reality there is no object that is 'five-fold' (in the former sense); as we shall explain later on.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (21).

[P. 137, L. 21 to P. 138, L. 8.]

For the following reason also the Soul should be regarded as eternal:—

Suṭra (21).

[THE SOUL MUST BE REGARDED AS ETERNAL] BECAUSE OF THE DESIRE FOR MILK FROM THE MOTHER'S BREAST, WHICH IS EVINCED (ON BIRTH) AFTER DEATH, † AND WHICH CAN ONLY BE DUE TO REPEATED FEEDING (in the past).—(Su. 21.)

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inference—'the Soul must be something produced and destroyed, because it undergoes variations,—like the Lotus'?"—This has been met by the *Bhāṣya* by pointing out that the citing of a mere example cannot prove anything at all, as already pointed out (P. 137, L. 6).

* पञ्चात्मकानि is the better reading.

† '*Prēṭya*'—after death; *i. e.*, in a person who, after having died, is just born again.'—*Bhāṣyachanḍra*.

In the infant just born we perceive a desire for the mother's milk,—the presence of such desire being indicated by the child's activities (in the shape of the moving of its hands and mouth towards the mother's breasts). This desire could not arise except from repeated experience in the past. "For what reason (should this be accepted)?" In the case of all living persons we find that when they are afflicted by hunger, there appears in them desire for food, which desire arises from continuity of remembrance due to repeated experiences in the past; now in the case of the new-born infant, the appearance of such desire cannot be explained except as being due to repeated experiences in a previous body;—and from this it is inferred that the infant had a body previous to his present one, in which body he had gone through repeated experiences of feeding (which has given rise to his present desire for milk). From all this it follows that what happens is that the Soul, having (at death) departed from his previous body, has become endowed with a new body, and on being afflicted with hunger, remembers his repeated feedings in the past, and (accordingly) desires the milk from the breast. Hence it cannot be true that there is a different soul to each of these bodies; it is the same Soul that continues to exist, even after the perishing of its former body.

Vārṭika on Sū (21).

[P. 371, L. 6 to L. 10.]

Because of desire for milk &c.—Says the *Sūṭra*.

In the newly-born child we see certain activities; and from this we infer the presence of desire for the mother's milk. Thus the desire is inferred from the activity,—the desire leads to the inference of remembrance of the past,—this remembrance leads to the inference of impressions,—the impressions to that of previous cognition,—and from this cognition we infer the existence of the previous body; the argument being formally stated as before.

"Why should this Sūṭra have been introduced, when is herein put forward has been already dealt with in Su. 3. 1. 18?"

There is no force in this objection; as the present Sūṭra explains in a more particular manner what was indicated only in a general way in the preceding Sūṭra. *

Suṭra (22).

[*Objection*]—" THE ACTION OF THE CHILD IS ONLY LIKE THE MOVING OF THE IRON TO THE MAGNET." (Sū. 22).

Bhāṣyā on Su. (22).

[P. 138, L. 10-11.]

"In the case of the Iron it is found that it moves "towards the Magnet, even without any repeated ex-"perience in the past; and similarly the desire (and con-"sequent activity) of the child for the mother's milk may "come about without any repeated experience in the past "[So that the activity of the new-born child does not "necessarily prove past experience]."

Vārṭika on Sū. 22.

[P. 371, L. 10 to P. 372, L. 2]

The present Sūṭra is meant to show that mere 'activity' of the child is not an infallible indicative (of the conclusion that it is meant to prove).

[The *Vārṭika* offers its own answer to the Objection urged in the Sūṭra 22]—There is however no force in this objection; as none of the alternatives possible is admissible. For instance, is the drawing of the iron to the magnet due to some cause? Or is it without cause? If it is due to some cause, how is it known that it is so? Well, as a matter of fact it is found that Iron moves up to the Magnet only, and not to stone, and it is Iron alone, and not stone, that moves to the Magnet; now from this restriction in the effect (*i.e.*, in the moving) it follows that there must be some restriction in the cause [*i.e.*, the movement of the Iron must be due to a definite cause]. This reasoning does away with the view

* In the previous Sūṭra we pointed to Joy &c. only as indicating desire in general; while the present Sūṭra, points out not only a particular form of desire, but *longing*.—*Ṭāṭparya*.

that the moving of the Iron is merely fortuitous. Now then (it being decided that the moving of the Iron is due to a definite cause), is the case of the movement of Iron put forward with a view to deny the possibility of the child's action being due to a visible cause? Or is it put forth to show that it is due to other causes (than the one to which the Siḍḍāntin has attributed it)? Or is it put forward with a view to propounding an argument in support of the view that the Soul is liable to being produced and destroyed? And to all this we would offer the same answer as before (*Vārṭika*, P. 370, L. 4, *et. seq*).

Var. P.372.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (23).

[P. 138, L. 11 to P. 139, L. 4].

[In answer to the Opponent's argument in the preceding *Sūṭra*, the *Siḍḍhāntin* asks]—Is this 'moving up of the Iron' (that you have put forward) without any cause? Or is it due to a definite cause? Without a cause

IT CANNOT BE, BECAUSE THERE IS NO SUCH ACTION IN ANY OTHER THING (EXCEPT IRON, AND THAT TOO IN THE PROXIMITY OF NO OTHER THING EXCEPT MAGNETS)—(Sū. 23).

If, in the case cited, the moving up of the Iron were without any cause (entirely fortuitous), then it would be possible for stone and other things also to move up to the Magnet, and there would be no ground for any such restriction (as that Iron alone, and no other substance, moves up to the Magnet).

If, on the other hand, the moving of the Iron be held to be due to a definite cause, then we ask—Who ever perceives any such cause? [All that is perceived is that the Iron moves up to the Magnet]. As a matter of fact, the sole indicative of the cause of an action is the action itself, and (consequently) any limitations in the Action indicates similar limitations in the cause. It is this that accounts for the absence of moving in the case of other substances (than Iron).* [Hence from the limitation in

* What is the cause of the moving up of the Iron to the Magnet placed near it is its contact with the imperceptible rays of light emanating from the

the Effect,—that the moving appears only in Iron, and not in other substances,—we infer that there must be, and this restriction must be due to, some corresponding limitation in the cause of the Motion]. Now in the case of the child also the action (of moving the mouth &c.) is found to be restricted (in the sense that such actions appear in the child only, and that also only when near its mother, and so forth); [all parties being agreed as to this action of the child being due to the desire for mother's milk], the only cause that can be indicated by the child's desire for the mother's milk consists in the 'continuity of remembrance due to repeated feeding in the past,'—and the instance cited by the Opponent (that of the moving of the Iron to the Magnet) cannot point to any other cause.* And no effect can appear unless its cause is present. Further, the instance † cited by the Opponent cannot set aside what is actually perceived (by all sentient beings) to be the cause of the said desire [*e.g.*, everyone perceives in his own case that when he sees sugar, his desire for it is due to his remembering its sweetness tasted by him in the past.] From all this it is clear that the citing of the instance of the Iron moving to the Magnet is entirely futile.

[Another explanation of the expression *anyatra pravrittyabhāvaṭi*, in the Sūtra is suggested]—*The moving of the Iron also is found to appear in the proximity of no other thing*; that is, the Iron is never found to move up to *Stone* [nor does it move up to a magnet far removed from it];—now, to what is this restriction due? If it is due to the limitations of its cause, and such limitations in the cause are indicated by the limita-

Bhā : P. 139.

Magnet. If this were not so, and the moving were due to something in the nature of the Iron itself, then every bit of Iron in the world would be constantly moving towards the Magnet that lies buried under the Sea.—*Bhāṣyachandra.*

* The printed text with its wrong punctuation, is unintelligible. The passage should read thus— न च स्तन्याभिलाषलिङ्गमन्यदाहाराभ्यासकृतात्स्मरणानुबन्धान्निमित्तं दृष्टान्तेनोपपाद्यते ; which is to be construed as follows—आहाराभ्यासकृतात् स्मरणानुबन्धात् अन्यत् स्तन्याभिलाषलिङ्गं (स्तन्याभिलाषो लिङ्गं यस्य तत्) निमित्तं दृष्टान्तेन (अयसो दृष्टान्तेन) न उपपाद्यते (उपपादयितुं शक्यते)।

† The case of the opening and closing of the Lotus cited under Sū. 20—says the *Bhāṣyachandra.*

tions in the action (due to that cause),*—then, in the case of the Child also, the desire, appearing in regard to a restricted object (like the mother's milk, for instance), can be due only to some restrictions in connection with its cause; and whether this cause consists in 'the remembering of repeated experiences of the past, or in something else, is settled by our actual experience: in our actual experience we have found that in the case of living beings the desire for food proceeds from the remembrance of past experience.

Vārṭika on Sū. 23.

This Sūṭra is meant to show that the *child's desire* (or the moving of the Iron) cannot be entirely fortuitous.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (24).

[P. 139, L. 4 to L. 11].

For the following reason also the Soul should be regarded as eternal. "Why?"

BECAUSE PERSONS FREE FROM LONGINGS ARE NEVER FOUND TO BE BORN.† (*Sū.* 24).

What is implied by the Sūṭra is that *only persons beset with longings are born.*‡ As a matter of fact, when a person is born, he is born as beset with longings; this 'longing' could be due only to the recalling to mind of things previously experienced; and this 'previous experience' of things in a preceding life could not be possible without a body; hence what happens is that the Soul, remembering the things experienced (and found pleasant) by him in his previous body, comes to 'long' for them; this is what forms

* The two Puri Mss. read यदिकारणनियमः सर्वाक्रियानियमलिङ्ग ; which also gives the same sense; but the reading of the printed text is clearer.

† Vishvanāṭha, suspecting this Sūṭra to be a mere repetition of what has been said in Sū. 22, in connection with the child's desire for milk, offers the following explanation.—In the former Sūṭra the child's desire was put forward as brought about by the remembering of the milk having been found, in the previous life, to be the means of a desired end; while what is put forward in the present Sūṭra is the fact of the said desire being due to 'attachment,' a condition that is applicable, not only to human beings, but to all kinds of animals.

‡ The *Bhāṣyachandra* rightly remarks that this implication is due to the two negatives in the Sūṭra—Persons *without attachments* are *not born*; which means that persons that *are born* are only those in whom attachment *is present.* But it becomes over-refined when it goes on to explain the simple expression '*arṭhāṭ āpadyaṭē*' to mean '*arṭhāpaṭṭyā anumīyaṭē.*'

the connecting link between his two lives; there are similar links between his previous life and his life preceding that, and between that and a life preceding that, and so on and on (to infinity);—which shows that the connection of the Soul with bodies has been without beginning; and without beginning has also been his connection with longings; and from this (beginningless series of attachments and consequent bodies) it follows that the Soul is eternal.

Vārṭika on Sū. 24.

[P. 372, L. 6 to L. 18].

The Soul must be eternal, *because persons free from longings are never found to be born*—says the Sūṭra. At the moment that a person is born, he is not found to be born without longings; and because persons free from longings are not born, it follows that they are born beset with attachments. What is meant by 'birth' we have already explained.

"What follows from the fact put forward in the Sūṭra?"

Longing is brought about by the recalling of previously experienced things; and no 'longing' is possible unless the Sense-organs are capable of apprehending their objects; and no 'recalling of things previously experienced' is possible without remembrance.

Bhāṣya on Sū. 25.

[P. 139, L. 11 to L. 14].

[The Opponent asks]—"How do you know that the "Longing of the new-born child arises from the recalling "of previously experienced things, and not

"THAT IT IS PRODUCED IN THE SAME MANNER

"AS SUBSTANCES AND THEIR QUALITIES?" (Sū. 25).

"In the case of ordinary substances that are capable of "being produced, their qualities are found to be produced "by certain causes (in the shape of fire-contact and the "like),—in the same manner, in the case of the Soul, *which* "*is capable of being produced*, its quality in the form of "*Longing* may be produced by certain causes (in the shape of "Time and Place &c.)".*

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* Vishvanāṭha explains this Sūṭra somewhat differently: 'Just as an ordinary substance, like the Jar, is produced along with certain qualities; so is the Soul also born, as along with the quality of attachment.'

The assertion put forward (in the present Sūṭra) is only a repetition of what has already been said before.

Vārṭika on Sū. 25.

[P. 373, Ll. 1-2.]

This Sūṭra is meant to show that the facts adduced by the Siḍḍhānṭin do not necessarily prove the desired conclusion.

This contention however has no force; as the answer to it has already been given.

Sūṭra (26).

[*Answer*]—IT IS NOT SO; BECAUSE LONGING (AND AVERSION) ARE DUE TO ANTICIPATION. (Sū. 26).

Bhāṣya on Su. (26).

[P. 140, L. 2 to L. 13].

The Soul's longing cannot be said to be produced in the same manner as Substances and their Qualities.—"Why?"—*Because Attachment and Aversion are due to anticipation.* As a matter of fact, in the case of living beings experiencing pleasures and pains from objects, Longing is found to arise from anticipation or conviction [that such and such an object is the source of pleasure, or of pain];—this 'anticipation' arises from the recalling to Mind of previously experienced objects;—and from this fact it is inferred that in the case of the new-born child also, the Longing must arise from the recalling to Mind of the previously experienced object † On the other hand, for ‡persons who hold the view that the Soul is produced (or brought into existence anew, at each birth), the appearance of Longing must be explained as proceeding from a cause

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* The argument here urged is the same as that urged in Sūṭra 22; there the argument was based upon the instance of the Iron and Magnet; and in the present Sūṭra, it is based upon the example of such ordinary things as the Jar and the like.

'What the Bhāṣya means by this remark is that the answer to this argument is also the same as that offered to Sū. 22'—*Ṭāṭparya.*

† The child recalls to mind the fact that the mother's milk was a source of pleasure; and hence his longing for it.

‡ In place of आत्मोत्पादाधिकरणात्तु, read आत्मोत्पादाधिकरणानान्तु, which is the reading of the two Puri Mss; and also of the *Bhāṣyachanḍra*, which explains the word as आत्मोत्पादः अधिकरणं पक्षः येषाम् तेषां वादिनान्तु मते.

other than the said 'anticipation' [as no such anticipation from past experience is possible under this theory];—just as the coming into existence of substances and their qualities [which is due to causes other than 'anticipation']. As a matter of fact however, it is not yet proved that the Soul is actually *produced*;* nor do we find any other cause for 'Longing,' than the said 'anticipation.' From all this it follows that it is not right to say that—'the coming into existence of the Soul and its Longing is like the coming into existence of Substances and their Qualities."

Some people explain the appearance of 'Longing' as being due to a cause entirely different from 'anticipation,' —such cause, according to them, being in the form of the 'Unseen Force' consisting of 'Merit—Demerit.' But even so (under this theory also) the Soul's connection with a previous body cannot be denied. For the said 'Unseen Force' (of 'Merit—Demerit') could have accrued to the Soul only during its connection with a previous body, not during its present life.† As a matter of fact however,‡ it is well known that *Longing proceeds from complete absorption in the thing*; and this 'absorption' is no other than the *repeated experiencing of the object*, which leads to the conviction or anticipation (that such and such a thing is the source of pleasure). What particular kind of Longings will appear in a new-born Soul will depend upon the peculiarities of the particular kind of body into which it is born; § what determines the special kind of body in which the Soul is born is his past 'Karma' (good or bad acts of the past); and the personality comes

* The printed text wrongly puts a stop after भारम्भोत्पादः

† As in the present life the new-born person has done no acts that could bring to him *Ḍharma* or *Aḍharma*.

‡ The author cites here a popular saying.—*Bhāṣyachanḍra*.

§ This has been added in view of the following objection :—"If the Longings in the new-born child are the result of the remembrance of past experiences, then this would mean that, even in a case where a Soul, that occupied a human body in its past life, happens to be born in an elephant's body, the desires of this elephant cub would be for such things as are sought after by human beings." The answer to this is that the character of the child's longings depend upon that of the body occupied by him at the time; and the longings in the elephant cub would be those in accordance with the experiences gone through by that Soul in some remote previous life in an elephant's body.—*Ṭāṭparya*.

to be known by the particular name (of an animal) by reason of the peculiar body with which it is equipped at the time.*

From all this it is clear that it is not possible for the said 'Longing' to be due to any other cause, except 'anticipation.'

Vārṭika on Sū. 26.

[P. 373 L. 4 to L. 7, also P. 372, Ll. 11-18].†

The Opponent's contention is not right; as *Longing arises from anticipation.* 'Anticipation' stands here for the wish that one entertains for previously experienced things.

"The Longing may be due to an Unseen Force.' If you mean by this that—"Longing does not necessarily imply previous connection with a body, as it may be due entirely to an Unseen Force,"—this cannot be regarded as an effective answer; it shows that you have not understood the meaning of the Sūṭra: the Sūṭra does not mean that *connection with a previous body* is the only cause (of Longing); all that is meant is that the Soul's *previous connection with a body* is proved (by the presence of Longing); and certainly this is not denied when you assert that 'Longing arises from an Unseen Force;'‡ so that what you have urged is nothing.

Longing proceeds from complete absorption in the thing &c.—says the *Bhāṣya.* The Body comes to be known as the

* The new-born personality is known as 'man' or 'elephant,' not because the Soul is *man* or *elephant*, but because the Soul happens to be equipped with a *human* or an *elephantine* body. This meaning, in the case of learned men, is *figurative*; while in the case of ignorant people, it is a misconception—*Bhāṣyachandra.*

The Vārṭika reads तादर्थ्यात् ताच्छब्द्यंलभते which means that the Body comes to be known as the 'person' because it serves the purposes of the Soul.

† The matter appearing as Ll. 11-18 on P. 372 of the Bib. Ind. Edition clearly forms part of the explanation of Sūṭra 26; though the Benares Edition also puts them under Sū. 25, as in the *Bib. Ind.* Edition. We have however thought it right to restore them to their proper place, under Sū. 26.

‡ As the *Siddhānṭin* also will admit this. The operation of the Unseen Force is not in any way inconsistent with the view that the Soul had several bodies in the past.

person, because it serves the purpose of the Soul;*—just as the reeds (that go to make up the Mat, are called 'Mat').

What has been said before in regard to the Soul being endowed with—a previous body, previous experience, remembrance and anticipation † may be brought in here also.

Section (6).
The Exact Nature of the Body.
[Sūṭras 27—29]‡

Bhāṣya on Sū. 27.
[P. 140, L. 13 to P. 141, L. 6].

It has been explained that the connection of the intelligent Soul with the Body is without beginning; this Body has its source in the acts done by the Personality, and becomes the receptacle§ of pleasure and pain. In regard to this Body, we proceed to examine whether, like the Olfactory and other organs, it is composed of a single substance, or of several substances. "Why should there be any doubt on this point?" The doubt arises from difference of opinion as

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*Though the Bhāṣya in all Mss. reads तादात्म्यात्ताच्छब्द्य, both editions of the Vārṭika read तादर्थ्यात् &c.

†'Anticipation' indicates 'remembrance,'—'remembrance' indicates 'previous experience,'—'previous experience indicates 'previous body.'

‡ The *Parishuddhi* mentions Shrī-vasṭa as raising the question why this section does not form part of the foregoing section,—inasmuch as this also explains the difference of the Soul from the Body. The answer given by the *Parishuddhi* is that it is necessary to have the 'detailed examination' of everything that has been 'mentioned;' and since the distinction of the Soul from the Body has been already explained in the previous section, it now behoves us to examine in detail the exact nature of the Body. The real motive for this procedure has been explained by the *Tāṭparya*, which points out that when one knows the exact nature of the Body and its appurtenances, he loses all regard for it, and hence acquires the necessary degree of dispassion, which is necessary for Release.

§The Body is the 'receptacle' of pleasure and pain only in the sense that they serve the purpose of qualifying and differentiating it; it is the *Soul* that is the actual 'receptacle' of pleasure and pain; as a 'receptacle' of a thing, in the proper sense of the term, must be such as forms its substratum, that in which the thing subsists by inherence; (and not merely the *container*.)—*Bhāṣyachanḍra*.

well * (as from the presence of diverse properties); people have held the Earth and other material substances to be the components of the Body, in varying numbers; † and the question naturally arises—what is the real truth? [The answer is supplied by the next *Sūṭra*]—

THE BODY MUST BE REGARDED AS COMPOSED OF THE EARTH; BECAUSE WE FIND IN IT THE PECULIAR QUALITY (OF EARTH).‡—(Sū. 27).

The human body must be regarded as composed of Earth;—Why?—*because we find in it the peculiar quality of Earth*. The Earth is endowed with Odour, and so is also the Body;—and inasmuch as Water and the other material substances are *odourless*, if the Body were composed of them it would be without odour. But as a matter of fact, the Body could not form the receptacle of the Soul's activities, if it were built up of the Earth only, without being mixed with Water, &c.; hence the Body should be regarded as being built up

* Both Puri manuscripts have a '*cha*' here, and the *Bhāṣyachandra* remarks that this '*cha*,' 'also,' is meant to include the 'presence of diverse properties,' which is one of the principal sources of doubt (*vide*—Sū. 1. 1. 23).

† Some philosophers regard the Body as composed of a single material substance; others of two, others again, of three, others of four, and others of five substances.—*Bhāṣyachandra*.

‡ The *Parishuḍḍhi* reads '*ṭaḍīyabishēṣaguṇopalābḍhēḥ*,' which, not being found in any manuscript, we take as the paraphrase of the phrase '*guṇānṭarropalabḍhēh*.' This 'peculiar quality' of the Earth is 'Odour'—says the *Bhāṣyachandra*, which is in keeping with the Parishuḍḍhi; it is only Odour that forms the 'peculiar quality' of Earth. But *Viṣhvanatha* would include all such qualities as *dark colour*, *solidity* and so forth.

The *Parishuḍḍhi* raises the question—In reality the Body is the receptacle of the activities of the Soul; and it is on the basis of this character that its examination should proceed; what bearing has the composition of the Body got on its examination? What does it matter whether the Body is composed of Earth or of Water? The answer given is that when it becomes ascertained that the Body is composed entirely of material substances, it becomes comparatively easy to prove that intelligence cannot belong to it; from which it would follow that—(*a*) it is the receptacle of the activities of which the contact of the existing Soul is the non-constituent cause,—(b) that it is the substratum of the Sense-organs, the developments whereof are due to the developments of the Body under the influence of food and drink,—and (c) that it forms the receptacle of the experiences of the Soul related to the Body.

by the mixture of all the five material substances; The Sūtra does not deny the mutual contact or mixture (in the Body) of the five substances.*

Bodies composed of Water, Fire and Air are found in other regions;† and in these also the presence (by contact) of the several material substances is in accordance with the character of the experiences to be undergone by the personality ensouling a particular body. In the case of all such ordinary things as the Dish and the like, it is found without the least doubt, that they are not built up without the contact of Water and other substances.‡

Vārṭika on Sū. 27.

[P. 373, L. 8 to L. 18].

The Soul having been described, it is now the turn of the Body, which the Sūṭra now proceeds to examine; or (as the *Bhāṣya* says) the Body is next examined, because the connection of the Soul with the Body is without beginning; and when the Body has been examined, the treatment of the Soul will be completed. What has got to be examined in regard to

* The Siḍḍhānṭa says that the Body is composed of, constituted by, the Earth only; the Earth alone forms its component cause; though the presence, by contact, of the other four substances also is necessary in its formation; but this does not make these four the *constituent cause* of the Body. The Jar has for its component cause, only the Clay; and yet the presence of water is necessary. The *Bhāṣyachanḍra* takes the term '*bhūṭasamyoga*' as a '*karmaḍhāraya*' compound, meaning 'well-recognised presence,' the meaning being—'the mere presence by contact of the other four, which (contact) is *duly recognised* (*bhuṭa*), cannot be denied'—the *Bhāṣyachanḍra* explaining 'niṣiḍḍhaḥ' as 'niṣeḍḍhum shākyaḥ.'

† The *aqueous* body is found in the regions of Varuṇa; the *fiery* body in the regions of the Sun, and the *aerial* body in the regions of Vāyu. *Ākāsha* does not form the component of any body; hence there is no *Ākāshic* or ethereal body,—according to the Nyāya.

‡ The *Bhāṣyachanḍra*, along with nearly all manuscripts, reads *niḥsamshayaḥ*: but *niḥsamshayā*, appears to be the right reading. The only way of construing the form '*niḥsamshayaḥ*' is to take it, as the *Bhāṣyachanḍra* does, along with '*bhūṭasamyogaḥ*' of the preceding sentence; otherwise (if we do not read *niḥsamshayāṭ*, and take it as qualifying '*niṣpaṭṭiḥ*'), the only form that could be admitted would be *niḥsamshayam*.

the Body is—*whether like the Olfactory and other organs, it is composed of a single substance, or of several substances*; there is doubt on this point, because of the diversity of opinions that have been held; on this question we have heard of several opinions; and the real truth is that—*the human body is composed of Earth.*

"Why does the *Bhāṣya* add the qualifying term 'human'?"

Since the Bodies in other regions are not made of Earth, it is only right that the qualification should be added.

[The human body should be regarded as composed of Earth] because it has Odour,—like the Atom (of Earth). In the case of the Atom we find that having Odour, it is of one uniform nature; and finding that the Body also has Odour, we infer that the Body also should be of one uniform nature, of one kind, (*i.e.*, composed of a single substance). *As a matter of fact the Body could not form the receptacle of the Soul's activities if it were built up of the Earth only, without being mixed with water, &c.*; and this mere mixture of several substances is not denied by us.

Sūtra 28 (A, B, C.).

(A)—"THE BODY IS MADE UP OF EARTH, WATER AND FIRE, BECAUSE WE FIND IN IT THE DISTINCTIVE QUALITIES OF THESE, [*i.e.*, ODOUR, VISCIDITY AND HEAT]."

(B)—"*IT IS MADE UP OF FOUR SUBSTANCES (EARTH, WATER, FIRE AND AIR), BECAUSE WE FIND IN IT IN-BREATHING AND OUT-BREATHING (IN ADDITION TO THE AFORESAID QUALITIES OF EARTH, &C.).*"

(C)—"IT IS MADE UP FIVE SUBSTANCES, EARTH, WATER, FIRE, AIR AND AKĀSHA, BECAUSE WE FIND IN IT ODOUR (OF EARTH) HUMIDITY (OF WATER), HEAT (OF FIRE),

BREATHING (OR CIRCULATION OF THE JUICES) (OF AIR) AND CAVITIES (OF AKĀSHA)."*

Bhāṣya on Sūṭra 28 (A, B and C).
[P. 141, L. 8 to L. 12].

The reasons put forward in these Sūṭras being inconclusive, the Author of the Sūṭra has taken no notice of them [*i.e.*, he has not taken the trouble to refute them].

Question:—In what way are they inconclusive?"

Answer:—As a matter of fact, the presence of the qualities of material substances in any object may be due, either to the fact of those substances forming the constituents of that object, or to the fact that the mere presence by contact of these substances in any object is possible—(a) when those substances form the constituents of that object, and also (b) when they do not form the constituents, and are only present in it by contact; which presence is not denied (by any party);—for example in the case of the Dish we find that Water, Air, Fire and Ākāsha are all present by contact [even though the dish is composed of Earth only, and not of these four]. [Thus it being found that the mere fact of the qualities of a certain material substance being found in the Body does not necessarily prove that the Body is actually composed of that substance,—the reasons put forward in the three Sūṭras must be regarded as *inconclusive*].

If the human body were composed of several substances, then, by reason of the peculiar character of its (multiple) constitution, it would be without odour, without taste, without colour and without touch.† As a matter of fact however, the Body is not so (without Odour &c.). Hence the conclusion is that *it should be regarded as composed of Earth, because we find in it the peculiar quality of Earth.*

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* All these three are *Sūṭras*. They are found in the *Nyāyasūchinibandha*, and also in the Puri Sūṭra manuscript. *Vishvanātha* and the *Bhāṣyachandra* both explain them as propounding the different opinions in regard to the composition of the human body. The edition of the printed text has been misled by the fact that these opinions have not been refuted by the Sūṭra. But this omission has been satisfactorily explained by the *Bhāṣya*, which says that the Author of the Sūṭra has taken no notice of these views, because the reasons put forward by them are of doubtful validity.

† This has been explained in detail by the *Vārṭika*; see below.

Vārṭika on Sūṭra (28, A, B and C).

[P. 373, L. 19 to P. 375, L. 3].

What has been said above disposes of the three views that—(A) "the body is made up of Earth, Water and Fire," (B) "it is made up of Earth, Water, Fire and Air," and (C) "it is made up of Earth, Water, Fire, Air and Ākāsha;"—because as a matter of fact, the qualities perceived are those of substances that are simply present in the Body by contact.

Vār. P. 374.

If the human body were composed of several substances, then by reason of the peculiar character of its constitution, it would be without odour, without taste, without colour and without touch,—says the *Bhāṣya* (P. 141, Ll. 10-12).

The explanation of this passage is as follows:—An object composed of Earth and Water would be without odour, because the odour subsisting in the single constituent atom could not produce odour in the product.* Similarly an object composed of Earth and Fire would be without odour and without taste; because the odour and taste of the single component atoms could not be productive of anything;—an object composed of Earth and Air would be without odour, taste and colour; because Air is odourless;—an object composed of Earth and *Ākāsha* would be without odour, taste, colour and touch; because *Ākāsha* is devoid of these. The principle underlying all these cases is the same,—that the quality of any single component cannot be productive of any effect. An object composed of Water and Fire would be odourless and tasteless;—that composed

* The *Ṭāṭparya* supplies the following explanation:—In the first place no single Diad (Bi-atom) could be produced out of one Earth-atom and one Water-atom; and even if such a Diad could be produced, it could not be endowed with odour; because in the Diad there would be a single odourous atom, that of Earth, and a single atom cannot produce any effect;—and the Diad being odourless, all subsequent products would be devoid of odour.

of Water and Air would be odourless, tasteless and colourless;—that composed of Water and *Akāsha* would be odourless, tasteless, colourless and touchless;—that composed of Fire and Air would be odourless, tasteless and colourless; —that composed of Fire and *Akāsha* would be odourless, tasteless, colourless and touchless;—similarly also that composed of Air and *Akāsha*; as also that composed of Earth, Water and Fire,—of Earth, Water and Air,—of Earth, Water and *Akāsha*;—that composed of Earth, Air and Fire would be odourless and tasteless; so also that composed of Earth, Air and *Ākāsha*;—that composed of Earth, Air and *Akāsha* would be odourless, tasteless and colourless;—that composed of Earth, Air and *Ākāsha* would be odourless and tasteless; so also that composed of Water, Fire and *Ākāsha*;—that composed of Water, Air and *Ākāsha* would be odourless, tasteless and colourless;—so also that composed of Fire, Air and *Ākāsha*; that composed of Earth, Water, Fire, and Air would be odourless; so also that composed of Earth, Water, Fire and *Ākāsha*, and that composed of Earth, Water and *Ākāsha*;—that composed of Earth, Air, Fire and *Ākāsha* would be odourless and colourless;—so also that composed of Water, Air, Fire and *Ākāsha*;—that composed of Earth, Water, Fire and Air would be odourless; for the simple reason that the quality of any single constituent is incapable of producing any effect.

If any single component (atom) were the productive cause of anything, then there would be either constant production, or constant non-production,—and the product would be eternal; as we have already explained above.*

* A single atom being by itself sufficient to produce its effect, and it being eternal, it would go on, without ceasing, producing its effect; [or if it were nor active, then the effect would never be produced];—and the destruction of an effect can be brought about either by the destruction of the constituent cause, or by the disruption of its several components; and in the event of a single atom being the cause, neither of these contingencies would be possible; being eternal, it cannot be destroyed; and being single, there can be no disruption of components; so that the product would be indestructible, eternal.—*Ṭāṭparya*.

Sūṭra (29).

ALSO BECAUSE OF THE AUTHORITY OF SCRIPTURE.

(Sū. 29.)

Bhāṣya on Sū. (29).

[P. 141, L. 14 to P. 142, L. 2.]

In the *manṭra**—'May thy Eye go to the Sun' (*Ṛigvēḍa*, 10-16-3), we find† the words—'May thy body go to the Earth'; and what is referred to here is the absorption of the product (the Body) into its constituent element. Again, we find another *manṭra* (recited in the course of the rites of consecration performed in connection with child-conception) beginning with the words—'I create thy Eye out of the Sun'—and going on to say—'I create thy Body out of the Earth' (*Shaṭapaṭha-Brāhmaṇa*, 11-8-4-6); and what is referred to is only the production of the product (Body) out of its constituent element. In the case of the Dish and such other things, we find that one product is produced out of one kind of constituents; and from this we infer that it is not possible for any single product to be produced out of several heterogeneous constituents.

Vārṭika on Sū. (29).

[P. 375, L. 5 to L. 12.]

Also because of the authority of scripture—says the Sutra. At the end of the mantra—'I create thy Eye out of the Sun,'—we find the words—'I create thy Body out of the Earth'; and what is meant by this 'creation' is the production of the Effect from its cause; the meaning being that the Sun is the constituent cause of the Eye and the Earth is the constituent cause of the Body. Similarly at the time of the after-death rite, the *manṭra* recited is—'may thy Eye go to the Sun,...........may thy Body go to the Earth'; and the meaning of this manṭra also is that everything becomes absorbed into that out which it was produced; that is, the Product becomes absorbed in its constituent cause. What is meant by 'absorption' here

*This manṭra is recited over the dead body, in course of its consecration by fire.

is that the cause is reduced to a condition wherein the product has ceased to exist,—and not that the product merges into the Cause; so that the theory referred to (in the manṭras quoted) is that before it is produced the Produce is non-existent, and that having come into existence, it is destroyed. [And they do not support the Sāṅkhya view that even before it comes into existence the Product has existed in a latent form, &c. &c.]

Section (7).

[Sūṭras 30-50].

The Sense-organs and their Material Character.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (30).

In accordance with the order in which the 'Objects of Cognition' have been *mentioned*, it is now the turn of the *Sense-organs* to be *examined*; and in regard to the Sense-organs we are going to consider whether they are the modifications of Primordial Matter (as held by the Sāṅkhyas), or they are made up of elemental substances (Earth &c.)*

"Whence does this doubt arise?"

[We have the answer in the following Sūṭra]—

Sūṭra (30).

THIS DOUBT ARISES FROM THE FACT THAT THERE IS PERCEPTION (WITH THE EYE) WHEN THE PUPIL IS THERE, AND THERE IS PERCEPTION ALSO WHEN THERE IS NO CONTACT WITH THE PUPIL. (Sū. 30.)

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* It is interesting to note that while the *Bhāṣya* confines the discussion between the Sāṅkhya and the Naiyāyika, the *Ṭāṭparya* brings in here the controversy between the Naiyāyika and the *Bauḍḍha* who holds that the organ is nothing apart from the outer physical body; i.e., the Visual-organ consists only of the Pupil, and not of a Luminous Substance underlying the Pupil, as the Naiyāika holds. The *Ṭāṭparya* also adds that according to the Sāṅkhya also, the Sense-organ is not exactly a 'modification of Primordial Matter' itself; but it is the direct product of '*Ahaṅkāra*,' 'Egoity,' which is the product of Buḍḍhi, which is the direct product of Primordial Matter. Even so, inasmuch as Primordial Matter is the root-cause of all manifested things, it is quite right to say that according to the Sāṅkhya, the Sense-organs are 'modifications of Primordial Matter.'

On one hand it is found that there is perception of colour only when the Pupil, which is a physical organ made up of elemental substances, remains intact, and there is no perception when the Pupil is destroyed [which would indicate that the Visual-organ consists of the Pupil only, which is made up of elemental substances]; while on the other hand, it is also found that when an object is before the observer, there is perception of it, without its coming into direct contact with the Pupil, and it is not necessary for it to come into any such contact with the Pupil; and certainly Sense-organs cannot operate effectively without getting at, coming into direct contact with, the object perceived; and in reality this latter fact (of an object being seen without coming into contact with the Pupil) can be explained only on the basis of the theory that the Organ is not made up of elemental substances and is all-pervading in its character [and it does not consist of the Pupil].* So that both characters being found to belong to the Organ, the aforesaid doubt arises.

Vārṭika on Sū. (30).

[P. 375, L. 15 to P. 376, L. 10].

In accordance with the order &c.—says the *Bhāṣya*. The question at issue is—whether the Sense-organs are modifications of Primordial Matter,—*i.e.*, products of *Ahaṅkāra*,—or they are made of elemental substances. The Sūṭra serves the purpose of explaining the cause that gives rise to this doubt. The Pupil is made up of elemental substances, and it is found that there is perception of things while the Pupil remains intact; and also that there is perception of a thing which is in front of the Pupil, though not actually in contact with it;—now this character of bringing about the perception of

* The organ can be all-pervading in character only if it be the product of *Ahaṅkāra*, which being all-pervading in its character, its products are also such, and hence unimpeded by anything, can come into contact with anything and everything; so that even though the object is not in physical contact with the physical Eye-pupil, it would not matter; as the Visual-organ, being all-pervading in its character, would be in contact with it all the same; and hence render it perceptible. If, on the other hand, the Visual-organ were made up of Elemental Substances, it could not get at things behind any physical obstruction whatsoever, even in the shape of transparent things.—*Ṭāṭparya.*

things without actual contact can belong to only such an organ as is not made up of elemental substances. Thus then both characters being found in regard to the Visual-organ, there arises a doubt.

Var. P. 376.

[The Bauḍḍha view is as follows]—"The Visual-organ "consists in the Pupil; as it is only when this physical pupil "is there that there is perception of Colour; that is, as a "matter of fact, there is perception of Colour only when the "Pupil is there, and there is no perception of Colour in the "absence of the Pupil; and as a rule a phenomenon must be "attributed to (be regarded as belonging to) that in whose "presence it comes about and in whose absence it does not "come about; as we find in the case of Colour and other "properties being attributed to only such substances as are "products."

This view is not right; as the premiss upon which it is based is invalidated by such instances as those of the Lamp and the like; that is to say, it is found that the perception of Colour comes about when the Lamp is there,—and yet this perception is not attributed to the Lamp; so that the general premiss stated (by the Bauḍḍha) is invalidated. Further, for one who holds the view that the Visual-organ organ consists only of the Pupil, there should be equal perception of near as well as remote things; that is to say, the Pupil never gets at (comes into direct contact with) the things perceived,—and inasmuch as this *absence of contact* could be equally present in the same degree in the case of both near and remote things, the perception of both should be of the same kind and degree. "But there would be difference due to perceptibility." If you mean by this that —"while the near object is perceptible by the Pupil, the remote object is not so, and hence there would be a difference in the perception of the two things,"—this is not

right; as it has been already refuted before, under the Sūtra (1, 1, 4) embodying the definition of Sense perception.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (31).

[P. 142, L. 8 to L. 13.]

[In refutation of the above-mentioned Bauddha-theory that the Visual Organ consists in the Pupil only], the *Sāṅkhya* asserts as follows :—

"The Sense-organs are not made up of Elemental Substances;—" Why?—

BECAUSE THERE IS PERCEPTION OF LARGE AND SMALL THINGS."—(Sū. 31).

"The term 'large' includes also the *larger* and the *largest*; and what is meant is that as a matter of fact, all things "of various degrees of magnitude are perceived; *e.g.*, the "(*large*) Banyan tree, as also the (*larger*) mountain, and so "forth;—similarly the term 'small' includes also the *smaller* "and the *smallest*; and the meaning is that as a matter of "fact things of various degrees of smallness are perceived; "such as the Banyan-seed and so forth. This fact of both "kinds of things being perceived sets aside the possibility of "the Sense-organs being made up of Elemental Substances; "as a matter of fact, that which is made up of Elemental "Substances can pervade over (and operate upon) only such "things as are of the same magnitude as itself; while that "which is not so made up is all-pervading, and as such can "operate upon all things (of all magnitudes)."*

Vārṭika on Sū. (31).

[P. 376, L. 11 to P, 379, L. 1.]

Others (the Sāṅkhyas) have held the following theory :—

"The Sense-organs are not made up of Elemental Substances,—*because there is perception of large and small things*

* The *Sāṅkhya* argument is thus stated by Vishnanāṭha :—The Physical Eye-ball cannot be the organ of vision; for if it were, then it would mean that the organ is operative without getting at the Object; which is open to objection. Then, it might be held that if the Eye-ball is not the organ, it is something else made up of Elemental Substances which is the organ;—but this also would not be right; as the organ of vision apprehends things of large as well as small magnitudes; which would not be possible, if it were made up of Elemental Substances.

"(Sū.). *The term 'large' includes &c. &c.*, says the *Bhāṣya*. "This fact of perception by the Visual Organ sets aside the "view that the organ is made up of Elemental Substances; "for a thing made up of Elemental Substances can operate "upon only such things as are of the same magnitude as itself; "while what is not made up of Elemental Substances is all-"pervading, and is connected with all things."

[The *Vārṭika* offers the following criticisms against the *Sāṅkhya* view and the argument urged in its support, in the Sūṭra, 31.]—

The argument put forward cannot be accepted, as what has been urged is found also in the case of such things as the Lamp and the like, which are (admittedly) made up of Elemental Substances; the Lamp and several other things, which are made up Elemental Substances, are found to illuminate (render cognisable) 'large and small things'; so that the premiss (put forward by the *Sāṅkhya*, that 'what brings about the perception of large and small things cannot be made up of Elemental Substances) cannot be true. If the fact of the Lamp, &c., being so illuminative be not admitted (by the *Sāṅkhya*), then, in that case, inasmuch as the Visual organ would be the only thing to which the character of rendering perceptible large and small things would belong (according to the *Sāṅkhya*), the premiss put forward would be fallacious, as being *too specific*,—the said character being one that is precluded from both kinds of things—those made up of Elemental Substances and those not so made up.* "But Cognition is actually found to be such a thing as is *illuminative of large and small things*, and it is *not made up* of Ele-

* If the said character belongs to the Visual organ only, then there can be no corroborative instance either way; *i.e*, no other thing—either made up of Elemental substances, or not so made up—could be cited as possessing that character; so that the said character of the Visual organ could not prove either that it is made up of Elemental Substances or that it is not so made up.

mental Substances." Certainly, no such thing is found; as a matter of fact, Cognition does *not* illumine large and small things; Cognition is *illuminative* itself, and not *illuminator;* what Cognition does bring about are only the ideas of abandoning, acquiring or ignoring the thing that has been cognised [and certainly these *ideas* are neither 'large' not 'small']. So that there is not a single thing which, being not made up Elemental Substances, is the illuminator of large and small things.

Vār. P. 377.

"But there is the Mind."

True; but Mind is neither made up Elemental Substances, nor *not* so made up.

The same applies to the Soul also, which is neither made up of Elemental Substances, nor *not* so made up.

"If the Mind is not something not made of Elemental Substances, then what you have said before, regarding the Sense-organs being made up of Elemental Substances and the Mind being not so made up, becomes discarded."

Certainly not; for 'not made up Elemental Substances' is synonymous with 'not of the nature of Elemental Substance'; what is meant by saying that 'Mind is not made up of Elemental Substances' is that Mind is not of the nature of Elemental Substance; in reality the Mind is neither 'made up of Elemental Substances,' nor '*not* made up of Elemental Substances.' "This does not help you; for the same may be said in regard to the Sense-organs also; that is to say, what is meant by the Sense-organs being called 'not made up of Elemental Substances' is that they are 'not of the nature of Elemental Substance'." [Our answer to this is that] the person (*i.e.*, the *Sāṅkhya*) who regards the Sense-organ as 'not made up of Elemental Substances' and as 'all-pervading' should be asked the following question:—Why is there no perception of this hidden by obstructions? "What

is the purport of this question?" Well, (what is meant is that) if the Sense-organ is all-pervading, the wall or any such obstruction can have no power of obstructing it. "What is obstructed is the *Vṛiṭṭi* (organic functioning) of the Sense-organ." If you mean by this that—" while it is true that the Sense-organ itself is all-pervading, what is obstructed by the wall and such obstructions are the organic functionings which go forth from the Sense-organ when it is moved by the causes that tend to accomplish the purpose of the person concerned, just as bubbles go forth out of a vast lake,"—then our answer is that this explanation cannot be accepted; as there is no proof for the existence of any 'Sense-organ' apart from the said 'functionings'; as a matter of fact there no proof for the existence of any 'Sense-organ' apart from the 'functioning,' which is what brings about the apprehension of things; and until there is some proof for such a thing, it cannot be accepted. And, on the other hand, that, (*i.e.*, the Sense-organ)' which is *not obstructed* (by obstructions) and that (*i.e.*, the functioning') which *is obstructed* cannot be one and the same; if they were the same, then there would be no sense in saying that " it is the same 'functioning' which goes forth (from the Sense-organ) and is obstructed." Further, if both were the same, then (like the functioning) the Sense-organ would be liable to production and destruction; *i. e.*, if the Sense-organ be not something different from the functioning then, just as there are production and destruction of the Functioning so would there be of the Sense-organ also. " But of the Functioning, there is only *manifestation*, and not *production*."

Vār. P. 378. If you mean by this that,—" I do not admit that functioning is *produced*, it is only *manifested*, nor is it *destroyed*, it only *disappears*,"—this explanation cannot serve any useful purpose; as it is only a particular form of *production*; *i.e.*, 'manifestation' is only a particular kind of 'production.' " How so?" For the

simple reason that there is no 'manifestation' of a thing unless some peculiarity is *produced* in it. If you think that a thing can be *manifested* without any peculiarity being *produced* in it,—then such *manifestation* should be incessant (eternal). This same remark applies to *destruction* also: for *ex hypothesi*, when there is what you call 'disappearance', it is not that something that existed has ceased to exist; and unless some peculiarity of the thing has *ceased*, it cannot cease to be perceived. Then again, for one who regards all things as eternal, it is not right that there should be perception and non-perception; for unless there is *production* of some peculiarity (in it) there can be no perception of it; a thing (not perceptible before); nor can there be non-perception of the thing (before perceptible) unless there is *destruction* of some peculiarity of it.

Then again, for one who regards the Sense-organ as eternal and all-pervading, the name 'cause' would be meaningless: As a matter of fact, when one thing comes into existence after another, the latter is called the 'Cause;' if both the Cause and the Effect be eternal (as they must be for one who regards all things as eternal), then what would 'come into existence after' what? And both being equally eternal, how could there be any causal relation between the two? It behoves you also to explain the meaning of the term, '*Kāraka*,' 'Agent.' "The *Kāraka* or Agent is that which brings into existence." It is true that the *Kāraka* is that which brings into existence; but for one who regards all things to be eternal there can be nothing that is brought into existence; and when there is nothing that can be brought into existence, we do not find any use for the *Kāraka*. "The use of the *Kāraka* lies in manifesting things." But what we have said above applies equally to *manifestation* also: like the *manifested* thing, the *manifestation* also is eternal; so that for the latter also there would be no need for the *Kāraka*.

Further, the theory under review implies the absurd contingency of several things being perceived simultaneously: That is, if the 'functioning' is not something different from that (Sense-organ) to which it belongs, then the existence of the latter would imply the existence of the former also, which would make it possible for several things to be perceived at the same time; and inasmuch as there would be several functionings of each Sense-organ, the latter, which is one, would become many! As the Sense-organ is *ex hypothesi* non-different from its Functionings, you will perhaps say that what you mean is that the Functionings are not different from the Sense-organ (and not that the Sense-organ is not different from the Functionings). But in that case there would be only a single Functioning (the Sense-organ being one only). If, with a view to avoid these difficulties, you say that you do not accept any of the two views (either that the Sense-organ is not different from the Functionings, or that the Functionings are not different from the Sense-organ),—then it means that the two are different, the Functioning is different from that to which it belongs. There is no third alternative possible.

From all this it follows that it is not right to regard the Sense-organ as all-pervading and eternal.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (32).

[P. 142, L. 13 to P. 143, L. 4].

[The *Bhāṣya* answers the *Sāṅkhya* argument of Sū. 31 as follows]—From the mere fact of there being apprehension of large and small things it cannot be inferred that the Sense-organs are *not made up of elemental substances*, or that they are *all-pervading*;

THE SAID APPREHENSION (OF LARGE AND SMALL THINGS) IS DUE TO THE PECULIARITY OF THE CONTACT BETWEEN THE LIGHT-RAYS (EMANATING FROM THE VISUAL ORGAN) AND THE OBJECT (PERCEIVED). (Su. 32).

As a matter of fact, the 'apprehension of large and small things' is brought about by the peculiarity of contact between the light-rays emanating from the Visual Organ and the object perceived*; just as there is by contact between the light-rays from the lamp and the object.

That there is such contact between the light-rays (from the Visual Organ) and the Object perceived is proved by the phenomenon of obstruction; that is, when the rays of light emanating from the Eye are obstructed by such things as the wall and the like intervening between the Eye and the Object), they do not illumine (and render perceptible) that object; this being exactly what happens in the case of light emanating from a Lamp. [And this goes to prove that for the perception of objects, the direct contact of light from the Eye with the object is essential; for if this were not so, and if the organ were an all-pervading one, the perception would not be obstructed by an intervening object].

Vārṭika on Sū. (32).

[P. 379, L. 1 to L. 14].

The 'perception of large and small things,' being due to other causes (otherwise explicable), cannot be accepted as a valid ground (for the idea that Sense-organs are *not made up of Elemental Substances*). That is say, the Sāṅkhya has put forward the 'perception of large and small things' as a reason for the conclusion that 'the Sense-organs are not made up of elemental substances; but as a matter of fact, the said perception is due to other causes; so that from the 'perception of large and small things' we cannot deduce either the fact that 'Sense-organs are not made up of elemental substances,' or that they are all-pervading.

* The light-rays emanating from the Visual organ which are devoid of any manifested colour, form the constituent parts of the organ, which, according to the Naiyāyika, is made up of the Elemental substance of Light; the Organ, consisting of the light-rays, issuing forth, comes into direct contact with the object; and whether it is a large or a small object perceived depends upon the exact nature and extent and force of the light-rays emanating from the organ. The example cited is that of the Lamp, because the light from the lamp also, like that from the Visual Organ, is devoid of manifested colour.—*Bhāṣyachanḍra.*

"Why so?"

Because the *said perception is due to the peculiarity of the contact between, &c. &c.*—says the Sūtra. That is to say, the perception of large and small things is brought about by the peculiar character of the contact of the rays of light from the Eye with the object perceived; from mere contact in general, there follows only a vague general sort of perception; while from the specific kinds of contact follow specific forms of perception. "What is the 'peculiarity' or 'specific character' of the contact?" The 'peculiarity' consists in the concatenation of the several contacts of the component parts (of the object and the organ concerned).* As a matter of fact, the contact that brings about a particular perception is aided by several contacts of component parts; and 'the contact of the Sense-organ with the object,' aided by the several contacts of their several component parts, constitutes what is called the 'peculiarity of the contact.' And inasmuch as this peculiar contact operates equally in the case of large and small things, the said 'perception of large and small things' is found to be explicable otherwise (than on the basis of the assumption that Sense-organs are not made up of Elemental Substances).

That there is such contact between the light-rays and the object is proved by the phenomenon of obstruction—says the *Bhāṣya* This obstruction is due to the fact that such things as the wall and the like are not of the nature of light (are not transparent). If the Sense-organs were capable of operating upon (rendering perceptible) things without actually getting at them [which they would be only if they were

* That is,—(1) the contact of the component parts of the organ with the component parts of the object; (2) the contact of the component parts of the organ with the object as a whole; (3) the contact of the organ as a whole with the component parts of the object; and (4) the contact of the whole organ with the object.—*Tātparya.*

not made up of Elemental Substances, and hence all-pervading],—such things as the wall and the like could not have the power of obstructing (their operation); hence we conclude that rays of light emanate from the Visual Organ, just as they do from the Lamp.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (33).

[P. 143, L. 4 to L. 8].

The Siḍḍhāntin having put forward the view that the fact of the Visual Organ consisting of light-rays can be inferred from the phenomenon of obstruction,—the Opponent urges the following objection :—

Sūṭra (33).

"INASMUCH AS NO SUCH THING (AS VISUAL LIGHT-RAYS) IS EVER PERCEIVED, WHAT HAS BEEN PUT FORWARD CANNOT PROVE ANYTHING."

"Inasmuch as by its very nature Light is endowed "with colour and touch, the Light of the Visual Organ, "if it existed, should be perceived,—just in the same manner "as the Light of the Lamp is perceived,—according "to the principle that 'the perception of a thing is due to its "being possessed of large magnitude, being composed of "several component particles, and being endowed with "colour'.* [And since the Light from the Eye is never "perceived, it follows that no such Light exists].

Vārṭika on Sū. (33).

[P. 379, L. 14 to P. 380, L. 3].

The Siḍḍhanṭin having put forward &c. &c.—says the *Bhāṣya*. The view put forward in the Sūṭra is that there

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* This principle is enunciated in the Vaishēṣika-Sūṭras, though the form of the Sūṭra (4. 1. 6) is somewhat different from what is quoted here. The Suṭra is worded as महत्यनेकद्रव्यवत्त्वात् रूपवत्त्वाच्च उपलब्धिः

The *Ṭāṭparya* explains the sense of the Opponent's objection thus :—" When a thing, which is capable of perception, is not perceived, the only right conclusion is that it does not exist ; and it would not be right to assert its existence on the ground of merely inferential reasons. If this were permitted, then it might be permissible to assert the existence of even such things as the horns of a man".

is no such thing as Light from the Visual Organs; and the grounds are as follows:—"Inasmuch as Light is some-"thing quite amenable to perception, it is not right to base "its existence upon mere *Inference*; when a thing that "is perceptible fails to be perceived, the natural conclusion "is that it does not exist; as we find in the case of such "things as the Jar and the like; the Jar and such other things, "being possessed of large magnitude, being composed of "several component substances and being possessed of Colour, "are perceived (whenever and wherever they exist);—"now, inasmuch as the Light of the Eye also is possessed of "large magnitude, is composed of several component sub-"stances and is endowed with Colour,—why is it not per-"ceived? That Visual Organ is possessed of large magni-"tude is due to the large magnitude, multiplicity and aggre-"gation of its constituent elements;—that it is composed "of several component substances is due only to the multi-"plicity of its constituent elements; and lastly, since light is "endowed with Colour and Touch, the Visual organ (if made "up of light) cannot be without colour. Thus then, all the "conditions of perceptibility being present, if the Light of the "Visual Organ fails to be perceived, it follows that it does "not exist."

Sūtra (34).

[*Answer to the above objection*]—MERE NON-PERCEPTION OF THAT WHICH CAN BE DEDUCED BY INFERENCE IS NO PROOF OF ITS NON-EXISTENCE. (Sū. 34).

Bhāṣya on Sū. 34.

[P. 134, Ll. 10—12.]

The existence of the light-rays (of the Visual Organ) being deduced by Inference from the phenomenon of 'obstruction,' which shuts off (makes impossible) the contact (of the object with the Visual organ,)—mere non-apprehension of them by Perception does not prove non-existence; just as in the

case of the upper surface of the lunar disc and the lower strata of the Earth (both of which are deduced by inference and not apprehended by Perception, and yet not regarded as non-existent).

Vārṭika on Sū. (34).

[P. 380, L. 5 to L. 16.]

Mere non-existence, &c.—says the Sūṭra. When a thing is not apprehended by Perception, if it happens to be deduced by Inference, it is not right to say that it does not exist; as we find in the case of the upper surface of the lunar disc and the lower strata of the Earth;—even though these two things fulfil all the conditions of perceptibility, yet they are not apprehended by Perception, but since they are apprehended by means of Inference, they are not regarded as non-existent. "What is that Inference?" It consists in the cognition of both (Earth and Lunar Disc) as having another side (than the one that is seen). Similarly in the case of the Light-rays of the Visual Organ, the Inference is based upon the phenomenon of obstruction.

Others (some Vaishēṣika teachers) have explained that the conditions laid down (in Vaishēṣika-Sū. 4. 1. 6;—*viz.*, that of (*a*) being endowed with large magnitude, (*b*) being composed of several substances and (*c*) being possessed of Colour—are meant to refer to the act of *Perception*, and not to the *Perceived* object. "What is the meaning of this?" What we mean is, *not* that whichever object fulfils the said conditions is *perceived*,—but that whatever object is perceived does fulfil the said conditions. So that the said *Vaishēṣika-Sūtra* (under this explanation) cannot be accepted as containing the description of the Conditions of Perception; as (according to this explanation) Perception would be absent even when the conditions are present; that is, even when an object is endowed with the characters mentioned, it may not be

perceived; from which it would follow that the said conditions cannot form the *cause* of Perception.*

Sūṭra (34).

THERE BEING NO UNIFORMITY REGARDING THE CHARACTER (OF PERCEPTIBILITY OR IMPERCEPTIBILITY) AS BELONGING TO SUBSTANCES AND QUALITIES, THERE CAN BE NO CERTAINTY IN REGARD TO ANY PARTICULAR THING BEING ACTUALLY PERCEIVED. (Sū. 35.)†

Bhāṣya on Sū. (35).

[P. 143, L. 14-18].

The said character (of Perceptibility or Imperceptibility) is diverse, inasmuch as it belongs (sometimes) to the Substance and (sometimes) to the Quality; for instance, while the *Substance*, in the shape of the molecule of Water (hanging in the atmosphere) with its constituent particles actually in contact (with our organs of perception), is not perceived (with the Visual organ),—its *quality* of *coolness* is perceived; and it is from the continuous presence (in the atmosphere) of such aqueous molecules that the two (Winter) seasons of *Hēmanṭa* and *Shishira* derive their character;—similarly while the substance in the shape of the molecule of light (hanging in the atmosphere), with its colour unmanifested, fails to be seen, along with its colour,—its warmth is actually perceived; and it is from the presence of this substance that the two seasons of Spring and Summer derive their character. [All this goes to prove that the mere non-perception of a thing is not a proof of its non-existence].

Vārṭika on Sū. (35).

There being no uniformity, &c. &c.—says the Sūṭra. The rest is clear in the *Bhāṣya*.

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* The *Ṭāṭparya* has taken this sentence as pointing out the weak point in the explanation. It is certainly a weak point, if the Sūṭra is really meant to enunciate the *causes* of Perception.

† The printed text of the Sūṭra reads उपलब्धिनियमः so also the *Nyāyasūchinibanḍha*. But we find the reading उपलब्ध्यनियमः in the *Bhāṣyachanḍra*, in the Puri Sū. Ms., in Sūṭra Ms. D; as also in the Puri Bhāṣya Mss. A and B. The translation adopts this latter reading.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (36.)

[P. 143, L. 18 to P. 144, L. 8.]

Where it does come about,—

PERCEPTION OF COLOUR (AND COLOURED SUBSTANCE) IS THE RESULT OF THE INHERENCE OF SEVERAL COMPONENT SUBSTANCES, AND OF THE PRESENCE OF A PARTICULAR CHARACTER OF COLOUR.* (Sūṭra 36).

That is to say, it is so whenever Colour and the Substance in which it subsists are apprehended by Perception. The 'particular character of Colour'—by reason of whose presence colour (and coloured substances) are perceived, and on account of whose absence, a Substance (as endowed with colour) is *not* perceived,—consists in what has been called its 'manifested character.'† It is for this reason (of perceptibility depending upon the *manifestation of colour*) that the Light-ray from the Eye, having its colour *unmanifested*, is not perceived with the Eye, [and certainly this non-perception does have not prove that the ray is non-excellent]. In connection with Light, we find that it possesses a diversity of character: *viz*: (*a*) sometimes it has both Colour and Touch manifested, as in the Sun's rays (which is perceived by the Visual and Tactile organs); (*b*) in some cases it has its Colour manifested but Touch unmanifested; as in the rays of light from the Lamp (which are perceived with the Visual organs); (*c*) in some cases it has its touch manifested and colour unmanifested, as light in contact with (heated) Water and such other things (which is perceived by the Tactile Organ only); and (*d*) in some cases it has both Colour and Touch unmanifested and is, as such, *not perceptible*, (either by the Visual or by the Tactile Organ) —*e. g.*, the light-rays emanating from the Eye.

Vārṭika on Sū. (36).

[P. 380, L. 19 to P. 381, L. 16.]

Question.—"Why is it that the Light-rays of the Visual Organ are not perceived?"

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* This *Sūṭra* is not found in Vishvanaṭha's *Vṛiṭṭi*, nor in the *Nyāyasūṭravivaraṇa*, nor in Sūṭra Ms. D., nor in Puri Suṭra Ms. But the *Vārṭika*, the *Nyāyasūchinibanḍha* and the *Bhāṣyachanḍra* treat it as *Sūṭra*.

† That is, Colour and Coloured object are perceived only when the colour is manifested.

Answer.—Because the conditions of perception are not present. *Presence of large magnitude, presence of several component substances* and *presence of Colour* are not the sole conditions of perceptibility; but what is meant by 'Colour' (whose presence is necessary for perception) is not merely colour, but a particular character of colour. To this effect we have the following Sūṭra—*Perception of Colour, &c. &c.* By the term 'particular character of Colour' what is meant is that peculiarity of Colour which is called 'manifestation'; because the mere character of 'Colour' is not one that differentiates one Colour from another; while 'manifestation' being a character that does serve to differentiate (one Colour from another), it is called a 'particular character'; just as the mere character of 'Brāhmaṇa' is not a 'particular character of Brāhmaṇa.' So that it is only what serves to differentiate things of the same kind from one another that is called a 'particular character.'

Vār. P. 381.

The 'manifestation' (of a quality, like Colour) is inferred from its effect; *i.e.*, 'manifestation is that particular character, by reason of whose absence the Aqueous Substance and the Luminous Substance (hanging in the atmosphere) with their component particles in contact are not perceived in the Winter and the Summer respectively,—and by reason of whose presence the light-rays of the Lamp and the Sun are perceived. And inasmuch as this 'particular character' of Colour is not present in the Light-rays emanating from the Eyes, these rays are not perceptible with the Eye.

Such diversity of character has been found in the case of Light. That is to say, Light is of four kinds: (*a*) That which has both Colour and Touch manifested, *e.g.*, the light-rays of the Sun; (*b*) that which has its Colour manifested but Touch unmanifested, *e.g.*, the Light from the Lamp; both these kinds of Light are perceptible (by the Eye), because their Colour *is manifested*;—(*c*) that which has its Touch manifested, but

Colour unmanifested, *e.g.*, the Light in (heated) Water; and (*d*) that which has both Colour and Touch unmanifested, *e.g.* the light in the Eye, both of these latter kinds of Light are imperceptible (by the Eye), because their Colour is *not manifested.*

[The cause of the said 'diversity' is explained in the following Sūṭra]—

Sūṭra (37).

THE FORMATION OF THE SENSE-ORGANS, BEING DUE TO MERIT AND DEMERIT, IS SUBSERVIENT TO * THE PURPOSES OF MAN. (Sū. 37).

Bhāṣya on Sū (37).

[P. 144, L. 10 to P. 145, L. 8].

As a matter of fact, the Sense-organs are formed in accordance with the purposes of the sentient being served by them,—such 'purpose' consisting of the *perception of things* and the *experiencing of pleasure and pain*; so that the generation of the light-ray in the Eye is for the purpose of getting at (and operating upon) the object perceived;† and the fact that the Colour and Touch (of this Light in the Visual Organ) are not manifested is deduced from (and assumed on the basis of) certain well-known usages [such, *e.g.*, as the dictum that 'the Sense-organs are themselves beyond the senses,' and so forth].‡ Similarly it is from

* The *Bhāṣyachandra* explains पुरुषार्थतन्त्रः, as 'brought about by man's purpose.' But from the *Bhāṣya* it is clear that it means 'subservient to man's purpose.'

† From the general principles enumerated in the Sūṭra, it follows that, because objects are perceived with the Eye, and the Eye-socket or Pupil is unable to get at the object,—and Sense-organs cannot apprehend things without getting at them,—we conclude that the formation of the Eye must be such that it is able to get at the object; and hence we come to the conclusion that the Eye is composed of Light, and it is the ray of light, that issuing from the Eye, falls upon the object that is seen with it.

‡ The *Bhāṣyachandra* explains '*Vyavahāra*' as '*Vyavahāraviśhēṣaḥ*,' *Vichiṭrajñānashabḍaprayogarūpāḍiḥ*, *Aṭinḍriyaminḍriyamiṭyāḍiḥ*. There are certain well-known notions in connection with the Sense-organs; one of these being that the Sense-organs themselves cannot be perceived by the Senses; and in the case of the Eye, this would be true only if the Eye consisted of such Light as has its colour and touch unmanifested; if it consisted of the Pupil only, the Eye could not be *imperceptible*.

usage (and experience) that we deduce the fact that in regard to certain objects there is hindrance (to the operation of the Visual organ), which indicates the presence of obstruction. In fact, as the Sense-organs, so also the manifold and diverse formation of all things, is 'due to Merit and Demerit (of Men being born into the World),' and is 'subservient to the purposes of Man.'

The term '*Karma*' (in the Sūṭra) stands for 'Merit and Demerit'; which serves to bring about the experiences of the sentient being.

Bhā. P. 145. The said 'Obstruction' can belong only to a material substance, because there is unfailing concomitance.* That is to say, the obstruction that we find as hindering the operation of the Sense-organ upon certain substances must be regarded as belonging to a material substance, for the simple reason that it never fails in its concomitance with material substances; for we have never found any *immaterial* substance (as *Akāsha* and the like) appearing as an 'obstruction.' [It is true that *non-obstruction* is found in the case of certain *material* substances also, *e.g.*, glass, rock-crystal and the like, which do not hinder the operation of the Visual organ; but] as for *non-obstruction*, this is not *unfailing in its concomitance*, either with *material* or with *immaterial* substances,—being found, as it is, along with both. [Hence non-obstruction cannot prove either the *material* or the *non-material* character of the Sense-organs.] Some people argue as follows:—"It comes to this that, because there is *obstruction*, the Sense organs must be *material*, and because there is *non-obstruction*, they must be *non-material*; 'non-obstruction' (of the Sense-organ) also we find when things, hidden behind the glass, or mass of white clouds, or rock-crystal, are clearly perceived." But this is not right; because there is *non-obstruction* also in the case of *material substances*; *e.g*, (*a*) there is illumination, by lamp-light, of things hidden behind glass, clouds and rock crystal; which shows that there is *no obstruction* of *Lamp-light* (which is admittedly *material*); and (*b*) there is *no obstruction* of the

* This sentence has been printed as a Sūṭra. But neither Sū. Ms. D., nor the *Nyāyasūchīnibandha*, nor the Puri Sū. Ms., nor Vishvanāṭha, nor the *Nyāyasūṭravivaraṇa*, nor the *Bhāṣyachandra* read any such Sūṭra. We do not, therefore, treat it as a Sū., the Sūṭra-numbering therefore, here onwards, will not agree with that of the printed text.

heat of the cooking fire operating upon things placed in the vessel (placed upon the oven) [and the cooking fire is also admittedly *material*].

Vārṭika on Sū. (37).

[P. 381, L. 18 to P. 382, L. 18.]

The formation of the Sense-organs, &c. &c.—says the Sūṭra. The rest is clear in the *Bhāṣya.*

Says the *Bhāṣya*—*The fact that the Colour and Touch (of this light in the Visual Organ) are not manifested is deduced from (and assumed on the basis of) certain well-known usages.*

Vār. P. 382. If the Visual Light had its colour manifested, then, at the time that several such light-rays fall upon any perceived object, that object would be burnt [as on the contact of fire; which is the only light in which colour is manifested]; and when several light-rays would fall upon the object at one and the same time, these says (being substances with manifested colour) would tend to hide the object from view, and the object should fail to be perceived. You will perhaps argue as follows—"When the rays of the Sun fall upon an object, it does not obstruct the rays of light issuing from the perceiving Eye (and the object does not fail to be perceived); and in the same manner, there need be no obstruction to the Visual rays by the several light-rays falling upon an object (which would thus not fail to be perceived)." But this is not right; the perception is brought about after piercing; that is to say, in the example cited by you what happens is that the rays of light issuing from the Eye pierce through the solar rays and then become connected with the object. As regards Visual Light however, if it had its colour and touch manifested, then the light-rays from the Eye of one person having fallen upon an object, it would become hidden under those rays (which having their colour and touch manifested would not be transparent), and would not be perceived by any other person. "But when several light-rays

impinge upon an object, what happens is that out of these rays there is produced a new substance, of the same nature as these rays, in the shape of another Ray."* If such were the case, then the perception of things by a man with an imperfect Eye (Visual Organ) would be of the same kind as that by a man with a perfect organ ;† and this cannot be accepted ; as such is not found to be the case. As a matter of fact, well-known usage shows that the light-rays from the Eye do not have their colour and touch manifested.

The manifold and diverse formation of all things is due to Merit and Demerit and is subservient to the purposes of Man ; the term 'Karma' stands for Merit and Demerit ; which serves to bring about the experiences of the sentient being—says the *Bhāṣya.*

The said 'obstruction' must belong to a material substance ; because it never fails in its concomitance ; that is, the Visual Organ must be a material substance,—because we find its operation obstructed by such things as the wall and the like,—as we find in the case of the Jar and such other material substances.

" But by reason of non-obstruction, it should be regarded as non-material." If you mean by this that—" If on the strength of its *obstruction* the Visual Organ is regarded as *material,*—then on the strength of its *non-obstruction,* it should be regarded as *non-material* ; and such *non-obstruction* of the Visual Organ is actually met with, when we find that there is perception of things hidden behind glass, clouds (vapour) and rock crystal,"—our answer is that this is not right ; as the premiss is not true ; in the case of the Lamp-light, we find that of the *material* light of the Lamp also there is *non-obstruction* (by rock-crystal, &c.) ; and there is *non-*

* That is, out of the several *components of the Visual Organ,* there is produced the single *composite* in the form of the Visual Organ'—*Tātparya.*

† According to the Purvapakṣī, in both cases the *composite* organ would be equally produced out of a number of component light-rays.

obstruction also of the heat of the cooking-oven over things placed in the cooking pan [both which go to show that there is necessary concomitance between *obstruction* and *material character*].

Bhāṣya on Sū. (38).

[P. 145, L. 8 to L. 14].

As regards the non-perception (of the Light-rays from the Eye), this may be due to special reasons. [For example]—

Sūtra (38).

ITS NON-PERCEPTION IS SIMILAR TO THE NON-PERCEPTION OF THE LIGHT OF THE STARS AT MIDDAY. (Sū. 33).

The general principle is that there is perception of a thing when there is 'inherence of several component substances' and also 'a particular colour' (Sū. 36); and yet in the case of the light of the stars, we find that even though the said conditions of perception are present, it stills fails to be perc·ived at midday, because it is suppressed by the (fierce) light of the Sun;—exactly in the same manner, in the case of the Light of the Visual Organ, even though the conditions of perception—in the shape of the presence of 'several component substances' and of 'a particular colour' —are present, it fails to be perceived, for certain special reasons. What this special reason is has been explained above (in the *Bhāṣya* on Sū. 36, P. 144), where it has been pointed out that there is no perceptional apprehension of a substance *which does not have its Colour and Touch manifested.* It is only when there is absolute non-perception, [*i.e.* when the thing is not perceived at all, and its non-perception is not due to any special causes], that it can be rightly regarded as proving the non-existence of the thing [and inasmuch as such is not the case with the Light of the Visual Organ, its merely accidental non-perception cannot justify the conclusion that it does not exist].

Vārṭika on Sū. (38).

[P. 382, L. 18 to P. 383, L. 6.]

As regards non-perception, this may be due to special reasons—says the Bhāṣya.

Its non perception. etc., etc.—says the *Sūṭra* In the case of the Star-light, we find that even though it fulfills all the conditions of perceptibility, it fails to be perceived at mid-day, by reason of its suppression; in the same manner, even though the Light of the Visual Organ fulfills all the conditions of perceptibility, it fails to be perceived by reason of the non-manifestation of its colour. That the Star-light is not perceived at midday is due to the Light of the Sun.

Vār. P. 383.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (39).

[P. 145, L. 14 to L. 18].

Some one might here argue that—" On the same analogy we may say that there is Light in the piece of stone also, and it is not perceived at midday because it is suppressed by the Light of the Sun." And in answer to this we have the following Sūṭra—

Sūṭra (39).

THE SAID ASSERTION CANNOT BE ACCEPTED; BECAUSE THERE IS NON-PERCEPTION (OF THE LIGHT OF STONES) ALSO AT NIGHT; (Sū. 39)—

and also because there is no cognition of it by Inference either (which there *is* in the case of the Light of the Visual Organ). Thus then, there being absolute non-cognition (at all times, and by all means of Cognition) of the Light of the Stone-pieces, we conclude that no such light exists. Such however is not the case with the Light of the Visual Organ [which *is* apprehended by means of *Inference*].

Vārṭika on Sū. (39).

[P. 383, L. 6 to L. 17].

Says the Opponent:—" It is not right to say that the non-perception of star-light at midday is due to its suppression by sun-light; as this would lead to the absurdity of all things being regarded as having light; if such be the case, then any such thing as stone and the like might be regarded as possessed of Light. If it be asked why the light of these things is not perceived?—the answer should be that it is not perceived because it is suppressed by sun-light."

And it is an answer to this that we have in the following Sūṭra—*This assertion cannot be accepted*, &c. &c., &c. If stone and such things were actually possessed of Light,—and the non-perception of such light during the day were due to its suppression by sun-light,—then it would certainly be perceived at night. "At night also it is not perceived because at night its manifester (in the shape of Sun-light, which would render the light of the stone visible) is absent." But the *supp. ssor* of a thing cannot be its *manifester* [and the Opponent ving declared above that Sun-light is the *suppressor* of Stone-light during the day, he cannot rightly say now that that same Sun-light, which is absent at night, is the *manifester* of stone-light]; and it behoves you to explain why there is no perception of the light of stone, &c. at night.

Then again, the existence of Light in such things as the Stone and the like is not vouched for by Inference either. This is what is meant by the particle '*api*,' 'also' (in the *Sūṭra*).

Thus then, all the means of cognition having failed to provide the cognition of Light in Stone, &c., the inevitable conclusion is that there is no Light in these things. On the other hand, such is not the case with the Light of the Visual Organ; it is *not* that its existence is not vouched for by Inference;—the fact that there is effective obstruction (of vision) by such things as the Wall and the like leading to the required inference [that in the act of vision rays of Light emanate from the perceiving Eye and reach the object perceived].

Bhāṣya on Sū (40).

[P. 145, L. 18 to P. 146, L. 4].

The view propounded by us is supported by reason also. [For]

Sūṭra (40).

THE PERCEPTION OF THINGS BEING BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE AID OF EXTERNAL LIGHT, THE NON-PERCEPTION (OF THE VISUAL LIGHT) MUST BE DUE TO NON-MANIFESTATION (OF COLOUR). (Sū. 40).

It is only when the Visual Organ is aided by some external light that it becomes capable of apprehending things; and in the absence of such light, there is no apprehension with the Visual Organ. [So that it is on account of the absence of an external light falling upon it that the Visual Light is not perceived]. As a matter of fact, even when the aid of (external) light is present, and there is perception also of Cool Touch, the object in which that touch subsists, (*i.e.*, the particles of Water hanging in the atmosphere) fails to be perceived with the Eye; for the simple reason that its Colour is not manifested; this shows that there is non-perception of an object endowed with Colour by reason of its Colour being not manifested * For these reasons we conclude that what the *Pūrvapakṣin* has said in Sū. 33—that "inasmuch as no such things (as the Visual Light-ray) is ever perceived, what has been put forward cannot prove any thing"—it not right.

Vārṭika on Sū. 40.

[P. 383, L. 17 to P. 384, L. 3].

Even though the Visual Light is present, *there is non-perception of it, by reason of the non-manifestation* (*of Colour*) *etc., etc.*—says the *Sūṭra*. This *Sūtra* is intended to cite an illustration. The sense is

Vār. P. 384.

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* In the case of the Water-particle hanging in the atmosphere, what happens is that its Colour not being manifested, it is not perceived with the Eye; and that this is so we infer from the fact that in the perception of Water we require the aid of external light; similarly, the Visual Light also requiring, for its perception, the aid of external light, it follows that the non-perception of this also must be due to the non-manifestation of its Colour. It is a generally recognised principle that a thing, which requires for its perception the aid of external light, fails to be perceived only when its Colour is not manifested; so that the non-perception of such a thing must be attributed to the *non-manifestation of its colour*, and not to its *suppression by stronger light*; as is found to be the case with the light of stars, which, not requiring the aid of any external light in its perception, has its non-perception at midday due to suppression by the light of the Sun.—*Vārṭika and Ṭāṭparya.*

as follows—Any thing that requires external light (for its perception), has its non-perception due to the *non-manifestation of Colour*; *e.g.*, in the case of the aqueous substance which has its component particles closely packed, (*i.e.* the Water-molecule), there is non-perception because its colour is not manifested; similarly, the Visual Light also standing in need of external light, its non-perception also should be due to the non-manifestation of its Colour.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (41).

[P, 146, L. 4 to L. 10.]

Question—" But why is *suppression* not put forward as the reason for the non-perception of the Visual Light ?* [The answer is given in the new Sūṭra].

Sūṭra (41).

BECAUSE THERE CAN BE SUPPRESSION (OF COLOUR) ONLY WHEN IT IS MANIFEST ALSO; (Sū. 41)

—and *also when it is not dependent* (*for its perception upon external light*; this is the implication of the particle '*cha*,' 'also.' As a matter of fact, there is suppression of only such Light as is manifested—*i.e.* duly evolved—and does not depend upon the aid of external light [as we find in the case of Stars]; when, on the other hand, such conditions are absent, (*e.g.*, in the case of the Light in such things as the Visual Organ), there can be no suppression; which leads us to conclude that when a certain Light, which is not perceived (with the Eye) by reason of its Colour being not manifested, becomes perceived when some external light falls upon it,—such Light cannot be said to be 'suppressed.'

From the above it follows that the Visual Light does exist (and is endowed with a particular form and character).

Vārṭika on Sū. (41).

[P. 384, L. 4 to L. 15.]

Question—" Why is not *Suppression* held to be the reason for the Visual Light not being perceived?"

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* This question emanates from those Logicians who hold that Visual Light has its Colour manifested, like any ordinary Light; and it is not perceived because it is suppressed by the stronger light of the atmosphere.

Answer—It is not so held—*because there can be suppression etc. etc.*—says the *Sūṭra*. Only that Light can be 'suppressed' which has its colour not manifested and which does not require the help of external light; as we find in the case of the light of stars. The Light of the Visual Organ, on the other hand, does not have its colour manifested; and it also requires the help of external light; and the Colour that *is not manifested* cannot be 'suppressed'; *e.g.*, the aqueous substance with its component particles closely knitted together. Again, even that Colour which is manifested,—if it is one that requires the aid of external light,—cannot be 'suppressed'; *e.g.* such things as the Jar and the like. Both these kinds of 'suppression' * are impossible in the case of Visual Light.

[The *Vārṭika* formulates two arguments in support of the proposition that Visual Light exists]—(*a*) 'The thing in question—the Pupil of the Eye,—possesses Light,—because, being a substance, it forms a necessary factor in the special set of causes that bring about the perception of Colour,—like the Lamp';—or (*b*) 'The Visual Organ is possessed of Light, because, being a substance, and being something that is endowed with a special aptitude, it illumines (renders visible) things hidden behind rock-crystal and such (transparent things),—like the Lamp.'

Sūṭra (42).

ALSO BECAUSE WE ACTUALLY PERCEIVE THE LIGHT IN THE EYES OF NIGHT-WALKERS. (Sū. 42.)

Bhāṣya on Sū. (42).

[P. 146, L. 12 to L. 14.]

As a matter of fact, we actually see rays of light in the eyes of 'night-walkers'—*i.e.* the cat and other animals (of the feline species); and from this we infer the existence of light in the eyes of other living beings.

* That is, the suppression of Light, (1) which has its Colour manifested and (2) which does not require the aid of external light.

"But just as the genus (of the Cat) is different (from that of Man), so would their sense-organs also be of different characters [so that the mere fact of the Cat's Eye possessing rays of light cannot justify the inference of the existence of Light in the Eyes of Man]."

There is no justification for the assumption that there is such difference of character (between the Eye of the Cat and the Eye of the Man); specially in view of the fact that both are equally found to have their approach (upon visible objects) hindered by obstructions such as the wall and other things. [Which fact is what forms the main ground for the assumption that the Visual Organ consists of Light].*

Vārṭika on Sū. (42).

[P. 384, L. 17 to P. 385, L. 5.]

Also because &c.—says the *Sūṭra*, citing an example in support of what has been said above; the full argument being—'The human Eye consists of light-rays,—because, while not being of the nature of Contact,† it forms a factor in the cause of the perception of Colour,—like the Eyes of night-walkers.'

"*But just as the genus (of the Cat) is different (from that of Man), so would their Sense-organs also be of different characters.*"

The sense of your argument is as follows:—"The genus 'Cat' subsists in the *Cat*, but not in the *Man*; and in the same manner, it may be that it is only the Cat's Eye that consists of Light, and not the Eye of Man."

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* The mere fact that while we see light-rays emanating from the Cat's Eye, and not those emanating from the Man's Eye, cannot justify the assumption that the two are not of the same kind of 'sense-organ'; in the case of the Sun and the Moon, though the former is felt to be hot and the latter cool, yet both are regarded as 'luminous'; hence mere difference in some detail of character does not prove diversity of 'genus.'—*Bhāṣyachanḍra.*

† This qualifying clause has been added with a view to exclude *Contact* itself, which also is a factor in the cause of perception of Colour; but as it is of the nature *of Contact*, the qualifying clause excludes it.

Vār. P. 385. This, however, cannot be accepted; in view of the force of obstructions; that is to say, even though there is difference in the genus of the Cat and the Man, yet we find that the light-rays from the Eye of the Man are obstructed exactly in the same manner as those from the Eye of the Cat.

For the following reasons also the Sense-organs should be regarded as made up of material substances:—(a) *because they are capable of resistance*, like the Jar and such other material things;—and (b) the auditory Organ is a material substance,—because while being a substance, it illumines (renders audible) external things in contact with it,—like the Olfactory organ, &c.

Bāhsya on Sū. (43).

[P. 146, L. to P. 147, L. 5.]

[Says the Opponent]—" It is not right to regard *the Contact of the Sense-organ with the Object* as an instrument of Cognition. Why?

" BECAUSE (AS A MATTER OF FACT) THERE IS PERCEPTION WITHOUT (THE ORGAN) GETTING AT (THE OBJECT); FOR (WE FIND THAT) THERE IS PERCEPTION OF THINGS BEHIND GLASS, VAPOUR AND ROCK-CRYSTAL."—(Su. 43).

" As a matter of fact, we find that when a flying piece of straw strikes against glass or vapour, it is actually seen with the Eye; and yet one thing can come into contact with another only when no third thing comes between them,—and whenever a third thing does come between two things, their contact is obstructed. Such being the case, if the contact of Light-rays (from the Eye) and the Object (the straw behind the glass) were the cause of its perception, then,—no contact being possible by reason of the obstruction (of the intervening glass),—there should be no perception at all. And yet we do perceive things hidden behind glass, vapour and rock-crystal;—all which goes to prove that the Sense-organs are operative without actually getting at (coming into contact with) the object. From this it follows that they are non-material in their character; because all material things (such

as the Arrow, the Axe and the like) have the character of being operative only by getting at their objects."

Vārṭika on Sū. (43).

[P. 385, L. 5 to L. 13.]

Says the Opponent—"It is not right to urge that there is perception of an object only when there is contact of the object with the Light-rays (from the Eye); because as a matter of fact, there is perception otherwise also.—*There is perception without the Sense-organ getting at the Object etc. etc.*,—says the *Sūṭra*. *When a flying piece of straw etc., etc.*,—says the *Bhāṣya*. If the Light-rays from the Eye were the illuminator of the object got at by them, then they could never illumine (render visible) things hidden behind glass, vapour or rock-crystal. But they do render visible such things. Hence it follows that the Visual Organ is not operative only by getting at its object. And from this it follows that it is not made up of material substances; as all material things are found to have the character of being operative only by getting at their objects."

Sūṭrā (44).

[*Answer to the above*]—THE ABOVE REASONING HAS NO FORCE AGAINST OUR DOCTRINE, BECAUSE THERE IS NO PERCEPTION OF THINGS BEHIND A WALL.* (Sū. 44).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (44).

[P. 147, L. 7.]

If the Sense-organs were operative without getting at their objects, then there would be nothing to prevent the perception of things hidden behind a wall.

* In the printed text and in Puri A, the *Bhāṣya* has a '*na*' preceding the Sūṭra. It is not in Puri B; nor is it supported by the *Bhāṣyachandra*. And as the denial is already contained in the *Sūṭra* itself, in the term '*apraṭiṣēḍhaḥ*,' an additional '*na*' would be superfluous.

Vārṭika on Sū. (44).

[P. 385, L. 13 to L. 15.]

The above contention of the Opponent is not right; because *the reasoning has no force* &c.—says the *Sūṭra*. We have already explained that if the Sense-organs are operative without getting at the objects, then such things as the Wall and the like could not have the power of hindering their operation. The rest is clear in the *Bhāṣya*.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (45).

[P. 147, L. 8 to L. 11.]

[The Opponent retorts]—"But if the Sense-organs were operative only by getting at the objects, then there would be no perception of things behind glass or vapour or rock-crystal."

[The answer to this is as follows]—

Sūṭra (45).

INASMUCH AS THERE IS NO REAL OBSTRUCTION (BY SUCH THINGS AS THE GLASS &C.), CONTACT DOES TAKE PLACE * (IN THE CASES CITED). (Sū. 45).

As a matter of fact, neither Glass nor Vapour obstructs the passage of Light-rays from the Eye; and not being obstructed, the rays do actually come into contact with the object.

Vārṭika on Sū. (45).

[P. 385, L. 18 to L. 19.]

Neither the Glass nor Vapour obstructs the rays of Light; and not being obstructed, they pass within (the Glass or Vapour) and come into contact with the Object (hidden behind the Glass or the Vapour).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (46).

[P. 147, L. 11 to P. 148, L. 3.]

One who holds the view that "there can be no non-obstruction of what is purely material" †—is not right;—

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* The *Bhāṣyachandra* and Vishvanātha read उत्पत्तिः for उपपत्तिः

† Puri Mss. A and B and the *Bhāṣyachandra* read यश्च न मन्यते &c., which may be construed to give the same sense thus:—'If one does not admit all this, and insists upon the view that there could be no absence of obstruction, if the Sense-organs were material in character.'

BECAUSE (AS A MATTER OF FACT) THERE IS NO OBSTRUCTION OF THE SUN'S RAYS,—IN CONNECTION WITH THE OBJECT BEHIND A PIECE OF ROCK-CRYSTAL,—AND IN CONNECTION WITH THE OBJECT TO BE BURNT.* (Sū. 46).

The view that has been held cannot be accepted as right,†—(*a*) because there is no obstruction of the Sun's rays, —(*b*) because there is no obstruction in regard to the object behind a piece of rock-crystal,—and (*c*) because there is no obstruction in regard to the object to be burnt;—the sentence in the Sūṭra is to be split up into three clauses by construing the term 'because there is no obstruction,' '*avighāṭāṭ*,' with each of the other three terms; and the meaning assigned to the Sūṭra is in accordance with this construction.

(*a*) The rays of the Sun are not hindered by the Jar and such things,—'as there is no obstruction' in this case; and the Water in the Jar becomes heated; such imbibing of the quality of warmth of one thing (Light) by another (*i.e.*, Water) is possible only when there is actual contact (between the two things); and the original coolness (of the Water) becomes suppressed by the warmth thus imbibed.

(*b*) When the object to be illumined is hidden behind rock-crystal, there is no obstruction to the lamp-rays falling upon it; and 'because there is no obstruction,' the object is got at by the light, and becomes perceived.

(*c*) When the thing is placed in a frying pan over the fire, it becomes burnt by the light of the fire; and here also 'because there is no obstruction' to the light-rays, the thing is got at by them, and because it is thus got at, it becomes burnt; and the heat (of the Light) is operative only by contact.

The term '*avighāṭāṭ*,' 'because there is no obstruction,' may also be taken by itself (as propounding a fourth argument): "What would be the meaning of '*avighāṭa*,' 'non-

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*Such is the translation of the Sūṭra as interpreted by the Bhāṣya, which (see below) analyses the Sūṭra into three factors. The simple meaning of the Sūṭra appears to be that 'there is no obstruction of the Sun's-rays even when the object burnt by it is behind a piece of rock-crystal.'

† This repetition of the *na* appears to be superfluous;—having already appeared before in the Sūṭra. But it is only Puri B that omits it; it is found in Puri A, in the *Vārṭika* and also in the *Bhāṣyachandra*. It may be taken as reiterating the denial of the Opponent's view.

obstruction' (in this case)?" It would mean that there is no hindrance on any side to the progress of the substance (Light) by any such intervening substance as has its component particles not ruptured and transformed (by the Light passing through them); * *i.e.*, there is no hindrance to its operation; *i.e.*, there is no obstacle to its contact (with the object). For instance, we find that water placed in an earthen jar imbibes the coolness of the outer atmosphere [in which case the hot light-rays go out of the Water through the intervening jar, without dismembering and transforming the latter †]. And there can be no perception of the *touch* (warmth or coolness) of a thing unless it is got at by the Sense-organ; and we also see (in the case of the Water in the Jar) that there is percolation, as also flowing out ‡. [Which also shows that substances can pass through an intervening substance without dismembering or transforming it].

Thus then, it becomes established that in the case of things hidden behind glass or vapour or rock-crystal, perception duly comes about, 'because there is no obstruction' to the rays of Visual Light by the said glass, &c., and they get at the object by passing through the intervening glass, &c.

Vārṭika on Sū. (46).
[P. 386, L. 1 to L. 14.]

Some people argue as follows:—"It is not possible for a material substance to be *not-obstructed*; all material substances are by their very nature, liable to obstruction."

This however, is not right; *because there is no obstruction*, &c., &c.—says the *Sūṭra*. *The view that has been held cannot be accepted; (a) because there is no obstruction of the sun's*

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* The term '*vyūhyamāna*' is used here in a peculiar sense; it has been explained by the *Ṭāṭparya* as meaning 'dismemberment'; the sense being that when the thing in the frying pan is burnt by the heat of the fire in the oven, the heat passing through the pan does not tend to the dismemberment of the pan's component particles; *i.e.*, it does not so happen that the pan is broken up and another pan appears in its place. And this permeating of the rays of light and heat—without dismembering and transforming the intervening substance, is what is meant by 'non-obstruction.'

† This parenthetical explanation is according to the *Vārṭika* and the *Ṭāṭparya*.

‡ The *Vārṭika* reads '*parispanda*' for '*praspanda*,' and explains it as *lateral motion*. The *Bhāṣyachandra* reads '*praspanda*,' and explains it as *percolating through the pores*; '*parisrava*' standing for actual *flowing out*.

rays;—*(b) because there is no obstruction in regard to the object behind a piece of rock-crystal;*—*and (c) because there is no obstruction in regard to the object to be burnt*—(says the *Bhāṣya*). The sentence of the Sūtra has been split up by construing the term 'because there is no obstruction' with each of the other three terms; a single sentence could not afford the three distinct meanings; hence each distinct sentence is taken as conveying a distinct meaning. The rest is clearly explained in the *Bhāṣya.*

"What is the meaning of 'non-obstruction' here?"

It means that one substance passes though another without dismembering and transforming the latter; that is to say, 'non-obstruction' consists in one substance coming into contact with the inner particles of another substance, and the component particles of the latter substance being not ruptured; or, it may be taken as consisting in the passing out of one substance from within another, without dismembering the component particles of the latter; *e.g.*, we find that when water is put in an earthenware jar, it imbibes the coolness of the outer atmosphere; and certainly a quality (such as coolness) independently by itself could not go out except as along with the substance in which it subsists.

'*Pari-spanda*' stands for *lateral movement,* and '*Pari-srava*' for *flowing out.*

Sūtra (47).

[*Objection*]—"THE VIEW PUT FORWARD IS NOT RIGHT; BECAUSE THERE IS POSSIBILITY OF EITHER OF THE TWO CHARACTERS BELONGING TO EITHER OF THE TWO SUBSTANCES." (Sū. 47.)

Bhāṣya on Sū. (47).

[P. 148, L. 5—6.]

"(*a*) Whether there is *non-obstruction* (of the Visual Light) "by the Wall and such other things, just as there is by glass "and vapour, &c., or (b) there is *obstruction* by glass and

" vapour, &c., just as there is by the wall;—inasmuch as both " these alternative views are equally possible, it behoves you " to show cause which, and why, is the right view."*

Vārṭika on Sū. (47).

[P. 386, L. 16 to P. 387, L. 1].

" *The view, etc., etc.*—says the *Sūṭra*. That is, it becomes " possible for the character of one thing to belong to another, " and *vice versa*; *i.e.* if there is *non-obstruction* of the Visual " Light by the Rock-crystal, &c., there should be *non-obstruc-*
Var. P. 387.
tion by the Wall also; and if there is *obstruc-tion* by the Wall, then there should be *obstruc-* " *tion* by the Rock-crystal also."

Sutra (48).

[*Answer*]—JUST AS THERE IS PERCEPTION OF COLOUR IN THE MIRROR AND IN WATER,—BY REASON OF THESE TWO BEING, BY THEIR NATURE, BRIGHT AND WHITE,—SIMILARLY THERE IS PERCEPTION OF COLOUR (ALSO IN THE CASE OF SUCH INTERVENING SUBSTANCES AS GLASS, &C., WHICH ARE, BY THEIR NATURE, TRANSPARENT).—(Sū. 48).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (48).

[P. 148, L. 9 to L. 14].

The Mirror and Water are possessed of '*prasāḍa*'—*i.e.*, a particular colour (bright-white); which belongs to them by their very nature; as is shown by the fact of their always possessing it; and of this 'bright-white colour' also, it is the very nature that it reflects (and renders visible) the Colour (of things placed before it); and in the case of the Mirror, we find that when a man puts his face before it, the light-rays emanating from his eyes strike the Mirror and are turned back (reflected), and thereby they come into contact with the man's own face, whose colour and form thus become perceived; this perception being called 'the perception of the reflected image'; and it is brought about by the peculiar colour of the Mirror's surface; that it is so is proved by the

* The Puri Mss. read *Niyamēna* for *Niyamē*; the *Bhāṣyachanḍra* also notices this reading and explains it to mean that "it is absolutely necessary to state your reasons."

fact that any such reflection fails to appear whenever there is a deterioration in the brightness of the Mirror's surface. [Though such is the case with the Mirror, yet] there is no such 'perception of the reflected image' in the case of Wall and such other things [and the only explanation possible is that these latter things are not endowed with that particular property which would enable them to reflect the light-rays from the Eye.] In the same manner, even though there is *non-obstruction* of the Visual Light by such things as the Glass and Vapour, &c., yet there is *obstruction* by such things as the Wall and the like; and this is due to the very nature of the things concerned [which must be accepted as they are].

Vārṭika on Sū. (48).

[P. 387, L. 5 to L. 14].

Just as there is perception of Colour, etc., etc.,—says the *Sūṭra. The Mirror and Water are possessed of 'prasāḍa,' i.e., a particular colour*; and this colour forms the very nature of those things, because it is always found in them. "What is the meaning of the particular colour belonging (to Mirror and Water)?" It means that it subsists in those things, without their being in contact with any other substance. It is also the property of the particular Colour itself that it is capable of making colour visible; and this constitutes its very nature; or the 'nature' meant by the *Bhāṣya* consists in the Colour subsisting in such things as Water and the like. Inasmuch as Mirror and Water are endowed with the character of '*prasāḍa*,' when the Visual Light strikes against these things, it turns back, and comes into contact with the man's face; and since the light (thus reflected) comes into contact with all things lying in front of the face, the face in the reflection is seen along with all these things; *e.g.*, the man who may be standing before the former man. Though the perception of the Mirror and that of the Face come one after the other, yet the sequence is so quick, that the interval is not noticed, and the perception of the face is tinged with that of the Mirror's surface. The rest is clear in the *Bhāṣya*.

Sūṭra (9).

IT IS NOT RIGHT TO QUESTION OR DENY THINGS THAT ARE (RIGHTLY) PERCEIVED AND INFERRED.* (Sūṭra 49).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (49).

[P. 148, L. 16 to P. 149, L. 2].

As a matter of fact, every Instrument of Right Cognition apprehends things as they really exist; so that when certain things are cognised by means of Perception or Inference, it is not right for you, in course of your inquiry, to *question* the reality of these things;—nor is it right for you to *deny* their reality. It would, for instance, not be right to argue that 'Just as Colour is visible by the Eye, so should Odour also be visible,' or that 'like Odour, Colour also should *not* be visible by the Eye;' or that 'like the cognition of Fire, the cognition of Water also should arise from that of Smoke'; or that 'like the cognition of Water, that of Fire also should *not* arise from that of Smoke.' And what is the reason for this? Simply this, that things are cognised by means of the Instruments of Right Cognition just as they really exist, exactly as endowed with their real nature, and as possessed of their own real properties; so that Instruments of Right Cognition always apprehend things as they really exist. You have put forward the following *question* and *denial*:—(*a*) 'there *should be non-obstruction* (of Visual Light) by the Wall, etc.; just as there is by glass and such things'; and (*b*) 'there should not be non-obstruction by glass, &c., just as there is none by Wall, &c.' But it is not right to do so; because the things that we have described (in connection with the obstruction or non-obstruction of Visual Light by certain objects) are such as are actually cognised by means of Perception and Inference; whether there is *obstruction* or *non-obstruction* (of a certain thing by another thing) can be determined only by our perception or non-perception, (*i.e.* it depends upon our perceiving or not perceiving such obstruction); so that in the case in question) from the fact that there is no perception of things behind the Wall and such things, it is *inferred* that there *is* obstruction by these things; and from the fact that there *is* perception of things behind glass and vapour, &c., it is inferred that there is non-obstruction by these latter.

* Puri Sū. Ms. reads '*paryanuyoga*' for *praṭiṣēḍha*; and Puri-Bhā. Ms. B. reads '*praṭiyoga*'; it is clear from the *Bhāṣya* that '*praṭiṣēḍha*' is the right reading.

Vārṭika on Sū. (49).
[P. 387, L. 16 to P. 388, L. 8].

It is not right to question etc. etc.—says the *Sūṭra*; because as a matter of fact, every Instrument of Cognition apprehends things as they really exist. The character of things (that we have put forward) are such as are *perceived* and *inferred*; and Instruments of Cognition (like Perception and Inference) always apprehend things as they really exist. So that the question and denial urged by you—to what could they refer? In fact it is not right (to put forward such questions and denials). For instance, it would not be right to argue, that 'just as by means of smoke we get the Cognition of Fire so should we get the Cognition of Water also'; or that 'just as the Cognition

Vār. P. 388. of Water does not arise from that smoke, so would the Cognition of Fire also not arise from it.' When you object to things as they really exist, you can only be disregarded. *Whether there is obstruction or non-obstruction (of a certain thing by another thing) can be determined only by our perception or non-perception; so that (in the case in question) from the fact that there is no perception of things behind the wall and such things, it is inferred that there is obstruction by these things; and from the fact that there is perception of things behind glass and real things, it is inferred that there is no obstruction by these latter.* (Bhāṣya).

[The *Vārṭika* reverts to the discussion of the general fact as to Sense-organs being operative only by getting at the objects]—*Objection*—"If the Visual Organ is operative by getting at the object, why is it that we do not see the collyrium applied to (and in contact with) the Eye?"

There is no perception, we reply, simply because there is no contact with the *organ* (of vision). It is only such things as are in contact with the organ of perception that are perceived; and the collyrium is not in contact with the Organ of Vision;

because the bodily encasement (the Eye-ball, &c.) does not constitute the 'Organ'; the 'Organ' consists of *Light*, and not of the bodily encasement; and the Collyrium is not in contact with the rays of Light (emanating from the Eye).

END OF SECTION (7).

Section (8).

[Sūṭras 50—59]

(*The Sense-organs one or many.*)

Bhāṣya on Sū. (50).

[P. 149, L. 2 to L. 6].

[Now the question arises]—Is there only one Sense-organ? or several Sense-organs?* Why should this doubt arise? [The Sūtra answers]—

Suṭra (50.)

THE DOUBT ARISES—BECAUSE BY REASON OF SUBSISTENCE IN SEVERAL PLACES, THERE SHOULD BE MULTIPLICITY; AND YET A SINGLE COMPOSITE ACTUALLY SUBSISTS IN SEVERAL PLACES.† (Sū. 50.)

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* The sequence of this section is thus explained by the *Parishuḍḍhi*—'In the foregoing section, it having been established that the Sense-organs are made up of material substances, and that they are operative by contact,—it has next to be proved that there are several Sense-organs; and the determination of this point is necessary as preliminary to what has gone before. For, if the Sense-organs are one only—and not many—then they cannot be made up of material substances; and if they are not material in their character, they cannot be operative by contact. Because if there is only one Sense-organ, there would be no force in such reasonings as—'the Visual organ must consist of Light, because from among Colour and other things it renders perceptible only Colour,' and so forth; and under the circumstances it could not be proved that the Organ operates by contact; as it is only when the organ is proved to be material in its character that it can be held to be operative by contact. The real purpose served by the present discussion is that when it has been proved that there are several Sense-organs, then alone can there be any force in such reasons for the existence of the Soul as—'by one and the same object is apprehended by the organs of Vision and Touch' and like.

†The Sūṭra presents a difficulty. The words as they stand mean—'We find several things occupying several places and also a single thing occupying several places.'—But the Vārṭika and Tāṭparya are dissatisfied with this. The grounds for dissatis-

As a matter of fact, we find that when different places are occupied, there are several substances; and yet the Composite substance, though subsisting in several places, is one only. Hence *in regard to the Sense-organs, which are found to occupy different places*, the said doubt arises.

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faction wth this latter are explained by the *Vārṭika*, and thus amplified by the *Tātparyā*;—If we take the words of the *Sūṭra* as they stand, it would mean—'we have seen that when there is diversity of place there is multiplicity, as when several Jars occupy diverse places; and we also find a single thing occupying several places, as when a single composite resides in several ot its components.' But such statement would be open to the following objections—in clause (a) 'diversity of place' स्थानान्यत्व denotes the quality of 'diversity' as subsisting in the *Place*; and in clause (*b*) the term नानास्थानत्व, the 'character of occupying several places,' denotes a quality subsisting in something else, other than *Place*. But Doubt can ever arise from *two qualities* subsisting in two distinct things. For these reasons, the reasoning of the Sūṭra could be resolved into one or other (not both) of the following; and neither would be right. For if the reasoning is put in the form—(a) 'Doubt arises because we have seen multiplicity *and* unity when there is *diversity of place*'—then inasmuch as this quality of diversity would belong to the plāce, it would not belong to āny one thing; and hence it would not be common to both (*one* and *many*); specially as what the Sūtra has pointed out (in clause b) is only the fact of the *one thing* having the quality of occupying several places; and it does not put forward the *diversity as belonging to the Place*;—this latter has been put forward (in clause *a*) only in connection with *multiplicity*. If, on the other hand, the reasoning is put in the form—(*b*)—'Doubt arises because we have found Unity and Multiplicity when things occupy several places'—then the difficulty is that, as a matter of fact, there is no substance which occupies several places, each substance occupying only one place; so that in this also the character would not be a common one; specially as what the Sūṭra declares in clause (*b*) is the fact that *the character of occupying several places* indicates *unity* of the thing. As for the contingency when several Jars occupy several places this has been spoken of, in clause (*a*) as indicating *diversity of place*, and not *the character of occupying several places*.

[For these reasons, the *Bhāṣya*, ignoring the literal meaning of the words of the Sūṭra, which would be apparently irrelevant, has explained the Sūṭra according to its sense—says the *Parishuddhi*. And this sense is as rendered in the translation. The whole point of the difference is that the 'occupying of several places' should be taken as belonging to the *Sense-organs* specifically, and not to things in general,—and that of *occupying of several places* indicating *multiplicity* as well as *singleness*.

The *Bhāṣyachandra* offers the following explanation :—

स्थानानि अन्यानि यस्य तस्य तत्तथा तस्य भावः 'स्थानान्यत्वम्' अनेकस्थानस्थितैकत्वम् तेन नानात्वात् तज्ज्ञापितनानात्वात् [This explanation of the compound avoids the difficulty

Vārṭika on Sū. (50).
[P. 388, L. 9 to P. 389, L. 6.]

It has been proved that the Sense-organs are material in their character. Now arises the question—is the Sense-organ one? or are they several?.

The grounds for this doubt are set forth in the Sūṭra. Some people (unmindful of what the Bhāṣya has said, specially in its last sentence), explain the *Sūṭra* simply to mean that—'Multiplicity has been found when there is diversity of place, *e.g.* in the case of several Jars,—and a single thing has been found to occupy several places,—*e.g.*, the Composite object?

But the Doubt, put in this form, does not appear to be quite reasonable. "Why?" (*a*) If the ground of doubt is set forth in the form—'because multiplicity and singleness have been found when there is diversity of place,'—then, inasmuch 'diversity of place' (being a property of *the Place*)

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raised in the *Vārṭika*]—'Because *multiplicity* of Sense-organs is indicated by the fact that it is found in several places'—and श्रवयविनः एकस्य नानास्थानत्वात् मानावयवाधारकत्वञ्च एकत्वम् ; and yet inasmuch as a single composite resides in several of its components, it would seem that the Sense-organ is one only.'

The difficulty raised appears to be more verbal than real: What the Sūṭra means is simply this—'we find that when things occupy several places, they are many; [*e.g.*, when the Jar and the Cloth occupy different places]; and we also find a single thing occupying several places; *e.g.*, the Composite is single and yet it resides in several components; so that when we find the Sense-organs occupying different places, there arises a Doubt as to whether they are several (like the Jar and the Cloth), or one (like the composite).'—as Vishvanāṭha puts it. And all that the *Varṭika* insists upon is the fact that the Sūṭra should be construed as simply putting forward *the character of occupying several places—as belonging to the Sense-organs*—as the property common to 'one' and 'several,' and hence giving rise to doubt as to the Sense-organs being one or many. And even when we take the Sūṭra as referring to things in general, the implication is exactly this.

Vardhamāna, in the *Nyāyanibanḍhaprakāsha*, puts the difficulty in a somewhat different manner:—"as the words of the Sūṭra stand, the first clause mentions *multiplicity due to diversity of place*, and it does not make any mention of *singleness* (the second factor of the Doubt); similarly, the second clause mentions *singleness during diversity of place*, and it does not make any mention of *multiplicity*; so that in either case, the Doubt remains unaccounted for'.

does not belong to any *single object*, it could not be regarded as the '*common* property' (giving rising to the Doubt). (*b*) If, on the other hand, (in order to avoid this difficulty) the ground of doubt is set forth in the form—'because when we find the character of occupying several places, things are found to be one as well as several,'—then, there is this difficulty, that as a matter of fact no substance is ever found to be *occupying several places*, and to be *several* [each place being occupied by a single substance]; hence the character (of occupying several places) would fail to be common (to *one* and *many*); for even when we see several such things as the Jar and the like, what we see is only a *diversity of place*, and not (any thing) *as occupying several places.*

Vār. P. 389.

This Doubt, which is found to be inexplicable according to both the possible explanations (of the words as they stand), becomes explicable when we take the Sūtra *as referring to the Sense-organs* as occupying several places; the form of the doubt being—whether there are several organs occupying several places? or only one organ occupying several places? Such a doubt *in regard to the Sense-organs* could not arise, either (*a*) 'because of the diversity of place,' or (*b*) 'because of (any single thing) occupying several places.' [As the former explanation would have it]. [Hence the only right way is to take the Sūtra as setting forth the two grounds *as pertaining to the Sense-organs* specifically, and not to things in general].

The *Vārṭika*, having explained the grounds of Doubt according to the *Sūṭra* and the *Bhāṣya*, sets forth another ground for the doubt in question]—There is doubt also (a) *because the Sense-organs are distinct from the Body*, and also (b) *because they are entities*; (*a*) As a matter of fact, we have found that things distinct from the Body are *one*—*e.g.* the *Ākāsha*—as well as *several*,—*e.g.* the Jar and such things;—(*b*) we have also seen that entities are one as well as several;

—both these characters—*distinctness from the Body*, and *being entities*—are found present in the Sense-organs; hence the said Doubt arises.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (51).

[P. 149, L. 6 to P. 150, L. 5].

[*Purvapakṣa*]—"The Sense-organ is *one*,—

"THE CUTANEOUS (TACTILE) ONLY, BECAUSE OF NON-ABSENCE. (Sū. 51.)

"The Cutaneous Organ is the only *one* organ",—says the Opponent. Why? "*Because of non-absence*; that is, there "is no *substratum of sense-organ* which is not pervaded by "the *Skin* (in which the skin is not present); so that in the "absence of *Skin* there can be no perception of anything. "Hence it follows that there is a single Sense-organ—the "Cutaneous (Tactile) Organ—by which all sense-substrata "are pervaded, and in whose presence alone the perception "of things is possible."

[* *Siḍḍhānṭa*]—The above is not right; because there is no perception (by the Tactile Organ) of the objects of other Sense-organs.† The distinctive feature of the Cutaneous or Tactile Organ is that it is the instrument of the perception of Touch; and when by means of this Tactile Organ, the Touch (of a certain thing) is perceived, there is no perception of the objects of other Sense-organs, such for instance, as Colour &c.—by such persons as are blind (devoid of the Visual Organ, even though endowed with an efficient Tactile Organ). [According to the Pūrvapakṣa] there is no other Organ except that which apprehends Touch; so that (according to that theory) the blind man should perceive *Colour* &c., exactly as he perceives Touch;—as a matter of fact however, Colour &c. are not perceived by the blind;—from which it follows that the Cutaneous Organ is not the only *one* Organ.

[The view that the Cutaneous Organ is the only sense-organ having been shown to be untenable, the *Pūrvapakṣin*

* This is the Siḍḍhānṭa put forward by the *Bhāṣya*; the Sūtrakāra propounds it in the next Sūtra.

† The *Bhāṣyachanḍra* calls this '*Sūṭra*'; but nowhere is it found as Sūṭra. The *Ṭāṭparya* regards it as Sūṭra. It is interesting to note that the *Parishuḍḍhi* states and criticises the view that this is a *Sūṭra*.

next advances the view that the various Sense-organs are only parts of the one Cutaneous Organ]—"The perception of those things would be of the same kind as the perception of Smoke; that is, as a matter of fact, the touch of Smoke is perceived (felt) by means of that particular part of the Cutaneous Organ (skin) which is located in the Eye,—and not by means of any other part of skin ; and similarly Colour, &c. also are perceived by particular parts of the skin ; and it is on account of the destruction of such particular parts that the blind fail to perceive Colour, the deaf fail to perceive Sound, and so forth."*

Answer—What has been urged is not to right ; as it involves a self-contradiction. Having asserted that—" inasmuch as the Cutaneous Organ is not absent anywhere, there is only one Sense-organ,"—you now allege that " the perception of Colour &c. is obtained by means of particular parts of skin, just like the perception of Smoke ;" if this latter allegation is true, then the instruments apprehending the several objects of perception (Colour, Touch &c.) must be regarded as *several* ; for the simple reason that each of them apprehends a particular object of its own ; as is proved by the fact that one particular object, (*e.g.* Colour) is perceived only when one particular instrument (the *Eye* or the *Skin in the Eye*) is present, and it is not perceived when the latter is destroyed. Thus your former assertion (that there is a single Sense-organ apprehending all things) becomes contradicted by the latter.

The non-difference' that you have put forward (in Su. 51), as the reason (for the conclusion that there is only one Sense-organ ') is also open to doubt. As a matter of fact, the substrata of the Sense-organs are pervaded by (*i.e.* composed of) the Earth and such other substances also ; for in the absence of these substances there is no perception of things. From this it follows that there is no single Sense-organ—the Cutaneous or any other—which can bring about the perception of all things.

Vārṭika on Sū. (51).

[P. 386, L. 7 to P. 393, L. 8].

" There is only one Sense-organ "—says the Opponent. Which one is that?

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* When the blind fail to perceive Colour, it is only becuuse that particular part of skin which was in the Eye, and which was the means of colour-perception, has been destroyed.

"*The Cutaneous is the only one Sense-organ, because of* "*non-absence*,—says the Sūṭra. What is this *non-absence*? "What we mean by 'non-absence' is that the Cutaneous "Organ is connected with the substrata of all sense-organs; "that is, there is not a single sense-organ which is not per-"vaded by the Skin.* Or, 'non-absence' may mean con-"comitance; the sense being that there is no perception by "any sense-organ except when the Skin is there. By reason "of this *non-absence*, we conclude that the Cutaneous is the "only one Sense-organ."

The above is not right; because there is no perception of the Objects of other Sense-organs—says the *Bhāṣya*. That is, the view put forward goes against actual experience (*i.e.* all evidence); † that is, one who asserts that there is only one Sense-organ contradicts actual experience. If the Cutaneous Organ were the only sense-organ, there would be tactile perception of all things; so that Colour would be perceived by the blind, Sound by the deaf, and so forth; as a matter of fact however, no such perception takes place;—hence it follows that the Sense-organ cannot be one only.

The 'non-absence' that has been put forward as the reason is not valid; as the reasoning based upon it [*i.e.* 'because the instruments by which all things are perceived are connected with the Cutaneous Organ, they should all be regarded as the Cutaneous Organ'] is not true; for as a matter of fact, the Substrata of the Sense-organs are found to be pervaded by, or connected with, several such things as the Earth and the like, which are not 'Sense-organs'; so that it is not true that 'anything connected with the substrata of sense-organs must be *the* Sense-organ.'

* The third 'na' appears to be superfluous.

† '*Lokavirodha*' means *contrary to experience*. But the *Ṭāṭparya* explains it to mean '*Pramāṇavirodha*,' *contrary to all evidence*; and the reason for this explanation given by the *Parishuddhi* is that, inasmuch as the Sense-organs themselves [are not perceptible, they can not form objects of 'ordinary experience.'

"It may be due to the destruction of the part.—That is, when the blind fail to perceive Colour,—or when the deaf fail to hear Sound,—this is due to the fact that a particular part of the Cutaneous Organ (by means of which Colour is perceived or Sound is heard) has been destroyed; just as we find that the perception of Smoke being brought about by means of a part of the Cutaneous Organ,—when that particular part of Skin in the Eye-ball is destroyed, there is no perception of the touch of Smoke."

This cannot be accepted, as it involves self-contradiction.

Var. P. 390.

When you say that—"the perception of Colour &c., is brought about by means of a part of the Cutaneous Organ, just like the perception of Smoke",—you contradict the assertion that "there is only one sense-organ", having previously declared that "the Cutaneous Organ is the only one sense-organ", you now assert that "the perception of Colour &c., is brought about by means of different parts of the Cutaneous organ"; and in doing this you admit what you have sought to deny. The 'parts' have no existence apart from the 'Whole'; and those 'parts' of the Cutaneous Organ that are regarded by you as the means of apprehending Colour &c.,—are these of the nature of 'Sense-organs' or not? "What of this?" Well, if those 'parts' *are* of the nature of 'sense-organs', then all those being so many different Sense-organs, the Sense-organ cannot be one only; if, on the other hand, the 'parts' are not of the nature of 'Sense-organs', then Colour &c., (which are perceived by their means) cannot be regarded as 'perceptible by the Senses'!

Sutra (52).

[*Siddhānta*]—IT IS NOT TRUE [THAT THERE IS ONLY ONE SENSE-ORGAN]; BECAUSE (SEVERAL) THINGS ARE NOT PERCEIVED SIMULTANEOUSLY. (Su. 52).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (52).
[P. 150, L. 7 to L. 11.]

[According to the view that there is only one sense-organ apprehending all things, what would happen would be that] the Soul would come into contact with the Mind, the Mind with the single Sense-organ, and the single sense-organ with all objects (Colour, Odour, Touch, Taste and Sound); so that (in every act of Perception), the contact of the Soul, the Mind, the Sense-organ and the several objects being present, there would be perception, at one and the same time, of all these objects. As a matter of fact however, Colour and such other objects are never perceived at one and the same time. Hence it follows that it is not true that there is a single sense-organ operating on all objects of perception.

Further, by reason of the non-concomitance of the perceptions of things, it cannot be accepted that there is a single sense-organ apprehending all things; if there were concomitance of perceptions of several things, then no blindness &c., would be possible.*

Vārṭika on Sū. (52).

The *Siḍḍhānṭa* view put forward is connected with the following Sûṭra—'*It is not true, because several things are not perceived simultaneously.*' For one who holds that there is only one sense-organ, it would be possible to have the perception of several things at one and the same time. "How so?" Well, there would be present, (*a*) the contact of the Soul with the Mind, (*b*) of the Mind with the Sense-organ, and (*c*) of

*The difference between 'non-simultaneity of perceptions' urged before and the 'non-concomitance of perceptions', urged now is not quite clear. The distinction, according to the *Vārṭika* and the *Parishuddhi*, is that 'non-simultaneity' is more general, referring principally to simultaneity of Perceptions; the sense being that several perceptions cannot appear at the same time; while 'non-concomitance' refers mainly *to the objects perceived*; the sense being that the several perceptions do not always appear together; *i. e.*, it is not necessary that the perception of Odour must always be accompanied by the perception of Colour; if that were so, then at the time that the blind man perceives Odour, he could have the perception of Colour also; and he would not be blind at all.

The *Parishuḍḍhi* remarks that what the *Sūṭra* really means to urge here is, not exactly the '*non-simultaneity of cognitions*', but only the impossibility of *several things* being perceived at one and the same time.

the Sense-organ with all objects of perception; so that out of these contacts of the Soul, the Mind, the Sense-organ and the several objects, there should proceed the perceptions of all those objects at one and same time.

[The *Vārṭika* raises an objection against the *Bhāṣya* interpretation of the *Sūṭrā*]—"The above reasoning is not right; as by that same reasoning, there should be the possibility (also according to one who holds that there are several Sense-organs) of the appearing, at one and the same time, of the perceptions of several such objects as are perceptible by the same sense-organ. That is to say, it has been urged that for one who holds that there is a single sense-organ, it being possible for the single Sense-organ to be in contact with several objects at one and the same time, there would be the absurd contingency of the perceptions of these several objects appearing at one and the same time;—but exactly in the same manner, for him also who holds that there are several Sense-organs, there would be the possibility of the perceptions of several things perceptible by any one sense-organ appearing at the same time.* The explanation that the *Siḍḍhānṭin* may put forward will be equally available for the other party also. If, on the other hand, the contingency is not objectionable, then there is no point in urging (against the Purvapakṣa) the contingency of 'the simultaneous perception of things' [as is done by the Suṭrā, as explained by the *Bhāṣya*]."

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* According to the *Pūrvapakṣa*, there is a single sense-organ apprehending all things; so that whenever one thing is perceived all things could be perceived. True; but according to the Siḍḍhānta also, though there are several Sense-organs, yet there are several things perceptible by each of those several organs; for instance, several kinds of colour are apprehended by the Eye, several kinds of Odour by the Nose; and so forth; so that according to this view also the contingency would be possible at the time that we perceive the Red Colour, our Eye is in contact with all *visible* things; so that the visual perception of all visible things should appear simultaneously. So that the contingeney is equally possible in both views.

(A.) To the above objection some people offer the following answer—[According to the Siḍḍhānṭa] the simultaneous perception of several things' is not possible, because of the difference in the *desire to cognise* (which is the precursor of every cognition, and which can arise, at any one time, in regard to only one thing). "But the same may be said for us also. If the simultaneous perception of several things is avoided by you by reason of the difference in the *desire to cognise*, then this 'difference in the *desire to cognise*' is certainly not barred against us either. So that what is necessary for the *Siḍḍhānṭin* is to find out some other reason, to account for the fact that perceptions cannot appear simultaneously, even when the *desire to cognise* (several things is there)."

Var. P. 391. (B.) Others have put forward the fact of the Sense-organs being *instruments*. This answer (to the objection against the Siḍḍhānṭa as put forward in the *Bhāṣya*) is as follows:—"Because the Sense-organs are *instruments* (there can be no simultaneity of perceptions); it is in the very nature of the Instrument that, even though operated (by an intelligent agent,) it cannot perform several operations *at one* and the same time; and when it is not so operated, it does not act at all."

But this explanation also is equally available to both (the *Purvapakṣin* and the *Siḍḍhānṭin*); for him also who holds that there is a single sense-organ, this Sense-organ is not deprived of the character of 'Instrument.' For these reasons, it is clear that it is not right to urge (against the Purvapakṣin) the fact that 'things are not perceived simultaneously' (as has been done by the *Sūṭra*)."

[Having pointed out difficulties in the *Bhāṣya* presentation of the *Siḍḍhānṭa* standpoint embodied in *Su.* 52, the *Vārṭika* introduces its own presentation of that standpoint]

—The *Purvapakṣin* who holds that there is a single Sense-organ, should be questioned as follows, in regard to the several alternatives possible:—You hold that there is a single Sense-organ which apprehends all things; now does this single Sense-organ operate by contact, or not? "What of that?" Well, if it operates by contact, then you should say what that single Sense-organ is. If the Cutaneous (Tactile) Organ is that single Sense-organ, then there can be no perception of Colour and such other things, which can never be in contact with the Cutaneous organ. If it could apprehend Colour &c. without coming into contact with them, then the same would be the case with Touch also [so that it would not be true that the organ operates by contact only.] If it be held that the organ operates half and half, both ways,—*i. e.*, some things it apprehends by contact, and others without contact,—then it loses the character of 'Instrument.' "Well, let it lose the character of 'Instrument'—What harm does that do to our position?" Now, it is in answer to this last argument of the Opponent that we have the *Sutra* (52) pointing out that—'what is put forward cannot be accepted, as it would involve the contingency of several things being perceived simultaneously';—the sense being that when the *contingency of several things being perceived simultaneously* is urged against the *Siddhāntin*, who holds that there are several sense-organs, his answer is that no such contingency can arise, *because the Sense-organs are 'instruments'* [and no instrument can have several operations at one and the same time];—while such an explanation is not available for the *Pūrvapakṣin*, according to whose view the Sense-organs have been deprived of the character of 'Instrument' [and who finds nothing undesirable in this]. Further, the assertion, that the 'sense-organ operates by contact, and it does not operate by contact,' is self-contradictory.

Further, the Cutaneous Organ cannot be the only sense-organ, *because of non-concomitance*; what is meant by 'concomitance' is that the perception of one thing by one person is accompanied by the perception of a second thing also; and if there be such concomitance, there would be no possibility of men being *blind* or *deaf* &c.

Sūṭra (53).

THE CUTANEOUS ORGAN CANNOT BE THE ONLY SENSE-ORGAN; AS THIS WOULD INVOLVE INNER CONTRADICTIONS.* (Sū. 53).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (53).

[P. 153, L. 13 to P. 151, L. 5].

The Cutaneous Organ cannot be regarded as the only Sense-organ; as such a view involves inner contradictions: That is, it would mean that by that Organ, Colour &c. are perceived without being in contact with it;—and if the organ is operative without contact (as it is *ex-hypothesi*, in the perception of Colour &c.), then it should be so in the perception of Touch also; or if Touch &c. are apprehended by the organ by contact only, then Colour &c. also should be apprehended by contact only.† It might be urged that —"the Cutaneous Organ operates half and half." But, in that case, since no obstruction would be possible, any and every object would be equally perceived. That is to say, if you mean that—"Touch &c. are apprehended by the Cutaneous Organ only when they are in contact with it, while Colours are apprehended by it without being in contact with it,"—then (our answer is that), under such a theory (where apprehension is possible *without contact*) there would be no obstruction (to the operation of the Organ); and there being no obstruction, there would be perception of all colours, the hidden as well as the unhidden; nor would

* The *Bhāṣyachandra* explains the term '*vipraṭiṣēḍdha*' as '*viḍhāya praṭiṣēḍha*, 'denying after affirming.'—*i.e.*, contradicting oneself.

This *Sūṭra* is not found in Vishvanāṭha; the *Bhāṣyachandra* appears to treat it as *Bhāṣya*; it is not found in Sūṭra Ms. D, nor in the Puri Sūṭra Ms. It is found in the *Nyāyasūchinibanḍha*, and the *Vārṭika* also treats it as *Sūṭra*.

† The right reading प्राप्तानां ग्रहणम् is supplied by the Puri Ms. A. and B.

there be any ground for the well-known phenomenon that there is perception of Colour near at hand, and no perception of Colour at a distance; that is to say, if the Cutaneous organ apprehends Colour without being in contact with it, then there would no reason for the phenomenon that, while Colour is not perceived from a distance, it is perceived when near at hand.

Vārṭika on Sū. (53).

[P. 391, L 18 to P. 392, L. 4.]

The Cutaneous Organ etc.—says the *Sūṭra.* The rest is clear in the *Bhāṣya.*

(A) Further, the derangement or destruction of one would make all perception impossible. That is, if there is only one Sense-organ, then if that one happens to be deranged, or destroyed, no kind of Perception would be possible.

Vār. P. 523.

(B) *Also because there is no possibility of obstruction.* If the Cutaneous Organ is the only one sense-organ, then no obstruction can have any force against its operation; and as a result of this even very remote things should be perceived.

(C) *There would be no ground for the phenomenon that there is perception of Colour near at hand, and no perception of Colour at a distance.* That is, if the Cutaneous Organ were operative without contact, then there would be no reason why there should be perception of things close to the organ, and no perception of things remote from it.

Bhāṣya on Sū (54).

[P, 151, L. 5 to L. 13].

The multiplicity (of sense-organs) having been proved (indirectly) by the denial of *singleness*, the *Sūṭra* proceeds to propouud direct positive arguments in support of the same.*

* This sentence has been construed in two ways, by the *Vārṭika* :—(1) *ēkaṭva-praṭiṣēḍhāt ananṭaram,*—'after having negatived singleness'—*nānaṭvasiḍḍhau sṭhāpanāhēṭuḥ upāḍiyate*—'the Sūṭra propounds arguments in support of multi plicity, ;—or (2) '*ēkaṭvapraṭiṣēdhāṭ nānaṭvasiḍḍhau*'—'the multiplicity of sense-organs having been proved (indirectly) by the denial of singleness, the Sūṭra proceeds to propounds direct argument in support of the same.

Sūṭra (54).

BECAUSE THE OBJECTS OF THE SENSE-ORGANS ARE FIVE-FOLD. (Sū. 54).

The term '*arṭha*' stands for *prayojana*, 'object' or 'purpose'; and as a matter of fact, this 'object' of the sense-organs is five-fold; that is, when Touch is apprehended by the Tactile Organ, that same organ does not apprehend Colour; hence we infer the existence of another Visual organ, which serves the 'purpose' of apprehending Colour; similarly when Colour and Touch are apprehended (by the Tactile and the Visual organs respectively), these two organs do not apprehend Odour; which leads us to infer a third, the Olfactory Organ, which serves the 'purpose' of apprehending Odour;—in the same manner, when the three (Touch, Colour and Odour) are apprehended (by the Tactile, the Visual and Olfactory organs respectively), these same organs do not apprehend Taste; hence we infer the existence of the fourth, the Gestatory Organ, which serves the 'purpose' of apprehending Taste;—lastly, when the four (Touch, Colour, Odour and Taste) are apprehended (by the the Tactile, the Visual, the Olfactory, and the Gestatory organs respectively) those same organs do not apprehend Sound; hence we infer the fifth, the Auditory Organ, which serves the 'purpose' of apprehending Sound. Thus, from the fact that the purpose of one sense-organ is not served by another, it follows that there are *five* Sense-organs.

Vārṭika on Sū. (54).

[P. 392, L. 4 to P. 393, L. 7.]

The multiplicity of sense-organs having been proved by the denial of singleness, the Sūṭra proceeds to propound direct positive arguments in support of the same—says the *Bhāṣya*. "But"—says the Opponent—"we do not understand how *multiplicity* is proved by 'denial'; for all that the denial can do is to show that *singleness* cannot be established; how does that prove *multiplicity*? Then again, inasmuch there can be no action or operation without a means or instrument (of accomplishing it) how can there be any *denying* (which is an *action*) of Singleness? All that the denial does is to

set aside *the inferential reasonings in support of the Singleness*; it does not set aside either *singleness* or *multiplicity*. Under the circumstances, what construction can be put upon the passage of the *Bhāṣya*?"

Answer: [The passage may be construed in two ways]—(A) '*Pratiṣēḍhāṭ nānāṭavaṣiḍḍhau*' should be construed as—'*pratiṣēḍhāṭ ananṭaram nānāṭvaṣiḍḍhau*'; *i.e.*, 'after the denial, in support of the establishing of multiplicity the Sūṭra propounds the argument *because the purpose of the sense-organs is five-fold*.' Or (B) the clause '*praṭiṣēḍhāṭ nānāṭvaṣiḍḍhau*' may be taken to mean that 'the denial of singleness having been proved by reasons supporting that denial, multiplicity also becomes proved by implication, indirectly.'

"What is the reason on which the denial is based?"

The reason is that—'otherwise several things would be perceived at the same time' (Sū. 52). This is the reasoning by which singleness has been negatived. And the negative proof having been already provided there, the next Sūṭra propounds the positive proof.*

Because the objects of the Sense-organs are five-fold—says the *Sūṭra*; and *the term 'arṭha' stands for the 'prayojana' &c.* &c.—says the *Bhāṣya*.

Says the Opponent:—"This Sūṭra has no semblance of reasoning at all. Why so? Because the probandum of a reasoning is that which is predicated by—forms the predicate of—the Proposition; so that the proposition being

* The *Parishuḍḍhi* remarks—Though the mere invalidating of the premises does not entirely demolish the Proposition, yet, in a case where the negativing of the Opponent's proposition is accomplished, it implies the establishing of the contrary of that proposition;—this is what is meant by the *Bhāṣya*. Formally formulated, the reasoning would stand thus—'In one body, the number of Sense-organs is *not one*,—because even though several things are in proximity, yet the perception of these comes gradually, one after the other, and not simultaneously;—in a case where the organ is one only, the perception of things in proximity to it, does not appear one after the other; as we find in the case of the Visual organ.'

in the form 'the Sense-organs are five', the premiss 'because the *arṭha* of the sense-organs is five-fold' is entirely irrelevant ;—even when '*arṭha*' is taken in the sense of *prayojana*,—and the premiss in the form 'because the *prayojana* of the Sense-organs is five-fold'—the irrelevancy remains. If (with a view to escaping from this difficulty) 'perceptions' are made the 'subject' of the Proposition [the Proposition being stated in the form 'perceptions are brought about by the instrumentality of five sense-organs'] then the probans (or premiss put forward) could not be valid (or relevant). The same thing happens if 'Objects' are made the 'subject' [the proposition being stated in the form 'Objects are apprehended by means of five sense-organs']."

Answer—The *Sūṭra* may be the taken as stating the following resonings :—'In regard to Colour, Taste, Odour, Touch and Sound, the observer is one whose action (of perceiving) is brought about by several instruments,—because in the appearing of one thing after the closing of another he requires the aid of a different instrument ;—whenever a person has several objects, he is always found to require the aid of a different instrument, when on the closing of one object there appears another object ;—*e.g.*, when a man is proficient in several crafts, he needs a different implement when on the closing of the work of one craft, he takes up that of another ;—now in the case of Colour, Taste &c. also, we find that when one of them appears (is perceived) after another has ceased, there is always need of a different instrument ;—hence we conclude that in regard to Colour, Taste, Odour, Touch and Sound, the Observer is one whose action is brought about by several instruments.'

Sūṭra (55).

[*Objection*]—"WHAT IS ASSERTED CANNOT BE ACCEPTED; BECAUSE THE 'OBJECTS' ARE MANY (AND NOT 'FIVE')"—(SŪ. 55),

Bhāṣya on Sū. (55).

[P. 151, L. 15 to L. 19.]

[Says the Opponent]—"That there are *five* sense-organs cannot be regarded as rightly proved by the fact that *the objects of the Sense-organs are five-fold*; —why?—*because the said objects are many*. The 'objects' of the Sense-organs are several; *e g.*, there are three kinds of Touch—the *cool*, the *hot* and *the neither-cool-nor-hot*; there are endless colours—in the shape of white, green and the rest; there are three odours—agreeable, disagreeable and indifferent; there are several tastes—the bitter and the rest; Sound is diverse, appearing in the form of letters as also in that of mere indistinct sound. In view of these facts, the man, who would hold the Sense-organs to be *five* on the ground of the objects of the sense-organs being five-fold, should also have to admit that there are many (more than five) Sense-organs, because the objects of the sense-organs are many."

Vārṭika on Sū. (55).

[P. 393, L. 9 to L. 15].

What is asserted cannot be accepted &c. &c.—says the *Suṭra*. This objection is raised against the *Siḍḍhānṭa* in the form is which it has been put forward; and what is meant by this objection is to object to the number *five*.

But in urging the objection the Opponent is not right, as he falls into self-contradiction; when he asserts that 'because the objects of the Sense-organs are many the Sense-organs must be many' he goes against his former allegation that 'there is a single Sense-organ.'

The Opponent answers this charge as follows:—"What is urged against us has no force; because we are advancing proofs; that is, what we mean (by Sū. 55) is, *not* to prove that there are several Sense-organs because the objects of the Sense-organs are five-fold,—and there would be self-contradiction only if we did this,—but simply to urge, in opposition to your argument that 'because the objects of the Sense-organs are five-fold, there must be five Sense-organs',

the fact that, if it be held that the number of Sense-organs should be five because their objects are five-fold, then it should also be admitted that the number of Sense-organs should be many because their objects are many."

Sutra (56).

[*Answer*]—INASMUCH AS (THE SEVERAL KINDS OF ODOUR ARE) NOTHING MORE THAN 'ODOUR,' THERE CAN BE NO DENIAL OF ODOUR OR THE REST (AS CONSTITUTING THE 'FIVE SENSE-ORGANS'). (Sū. 56).

Bhāṣya on Sū, (56).

[P. 152, L. 1 to L. 11].

As a matter of fact, Odour (Colour, Taste, Touch and Sound) have their exact extensions precisely determined through their respective communities (or genera) ;—so that the perceptions of these can be rightly regarded as indicating the existence of distinct apprehending instruments, only when it is found that they (the perceptions) are such as are *not* brought about by the same (or similar) instruments.* Further, the argument that has been put forward (in Sū. 54) has for its subject the 'perceptible things' *as grouped under well-defined heads*, and not *individual things, severally* ; while your denial (in Sū. 55) of the number 'five' as applied to 'perceptible things' refers to individual things regarded severally. Consequently the denial cannot be regarded as as right and proper.†

* The reading न प्रयोजयन्ति is wrong ; the right reading is प्रयोजयन्ति as found in the two Puri MSS. and in the *Bhāṣyachandra*, and also supported by the *Bhāṣya* below.

† All Odours are apprehended by the same organ ; hence they are grouped under one head,' and regarded as 'one', similarly with Colour, Taste, Touch and Sound. Hence those five groups justify the assumption of five 'Sense-organs.' The Opponent takes each Odour as a distinct unit, and for each such unit he would have one organ ; and hence he does not agree to restrict the number of organs to five only. But when all Odours are actually found to be apprehended by the same organ, there is nothing to justify the assumption or several organs for the apprehending of Odour.

"But how do you know that Odour and the rest have their extension precisely determined through their respective communities?"

Well, as a matter of fact, the three kinds of Touch—the cool, the warm and the neither-warm-nor-cool—are all grouped (and unified) under the single community of 'Touch'; so that when we perceive the *cool* Touch (by the Tactile organ), the perception of the other two kinds of Touch—the *warm* and the *neither-warm-nor-cool*—cannot indicate, or justify the assumption of, other instruments (distinct from the said Tactile organ); for the simple reason that all the several kinds of Touch are as a matter of fact perceptible by the same instrument; that is, the other two kinds of Touch also are actually perceived by means of the same organ as the *cool* Touch. Similarly, all kinds of Odour are included under the single group 'Odour, all kinds of Colour under 'Colour,' all kinds of Taste under 'Taste' and all kinds of Sound under 'Sound.' As for the perceptions of Odour (Taste, Colour, Touch and Sound) on the other hand, each of these is found to be obtained by means of a different kind of instrument; and as such they indicate so many different organs. From all this it becomes established that 'because the object of the Sense-organs are five-fold, there are five Sense-organs.'

Vārṭika on Sū. (56).

[P. 393, L. 15 to P. 394, L. 2].

The answer to the objection urged (under Sū, 55) is given in the next *Sūṭra* (56), which says—*Inasmuch as &c. &c.* Odour &c., have their extension determined through the communities of 'Odour' and the rest; and they do not indicate the presence of any other instruments except those that bring about their own perception. All those entities in which the community of 'Odour' subsists are found to have their perception brought about by a single (same) organ; hence the sub-divisions of Odour)—'agreeable'; 'disagreeable' and 'indifferent',—(being all perceptible by means of the same organ) cannot point to any other organs of perception.

Similarly with the others (Colour and the rest). The rest is clear in the *Bhāṣya*.

Bhāṣya on Su. (57).
[P. 152, L. 11 to L. 14.]

[Says the Opponent]—"If things can be grouped under "a community, then it follows that all the Sense-organs

"SHOULD BE REGARDED AS 'ONE,' THEIR (SEVERAL) "OBJECTS BEING NO MORE THAN 'OBJECT' (Su. 57).

"That is to say, all objects being included under the single "community of 'object' [the 'objects of the Sense-organs' are *one*, from which it follows that there is only one Sense-organ]."

Vārtika on Sū. (57).
[P. 394, L. 2 to L. 7.]

"*If things can be grouped under a single community, then it follows that there is only one Sense-organ; since their objects are no more than 'object.'* The meaning of this is that there is no incongruity (in the *Pūrvapakṣa* view that there is a single Sense-organ).

Sūtra (58).

[*Answer*]—NOT SO; BECAUSE OF THE FIVEFOLDNESS —(*a*) OF THE SIGNS (OR INDICATIVES) IN THE SHAPE OF PERCEPTIONS, (*b*) OF THE LOCATION, (*c*) OF THE PROCESS (OPERATION), (*d*) OF THE SHAPE (MAGNITUDE) AND (*e*) OF THE CONSTITUENTS. (Sū. 58).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (58.)
[P. 152, L. 16 to P. 153, L. 8].

As a matter of fact, objects are never found to have their extension determined through the community of 'Object'; and hence they cannot all be inferred as perceptible by any single organ, independently of other organs; in the case of Odour, &c., on the other hand, we find that they do have their extension determined by their respective communities, 'Odour' and the rest; and as such they are inferred as perceptible—each by a distinct Sense-organ. Hence what is urged (in Su. 57) is entirely irrelevant.

This is what is described in detail in the Sutra :—

(A) *Because of the fivefoldness of the signs in the shape of Perceptions*; what indicate the existence of Sense-organs are our own perceptions, since the presence of Sense-organs is proved only by the perception that we have of certain things;—this has been already explained in the Bhāṣya on Sū. 54, which speaks of the 'fivefoldness of the objects of Sense-organs';—thus then, inasmuch as the 'indicatives of Sense-organs,'—the shape of perceptions, are fivefold, the Sense-organs must be five.

(B) The *location* also of the Sense-organs are *fivefold* : (1) The Tactile Organ, which is indicated by the perception of Touch, has its *location* throughout the body ; (2) the Visual Organ, which, as issuing out of the body, is indicated by the perception of Colour, has its *location* in the pupil of the Eye ; (3) the Olfactory organ has its location in the nose; (4) the Gestatory organ has its *location* in the Tongue ; (5) the Auditary Organ has its *location* in the cavity of the Ear ;*—all this being proved by the fact that the five organs have their existence indicated by the perceptions of Odour, Taste, Colour, Touch and Sound.

(C) On account of the fivefoldness of the *processes* also there is diversity in the sense-organs : *e.g.*, (in visual perception) the Visual Organ encased in the pupil issues outside and then gets at the objects possessed of Colour ; the Organs of Touch (Taste and Odour) on the other hand are themselves got at by the objects, which latter reach the Organs by the movements of the body in which the Organs exist ; while the contact of the Auditory Organ with the Sound (heard) is obtained by reason of this latter proceeding in a series.

(D) '*Ākriti*,' shape ', stands for the exact limit or extent of magnitude ; and this is found to be fivefold. The Olfactory, the Gestatory and the Tactile Organs have their

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* The *Bhāṣyachandra* remarks that, inasmuch as the Auditory organ consists of *Ākāsha* it is not right to locate it in the Ear-cavity. To avoid this difficulty, it offers other explanations of the compound '*karṇachhiḍrāḍhiṣṭhānam*' : (1) '*chhiḍram*', 'cavity', stands for a particular form of contact ; and '*karṇa*' stands for an object made up of earth-particles : and '*aḍhiṣṭhāna*' stands for auxiliary ; hence the whole compound means 'that which has for its axiliary an object made up of earth-particles' :—or (2) 'that which is the aḍhiṣthāna,—substratum,—of the contact of the Ear'.—Both these interpretations would apply to the *Akasha*.

shape or magnitude restricted to their respective substrata (in the body; the shape of the Olfactory organ is the same as that of the Nose, and so forth),—and are inferred (as distinct from the perception of their objects;—while the Visual organ, though located in the pupil, moves out of the socket and pervades over the object;—while, lastly, the Auditory Organ is nothing other than Ākāsha itself, and like *Akāsha*, is all pervading,—being inferred only from the perception of Sound; and yet this Organ manifests or renders audible only certain particular sounds,—being restricted in its scope by the substratum (body) in which it subsists, by reason of the force of the peculiar faculties (of Merit and Demerit) belonging to the person concerned.*

(E) By *Jāṭi*, 'Constituent', is meant 'source'; the 'sources' or 'constituents' of the Sense-organs are five, in the shape of the rudimentary substances, Earth (Air, Water, Light and Akāsha). It follows therefore that, because the 'constituents' are five, the Sense-organs also must be five.

Vārṭika on Sū. (58).

[P. 394, L. 5 to P. 395, L. 7.]

What has been urged (in Sū. 57) has no force, as it has been already answered; *i. e.*, it has already been answered by what has been said under Sū. 54. For the purpose of explaining this same point we have the next Sūṭra—*Not so, because of the fivefoldness of (a)—the signs &c. &c. &c.*

(A) How 'perceptions' are the 'signs' or indicators, of the Sense-organs has been already explained in Sū. 56.

(B) The Sense-organs must be several,—because they have distinct *locations*;—things with distinct locations are always found to be distinct; *e.g.*, there is diversity of location in the case of several jars;—there is similar diversity of location in the case of Sense-organs;—hence these

* Though the Auditory organ is nothing more than the all-pervading Ākāsha; yet it cannot apprehend all Sounds in the world, because its scope is restricted by the disabilities of the body in which it subsists,—this connection of a particular organ with a particular object being determined by the merit and demerit of the man to whom it belongs.

must be several. According to the theory that there are distinct locations for the several Sense-organs, when the location of one organ is destroyed, another organ remains unaffected, resting in its own distinct location ; so that this theory involves no incongruity.*

(C) *On account of the diversity of processes,*—in formulating the argument this reason should be stated in the form 'because the processes of the Sense-organ are diverse' the undesirable contingency involved in the contrary view may be pointed out here also, as before.

(D) *'Shape' stands for the exact extent of magnitude ...the Olfactory : the Gestatory and the Tactile Organs have there magnitude restricted to their respective substrata*—says the *Bhāṣya.* The Visual Organ, issuing out of the Eye-socket, pervades over the object ; and is thus of larger magnitude (than the aforesaid three organs). The Auditory Organ, which is only Ākāsha, is restricted in its operations by the limitations of its location ; Akāsha becomes connected with (located in) the Ear-cavity, which is found under the influence of Merit and Demerit, and which (on that account) becomes the means of the apprehension of Sounds, agreeable, disagreeable or indifferent ; and what renders Sound audible is only the *Akāsha* thus connected with the Ear-cavity, and not as connected with any other orifices of the body, like the mouth and the rest ; nor is the Sound rendered audible elsewhere (than in the Ear-cavity) ; and it is for this reason that the Auditory Organ is affected favourably or otherwise by what is done to the Ear-cavity ; for so far as the *Akāsha* itself is concerned (which constitutes the Auditory Organ), it is eternal, and as such cannot be affect-

Var. P. 395.

* This incongruity will be present in the theory that all Sense-organs have the same location ; as in that case the destruction of one location would mean the destruction of the location of all Sense-organs ; so that the removal of the Eyes would put an end to all sense-perception !

either favourably or unfavourably. The greater or less efficiency also of the Auditory Organ is due to this same reason.

(E) 'Constituent' stands for 'source'—says the *Bhāṣya*. The sources of the Sense-organs are five; the five substances, Earth &c., are the sources of the Sense-organs. What is meant by these being the 'sources' of the sense-organs is that the sense-organs *are of the nature of Earth* &c.,—and not that they are the *products* of these; because *Akāsha* (which forms the Auditory organ) being eternal cannot be the *product* of anything.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (59).

[P. 153, L. 9 to L. 15.]

(The *Sāṅkhya* asks]—"How do you know that the Sense-organs have their source in the *rudimentary substances*, and not in *Unmanifested Primordial Matter*?"

[The answer is given in the following Sūtra.]

Sutra (59).

THE SENSE-ORGANS ARE REGARDED AS BEING OF THE SAME NATURE AS THE RUDIMENTARY SUBSTANCES, BECAUSE THERE IS PERCEPTION (BY THEIR MEANS) OF THE SPECIFIC QUALITIES OF THESE SUBSTANCES. (Sū. 59).

In the case of Air and the other rudimentary substances we find that there is a restriction as to the perception of particular qualities; e.g. Air serves to manifest Touch; Water serves to manifest Taste; Light serves to manifest Colour; as for Earth, one earthy thing (oil, *f. i.*,) serves to manifest the odour of another earth thing (the *kuṅkuma*, *f. i.*,);—this restriction as to the perception of the specific qualities of rudimentary substances is found in the case of the Sense-organs also [*e.g.* the Olfactory Organ manifests *Odour* only, the Tactile Organ *Touch* only, and so forth]; hence from the fact that there is restriction as to the perception of the the specific qualities of Rudimentary Substances, we conclude that the Sense-organs have their source in (are constituted

by) those Substances, and not in Unmanifested Primordial Matter.*

Vārtika on Sū. (59).

[P. 395, L. 7 to L. 18.]

Question :—"How do you know that the Sense-organs have their source in the Rudimentary Substances, and not in Unmanifested Primordial Matter ?"

This question has no force; as it has been already answered; it has been already explained (under Sū. 30) that the Sense-organs do not have their source in Unmanifested Primordial Matter.

Th eSense-organs are regarded etc., etc.—says the *Sūṭra.* The 'specific qualities of the Rudimentary Substances, are Odour,' Taste, Colour, Touch and Sound; these are called 'specific' because they serve to *specify* (and distinguish the substances from one another); *e.g.*, Earth is distinguished from Water and the rest by the presence of Odour; Water is distinguished from the rest by the presence of Taste, and so forth. According to both parties, a restriction is met with, in the case of the external substances Earth &c., as to the manifestation of their specific qualities; and there is similar restriction as to Odour &c. being manifested by the Olfactory and other Organs respectively. Hence from the fact that there is perception of the specific qualities of the Rudimentary Substances we conclude that the Sense-organs have their source in those substances.

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*The *Ṭāṭparya* makes the following observation. By the declaration that there are only five Sense-organs, it is implied, that the other five - Hands, Feet &c.—which also have been regarded as 'Sense-organs'—are not 'Sense-organs;' and the reason for this lies in the fact that they do not fulfill the conditions of the 'Sense-organ;' these conditions are—(1) that they should be connected with the Body, (2) they should be distinct from the defects of sanskāras and (3) they should be the direct instruments of cognition; and those (specially the last) are not present in Hands, Feet, &c.

"But which Organ is of the nature of which substance?"

That Organ which serves to manifest the specific quality of a particular Substance is of the nature of (has its source in) that Substance, so that the Olfactory Organ is of the Earth, because it serves to manifest Odour,—like the external Earthy Objects; similarly with the rest.

End of section (8).

Section (9).

(*Sūṭras* 60—71).

Examination of the 'Objects' of Sense-organs.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (60) and (61).

[P. 153, L. 15 to P.154, L. 7].

It has been mentioned* above (in Sū 1·1-14) that Odour &c., are the qualities of Earth, and inasmuch as this assertion would be true if Earth &c., had each only one quality, as well as if they had several qualities,† the author of the Sūṭra adds the following Sūṭrās—

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* What this refers to is not the mere 'mention' '*uḍḍēsha*' of the Objects; it apparently refers to their 'definition', '*lakṣaṇa*.' The *Tāṭparya* says—'with a view to *examine* the nature of *objects*, the *Bhāṣyakāra* recalls the definition provided under Sū. 1-1-14'; the mere 'mention' of 'objects' has been made under 1-1-1. The *Parisuḍḍhi* adds that the purpose underlying the examination of the 'objects' is the proving of the main thesis that there are several sense-organs', as also the discarding of the objections against the definition of Earth &c.

† Here the author propounds the doubt that forms the basis of the present enquiry: As regards the assertion in Sū. 1-1-14, it may mean, either—(1) that each one of Odour, Colour &c., belongs to each one of Earth, Light &c.; or (2) that among Earth and the rest, some have one quality, some two; or (3) that all belong to all.—*Vārṭika*. On this the *Parishuḍḍhi* remarks—The question is—Is the assertion in Sū. 1-1-14 meant to be *restrictive* (of one quality to one substance)? or *alternative* (one possessing one quality, one several and so forth)? or *cumulative* (all possessing all)? Or the doubt may be in regard to Odour, Colonr, &c.;—some qualities are common to all substances, some belong to only a few;—to which of these categories do Odour &c. belong?

Sūṭra (60) and (61).

FROM AMONG ODOUR, TASTE, COLOUR, TOUCH AND SOUND,—THOSE ENDING WITH TOUCH BELONG TO EARTH (Sū. 60); AND [FROM AMONG THOSE ENDING WITH TOUCH] EXCLUDING FROM THE BEGINNING, ONE BY ONE, THEY BELONG RESPECTIVELY TO WATER, LIGHT AND WATER; AND TO AKASHA BELONGS THE LATTER. (Sū. 61).*

'From among those ending with Touch'—this term, with its (former Nominative) case-ending changed (into the Genitive)—has to be construed along with Sū. 61.†

To Akāsha belongs the latter—*i.e.* Sound,—(so called) *in reference to those ending with Touch.*‡ "Why then is the comparative suffix '*ṭarap*' used, [when the reference is to the *four* qualities of Odour &c., while '*tarap*' is used when one thing is referred to *one* other thing]?" The word is an independent positive adjective (and not a comparative term ending with '*tarap*') and all that it signifies is that which comes after'; and in Sū. 1-1-14,—where all five are mentioned—'Sound' comes after 'those ending with Touch.' Or, the word may be taken as a relative term,—the reference being to 'Touch' only; the meaning being 'among those ending with Touch, that which is last, *i. e.* Touch,—in reference to this, Sound is 'latter.'

Vārṭika on Sū. (60) and (61).

[P. 395, L. 19 to P. 396, L. 15].

It has been asserted above that Odour &c., are the qualities of Earth and the rest; and this assertion is equally compat-

*These are two *Sūṭras*—according to the *Vārṭika* and also according to the *Bhāsyachandra*.

†This term is necessary in Su. 61 : and it can be brought only from the foregoing Sūtra ; there however it has the Nominative ending : hence when construed with Su. 61, its case-ending has to be charged. The meaning is that Earth has Odour, Taste, Colour and Touch ; Water has Taste, Colour and Touch ; Light has Colour and Touch ; Air has only Touch.

‡ The term '*sparshaparyanṭēbhyaḥ*', with the case-ending changed, being brought in from the preceding *Sūtra*.

tible with (*a*) restriction, (*b*) option, and (*c*) cumulation; (*a*) by 'restriction', each one of the qualities would belong to each one of the substances; (*b*) by 'option', some of the substances may have one, while others have two or three or four qualities; and (*c*) by 'cumulation' all the qualities would belong to all the substances. With a view to specify which of these views is correct, we have the two Sūṭras, which restrict the qualities to the several substances. Four qualities belong to the Earth; and one less than that to Water; one less than that to Light; and one less than that to Air.

'*From among those ending with Touch'—this term with its case-ending changed has to be construed etc. etc.*—says the *Bhāsya*. "What is the effect of this?" We get at a construction wherefrom we obtain the meaning that—"From among those ending with Touch'—*i. e.*, after them—comes 'Sound', which belongs to Ākāsha. "In that case the comparative suffix *ṭarap* cannot be right; as it is always found to be used between *two* things; in the present instance, if it means 'one among many', we should have the superlative form *uṭṭamaḥ*."

Well my good Sir, the term is not a comparative adjective ending in the suffix '*ṭarap*'; it means simply *that which comes after*; '*uṭṭaraḥ*' being synonymous with '*paraḥ*.' *Or*, '*the word may be taken as a relative term, the reference being to Touch only*;—so that the term may be taken as ending in the comparative suffix '*tarap*'. "But we have already said that if the term is a relative one, it should be *uṭṭamaḥ* (and not *uṭṭaraḥ*)." That is not right; as the reference is to '*Touch*' only; the sense being that '*Touch*' is later than 'Odour, Taste, Colour and Touch', and 'Sound' is later than 'Touch', this is what is meant by the term '*uṭṭaraḥ*'.

Sutra (62).

[*The Pūrvapakṣin objects*]—"THE VIEW EXPRESSED CANNOT BE ACCEPTED; BECAUSE ALL THE QUALITIES (ATTRIBUTED TO THE SUBSTANCES) ARE NOT APPREHENDED (BY THE SENSE-ORGANS CONSTITUTED BY THEM)."

Bhāṣya on Sū. (62).

[P. 154, L. 9 to L. 11.]

[The Purvapakṣin, holding the view that each one of the substances, is possessed of only one quality, objects to the view put forward in the preceding *Sūtra*—"The said distribution of qualities is not right.—Why?—Because as a matter of fact, all the qualities that have been attributed to the various substances (under the preceding Sūtra) are not apprehended by the Sense-organs composed by those substances. For example, by the Olfactory organ, which is composed of Earth, all the four qualities ending with *Touch*, are not apprehended; it is *Odour* alone that is apprehended by it. Similarly with the others also."

In what manner then are the Qualities to be distributed?—asks the *Siddhāntin*.

[The Purvapaksin answers this question and propounds his theory in the next Sūṭra].

Vārṭika on Sū. (62).

[P. 396, L. 17 to L. 19].

"*The said distribution of the qualities is not right;*—Why?—Because all of the four qualities, Odour and the rest, attributed to Earth are not really apprehended by the Olfactory Organ, which is composed of Earth. Similarly all of the three qualities attributed to Water are not apprehended by the Gestatory Organ, which is composed of Water; nor are both the qualities attributed to Light apprehended by the Visual Organ, which is composed of Light."

How then are the qualities to be distributed?

[The *Pūrvapakṣin* answers the question in the next Sūṭra].

Suṭra (63).

[*The Pūrvapakṣin says*]—"INASMUCH AS EACH OF THE QUALITIES SUBSISTS, ONE BY ONE, IN EACH OF THE SUBSTANCES, ONE AFTER THE OTHER,—THERE IS NO APPREHENSION OF THE OTHERS."* (Sū. 63.)

Bhāṣya on Sū. (63).

[P. 154, L. 14 to P. 155, L. 2].

"As a matter of fact, from among Odour (Taste, Colour, Touch and Sound), each subsists, one by one, respectively in Earth, (Water, Light, Air and Ākāsha). Hence 'there is no apprehension of the others'—*i.e.*, (*a*) 'of the other three qualities,' (*b*) 'of the other two qualities' and (*c*) 'of the other quality'; that is to say, (*a*) there is no apprehension, by the Olfactory Organ, of Taste, Colour and Touch,—(*b*) there is no apprehension, by the Gestatory Organ, of Colour and Touch,—(*c*) there is no apprehension, by the Visual Organ, of Touch."

Question—If such is the case, then, how is it that the Rudimentary Substances (Earth and the rest) are actually perceived as possessing *several* qualities?

Answer—"The perception of several qualities is due to admixture †; that is, that Taste and the other qualities are perceived in Earth is due to the Mixture (*i.e.*, presence therein) of particles of Water and the other substances. Similarly with the others."

Vārṭika on Sū. (63).

"*Inasmuch as each of the qualities etc. etc.*—says the *Sūṭra*. Since each of the Rudimentary substances is possessed of only one quality, it is only one quality that is perceived by means of each sense-organ. This is what is meant by *Sūṭra* phrase 'one by one'."

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* The right reading is एकैकश्येन as found in Sū. Ms. D, in Puri Sutra. Mss. A and B; in *Nyāyasūchīnibandha*, and also in the *Vārṭika*.

† This is printed as Sūṭra; but no such Sūṭra is found anywhere; and from the *Bhāṣya* below (*e. g.*) it is clear that the *Pūrvapakṣa* consists of only three Sūṭras.

Question—If such is the case, then how is it that the rudimentary substances are actually perceived as possessing several qualities?

Answer—"The perception of several qualities is due to admixture;—that is, Earth is associated with Water and the other substances; that is why it is perceived as possessed of several qualities. Similarly with the rest. There is no thing incongruous in such mixture of the five substances."

Bhāṣya on Sū. (64).

[P. 155, L. 2 to L. 7].

[The *Siddhāntin* asks] —If such be the case, then there should be no restriction; inasmuch as there is no restriction in the association of the substances, there should be no such restriction as that 'Earth has *four* qualities,' 'Water has *three* qualities', 'Light has *two* qualities' and 'Air has *one* quality.'

[The *Pūrvapakṣin* answers]—"Certainly, restriction is possible."—How?

Suṭra (64).

"BECAUSE THE PRECEDING IS PERMEATED BY THE SUCCEEDING."—(Sū. 64).

"As a matter of fact, among Earth (Water, Light, Air and Akāsha), that which precedes is permeated by what succeeds it; and on account of this (restricted) mixture or association, there is restriction (in regard to the qualities).*

"All this is to be learnt from the account (contained in the Purāṇas) of the creation of things; and it cannot be

‡ Earth is permeated by all the other four substances; hence all those qualities are found in it; Water is permeated by all but Earth, hence it is found to possess all qualities except *Odour*; and so with rest.

This is the explanation of the *Ṭāṭparya*. The *Bhāṣyachandra* explains the Sūṭra as—'Earth is permeated by Water &c., and Water by Earth &c. But this is not in keeping with the *Bhāṣya*.

directly known now (by us; since the matter is beyond the reach of our mind)." *

Vārṭika on Sū. (64).

[P. 397, L. 8 to L. 12.]

Question—If it is as the *Pūrvapakṣin* puts it, then there should be no such restriction, as that it is Earth alone, and not other substances, that possess four qualities; because there is no restriction in the nature (of the substances).

Answer—"Certainly, the said restriction is not impossible; *because the preceding is permeated by the succeeding*—says the *Sutra*. That is the 'preceding' (Earth) is permeated by the 'succeeding'—*i.e.*, Water and the rest; and and the 'succeeding'—Water &c.—are not permeated by the 'preceding'—Earth &c. 'Permeation' is a particular kind of contact. [and it is by reason of this peculiar form of association of the substances that there is the said restriction as to the qualities perceived in each of them]."

Sutra (65).

(*Siddhānta*)—NOT SO; BECAUSE THE EARTHY AND THE AQUEOUS SUBSTANCES ARE BOTH ACTUALLY PERCEIVED [WITH DISTINCT QUALITIES OF THEIR OWN.]† (Sū 65).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (65).

[P. 156, L. 9 to p. 156, L. 14].

'*Not so*'—denies all that has been stated in the preceding three *Suṭras*. And the reason for this denial is given in the next phrase—*because the Earthy Substance* (*Earth*) *and Aqueous*

* Such is the explanation given by the *Ṭāṭparya*. The *Bhāṣyachanḍra* explains that all this peculiar creation, in which the substances are associated together in this peculiar fashion is the result of God's peculiar powers; and hence it cannot be questioned; it must be accepted as true, as described in the Scriptures.

† The *Bhāṣya* has provided four explanations of the Sūṭra, embodying the following four statements—(a) Earth and Water are actually perceived, (b) they are perceived with distinct tastes, colours and touches; (c) they are perceived with distinct qualities of their own; and (d) Each of the Substances, Earth, Water &c. is perceived as mixed up with the rest. We have adopted (c) alone in the translations, as it is the widest, and as such practically includes the others.

Substance (Water) are both actually perceived. [If the *Pūrvapakṣin* theory were true, and each of the Substances had only one quality, then] according to the principle that 'Perception is due to large magnitude, to composition by several components and to Colour,' the *Luminous Substance* (Light) alone would be perceptible, and not either Earth or Water; since the two latter are devoid of Colour (according to the *Pūrvapakṣa*, and the presence of Colour is a necessary condition of perceptibility).* As a matter of fact however, Earth and Water are as perceptible as Light. Nor will it be right to attribute the presence of several qualities in a substance to its association with other substances; because if one holds that the perceptibility of Earth and Water is due to the presence therein of such Colour as belongs to another substance (Light) which is mixed with it,—then, for him, Air also should be equally perceptible; or you should find some explanation for the restriction (that while Earth and Water are perceptible, Air is not perceptible) [the condition of perceptibility, in the shape of mixture with Light, being equally present in all the three].

(B) Or, the clause '*because the Earthy and the Aqueous are perceived*' may mean 'because distinct tastes of Earth and Water are perceived; *i.e.*, as a matter of fact, the taste of Earth is of six kinds, while that of Water is only *sweet*, and this could not be, if the two were actually mixed up. Or, *because distinct Colours of Earth and Water are perceived*; while if the Colour of Earth and Water were due only to the Colour of the Light mixed up with them, then such Colour would serve only to illumine (render perceptible) other things, and it would itself not be illumined (and perceived); '† as a matter of fact however the Colours of Earth and Water are

* Even according to the Opponent, Earth, Water and Light are held to be perceptible by the Eye; but according to the view that each substance has only one quality, Earth would have Odour only, and Water would have Taste only; so that both of these being devoid of Colour, would be invisible; and Light would be the only visible substance. Nor will it be right to assert that the visibility of Earth and Water is due to their association with Light. For such association, according to the *Pūrvapakṣa*, is present in Air and Ākāsha also; so that these two also should be perceptible by the Eye. *Tātparya.*

† For the *Colour of Light* is only *White-light*, which, while itself not perceptible, renders other things perceptible. Hence if the Colour in Earth and Water were only the Colour of Light, it would not be itself perceived; while the Colour of Earth and Water are actually perceived; these Colours must belong to something other than Light.

actually perceived, as being of several kinds and only one kind respectively ; *e.g*, the Colour of Earthy things is of several kinds, green, red, yellow and so forth ; while the Colour of Water is only white, and that also illuminative in its character :—such a phenomenon is never found in the case of Substances consisting only of the mixture of several substances, each endowed with only one quality.

The Sūṭra has mentioned 'Earth' and 'Water' only by way of illustration. The same is true of other things also which we proceed to show in detail : The reason for our denying the Pūrvapakṣa is—*because of Earth and Light, distinct touches are perceived*; *i.e.*, the touch of Earth is *neither-hot-nor-cold*, while that of Light is actually perceived as *hot*; and no such phenomenon would be possible if both (Earth and Fire) were mixed up with Air, which is *neither hot-nor-cold.*

(*c*) Or, the phrase, 'because the Earthy and Aqueous substances are perceived,' may mean that *both these substances, Earth and Water, are actually perceived with distinct qualities of their own* ; *e. g.* Earthy things are perceived with four qualities, and Aqueous things are perceived with only three ; and from this we conclude that the *constituent Earth* (of the Earthy Substance) is also endowed with those same (four) qualities ; because the finished product is indicative of the nature of its cause, which, by reason of its being the cause, is regarded as modifiable (into that product). Similarly, inasmuch as the Earthy and Luminous Substances are perceived as possessed of distinct qualities, we conclude that the constituents of these also must be possessed of these same distinct qualities.

(*d*) Or, [The *Sūṭra* may be explained to mean that] a difference is actually perceived between Earthy and Aqueous substances, both of which are distinctly perceived ; that is to say, it is actually perceived that Earthy Substances are mixed up with Water (Light and Air),—that Aqueous Substances are mixed up with other two substances (Light and Air),—and that Luminous Substances are mixed up with Air ; and not a single substance is ever found to be possessed of a only one quality.

As for the reasoning propounded in Sū. 64—"because the preceding is permeated by the succeeding [restriction of qualities becomes possible]"—it is no reasoning at

all; because we do not find in it any reason leading up to the conclusion,—on the strength whereof we could accept the proposition. As for the assertion (made by the Opponent, in the *Bhāṣya*, P. 155, L. 7)—"that the preceding is permeated by the succeeding is to be learnt from the account, contained in the Purāṇas, of the creation of things, and it cannot be directly known now"—is not right; because there would be no ground for the restriction [that Odour only should subsist in Earth, that it subsists in Earth only, and so forth].* Further, it is actually seen even now that 'the preceding substance is permeated by the succeeding; *e. g.* Light (Fire) is permeated by Air [so that the assertion referred to is not true, being contrary to a fact of perception]. Then again, 'permeation' is only a kind of *contact*, and this is equal to both; so that there can be no explanation for the fact that, while Light becomes endowed with Touch by reason of its being permeated by Air, Air does not become endowed with Colour, though it is permeated by Light. Further, it is actually seen that the Touch of Air (which is neither hot-nor-cold) is suppressed by the Touch of Light (which is hot), and becomes imperceptible (by reason of that suppression); and certainly a thing cannot be suppressed by itself [and this is what the said phenomenon would mean if the touch of Light were due to its permeation by Air; as in that case the said suppression would mean that the *Touch of Air* is suppressed by the *Touch of Air*].

Vārṭika on Sū. (65).

[P. 397, L. 12 to L. 17.]

Not so, because the Earthy and the Aqueous substances etc., etc., says the *Sūṭra*. The denial is meant to negative the three immediately preceding *Sūtras*. He for whom each of the substances is endowed with only one quality, for him only a thing consisting of Light would be perceptible, as it is only such things that would possess Colour (which is essential for visual perception); and neither Earthy

* The *Bhāṣyachandra* explains the passage as translated. The *Ṭāṭparya* offers a somewhat different explanation:—"There is no evidence according to you, in support of the view that Odour subsists in Earth only; for the only arguments that you propound are against such a conception; hence the account of the creation of things, referred to you, must be taken as figurative, not literally true."

nor Aqueous things would be perceptible, as none of these would possess Colour.

It has been explained in the *Bhāṣya* how this *Sūtra* can be treated as affording several meanings.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (66).

[156, L. 14 to P. 157, L. 5.]

Having thus repudiated a theory opposed to all reason, the *Sūṭra* next turns to answer the argument (put forward under Sū. 62)—that " the view cannot be accepted, because all the qualities (attributed to Substance) are not apprehended by the Sense-organs constituted by them ":—

Sūṭra (66).

INASMUCH AS FROM AMONG THE QUALITIES [OF THE ORGANS OF OLFACTION, GUSTATION, VISION, TACTION AND AUDITION] THERE IS AN EXCESS (IN EACH ORGAN) OF EACH OF THE QUALITIES [ODOUR, TASTE, COLOUR, TOUCH AND SOUND], ONE BY ONE, IN THE ORDER IN WHICH THEY ARE MENTIONED,—EACH ORGAN IS REGARDED AS PREPONDERATING IN THAT QUALITY.* (Sū. 66).

* We have translated the *Sūṭra* according to the interpretation of the *Bhāṣya*. The *Vārṭika* does not accept this view, on the ground that—" if the predominance of an Organ consisted of its apprehending a certain object, then all Organs would be equally predominant; for every Organ apprehends its object. But the *Vārṭika* apparently misunderstands the expression *ṭaṭṭāṭpradhānam* of the *Bhāṣya*: it does not mean that each of the *Organs* respectively is predominant, as the *Vārṭika* seems to take it—but that each of the Organs has that for its predominant quality, and this predominance is indicated by the Sense-organ manifesting that only; and this is not open to the objection urged in the *Vārṭika*. Further, the *Vārṭika* explanation has no point; if the Olfactory Organ is predominant, as endowed with the largest number of qualities (four),—what can that have to do with its apprehending *Odour only*, which is the point at issue? In fact that it is endowed with four qualities should make it capable of apprehending all those qualities. The *Ṭāṭparya* has attempted to justify the *Vārṭika's* interpretation.

The *Bhāṣyachandra* follows the *Vārṭika*; but Vishvanṭha accepts the *Bhāṣya*. *Vardhamāna* also in the *Nyāyanibandhaprakāsha*, offers the following explanation of the Sūṭra—' Inasmuch as among the qualities of the Olfactory and other Sense-organs, there is an excess of the preceding over the succeeding qualities, each of the Organs is predominant through that quality, hence it cannot apprehend *all* qualities; it can apprehend only that quality (in its manifested form) whose presence imparts to it the said predominance.

Hence [because of the fact mentioned in the Sūtra] there can be no apprehension (by any sense-organ) of all qualities. Among the qualities of the Olfactory and other Organs,—*i.e.*, among Odour and the rest—there being an excess (in each Organ) of the preceding quality (over the succeeding qualities)—each organ is regarded as preponderating in that quality.

"What does this *predominance* mean?"

It means that the Organ is capable of apprehending that object.

"What is meant by the '*excess*' of a quality in an Organ?"

It means that that Organ has the capability of manifesting (rendering cognisable) that quality.

[The meaning of the Sūtra thus is as follows]—Just as the external substances of Earth, Water and Light,—which are endowed respectively with four, three, and two qualities—are capable of manifesting, not all these qualities, but only Odour, Taste and Colour, respectively;—and this on account of the fact that in the substances there is an excess of the qualities of Odour, Taste and Colour respectively,—in the same manner the Organs of Olfaction, Gestation and Vision,—which are endowed respectively with four, three and two qualities,—are capable of apprehending not all qualities, but only Odour, Taste and Colour respectively,—and this on account of the fact that in each of the Organs there is an excess of those qualities, Odour, Taste and Colour respectively.—Hence [inasmuch as the Organs are not possessed of the capability of apprehending all qualities] there can be no apprehension, by the Olfactory and other Organs, of all qualities.

[On the other hand] If one holds that—"the Olfactory Organ apprehends Odour, *because it is endowed with Odour*, and so on with the Gestatory and the Organs"—then, it should be possible—for each of the other Organs, of Olfaction and the rest, to apprehend all the qualities that it is endowed with* [which would not meet the Opponent's objection].

* Under the theory noticed—according to which the fact that the Olfactory Organ apprehends Odour, *because it is possessed of Odour*, and not because there is an excess of Odour in it—the Organ should apprehend all the four qualities of Odour, Taste, Colour, and Touch, with which it is held to be endowed. So that the contingency of one Organ apprehending all qualities would remain possible.

Vārtika on Sū. (66).
[P. 397, L. 17 to P. 398, L. 8].

Having thus repudiated a theory opposed to all reason, etc., etc. says the Bhāṣya. There being an excess of the preceding quality over the succeeding, each Organ is regarded as preponderating in that quality—says the *Sūṭra*; hence there can be no apprehension (by any one organ) of all qualities. That is, among the Olfactory and other organs, the preceding is more important than the succeeding.*

" In what does this importance consist ?"
It consists in the organ being endowed with four (three or two) qualities.

"Wherein does the excess of a quality consist ? "
It consists in the organ's capability of manifesting (rendering perceptible) its own quality; that is, when one thing is distinguished by the presence of a quality, that quality, by virtue of that thing being capable of manifesting a like quality, is regarded as being there *in excess* ; as we find in the case of external substances. Similarly in the case of Sense-organs also, we find a restriction as to each of them manifesting only one quality. Hence there can be no apprehension (by any Sense-organ) of all the qualities.

He, who holds that the Olfactory organ apprehends Odour because it is endowed with that quality, cannot escape from the absurd contingency that one sense-organ would apprehend all qualities.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (67).
[P. 157, L. 5 to L. 12.]

The question now arises—" To what is this restriction due —that only one organ is composed of the *Earth* ; and not all? —that only a few are composed of Water and Light particles, and not all ? "† *Answer*—

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* The *Vārṭika* interprets the argument differently from the *Bhāṣya*.

† The question simply means that one organ (the Olfactory) is held to be composed of Earth, the Gestatory Organ of Water, the Visual Organ of Light, and so forth ; now to what is all this restriction due? Agreeably to this, the

Sūṭra (67).

THE RESTRICTION [AS TO ONE ORGAN BEING COMPOSED OF EARTH, AND SO FORTH] IS DUE TO PREPONDERANCE [*i.e.* SINGULARITY]*—(Su. 67).

[In the formation of any thing] there is a coming together (amalgamation) of such distinct substances as are capable of bringing about the requisite thing—this amalgamation being regulated by the destiny (merit-demerit) of men (to whom the thing is to belong); it is *this amalgamation of distinct substances* that constitutes the 'preponderance' [which means 'singularity']—of the thing; the word 'preponderance' is found to be used in the sense of 'singularity' or 'excellence'; e.g., an *excellent* thing is called 'preponderating.' For instance, such things as Poison, Medicinal Plant, Gem and so forth, which are produced under the influence of the destiny of Men, are capable of accomplishing distinct purposes; and all things do not accomplish all purposes. In the same manner, when the Olfactory and other organs are produced, they are capable of apprehending only certain distinct things,—and not all things.

Vārṭika on Su. (67).

[P. 398, L. 9 to L. 16.]

Question.—"Why is it that every Earthy Substance is not regarded as the Olfactory Organ?"

Tāṭparya puts the question as—"Whence do you get at the restriction that it is the Olfactory Organ alone that apprehends Odour?" The *Vārtika* and Vishvanātha put the question differently—"Why is not every substance composed of Earth regarded as the 'Olfactory Organ'? The *Bhāṣyachandra* and the *Nyāyasūṭra-vivaraṇa* put the question in the simplest form—"What are the reasons for regarding the Olfactory Organ alone as composed of Earth, the Gestatory Organ alone as composed of Water and so forth?" With the exception of the *Vārtika* and *Vishvanāṭha*, all are in agreement with the *Bhāṣya*.

* The Bhāṣya has explained the expression '*bhūyasṭvāṭ*' of the Sūṭra mean *prakriṣṭaṭvāṭ*, due to superiority or singularity. Would it not be simplerot to take it as meaning simply *preponderance*?—the argument being that 'the Olfactory Organ is regarded as of Earth, because Earth forms the *preponderating* element in its constitution In view of this we have translated the said expression as 'preponderance,' which is its natural signification, and placed the *Bhāṣya*-rendering as a parenthetical explanation.

With a view to account for the restriction (why only one Earthy substance is regarded as the Olfactory Organ) we have the *Sūṭra—The restriction, etc., etc.*

Question.—"What is this *preponderance* (spoken of in the *Sūṭra*)?"

Answer.—The 'Preponderance' of a thing consists in the amalgamation of such distinct substances as are capable of bringing about the requisite thing, such amalgamation being regulated by the destiny of men. The word 'preponderating' is often used in the sense of *excellence* or *singularity*; as in ordinary language an 'excellent' thing is called 'preponderating.' Such ordinary things as Poison, Medicinal Plants, Gems, &c., capable of accomplishing distinct purposes, are produced under the influence of the destiny of men.

Bhāsya on Sū. (68).

[P. 157, L. 12 to L. 18.]

Question·"Why is it that the Sense-organs do not apprehend their own qualities?"*

[The answer is given by the following *Sūṭra*]—

Sutra (68).

BECAUSE IT IS ONLY AS ENDOWED WITH QUALITIES THAT THE SENSE-ORGANS ARE WHAT THEY ARE. (Sū. 68.)

The Olfactory and other organs do not, as a matter of fact, apprehend their own qualities, Odour and the rest. If you ask—"Why is this so?"—our answer is that it is only as endowed with their respective qualities that the Olfactory and other Organs are regarded as 'Sense-organs.' That is to say, the Olfactory Organ apprehends outside Odour, only when it is itself accompanied by Odour which serves the same purpose (of making perceptible the Odour, of other things) as the organ itself; so that it cannot apprehend its

* "If, for instance, the Olfactory Organ is, as the Siddhānṭin holds, endowed with Odour, how is it that the Organ does not perceive this Odour present in itself?"

Vishvanāṭhā introduces the Sūṭra somewhat differently :—'The Sūṭra proceeds to prove that the Sense-organs are actually endowed with the qualities of Odour, &c.'

own Odour, for the simple reason that in this the necessary auxiliary (in the shape of its own Odour) would be wanting. Similarly with the other sense-organs.

Vārṭika on Su. (68).

[P. 398, L. 16 to P. 399, L. 2.]

Question—" *How is it &c.*—That is, for what reason do the Olfactory and other organs not apprehend their own Odour, &c. ? "

Answer—*Because it is, etc., etc.*—says the Sūṭra—That the Sense-organ is an organ only as equipped with its quality ; what is without a quality cannot be a Sense-organ. It is for this reason that a Sense-organ does not apprehend its own quality.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (69).

[P. 157, L. 18 to L. 22.]

If it be held that—" the Odour of the Olfactory Organ would itself be the requisite auxiliary also,"—then our answer is—

Sūṭra (69).

BECAUSE A THING CANNOT BE APPREHENDED BY ITSELF (Sū. 69);—

there can be no apprehension, by the Sense-organs, of their own qualities. In fact, the assertion made is exactly like the statement—" Just as an external substance is apprehended by the Eye, so, by the Eye, that same Eye itself should be apprehended" ; for in both cases (the apprehension of the Eye by itself, and of the organ's quality by itself), the causes of requisite apprehension are wanting. [*i.e.*, The quality, forming an integral part of the Sense-organ, cannot be apprehended by the same organ ; nothing can operate upon itself].

Vārṭika on Sū. (69).

[P. 399, L. 2 to L. 13.]

If the Odour were an auxiliary of the Olfactory Organ, as well as a thing apprehended by it,—then, *because a thing cannot be apprehended by itself*—[there can be no apprehension, by the Sense-organ, of its own quality]. If the Sense-

organ were to apprehend its own Odour, then this Odour could not be 'perceptible by a Sense-organ'; for while apprehending its own Odour, the Sense-organ would be apprehending itself; since Odour forms its very essence; and certainly there is no instrument in the world that operates upon itself; so that the assertion of the Opponent is wanting in any corroborative instances. Further, it is never directly perceived that the Odour of the Olfactory Organ is apprehended by that same organ. Then again, why do you not put the question—"Why is the Olfactory Organ not apprehended by itself?" You do not put it simply because such apprehension is never found to appear; that is to say, you do not put the question because the Olfactory Organ is never found to apprehend by itself. And exactly in the same manner, inasmuch as the Odour of the Olfactory Organ is never found to be apprehended by itself,—it is not right to put the question why the Sense-organs do not apprehend their own qualities. Because the reasons for non-apprehension—the absence of the requisite causes—are the same in both cases.*

Vārṭika (70).

[*Objection*]—"WHAT IS ASSERTED CANNOT BE ACCEPTED; BECAUSE THE QUALITY OF SOUND IS ACTUALLY PERCEIVED."—(Sū. 70.)

Bhāṣya on Sū. (70).

[P. 158, Ll. 2—3.]

"It is not true that the Sense-organs do not apprehend their own qualities; because Sound is apprehended by the Auditory Organ, and yet it is its own quality [Sound being the quality of *Ākāsha*, and the Auditory Organ being nothing other than *Akāsha*]."

* Vishvanāṭha explains the *Sūṭrā* differently: The presence of Odour &c. in the Sense-organs having been established, the *Sūṭra* proceeds to show that we infer that these qualities are *unmanifested*, from the fact that they are *not perceived*;—the meaning of the Sūṭra being that *the* Sense-organ cannot apprehend its own quality.

Vārṭika on Sū. (70).
[P. 399, Ll. 15—16.]

"*What is asserted cannot be accepted, because etc.*—says the *Sūṭrā*. It is not right to say that the Sense-organs do not apprehend their own qualities; because *Akāsha* (in the form of the Auditory Organ) does apprehend its own quality, Sound.

Sutra (71).

Answer—THE SAID APPREHENSION IS DUE TO THE FACT OF THE QUALITY (SOUND) AND SUBSTANCE (ĀKĀSHA) BEING UNLIKE OTHER QUALITIES AND SUBSTANCES. Sū. (71).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (71).
[P. 158, L. 5 to L. 10.]

As a matter of fact, it is not as endowed with a particular Sound that Akāsha becomes the (Auditory) Sense-organ possessed of a quality *; and Sound is not the manifester of Sound [so that the Auditory organ consisting of Akāsha differs from the other organs consisting of Earth &c., because it is only as possessed of Odour that Earth constitutes the Olfactory organ, and so forth; while Ākāsha forms the Auditory organ by its very nature;—and Sound also differs from Odour].

Further, that the Olfactory and other organs apprehend their own qualities is known neither by Perception, nor by Inference; while as regards the Ākāsha of the Auditory organ, we do know, by Inference, that Sound *is* apprehended by it; and Sound is the quality of Ākāsha. The inference that leads to this Cognition is that which operates by elimination: [among the Substances that could be regarded as the Auditory organ, to which alone Sound could belong as a quality] the Soul is the *hearer*, and not the *instrument* (of hearing) [Hence the Soul can not be the Auditory organ];—if the Mind were the Auditory organ, then (Mind being imperishable) there would be no possibility of deafness;—as regards Earth (Water, Light and Air), though they have the capacity

* That is, it is *not* by reason of its having Sound for its quality that the Auditory organ is an organ of perception; by its very nature is the Auditory organ Ākāsha. The quality of Sound that belongs to Ākāsha of the Auditory organ could not be the same that is apprehended by it.

of becoming (composing) the organs of Olfaction and the rest, they do not have the capacity of forming the Auditory organ;—*Ākāsha* thus is the only substance left;—hence it is concluded that it is *Ākāsha* that forms the Auditory Organ.

Vārṭika on Sū. (71).

[P. 399, L. 16 to P. 400, L. 16.]

Our answer to the objection (in Sū. 70) is as follows:—It is not as endowed with Sound that the Auditory organ is regarded as a Sense-organ; that is, though it is only as endowed with their respective qualities that the other organs are regarded as Sense-organs, yet, such is not the case with *Ākāsha*;—Why?—*because Sound is unlike other qualities, and Akāsha is unlike other substances.* This is what is meant by the Sūtra (71). What is meant is that Sound is not the manifester of Sound, nor is Ākāsha, *with a quality*, the Auditory Organ.

Vār: P. 400.

"What then is the Auditory Organ?"

It is *Ākāsha itself*. This is learnt by elimination: (1) The Soul cannot be the Auditory Organ; because being the Agent, the Soul can be only the *auditor*, and not the *Auditory Organ*. (2 Nor can Mind be regarded as the Auditory Organ; for if the Mind were that organ, then there would be no possibility of deafness; and further, inasmuch as Mind operates upon all things, the Auditory organ also would operate upon (and apprehend) all things. (3) Nor can Earth &c., be regarded as the Auditory organ; because these are taken up in the constitution of the Olfactory and other organs; as a matter of fact, Earth &c., are taken up in the composition of the Olfactory and other organs; so that if Earth &c., formed the Auditory Organ, Sound would fail to be perceived, if there were any derangement in the Olfactory and other organs! (4) If the Tactile Organ were the Auditory Organ, there would be no possibility of deafness [as total destruction of all Skin would be impossible]! And a total

annihilation of all Skin (tactile organ) would mean death. (5) If Space and Time formed the Auditory Organ, then Sound, being the quality of something other than that (Space and Time), could not be apprehended by that organ! [Sound belongs to Akāsha, while the Auditory Organ consists of Space and Time, *not* of *Akāsha*, *ex-hypothesi*]. If (with a view to escape from this difficulty) it be urged that Sound is a quality of Space and Time,—then the only quarrel between us is that of names; for Ākāsha (according to us also) is only that of which Sound is a quality; and the only difference between us is that you* give it a different name 'Space and Time'. If it is not so, then what you assert (in regard to Sound being the quality of Space and Time) means the total denial of *Ākāsha*,—the quality of Sound (as a substratum whereof alone is *Akāsha* postulated) subsisting (according to you) in something else. If Sound subsists in something else, then *Ākasha* becomes rejected; as apart from Sound there is nothing that could indicate the existence of *Ākāsha*; as there is in the case of Space and Time, whose existence is indicated (proved) by the qualities of Priority, Posteriority and the like.

Thus then, there is no other *substance* left (which could be regarded as constituting the Auditory Organ]. Nor can Qualities be regarded as the Auditory Organ; nor Actions; nor Community, Individuality or Inherence; because none of these is found to be endowed with the requisite aptitude. Nor, lastly, can it be held that there is no such thing as the Auditory Organ; as its existence is positively indicated (proved) by the perception of Sound. So that the only thing that remains is *Akāsha*. Hence it follows that it is *Akāsha* that constitutes the Auditory Organ.

Thus Ends the First Daily Lesson of Discourse III.

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* The *Bhāṣyachandra* quoting the *Vārṭika* reads भवतांम् for भवता.

DISCOURSE III.

Daily Lesson II.

Section (1).

Transient Character of Buddhi—Cognition.

(Sūṭras 1—9).

Bhāṣya on Sū (1).

[P. 158, L. 12 to P. 159, L. 5].

The *Sense-organs* and *Objects* have been fully examined; now it is the turn of the Examination of *Buddhi*, Cognition. * And the first question that arises is—Is Cognition eternal or non-eternal?

"Why should there be this doubt?"

Sutra (1).

THE DOUBT ARISES BY REASON OF THE SIMILARITY (OF COGNITION) TO ACTION AND ĀKĀSHA. (Sū. 1).

(*a*) The 'similarity' of Cognition to Action and Ākāsha consists in intangibility; (*b*) and further, in Apprehension we do not perceive any such definite character as either *liability to production and destruction*—which would mark it as *non-eternal*—or the contrary [*i.e.*, *non-liability to production and destruction*] which would mark it as *eternal*; hence [all necessary conditions of Doubt, described under Sū. 1-1-23, being present] the said Doubt arises.

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* The Agent (Soul), the Instrument (the Sense-organs) and the Objects of Apprehension or Cognition having been duly examined, it is now the turn of the examination of the nature of Cognition or Apprehension itself.—*Bhāṣyachandra.*

The things outside the Body having been examined, the Author next proceeds to examine those within the Body,—says the *Parishuddhi.* On this Vardhamāna makes the following observations :—

When it is said that the things now going to be examined exist *in the Body*, it cannot mean that they subsist or inhere in it, as in this sense Cognition and Mind cannot be said to exist in the body; nor can it mean that they are in physical contact with it; as this would not be true of Cognition, and also because many external things also are in contact with the Body. What is meant is that the coming Lesson deals with such objects of Cognition as are distinguished by the character of being the cause of experiences in connection with the Body. Such examination is conducive to that Disgust for things which is a necessary step towards Final Release.

Vārṭika on Sū. (1).
[P. 401, L. 4 to L. 10].

The Sense-organs and the Objects have been examined; next it is the turn of Cognition to be examined. And the first inquiry that is stated is as regards the character of Cognition—is, it eternal or non-eternal?—The mere existence of Cognition having been already proved [there is no need for enquiry as whether or not there is any such thing as Cognition]. On this point the author of the Sūṭra explains the grounds for Doubt. *The Doubt arises &c. &c.*—says the *Sūṭra.* The character common to Cognition and the two things mentioned in the *Sūṭra* consists of *intangibility. In Cognition we do not perceive any such definite character as either liability to production and destruction—which could mark it as non-eternal—or the contrary, which could mark it as eternal*— says the *Bhāṣya.* Hence there arises the said Doubt.

Vār. p. 401.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (2).
[P. 158, L. 17 to P. 159, L. 10].

[An objection is raised against the above question]—"The doubt put forward is groundless; it is a fact known to every living being that Cognition is transient, being just like Pleasure and such experiences; every man has such notions as—'I shall know' 'I know' and 'I have known;' and the connection with the three points of time (involved in these conceptions) would not be possible if Cognition were *not liable to production and destruction* [So that it is not true that we do not find in Cognition the *liability to production and destruction*];* hence, inasmuch as Cognition is

*The three notions mentioned imply that there is *production* of Cognition (as involved in the notion 'I shall know,' which means that the cognition shall be produced), there is continuity of Cognition (as expressed by 'I know' 'which means that Cognition is *present*), and there is *destruction* of Cognition (as expressed by 'I have known,' which means that the Cognition has come to an end).—*Bhāṣyachandra.*

The *Ṭāṭparya* puts the question somewhat differently:—"If by 'Buddhi' in the present context, you mean the individual cognition of things, then the whole discuss-

related to all three points of time (being, as it is, liable to production, existence and destruction), it follows as an established conclusion that Cognition is *non-eternal.* Further, in the *Nyāya-sūṭra* itself it has been asserted as a well-substantiated fact—(*a*) that 'Cognition is *produced* by the contact of the Sense-organs, and the Object' (Sū. 1-1-16), and (*b*) that 'the non-simultaneous *production* of Cognitions indicates the existence of Mind' (Sū. 1-1-16) [wherein it is taken for granted that Cognitions are *produced*, from which it follows that Cognition is *not-eternal*]; so that no further doubt and discussion would to be called for."

Our answer (in justification of the present enquiry) is that the present enquiry is for the purpose of refuting the unreasonable assertions based upon false speculation; the Sāṅkhyas, speculating in the realms of philosophy, assert that—"Buddhi, the internal Organ of Man, is eternal;" and they also put forward arguments in support of this assertion, as in the following *Sūṭra*. *

ion becomes pointless, as no one holds such cognitions to be other than momentary. If, on the other hand, you mean by *Buddhi*, the *Mahaṭ* of the *Sāṅkhya*, then, before discussing the character of such a thing, it behoves you to discuss its very existence; as the Naiyāyika does not admit of any such universal Thinking Principle as the 'Mahaṭ' of the Sāṅkhya.

Vardhamāna has some observations to make in regard to the exact words in which the subject-matter of the discussion should be stated. In the sentence—'Is Buddhi eternal or non-eternal,' the term '*buddhi*', like every other term, denotes the genus '*buddhiṭva*;' and as this latter is eternal, according to all parties, there is no occasion for doubt on this matter. Nor can the question be stated in the form —'Is the *word buddhi* one whose *denotation* is eternal, or is it one whose *denotation* is not eternal? 'Because it is possible to give the name to a person, whereby the physical body of that person would form the denotation of the word 'buddhi;' and certainly there could be no question of this denotation being eternal. Some people have stated the question in the form —"Is the denotation of the term *buddhi*, which is the substratum of the genus '*buddhiṭva*,' eternal or non-eternal?" The Author himself would favour the question in the form—'Is *cognition* co-substrate with I-*ness* or not?' According to the *Sāṅkhya*, the *Buddhi-ṭaṭṭva* is the substratum of Cognition, which is something different from the Āṭman, and as such *not* co-substrate with *I-ness.*

* Whether Buddhi is eternal or non-eternal is not the main subject of our present enquiry; this has been introduced only as a preliminary issue, which serves to establish the conclusion that there is no such thing as the Universal Thinking Principle, the Mahaṭ, which the Sāṅkhya posits as something distinct from the ephemeral Cognitions of things. The fact of the matter is that if *Buḍḍhi* were something

Sūtra (2).

"BECAUSE THERE IS RE-COGNITION OF THINGS." (Sū. 2).

"What is this 're-cognition'? 'Re-cognition is the name of that re-collective cognition which is involved in the conception that we have in regard to one and the same thing, in the form—'I now cognise the same thing that I had cognised before.' Such re-collective cognition can be possible only when Cognition is eternal; for if there were several divergent Cognitions, capable of being produced and destroyed, no 're-cognition' would be possible; for a thing *cognised* by one cannot be *re-cognised* by another." *

Vārṭika on Sū. (2).

[P. 401, L. 10 to P. 402, L. 7].

Objection:—"*The doubt put forward is groundless*; because the matter is known to every living being. It is a fact well known to every living being, whether Cognition is eternal or non-eternal. *Further, Cognition is known to be connected with all three points of time*; that is, in connection with Cognition, we find all three points of time manifesting itself—as is proved by such conceptions as—'I shall know,' 'I know' and 'I have known'; and no such connection with three points of time would be possible unless Cognition were liable to production and destruction; for instance, no such 'connection with three points of time' is found in the case of *Ākāsha*, which is *not* liable to production and destruction.

eternal, then it would certainly be something different from the momentarily appearing and disappearing cognitions;—if on the other hand, the grounds put forward in proof of the eternality of *Buddhi*, are found to be incapable of establishing it, then there would be no justification for postulating any Universal Thinking Principle apart from the Cognitions; and it becomes established that 'Buddhi' and 'Cognition' are synonymous terms, as declared by the *Naiyāyika* in Sū. 1-1-15. It is in this manner also that the present enquiry becomes connected with the definition of Buddhi set forth in the *Sūṭra* (1-1-15) There would be no such relevancy in the enquiry if it pertained merely to the eternality or non-eternality of Buddhi.—*Tāṭparya.*

* And according to the Sāṅkhya, Buddhi is eternal, and yet capable of undergoing modifications; by virtue of which it becomes connected with the several cognitions involved in Re-cognition. This would not be possible of the Soul, which is eternal, unmodifiable.—*Tāṭparya.*

Thus then, when we find in Cognition, this distinctive character (*liability to production and destruction*, which marks it out as *not-eternal*), there is no ground for Doubt. For these reasons there can be no ground for any further doubt or discussion." The rest is clear in the *Bhāṣya*.

Answer:—The present enquiry is for the purpose of refuting unreasonable assertions based upon false speculations—says the *Bhāṣya*. What is intended is not merely to establish the non-eternality of Cognitions, but to refute the philosophical doctrines of Opponents. The *Sāṅkhyas*, speculating in the realms of philosophy, assert that 'Buḍḍhi is eternal,' and they also put forward the argument in support of their assertion; *viz*: "*because there is re-cognition of things*". We have such notions as—'The things I had cognised before I cognise now;' and this 're-collective cognition,' which involves the appearance of two cognitions (past and present) in regard to the same thing, is possible only if Cognition is *eternal*; and if there were several diver gent cognitions, no such 're-cognition' would be possible; as we find in the case of the cognitions of different persons.

Var. P. 402.

Sūṭra (3).

[*The Siḍḍhānṭin's answer to the Sāṅkhya argument*].

INASMUCH AS WHAT HAS BEEN PUT FORWARD IS ITSELF STILL TO BE PROVED, IT CANNOT BE ACCEPTED AS A VALID REASON. (Sū. 3).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (3).

[P. 159, L. 12 to P. 160, L. 18].

Just as the 'eternality' of Buḍḍhi is 'still to be proved', so is also the fact that 're-cognition' belongs to *Buḍḍhi* 'still to be proved', *i.e.*, not proved [it cannot be admitted];—why so?—because what belongs to an intelligent being cannot be attributed to an instrument; as a matter of fact, *Buḍḍhi*,—which is spoken of as '*jñāna*' (Cognition), '*ḍarshana*' (Perception), '*upalabḍhi*' (Apprehension), '*boḍha*' (Understanding), '*praṭyaya*' (Cognizance), and '*aḍhyavasāya*' (Ascertainment),

—is a quality of, and belongs to, the conscious person; and it is only the conscious person that *re-cognises* what he has *cognised* before; so that it is to this conscious person only that 'eternality' can be attributed, on the ground of 're-cognition.'* If it be held that 'Consciousness' (or 'Intelligence') belongs to the instrument [and not to the Soul; so that Recognition also would belong to the Instrument],—then it becomes necessary to explain the exact nature of the *conscious* (intelligent) Being; for unless you define the exact nature of the 'Conscious Being,' you cannot posit a totally different † Soul (a Personality or conscious Being totally different from what is generally regarded as the Conscious Being), That is to say, if it be held Cognition (Consciousness) belongs to the Internal Organ in the shape of the Mind, we ask you—of this 'conscious being' of yours, what is the exact form, what the character, and what the exact nature? And what does this 'Conscious Being' do with the cognition subsisting in the *Buḍḍhi?* If it be held that—"it cognises, *chēṭayaṭē*,"—our answer is that this expression would in no way differ from '*jñāna*,' 'cognition'; that is to say, the two expressions—'the man *cognises*' and 'Buḍḍhi *knows*'—would both connote *cognition*, and nothing else; ‡ as the words '*chēṭayaṭē*' ('cognises'), '*jānīṭē*' '(knows)' '*buḍhyaṭē*' '(understands'), '*pashyaṭi*' (perceives') '*upalabhaṭē*' ('apprehends'),—all mean one and the same thing. "But *Buḍḍhi* is what *makes things known*." That is just so; the *Person knows* and the *Buḍḍhi makes known* things; but (under this theory) it thus becomes established that Cognition belongs to the person (as held by the Siddhāntin), and *not* to the Internal Organ, 'Buḍḍhi' (as held by the Purvapakṣin).§

* It is the person that *recognises*; 'recognition' belongs to him; hence if 'recognition' proves *eternality*, this eternality can belong only to the Conscious Person, and not to Buḍḍhi, which, as the Internal Organ, is a mere *instrument*; for this simple reason this Buḍḍhi does not appear in the *Recognition* at all.—*Ṭāṭparya*.

† The *Naiyāyika* posits one kind of Conscious Being in the shape of the Soul; the Opponent now posits the 'Conscious Being' in the shape of the Instrument, the Internal Organ. Before this can be accepted, the Opponent should explain what he exactly means by the 'Conscious Being.'

‡ 'What is spoken of as *cognising*, i.e., the Person, is nothing different from what is spoken of as *knowing*, i.e., Buḍḍhi; so that 'Buḍḍhi and Person' become 'synonymous terms.' This is the explanation of the *Bhāṣyachanḍra*.

§ One is said to 'know,' when he brings about cognition in himself; while one is said to 'make known' things when it brings about cognition in others;

[It having been proved that Cognition belongs to the Person, and not to Buḍḍhi, the Author proceeds to refute the view that the actions denoted by the terms 'cognition,' 'apprehension,' 'understanding' are different from one another, and as such should belong to different entities]—If it be held that each of the actions denoted by the terms (abovementioned) belong to distinct individual persons,—then it behoves you to show cause for your denial (of the view that they belong to the one and the same person). That is to say, if the Opponent holds the view that—"one person does the *cognising*, another the *understanding*, a third the *apprehending*, and a fourth the *perceiving*",—then it comes to this that all these persons,—the *cogniser*, the *understander*, the *apprehender* and the *perceiver*—are so many distinct persons, and *the corresponding qualities* (*of cognition and the rest*) *do not belong to one and the same person*. Such being your view, (we ask you)—what is your reason for this denial? if you put forward "the non-difference of denotation" as your reason,—then the same may be said for us also. That is, if what you mean is that—"inasmuch as the words *cognises*, *apprehends* &c. denote the same thing, it cannot be right to attribute (and restrict) them all to one and the same Person [and there would be no sense in predicating so many synonymous terms in reference to the same Agent],"—then the same fact (of sameness of denotation) may be equally urged against you also: For in the two expressions, 'the person *cognises*, *chēṭayaṭē*,' and 'the Buḍḍhi *knows*, *jānāṭi*,' there is no difference in the denotation of the terms 'cognises' and 'knows'; so that both (Person and Buḍḍhi) being equally cognitive or Conscious Beings, [there being no reason for predicating one of the Person, and the other of the Buḍḍhi] one of the two must be rejected [and Cognition should be attributed to one only].*

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so that these two being totally different, *cognition* cannot belong to *Buḍḍhi*, which, *ex-hypothesi*, only *makes* things *known*.'—*Bhāṣyachandra*.

* This passage is somewhat obscure; the obscurity being enhanced by the reading of the text. Several manuscripts, as also the *Vārṭika*, read '*arṭhasyābhēḍa iṭi samānam, abhinnārṭhā* &c. &c. The only meaning that can be deduced from this text is as translated above; we have adopted this in the body of the text, in deference to the *Vārṭika*. Several other manuscripts however, among them the two Puri Mss., and also the *Bhāṣyachandra*, read '*arṭhasya bheda iṭi* &c. &c. Apparently this is the better reading; because the proposition that the 'several qualities do not belong to the same individual' can be supported by the fact that the qualities

If (with a view to escape from the above difficulties) it be held that—"the name '*buddhi*' stands for the Mind, being explained as '*budhyatē anayā*', *that by means of which things are cognised* [i. e. it is the *Instrument*, not the *Agent* of cognition]; and the Mind is certainly eternal",—then our answer is that that may be so * (Mind may be eternal); but the eternality of Mind is not proved by *the recognition of things* (which has been urged by the Opponent as the reason for the eternality of *Buddhi*);—specially because as a matter of fact, we find *Recognition* appearing even when there is a diversity of *Instruments*, only if the Cognitive Agent happens to be the same [so that Recognition cannot imply or prove the sameness and continuity of the *Instrument*];—for as asserted in Sū. 3-1-7,—'there is *recognition*, with the right eye, of what has been seen with the left'—an assertion made in regard to the eye, but equally true of the Lamp also; there being recognition, of a thing previously seen with the help of one lamp, with the help of another. From all this

expressed by the terms are different; if it were the same single quality denoted by them all, then there would be nothing wrong in predicating all the terms of the same individual. The difficulty in this reading however is that, the repeated reference to the argument of the preceding clause is found, in all manuscripts, in the form '*abhinnārthaḥ &c.*', which shows that the preceding clause must be '*arthasyābhēdaḥ*'. The *Bhāṣyachandra* has made an attempt to construe this passage according to its own reading, by which the translation should stand thus:—"There is a difference in the denotation of the terms *cognises* &c., which are not synonymous;—if this is what you mean, then we may make a similar assertion: the words in question *are* synonymous [this assertion being as reasonable as yours, that they are *not* synonymous]; and hence it is not possible to make any distinction (either as to the qualities denoted by the words, or to the entities to whom the qualities belong). If you admit this (well-established fact), then the same may be said (in connection with what we are going to point out): That is, in the two expressions, 'the Person cognises' and 'the Buddhi knows', there is no difference in the denotation of the two terms' 'cognises' and 'knows'; so that both Buddhi and Person being cognitive entities, one or the other must be rejected (not regarded as really cognitive) [there being no room for two cognitive entities in the same body]."

It will be found that both these explanations involve a certain amount of forced construction. In that which has been adopted in the body of the text, the explanation of the phrase '*vyavasthānupapattiḥ*' is not entirely satisfactory; while the *Bhāṣyachandra* in several places has been forced to give up the construction of passage, which appears to be the most natural, and most in keeping with the style of the *Bhāṣya*.

* The Puri Mss. and the *Bhāṣyachandra* read '*astyētadēvam*'; which means 'Mind is eternal, we admit that.'

it follows that what has been put forward by the Opponent (i. e. 'the recognition of things') is a reason for the eternality of the *Cognitive Agent* (Soul; and not for that of the *Instrument*, Buḍḍhi).

Vārṭika on Sū. (3).

[P. 402, L. 9 to P. 405, L. 9]

Inasmuch as what has been put forward &c. &c.—says the *Sūṭra*. Just as the 'eternality' of Buḍḍhi is still to be proved, so also it is still to be proved that 'recognition' belongs to Buḍḍhi. Why so? *Because what belongs to an intelligent being cannot be attributed to an Instrument; as a matter of fact, Buḍḍhi,—which is spoken of as 'Cognition' 'perception', 'apprehension', 'understanding',—is a quality of, and belongs to, the conscious person; it is only the conscious person that 'recognises' what he has 'cognised' before; so that it is to this conscious person only that 'eternality' can be attributed on the ground of 'recognition'*—(*Bhāṣya*).

[Having stated the argument of the *Bhāṣya*, the *Vārṭika* proceeds to add some arguments of its own].—Because the Instrument cannot be the substratum of an action;—as a matter of fact, no Instrument is ever found to be the substratum of any action; and 'apprehending' is an action; hence it cannot subsist in the Instrument.* "But, since

* The *Parishuḍḍhi* remarks—In reality what the Vārṭika states here with a view to show an incongruity in the Opponent's position is itself incongruous: that which has no action, which is inactive, cannot be an 'Instrument' at all. And in view of this difficulty, the *Tāṭparya* explains the Vārṭika as follows:—What the *Vārṭika* means is that the Instrument is not the substratum of the *principal* action; it certainly does become the substratum of the secondary action. [E. g., the act of *cutting* does not belong to the axe; but the actions of rising and falling upon the wood do belong to it]; in the present context, 'apprehending' is the principal action; and that to which this action directly belongs is the *Agent*, not the Instrument; thus then, what is proved by the act of 'Recognition' is only its agent, conscious person, and not its Instrument', the *Buḍḍhi*. The *Parishuḍḍhi* goes on to say, that sometimes the principal action subsists in the *object* also (and not always in the Agent); but it is universally admitted that this is not the case with the action of Apprehending, which always subsists in the Agent, and not in the Objective or in the Instrument.

it is the substratum of its own action, what is asserted is not right." If you mean by this that—"Every active thing being the substratum of its own action, it is not right to say that the Instrument is not the substratum of action."—Our answer is that it is true that everything is the substratum of its own action, and by its own action a thing does not become entitled to the name of 'Instrument;' on the contrary, in regard to its own action, everything is the 'agent;' while the present enquiry in connection with *Buḍḍhi* proceeds on the basis of the understanding that Buḍḍhi is an *Instrument.* Hence the Objection that has been urged is not rightly taken. "But from what you say, everything should be regarded as *Agent.* If through its own actions, a thing is entitled to the name of *Agent,* then every active thing (everything that helps in the accomplishment of an act) should be regarded as the *Agent.*" True; but what is an acknowledged tenet can not be urged as an undesirable contingency.* "But in that case if everything is to be regarded as *Agent,* how do you account for such distinct names as *Agent, Instrument* and the like?" These distinct names are on the basis of the principal or primary action (and not on that of the secondary or subsidiary actions of the several things concerned in it); and that action is to be regarded as 'primary' for the accomplishing of which the Instrument is taken up; so that when all that is meant to be expressed is that the several things are conducive to (instrumental in) a primary action,—and the diversity of the subsidiary actions of each of those things is not meant to be emphasised,—those things (which constitute the Agent, the Object &c,) are spoken of under the common name of '*kāraka,*' 'active thing'; while when the diversity of the several actions is intended to be sever-

Vār. P. 403.

* That everything is an 'agent' in regard to its own action, is an acknowledged tenet with us; hence this cannot be urged as an undesirable contingency.

ally emphasised, those things come to be spoken of under the distinct names of 'Agent,' 'Instrument' and 'Object.' [as regards such expressions as (a) '*kartā-kārakam*,' 'the active thing, the 'Agent,' (b) '*karaṇa-kārakam*,' 'the active thing 'the Instrument,' and like] the active things being spoken of under their common name 'active thing,' 'kāraka,' the specific name, 'Agent,' 'Instrument,' &c. is added with a view to indicate the distinctive feature of each of them —which distinguishes it from the others,—so that no other is included under that (qualified) name.* Thus then, it is with reference to the principal action that the several active things come to be spoken of under the several names of 'Agent,' 'Instrument' &c.; and among these, that which operates upon other things, and is not itself operated upon by anything else, is the 'Agent'; and similar explanations of the others may be provided, in accordance with what has been said by us before (in Aḍhyāya II). "If the character of the Agent consists in being *not operated upon by other active things*, then, inasmuch as the so-called Agent also acts only though the aid of the several active things conducive to the principal action), [it does not fulfil the conditions of you definition of the 'Agent'.]." It is not true that the Agent acts only through the aid of the several other things; for what urges the Agent to act is the result (sought to be accomplished); as a matter of fact, what urges the Agent to activity is the *result*, and not the Instrument or any other active thing; and since the *Result* is not an 'active thing,' [so that by being urged by the Result] the Agent does not lose the character of *being not urged by an active thing*;—and that the Agent takes up the other active things is due to the fact of those being invariable concomitants of (and indispensable for) the accomplishment of the

* Just as in the expression 'blind man,' the term 'man' is the common name, wherein all men are the same; while the qualifying term 'blind' connotes that wherein he differs from all other men.

said action; that is, inasmuch as without the Instrument and other active things being taken up (by the Agent) the action cannot be accomplished, those several active things, being indispensable, come to be taken up (by him).

From all this it is clear that *the character that belongs to the Conscious Being cannot be attributed to the Instrument (Buḍḍhi).*

Even admitting that 'Re-cognition' belongs to the Internal Organ (Buḍḍhi),—in as much as 'Re-cognition' would be excluded from (not invariably concomitant with) both 'one' and 'many,' it would be 'too specific;' that is, as a matter of fact, 'Re-cognition' (which is the *probans* in the reasoning put forward by the Opponent) is not found to be invariably concomitant with either 'unity' or 'multiplicity' [so that even if present in Buḍḍhi, it could not prove either 'unity,' and hence 'eternality,' or 'multiplicity' and hence 'non-eternality,' with regard to it].* Further, when we come to examine the real nature of 'Re-cognition,' the *probans* becomes 'contradictory;' that is to say, when Re-cognition is analysed, it only serves to indicate the multiplicity (and hence non-eternality) of Buḍḍhi. For instance, when the first perception of a thing has disappeared, and the second perception appears, there comes a third cognition preceded by remembrance, which follows upon the manifestation of the impressions (left by the former perception), it is this third cognition that constitutes 'Re-cognition;' —and for one who holds that there is only one (continuous, eternal) Buḍḍhi, even a *second* cognition would be impossible, whence could there be a *third*? [So that Re-cognition proving the multiplicity, and hence non-eternality, of Buḍḍhi,

* If Re-cognition were invariably concomitant with unity, it would prove that Buḍḍhi is ever one, which would mean that it is *eternal*. On the contrary, if Buḍḍhi were proved to be *many*, it would mean that it is *non-eternal*.

becomes a 'contradictory' *probans* in the Opponent's argument]. "But the diversity is in the cognizances." "If you mean by this that—" while Buḍḍhi continues to remain fixed, its cognizances go on appearing and disappearing; so that when the first cognizance disappears and the second cognizance appears, that is *Re-cognition*,"—this cannot be right; because we cannot conceive of *Buḍḍhi* apart from the *cognizances*. It behoves you to explain the exact nature of that *Buḍḍhi* which you assume to be something different from 'cognizance;' for us '*Buḍḍhi*' is only 'cognizance,'—*Buḍḍhi* being nothing more than the *apprehension of things*. Then again, the two examples of (*a*) the 'recognition' by the Tactile Organ of what has been seen by the Visual Organ, and of (*b*) the 'recognition' with the help of one lamp of what has been seen with the help of another lamp—go to indicate that 'Re-cognition' pre-supposes 'multiplicity' (of Cognitions and Instruments) [which proves that it involves several transitory *Buḍḍhis*, and not a single eternal *Buḍḍhi*]; and thus the *probans* (in the Opponent's argument) turns out to be 'contradictory.'

Vār. p. 404.

If it is the Buḍḍhi that does the *ascertaining*, what is it that the Conscious Entity does with the cognition subsisting in Buḍḍhi? If it be held that—it "*cognises*," —we ask—who is it that *cognises*? If it be held that "cognising is done by that to which the *ascertaining* belongs, then this involves self-contradiction [that one to whom the ascertaining belongs does the cognising by means of the said ascertaining, cannot be possible; as it is not possible for a thing to operate upon itself]. If, on the other hand, it is the Soul that does the *cognising*,—how is it possible for the Soul to do the cognising with the help of the ascertaining or cognizance that subsists in Buḍḍhi? For as a matter of fact, one thing cannot become active by the action sub-

sisting in something else. If then, it be held that "the conscious Person *cognises* and the Buḍḍhi *knows*",—the two terms do not denote anything different from 'cognition'; i. e. 'cognises' means exactly the same thing as 'knows'.

"But Buḍḍhi is what *makes things known.*" If you mean by this that—"while Buḍḍhi *makes things known*, it is the Soul that *knows* them",—then our answer is that *that is just so*; it is the Soul (Person) that *knows* things, and *Buḍḍhi* only *makes things known*. But this is quite contrary to the position taken up by the *Pūrvapakṣin*.

Then again, it behoves you to explain what difference there is in the exact nature of 'ascertaining' and 'cognising.' "It behoves you also to explain how they are both one and the same." Well, the two are one and the same for the simple reason that there is no difference between them, either as to place or to time or to character; that is, because the Soul *cognises* things exactly the same—in point of time, place and character—as that *ascertained* by *Buḍḍhi* [the two must be the same]. "But it is not established that there is no difference in the character of the two." If you mean by this that—"it is true that the Soul cognises things that are just the same—in regard to place and time—as those ascertained by Buḍḍhi; but it is not true that *ascertaining* is the same in character as the *cognising*"*—this cannot be right; as this would mean that there are several *persons* (conscious beings) in one and the same body; that is, if the *ascertainer* is different from the *cogniser*, one person *recognises* and another *sees*, and yet another hears and thinks,—then, *it comes to this that all these persons*—the seer, the hearer, the thinker and the rest—*are so many distinct persons.*

Further, what have you got to say in support of the proposition that "all these (cognition, understanding, &c.) do

* Both editions read पुनर्यैचैतन........; which gives no sense. We adopt the reading 'पुनश्चेतन'...

not belong to one and the same Person"? All that you can say is that all these terms are synonymous. But while it is true that these words are synonymous, it is also true that there is no difference in the denotation of the terms 'cogniser', 'ascertainer', 'thinker,' and 'understander'; so that it is not right to assert that "Buḍḍhi *ascertains* and Soul *cognises*."

If 'Recognition' were put forward in proof of the eternality of *Mind*,—there would be no force in this; for the eternality of *Mind* is admitted; as a matter of fact, we also admit that Mind is eternal; so that there is no need for any arguments for proving it.

Nor can 'Recognition' rightly prove the unity of the Instrument (Buḍḍhi); as the premiss of such reasoning could not be true; for we find that there is 'Recognition' also when there is a *diversity* of Instruments,—only if the Cogniser remains the same; for instance, there is Recognition by the Organ of Touch of what had been seen by the Visual Organ,—and also by means of one lamp of what had been seen by means of another.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (4).

[P. 160, L. 18 to P. 161, L. 1.]

The view has been held (by the *Sāṅkhya*) that—"From out of the *eternal* '*Buḍḍhi*', there go forth, in reference to the single object cognised, emanations, which constitute the 'Cognitions' of those objects,—and that the 'Emanation' is nothing different from the Source from which it proceeds."—This, however,

IS NOT RIGHT; BECAUSE THERE IS NO SIMULTANEOUS COGNITION OF THINGS. (Sū. 4.)

If the 'Emanation' and its source were non-different,—then, inasmuch as the Source (Buḍḍhi) is, *ex hypothesi*, eternal, the Emanations also should be always present (eternal); which

would mean that all the cognitions of things that we have are eternal; and if this were so, then the cognitions of things should be simultaneous [which is an absurdity].

Vārṭika on Sū. (4).

[P. 405, L. 9 to L. 13.]

The view has been held &c. &c.—says the *Bhāṣya*. *This cannot be right; because there is no simultaneous cognition of things,*—says the *Sūṭra*. What the *Sūṭra* means is that, the 'Source' being permanent, its Emanations also should be permanent (if both be the same).

Sūṭra (5).

[OTHERWISE] THE CESSATION OF THE COGNITION* WOULD MEAN THE DESTRUCTION (CESSATION OF THE EXISTENCE) [OF THE INTERNAL ORGAN, BUḌḌHI].—(SŪ. 5).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (5).

[P. 160, L. 25 to P. 161, L. 1.]

[If Cognitions were not eternal, even though the same as *Buḍḍhi*, then], whenever the Cognition (Emanation from Buḍḍhi) ceases to exist (as it must, being transient), the 'Source of Emanation' also should cease to exist; and this would mean that the Internal Organ (Buḍḍhi, which is the source from which the Emanations in the shape of Cognitions, proceed) is destroyed. On the contrary [i. e. if even on the cessation of the *Emanation*, its *source* continues to exist], the two should have to be regarded as different from each other.

Vārṭika on Sū. (5).

[P. 405, Ll. 15-16.]

Otherwise, the cessation &c. &c.—says the *Sūṭra*. What the Sūtra means is that (Emanations and Source being identical), the cessation of the Emanations should mean the cessation of their source also.

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* Here, as in Sū. 7, '*praṭyabhijñāna*' stands for *cognition in general*.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (6).

[P. 161, Ll. 1—5.)

The *Siddhānta.*

As a matter of fact, the Mind, which is of limited magnitude (not all-pervading), comes into contact with the several sense-organs*, one by one (and at distinct points of time); so that—

INASMUCH AS THE PROCESS IS GRADUAL, THE APPREHENSION IS NOT SIMULTANEOUS,—(Sū. 6.)

that is, of the objects of sense-perception. Hence it follows that the 'Emanation' and its 'Source' are distinct from each other; for if they were one and the same, there would be no appearance and disappearance of them (which would be incompatible with the afore-mentioned *gradual* process).†

Vārṭika on Sū. (6).

[P. 405, Ll. 16—17.]

As a matter of fact, the Mind, which is of limited magnitude, comes into contact with the Sense-organs, one by one—says the *Bhāṣya*; so that *inasmuch as &c. &c.*—says the *Sūṭra.* What the *Sūṭra* means is that there is difference between the Emanation and its Source; if the Emanation and its Source were one and same, there would be no appearance and disappearance for them.

Sūṭra (7).

THE NON-APPREHENSION OF ONE THING IS DUE TO (THE MIND) BEING OCCUPIED WITH OTHER THINGS (Sū. 7).

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* *I. e.* with the Soul, and the Sense-organs—says the *Bhāṣyachanḍra.*

† The clear meaning of the *Sūṭra* and *Bhāṣya* is as translated;—the term '*inḍriyārṭhānām*' being syntactically construed with the '*grahaṇam*' of the Sūṭra. The *Bhāṣyachanḍra* however offers a different construction : According to it the words of the *Bhāṣya* have no syntactical connection with those of the Sūṭra; and the first sentence of the *Bhāṣya* is to be construed as—*inḍriyarṭhānām nānāṭvam* (there is diversity in the Sense-organs and in the objects of perception), *vriṭṭivriṭṭimatoshcha nānāṭvam* (there is diversity between the substratum of the emanation and the emanations themselves—i. e. the contact and the resultant cognition).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (7).

[P. 161, Ll, 7-9.]

The term '*apraṭyabhijñāna*' here stands for 'non-apprehension' (and not for *non-recognition*). The 'non-apprehension' of a certain object is explained on the assumption that (at that time) the Mind is occupied with some other object; and this (explanation) is possible only on the presumption that the Emanation is something different from its Source; for if the two were one and the same, there would be no force in any previous 'occupation with other objects.'

Vārṭika on Sū. (7).

[P. 406, Ll. 1-3.]

The non-apprehension &c., &c.—says the *Sūṭra*. The explanation offered is possible only if the Emanation and its Source are different from each other; *for if the two were one and the same there would be no force in any 'previous occupation with other objects'*—says the *Bhāṣya*.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (8).

[P. 161, L. 9 to L. 22.]

* If the Mind were all-pervading, its gradual contact with the Sense-organs, one by one,

WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE; BECAUSE THERE IS NO MOTION—(Sū. 8).

The Sense-organs (before becoming operative) have to be got at by the Internal Organ; and the *moving*, necessary for this *getting at* something, cannot be present (in the Mind, if it is all-pervading); so that gradual operation being impossible, there can be no explanation for the (well-known) fact of

* This anticipates the argument that the mere fact of the Mind's contact with the Sense-organs being gradual does not necessarily imply that the Mind is not all-pervading; for even though the Mind is all-pervading, yet it would be possible to have contacts with the Sense-organs, one by one. The sense of the refutation is that this is not possible:—the term '*Samyogaḥ*' of the *Bhāṣya* being syntactically connected with the '*na*' of the Sūṭra. The gradual contact of a thing with general things pre-supposes *motion*—moving from one place to the other—on the part of the former; no such motion is possible for a thing which is all-pervading; *i.e.*, occupying all points in space, it cannot, and need not, move from one place to another. Hence if Mind were all-pervading, it could not have motion; and hence it could not have gradual contact with the Sense-organs.

apprehensions being *non-simultaneous* (as urged in Sū. 6). For the non-simultaneity of apprehensions having been found impossible, by reason of the absence of motion in the *all-pervading* Mind, there is no other reason from which it could be inferred (by which it could be accounted for). * In the case of the Organ of Vision, though the fact of near and remote things (*e.g.* Hand and Moon respectively) being seen at the same time leads one to conclude that the Organ has no motion, yet the fact that it *has* motion is inferred from the reason in the shape of the phenomenon of obstruction of vision by the interposition of something else, between the Eye and the Hand (which is near), and between the Eye and the Moon (which is remote). [There is however no such reason or ground available for the inferring of motion in the Mind, in which motion is found to be apparently impossible by reason of its all-pervading character, according to the Opponent].

All this dispute does not arise in regard to the *existence* of the Internal Organ (Mind), nor in regard to its *eternality*; for that there *is* such an Internal Organ as the Mind, and that it is eternal, are well-established facts†. "In regard to what, then, does the dispute arise." It arises in regard to its all-pervading character;—and this character is denied (by the *Siḍḍhānṭin*) on the ground that *there is no proof for it* [lit., it is not found to be cognised by any instrument of right cognition].

[The *Bhāṣya* proceeds to show a further reason for rejecting the view that the Emanations, Cognitions, and their Source, *Buḍḍhi*, are identical]—The Internal Organ is *one*, while the Emanations, in the shape of Cognitions, are *many*; e.g., *visual* cognition, *olfactory* cognition, cognition *of Colour*, cognition *of Odour*; all this would be impossible if the Emanations and their source were identical.

From all this we conclude that it is the (Conscious) Person that cognises, and not the Internal Organ.‡

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* The Author cites an example *per contra*.—*Bhāṣyachanḍra.*

† The Naiyāyika also admits the Mind to be atomic and hence eternal. It is only Buḍḍhi, cognitions, that he holds to be transient.

‡ For the *Siḍḍhānṭin*, who regards the Emanations as different from their source, it is quite possible and reasonable that things are cognised by the Soul, by the instrumentality of such instruments as the Internal Organ and the several Sense-organs—*Ṭāṭparya.*

By this fact (that it is the Person that knows, and not the Internal Organ)* what has been said (in Su. 7) in regard to the Mind being 'occupied with other things' becomes refuted; because 'being occupied with other things' can only mean 'apprehending other things'; and this belongs to the Person, not to the Internal Organ;† though we do admit of the Mind also being 'occupied,' in the sense that in one case it is in contact with a Sense-organ, while in another it is not in such contact.‡ [But this does not justify the view that the apprehending is done by Buḍḍhi, and not by the Person].

Vārṭika on Sū. (8).

[P. 406, L. 3 to P. 407, L. 10].

If the Mind were all-pervading, etc. etc.—say the *Bhāṣya* and *Sūṭra*. What the *Sūṭra* means to lay stress upon is that the Sense-organs are got at by the Internal Organ; and if the Internal Organ were all-pervading, it could be in contact with several Sense-organs at one and the same time, and simultaneous Cognitions would be possible,—the Opponent's theory is open to this objection. "But even if the Mind is *atomic* (as the Naiyāyika holds it to be), simultaneous cognitions should be possible in regard to things perceptible by the same Sense-organ." There can be no simultaneous cognitions, for the simple reason that the Mind is an *instrument*, an *organ*. "Why cannot the same explanation be possible for us (who also hold the Internal Organ to be an instrument)?" The same explanation cannot be available for you; because simultaneity

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* Or the fact that the Internal Organ is not all-pervading—according to the *Bhāṣyachanḍra*.

† He alone can be 'pre-occupied' who apprehends things; and inasmuch as it is the Person, and not the Internal Organ, that apprehends, it is only the Person that can be said to be 'occupied by other things.' This however does not mean that no kind of 'occupation' is possible for the Internal Organ; 'occupation' in the sense of being in contact with the Sense-organs, is quite possible for the Internal Organ; it is only 'occupation' in the sense of 'apprehending things' that cannot belong to it.

‡ The *Bhāṣyachanḍra*, as also the two Puri Mss., drop केन in both places.

of cognitions is found when there are diverse sense-organs; that is, when there are several* sense-organs supervised by a single Supervisor, they are found to be operative simultaneously; *e.g.*, two axes in the two hands of a person operate simultaneously [because they are supervised, handled, by the same person]; in the same manner, if the several Sense-organs were supervised by a single all-pervading Internal Organ, [which, according to the Pūrvapakṣin, is also the Supervising Agent], it should be possible for them to operate simultaneously; and this being possible, it should be possible to have simultaneous cognitions.†

Because there is no motion—says the *Sūtra*. If the Internal Organ were all-pervading, it would not be possible for it to have motion, which is necessary for getting at (the Sense-organs). Nor is there available (for you, who hold the Internal Organ to be all-pervading) any reason for holding that the Sense-organs do not operate simultaneously,—on the strength of which reason you could uphold the non-simultaneity of cognitions, which has been shown to be incompatible (with your theory). In some cases people do admit things that have been found incompatible; *e.g.*, though the motion of the Visual Organ is denied (and found incompatible) on the ground that some people can see near and remote objects at one and the same time,—*i.e.* because one sees the Hand, which is near him, and the Moon, which is far off, at one and

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* बहुभिर्वाणि is the right reading.

† In ordinary experience it is found that when there are diverse instruments handled by a single Agent, these instruments do operate at one and the same time. According to the Sāṅkhya, the Internal Organ is the Agent, and it is also all-pervading; so that under this theory, all Sense-organs should be supervised by the Internal Organ always, and all at one and the same time; which would mean that we should always have Simultaneous Cognitions.—The same absurdity does not arise under the *Siddhānta*; for according to this, the Internal Organ bein atomic, and not all-pervading, it could never be in contact with more than one *Sense-organ*, or more than one *Object*, at a time; so that no simultaneous cognitions of things—perceptible either by the same or by several Sense-organs—could ever be possible. —*Tātparya*.

the same time, it follows that the Visual Organ does not move,—though the motion of the Visual Organ is thus denied, yet the motion is inferred (and admitted) from the phenomenon of obstruction by intervening things;—there is however no such proof (ground for inference) for the non simultaneity * of cognitions (when the Internal Organ is all-pervading). [Hence under the theory that the Internal Organ is all-pervading, the contingency of cognitions being simultaneous cannot be escaped from; which proves that the theory is untenable].

Says the *Bhāṣya* —*All this dispute does not arise in regard to the existence of the Internal Organ, nor in regard to its eternality,—" in regard to what then does the dispute arise?" —it arises in regard to its all-pervading character; and this character is denied on the ground that there is no proof for it*; that is, there is no proof in support of the assertion that the Internal Organ is all-pervading.

Further, the Internal Organ is *one*, while the 'Emanations,' in the shape of the Visual and other kinds of cognition, are *many*; and this fact is incompatible with the view that the Emanations and their Source are identical. For us, on the other hand, who hold the Emanations to be different from their Source,—it is quite proper that things are apprehended by the Soul with the aid of such instruments as the Internal Organ and the Visual and other Organs.

By this fact what has been said (in Sū. 7) in regard to the Mind being 'occupied with other things' becomes refuted,—says the *Bhāṣya*; and the meaning is that this becomes refuted by the fact that it is the Person that cognises, and not the Internal Organ. "What is the meaning of *being*

* चायौगपद्यम् is the right reading.

occupied?" It means that there appear several cognitions pertaining to desired objects; and this appearance of several cognitions is for the person, not for the Internal Organ. As for 'being occupied' in the sense of being in contact (with one) and not in contact (with others), this we admit as belonging to the Internal Organ.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (9).

[P. 161, L. 22 to P. 163, L. 2].

[The Opponent, the *Sāṅkhya*, says)—" Even when the 'Emanation' is identical with its Source, it cannot be (reasonably) asserted that 'the Internal Organ is *one*, and its Emanations many.' [For]

Sūṭra (9).

" THE NOTION OF ITS BEING DIFFERENT (DIVERSE) IS ANALOGOUS TO THE NOTION OF DIFFERENCE (DIVERSITY) IN REGARD TO THE ROCK-CRYSTAL." (Sū. 9).

" In regard to the Emanation (which, as identical with the Internal Organ, is, in reality, *one* only), there is a notion of its being many (diverse), by reason of its being associated, or in contact, with diverse objects;—just in the same manner as, in regard to the rock-crystal, which is in contact with other (coloured) substances, there is the notion of its being different (from the pure *white* rock-crystal),—when the crystal is spoken of as being 'blue' or 'red' (as distinguished from the *white* crystal)."*

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* The phrase '*viṣayāntaropadhānāt*' at the end of the paragraph is to be construed with '*nānātvābhimānaḥ*' of the second line; the construction being—तस्यां दृत्तौ नानात्वाभिमानो विषयान्तरोपधानात्, यथाद्रव्यान्तरोपहित......नीलोलोहित इति ।

The sense of the Pūrvapakṣa is thus explained by the *Ṭātparya* :—" It is true that Emanations *appear* as *many*; but this appearance is a mistaken one; for it is not possible for the Emanations, which are not different from the Internal Organ, to be *many* in reality. The fact of the matter is that, just as in the case of the Rock-crystal, which is one and of one uniform colour, notions of diversity appear by reason of its contact with several coloured things, and this notion of diversity is purely adventitious,—in the same manner when the pure white Internal Organ becomes associated, though the Sense-organs, with diverse things, it takes the form of the Cognitions or 'Emanations,' and hence *appears* as diverse and many."

[The *Bhāṣya* answers the above view of the *Sāṅkhya*]—*We cannot accept the above, as there is no reason in support of it.** What the Opponent means is that—"the notion of diversity in regard to Cognitions is only figurative, unreal, being like the notion of diversity in regard to the rock-crystal; and it is not *real*, as is the notion of diversity in regard to Odour, Taste, etc.";—but in support of this theory there is no reason adduced [what is stated in Sū. 9 being only an Example]; and in the absence of valid reasons, it cannot be accepted as right. "But the absence of reasons is equal."† Certainly not; for as a matter of fact, *in the case of Cognitions it is actually found that they appear and disappear one after the other* [and not all together;—and this is a clear reason in support of the proposition that they are really *many, not one*]. That is, it is found as a matter of fact that in connection with the Objects of Perception, Cognitions appear and disappear, one after the other (at different points of time); and from this it follows that the notion of diversity in regard to Cognitions is real, just as it is in regard to Odour, etc.

Vārṭika on Sū. (9).
[P. 407, L. 10 to P. 409, L. 10].

The *Pūrvapakṣin* says—"The Sāṅkhya, versed in the science of reasoning, cannot accept the view that the Internal Organ is *one* and the Emanations *many*. For, as a matter of fact, just as the Internal Organ is one, so is the Emanation also. It might be urged that—'this goes against a perceptible fact,—the sense being that, if it be held that the Emanation is not different from the Internal Organ, this goes against a perceptible fact; since, according to this view, there could be no such *diversity* of Cognitions as of Colour,

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* This is found as *Sūṭra* in Puri Sū. Ms., in Sūṭra Ms. D, also in *Nyāyasūṭravivaraṇa*; the *Bhāṣyachandra* and Vishvanāṭha also treat it as Sūṭra. But it is not found in the *Nyāyasūchīnibandha*, and both the *Vārṭika* and the *Tāṭparya* take it as part of the *Bhāṣya*. Varḍhamāna says that some people call it 'Siḍḍhānṭa-Sūṭra,' and adds that the *Tāṭparya* calls it '*Bhāṣyam*,' because the '*bhāṣya*' is nothing more than an explanation and expansion of the 'Sūṭra'.

† "Just as we make the simple assertion,—that the notion of diversity is figurative—without adducing any reasons,—so do you also merely make the assertion that the notion of diversity is real, without adducing any reasons. So that both of us are open to the same charge."

Taste, Odour and Touch.' But our answer is that it is not true that there could be no such diversity of cognitions; for this diversity is in consequence of the diversity of the objects (cognised). That is, even though the Emanation (Cognition) is one and non-different, yet, it appears as *diverse*, by reason of the diversity in the objects cognised; just as such things as the Rock-crystal and the like, appear as diverse, by reason of the proximity of its attendant substances. It is with a view to embody this idea that we have the Sūtra.—*The notion of its being different is analogous, etc.* (Sū. 9)."

[Our answer to the above is as follows]—The view put forward cannot be accepted; as the premiss involved is not true. As a matter of fact, notions of diversity are found to be of both kinds—(*a*) it appears in regard to such things as Odour, etc., which are really diverse, (*b*) and also in regard to such things as the Rock-crystal, which are not-diverse; so that if we take the *Sūtra* as it stands, it contains no reason (in support of the proposition stated); being as it is a mere statement of an example (showing one kind of notion of diversity); and merely stating an example, it does not contain any reason (to show to which of the two kinds the notion of diversity in regard to Cognitions belongs). Further, as regards the Pūrvapakṣa, none of the several alternatives (possible under the statement in Sū. 9) is found to be tenable [or to have any force at all]*.

Vār. P. 408.

The case of the *Rock-crystal* has been cited as the example; and the only two alternatives possible are:—(*a*) the Rock-crystal actually differs through the difference in its associates, or (*b*) it does not differ. "But what of this?" Well, if the Rock-crystal actually differs, then it does not afford an instance (in support of the *Pūrvapakṣa*); while if it does not differ, then the question is—whence arises the notion of

* So that it is not only that there is no reason in support of the Pūrvapakṣa; there are reasons against it.

diversity in regard to it? If it be held that this notion arises from the diversity of its associates,—then (we ask)—how do you know that the associates are different? If the knowledge be held to be due to the difference in the Cognitions, then there is self-contradiction; for the two statements—'the *Emanation* is not different' and 'the *Cognition* is different'—are mutually contradictory; the two terms 'Emanation' and 'Cognition' being, according to the Sāṅkhya, synonymous.

[The Sāṅkhya asks]—"What is your reason supporting the view that the Emanations (Cognitions) are diverse?"

[The *Bhāṣya* answers]—The reason consists in finding that Cognitions appear and disappear one after the other; as a matter of fact, it is found that Cognitions are born and disappear one after the other. Further, inasmuch as the notion of diversity pertains to one as well as to diverse objects, whence do you get at the idea that the notion appears in regard to what is really diverse, or in regard to what is only one?* That is to say, we have found the notion of diversity appearing in regard to the Rock-Crystal, which is really only one; and we have also found the notion of diversity appearing in regard to Odour, &c., which are really diverse; so that the notion of diversity being found to appear under both circumstances, it cannot be right to assert (on the strength of the said notion alone) that the thing (with regard to which the notion appears) is really either one or many.

Then again, the notion of diversity that is found in regard to one and the same Rock-crystal cannot possibly appear unless there is (actual) diversity in the Cognitions; so that for one who holds all Cognition to be one only, there

*This anticipates the following Pūrvapakṣa argument—"The notion of diversity in regard to Cognitions may be treated as the reason for regarding the Emanations as *one*; the reasoning being stated in the form—the Emanations are one only—because these appear in regard to the (false) notions of diversity—as in the case of the Rock-Crystal. So that it is not true that there is no reason stated in Sū. 9 in support of our contention."

cannot appear, in regard to the Rock-crystal, such *diverse cognitions* as the 'blue' and the like. Some people might suggest the explanation that—"it is quite true that in regard to the Rock-crystal, the notions of *blue* &c. should not appear; for there is (in such cases) no direct connection (of the *blue* &c. with the perceiving organ); as a matter of of fact, the *blue object* is not in contact with the Visual Organ; if it *is* in contact, then it is that object which would be perceived as *blue*, and not the *Rock-crystal*; so that it is only right that the notion of *blue* should not appear in regard to the Rock-crystal,—as such a notion could be co-substrate with the Rock-crystal (and not the blue substance)." But this explanation cannot be accepted; because we find close juxtaposition; (in the phenomenon under consideration) what are in contact with the Eye are the Rock-crystal and the blue object in close juxtaposition; so that it is only natural that by reason of this close contact the blue colour is imposed upon the Crystal, and there arises the misconception that it is blue; just as in the case of things that are really apart from one another, if one fails to perceive the space intervening between them, he has the misconception that they are in close touch with one another. [So that the impropriety of the notion of 'blue' in regard to the Rock-crystal cannot be explained as being due to *absence of connection*].

He for whom there is no diversity in Cognitions—and all Cognition is one—, for him the scientific doctrine that 'there are three Instruments of Cognition' would be not true; for if there is no diversity in the *Cognitions*, there can no diversity in the *Instruments of Cognition* [and yet the Sāṅkhya himself declares that 'there are three Instruments of Cognition']. "The threefoldness is due to the diversity in the objects cognised." If you mean by this that—
Vār. P. 409.
"the objects cognised are of three different kinds, and being affected by this, the Cognition also becomes threefold",—this cannot be right; for diversity in the objects

cognised cannot be apprehended without diversity in the Instruments of Cognition*; as a matter of fact, unless there is diversity in the Instruments of Cognition, we cannot apprehend any diversity in the objects cognised. "But it may be due to identity with the object." If you mean by this that—"it is the object itself which, being (diverse) as it is, appears as such (in the Cognition†),"—this cannot be accepted; as in that case there would be no use for the Instruments of Cognition; i. e. if it is as you put it, then the Instruments of Cognition are useless. Further, your theory involves two self-contradictions (or incongruities): *viz.* (*a*) you assert that 'diversity of objects is not indicated by diversity of Instruments of Cognition,' and then again, that 'the object becomes diverse because of its being identical with Cognitions' [and these two statements are incompatible with one another]; and (*b*) you assert that 'the *person* cognises as the Buḍḍhi determines', and this also is incongruous [as the determining and the cognising must be done by the same agent; and] because of the absence of variety (or diversity); what you say is possible only in the case of a thing possessed of variety; it is not possible in the case of that which is devoid of variety [*i. e.* which is non-different]. Further, the assertion that 'one apprehends the Cognition as subsisting in Buḍḍhi' also is contradictory; as this statement [which means that the Buḍḍhi is the substratum in which the Cognition subsists], taken along with the tenet that Buḍḍhi and Cognition are one and the same, would mean that the substratum and the thing subsisting in it are one and the same: According to you Cognition being the same as Buḍḍhi, the said assertion would mean that the substratum (Buḍḍhi) is the same as

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*As a matter of fact, the diversity in the objects is due to the diversity in the Cognition or in the Instruments of Cognition; and not *vice versa*.

†That is, the object and the Cognition being identical, when the former is diverse, the latter also becomes so.

that which subsists in it (*i. e.* the Cognition); so that the assertion—'one apprehends the Cognition as subsisting in the Buḍḍhi'—involves self-contradiction.

End of Section (1).

Section (2).

(Sūṭras 10—17.)

Examination of the Theory that Things of the World are undergoing destruction every moment.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (10).

[P. 163, L. 2 to L. 12.]

Under Sū. 9, the *Sāṅkhya* has asserted that—"The notion of diversity in regard to the Emanation is analogous to the notion of diversity in regard to the rock-crystal";—being unable to admit this, the Nihilist [who holds that things of the world are in a continuous flux, undergoing destruction every moment] argues as follows:*—

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* Having thus refuted the Sāṅkhya doctrine from the standpoint of the *Nyāya*, the Author, with a view to point out the defects in that doctrine pointed out by the Bauḍḍha philosophers, proceeds, first, to expound the doctrine of the Bauḍḍhas.—*Ṭāṭparya.*

Though the main subject-matter of this section—the demolition of the Nihilistic philosophy,—is of use in all philosophical systems, yet in the present context, it has been introduced with a view to the proving of the Soul's existence; it is only when the continued existence of things has been established that there can be any force in the arguments, based upon Recognition, that have been put forward under Sū. 3. I. 1, *et seq.*; and it is only when the difference between qualities and things possessed of qualities has been established that we can prove the existence of the Soul, as the necessary substratum of such well-known qualities as Desire and the rest—*Parishuḍḍhi.*

Some people have held that this is only a part, and continuation, of the foregoing section; and should not be treated as a separate section; specially because the Bhāṣya at the end of the present section concludes with the words—'Thus it is proved that Buḍḍhi is not-eternal', from which it is clear that the Bhāṣya takes the whole as one section dealing with the *non-eternality of Buḍḍhi.* But the fact of the matter is that the subject-matter of the present section is totally different; the Bhāṣya-conclusion is due to the fact that the subject of the present section has been introduced in connection with the *non-eternality of Buḍḍhi.*—*Varḍhamāna.*

Sūtra (10).

[*The Nihilist says*]—"IN THE ROCK-CRYSTAL ALSO, THERE ARE PRODUCED FRESH ROCK-CRYSTALS ONE AFTER THE OTHER; SINCE ALL INDIVIDUAL THINGS ARE MOMENTARY; HENCE WHAT HAS BEEN STATED (IN SŪ. 9) IS WITHOUT REASON." (Sū. 10).

"The proposition (stated in Sū. 9) that—'In the case of the Rock-crystal, the notion of diversity is due to the diversity of its associates, the Rock-crystal remaining one and the same during the whole time"—*is without any reason* in its support;—'Why?'—*because in the Rock-crystal also there are produced fresh rock-crystals one after the other*; that is to say, in what is regarded as the Rock-crystal, several rock-crystals appear and several disappear (during the time);—'how is that?'—*since all individual things are momentary*; the 'moment' is an extremely small point of time; and things whose existence lasts only for that time are called 'momentary'. 'How do you know that individual things are momentary?' We infer this from the fact that in the case of the Body and such things we find a continuous series of growth and decay; in the Body the essence of food taken, brought about by the process of digestion, *grows* into blood and the other constituents of the body; and this growth and consequent decay goes on continuously; and by 'growth' there is production or birth of the individual things, and by 'decay' there is destruction.* It is in this fashion that, by a process of modification of its constituent elements, there comes about, in the Body, in due course of time, a growth or development. And what is found in the case of one individual thing, (in the shape of the Body) should be understood to apply to every individual thing."†

* We have adopted and translated the reading as in the printed text. In place of पक्तिनिर्वृत्तस्या &c. however, the two Puri Mss. and the *Bhāṣyachandra* read पक्तिर्वृत्तस्या &c. By this reading the passage should be translated thus: 'In the case of the Body we find that there is *pakṭi*, ripening, which is a form of destruction; and there is continuous growth and decay of the food-essence, which becomes destroyed and then turns into blood &c.'.

† The Nihilistic position is thus summed up in the *Tāṭparya*—"All that exists must be momentary,—as the Body;—and the Rock-crystal also, being something that exists, must be momentary. In the case of the Body we find that it undergoes growth and decay, in course of time becoming fat and lean; from which we infer

Vārṭika on Sū. (10).

[P. 409, L. 11 to P. 410, L. 6.]

Under Sū. 9 the Sāṅkhya has asserted &c. &c.—says the *Bhāṣya*; and against this the Bauḍḍha Nihilist says—"*In the Rock-crystal &c. &c.*"—says the *Sūṭra*. "It is not right to assert that there is notion of diversity in regard to the Rock-crystal which remains one and the same,—*because individual things are momentary*;—and this momentary character of things is proved by our finding that there is continued growth and decay; that is, the momentary character of things is inferred from the fact that in the case of the Body and such things, we find that the essential juices (of food) brought about by the process of digestion, go on growing and decaying (increasing and decreasing) every moment; and 'growth' means the *production* and 'decay' means the *destruction*, of the individual; and the actual production and destruction of the Body (as a whole) appear at another time; from which it is concluded that

Vār. P. 410. the Body undergoes growth and decay every moment. A thing that is not found to undergo growth and decay every moment, does not undergo them at any time at all; as we find in the case of the Earth: while the Earth (the Earthy Object, the Jar) itself remains unchanged by baking, there is no appearance or disappearance, in it, of such qualities as are produced by baking; and just as in the Earth, which is being baked, there go on momentary transformations, so are there in every individual thing. This argument may be formulated thus:—The Body must be

that it is undergoing minute charges every moment; and these changes constitute so many 'destructions'. Even though such growth and decay are not apparent in the case of the Rock-crystal and such things, yet we are justified in assuming that there must be such in these cases also, because they are *entities*, like the Body." So that the notion of diversity in the case of the Rock-crystal is not mistaken; there are really diverse crystals, appearing one after the other; though the crystal apparently remains the same.

regarded as becoming different at each point of time,—because while the cognition of its external form continues the same, at the end, a change is perceived in it:—just as in the case of the Earthy substance which is being baked, and in the case of the Earthy substance which is not being baked."

Sūṭra (11).

[*The Naiyāyika's answer to the above Bauḍḍha argument*]—

INASMUCH AS THERE IS NO REASON IN SUPPORT OF THE UNIVERSAL PROPOSITION,—WE CAN ADMIT OF IT ONLY IN ACCORDANCE WITH OUR EXPERIENCE (Sū. 11).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (11).

[P. 163, L. 14 to P. 164, L. 2].

It is not universally true that 'in all individual things there is a continuous series of growth and decay, just as there is in the Body';—why?—*because there is no reason or proof in support of such a universal proposition*; that is, such a universal proposition is not supported either by Perception or by Inference. Hence *we can admit of it only in accordance with our experience*; that is, in cases where we actually perceive such continuous series of growth and decay, there, by reason of our actually seeing the appearance and disappearance of several individual entities, one after the other, we admit of such a series of growth and decay; e g., in the case of the Body and such other things; where, on the other hand, we do not perceive any such series, there we deny it; e.g., in the case of such things as the stone and the like. In the case of the Rock-crystal, we do not perceive any such series of growth and decay. Hence it is not right to assert that "in the Rock-crystal, there are produced fresh rock-crystals, one after the other" (Sū. 10); for such an assertion (attributing growth and decay to all things on the ground of the Body being subject to growth and decay) would be similar to the attributing of the bitter taste to *all things* on the ground of the *Arka* (a poisonous plant) being bitter!

Vārṭika on Sū. (11).

[P. 410, L. 6 to P. 411, L. 2].

Inasmuch as etc., etc.—says the *Sūṭra*. The finding of the continuous series of growth and decay in the Body, may

prove the fact of the Body being different at each moment of its existence; but it cannot prove such Diversity (of individual entities) in the case of the Rock-crystal and such things, in whom we do not find any such peculiar growth and decay; so that what the Nihilist has put forward is not a valid reason at all. "There must be diversity where it is actually perceived". If you mean by this that—"by the perception of the series of growth and decay we do not seek to prove the momentariness of *all things*; all that we mean is that where there is such a series of growth and decay, the things is momentary";—then our answer is that it is quite true that in cases where there is continuous growth and decay, there is a *diversity* of individual entities; but this does not mean that they are *momentary*; inasmuch as 'perception of growth and decay', which is capable of being otherwise accounted for, cannot be accepted as a reason for (*i. e.* necessarily proving) *momentariness.* "How can it be accounted for otherwise?" Well, what happens in the case of the Body is that the component particles of the Body, on becoming joined by the particles of food, renounce their former composite form and take up another, and thus bring about *another* body (different from the former); and thus it is only right that we should admit of *diversity* (of individual bodies) [on the strength of the fact put forward; but it cannot be accepted as a valid reason (for regarding the bodies as *momentary*).

"The statement of the proposition is similar in both cases." If you mean by this that—"it is admitted that the component particles of the Body being joined by the particles of food renounce their former composite form and take up another, and bring about a different (new) body; but it is not admited that the new body is produced, because of the momentary character (of the former body); now what is the reason for this?"—our answer is that we do not admit

it because it is no proof; that is, it is not that we seek to prove the diversity of bodies by the presence of growth and decay through food; you have asserted that the body is a different one because there are found in it features that distinguish it from the former body,—and from that you have deduced the momentary character of bodies,—so that you make 'the perception of distinguishing features' the reason
Vār. P. 411. for 'momentary character'; and what we do is simply to point out that the said 'perception of distinguishing features' is capable of being otherwise accounted for, and hence can not be a *reason* for 'momentary character;' and we do not assert anything as a proof (for diversity).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (12).

[P. 164, L. 2 to L. 8].

Some people hold that—"Every object consists of a series of entities, each entity being entirely destroyed and succeeded by an entirely different entity, without any trace of the former,—and each of these entities has but a momentary existence;"—but this view

CAN NOT BE ACCEPTED; BECAUSE THE CAUSE OF PRODUCTION AND OF DESTRUCTION (WHEN PRESENT) ARE PERCEIVED. (Sū. 12).

The augmentation of component particles is perceived to be the 'cause of production,' in the case, for instance, of the *Ant-hill* and such other things; and the *disruption of component particles* is perceived to be the 'cause of destruction,' in the case, for instance, of the Jar and such other things. But when a philosopher holds that a thing is *destroyed*, without losing any of its component particles, or that a thing is *produced*, without having its component particles augmented,—there can *not* be perceived any cause, either of the 'total destruction' or of the 'production' of an entirely new thing.*

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* The Vārṭika explains the argumemt somewhat differently.

Vārṭika on Sū. (12).

[P. 411, L. 2 to P. 413, L. 3].

In case it be necessary for us to put forward positive proof (of Diversity), we put forward the following—*Because the cause of production and of destruction is always perceived*—says the *Sūṭra.*

(A) In the case of the Ant-hill and the Jar respectively, we perceive the 'cause of production,' in the form of *augmentation*, and the 'cause of destruction,' in the form *disruption*; these two would not be possible if things had really momentary existence. 'Augmentation' means *growth*—e.g. when we say 'the bull has *grown*;' 'Disruption' means *decay*;—e g., when we say 'the bull has decayed;' both these expressions pertain to things that have continuous existence; when a new thing is produced, we do not say that 'it has *grown*;' nor when it is destroyed do we say 'it has decayed.' So that what the *Sūṭra* means is—'inasmuch we perceive the cause of production, in the shape of augmentation, and the cause of destruction in the shape of decay [things can not have merely momentary existence].*

(B) Or, the term '*kāraṇa*,' in the *Sūṭra* may be taken as standing for the 'substratum,' the 'container'; the '*kārya*' or product being the 'contained;' and what the *Sūṭra* means is that, 'if things are momentary, the relation of container and contained, the relation of cause and effect is not possible;—hence, the meaning of the Sūṭra is—'inasmuch as we perceive the relation of Cause and Effect (among things), things cannot be momentary'; the argument being

* This is the *Vārṭika's* interpretation of the Sūṭra;—this is somewhat different from the interpretation of the *Bhāṣya*, according to which the Sūṭra means—'inasmuch as the causes of production and destruction are always perceived, if present,—and as we can not perceive any such cause in the case of the momentary production and destruction of things,—we conclude that there is no such production or destruction.'

formulated in the form—'The Cause and Effect must exist at the same point of time, because they bear to each other the relation of container and contained,—just like the milk and the basin'; the milk is contained in the basin, and exists at the same time as the basin. "What you say cannot be accepted; as there is no such thing as the relation of container and contained," If you mean by this that—"no such relation as that of container and contained subsists between the cause and its effect, because as a matter of fact, the Effect is not *contained* in anything at all; we have never seen any Effect being contained in anything,"—our answer is that this is not true, the premiss propounded being not quite true: it is not exactly true that 'no effect is contained in anything'; for according to both parties, Colour is an effect and is yet contained in something; and further, it goes against your own tenet that 'Touch is the substratum of Colour'; that is, if Colour be held to be not contained in anything, then that contradicts your assertion that 'Touch is the substratum of Colour.' On the strength of this example of Colour—which bears testimony to the coevalty of two things—whatever pair of things we prove to be coeval,—all those things come to be proved as existing at the same point of time.

[The Opponent takes up a new line of argument]—"Even among momentary things we find the relation of cause and effect; both destruction and production happening at the same point of time; e.g., in the case of the rising and dipping of the two ends of the scale." If you mean by this that—"he relation of Cause and Effect is possible among momentary things also, the appearance of the effect being simultaneous with the destruction of the cause: the effect comes into existence at the moment that the cause is destroyed; and while it is undergoing destruction the Cause is *extant*, and the production of the Effect comes about at the same moment of time as the destruction of the cause; just

as the rising of one end of the scale and the dipping of the other occur at the same moment,"—our answer is that this is not right, as you have not understood the meaning of the reason we have put forward: we do not say that there is no relation of Cause and Effect among momentary things; what we mean is that the Cause and the Effect existing at two different points of time, they cannot bear to each other the relation of container and contained; and that there is no instance to show that an Effect exists without substratum (or container); while in support of our view—that the Effect is contained in the cause—we have the instance of Colour, etc.* Then as regards the action of the *Scale* (that you have cited as an instance of simultaneity of cause and effect), we do not accept the view that the *rising of* one end and the *dipping* of the other are two distinct acts; in fact the two together form a single act; and as such this cannot be regarded as an instance of the simultaneity of two acts; that is to say, if what you put forward refers to the *Scale* (as a whole), then the two acts (of rising and dipping) that you spoke of constitute a single act of *swinging* (of the entire Scale); and there being a single act, it is not right to speak of 'simultaneity' in this connection; for what is *one* cannot be spoken of as 'simultaneous.' If, however, you refer to the two parts (pans, of the scale),—then, inasmuch as no one holds the view that these two acts are related to each

* The Opponent has been trying to show that the relation of Cause and Effect *is* possible also among momentary things. But it is not the relation of cause and effect that we put forward as the reason for the non-momentary character of things; it is the relation of container and contained as subsisting between cause and effect, that we have put forward as the reason; and this latter relation is not possible in the case of momentary things. What too is the meaning of the 'destruction' of the cause? Does it consist in the non-existence of the cause? Or in the presence of the causes leading to its destruction? If the former, then there can be no simultaneity between Cause and Effect; and if the latter, the cause of destruction coming into existence while the thing to be destroyed is still present, how can this latter be regarded as *momentary*? If the Effect came into existence at the same time as the Cause, then the two being like the two horns of the Cow, one could not be regarded as the cause of the other.—*Tātparya*.

other as cause and effect [since the *Rising* subsisting in one pan, cannot be the cause of the *Dipping* in the other pan], what could be related to what? [the two acts subsisting in two distinct substrata]. If what you mean to lay stress upon is only the *simultaneity* (between the Rising and Dipping of the two ends of the scale);—then our answer is that there is simultaneity between things only when there is simultaneity between their causes; i e., it is only when the causes of several things exist at the same time that those things come into existence simultaneously; so that there can be no connection between the Rising and the Dipping (of the two ends of the scale themselves); and as for the simultaneity of their causes, —this is not possible; for the cause of the *Rising* consists of *gravity*, a certain effort and some conjunctions; and that of the *Dipping* the cause consists of the contact of the scale with the string as aided by the contact of substances possessed of gravity. [Thus then, even though between Rising and Dipping there may be this simultaneity that their causes are simultaneous, it does not prove anything either as regards the Rising and Dipping between cause and effect, or as regards things being momentary]. If the Opponent should deny that Motion or Conjunction are distinct things,—this has already been answered: it has been already pointed out that Conjunction is something different; and being the cause of Conjunction, Motion also must be something different.

Vār. P. 413.

Even such causes of production and destruction as are found present in the case of certain things are not found to be present in the case of the Rock-crystal; and what is never found cannot be admitted.

Sūtra (13).

[The *Nihilist* says]—

" JUST AS IN THE CASE OF THE DESTRUCTION OF MILK, AND THE PRODUCTION OF CURD, THE CAUSE IS NOT PERCEIVED [AND IS YET ADMITTED],—SO WOULD IT BE IN THE CASE OF THE SUBSTANCES IN QUESTION."—SŪ. (13).

Bhāṣya on (Sū. 13).

[L. 164, L. II to L. 13.]

"[When milk is turned into curd] though we do not perceive the cause either of the destruction of the milk, or of the production of the curd, yet the existence of such cause is admitted; -similarly in the case of the Rock-crystal, the existence of the cause of destruction, as also of the production, of several individual entities should be admitted."

Vārṭika on Sū. (13).

[P. 413, L. 7 to L. 9.]

"*Just as in the case of the destruction of milk &c &c.*—says the *Sūṭra.* Even though the cause of the destruction of milk is not perceived, and yet it is admitted; so also the cause of the production of the curd; in the same manner, the causes of the production of the individual Crystal-entities are not perceived, yet they should be admitted."

Sūṭra (14).

[*The Siddhānṭin* answers].—

INASMOCH AS THERE IS ACTUAL APPREHENSION THROUGH INDICATIVES, THERE AS NO NON-PERCEPTION (IN THE CASE OF MILK AND CURD).—Sū. (14).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (14.)

[P. 164, L. 15. to P. 165, L. 1.]

As a matter of fact, the cause of the destruction of Milk is actually apprehended,—being indicated by the destruction of the Milk; similarly the cause of the production of Curd is also apprehended,—being indicated by the production of the Curd; so that it is not true that there is "non-perception" (of the said causes).* Contrary to this is the case of

* That there is destruction of the Milk is inferred from the appearance of Curd in the milk-particles; the inference being—'In the milk-particles there has been *destruction of Milk*, because there have appeared in them particles of a substance other than, not compatible with, Milk, and the *destruction of Milk being* thus cognised, inasmuch as the said *destruction* is an effect, it must have a *cause*; so that the *cause of destruction* is indicated by, has for its indicative, the *destruction*. The indicative of the *production of Curd* consists in the actual *perception of the Curd*; and when the *production* is thus cognised, inasmuch as it is an effect, it

such substances as the Rock-crystal and the like; for in the case of these, there is nothing to indicate the productions of several individual entities (in the same object); which leads us to conclude that there is no such production (of several entities in a piece of Rock-crystal).

Vārṭikā on Sū. (14).

[P. 413, L. 11 to P. 421, L. 13].

Inasmuch as there is actual apprehension etc. etc.,—says the *Sūṭra*. That which is actually apprehended through indicatives cannot be said to be non-existent. Quite different is the case of the Rock-crystal and such substances; that is to say, there is nothing to indicate that in each such object as the piece of Rock-crystal there are productions of several (momentary) entities. "It is not true that there is nothing to indicate this; the diversity in the touch, which is cool and warm, proves that there is diversity (in the things); as a matter of fact, we find that there are different kinds of touch, cool or warm, only when there are different things; as we find in the case of Fire and Water [the two being regarded as different things, because one is *hot* and the other *cool*]*;—and such diversity of touch is found in the case of the piece of Rock-crystal also [from which it follows that several pieces have come into existence]."

It is true that there is this diversity of touch (in the case of the Rock-crystal); but it is due to other causes.

"What is that cause?"

That cause consists of the entrance (into it) of particles of Fire and Water; that is, when particles of Water enter into it, the Rock-crystal becomes cool, and when particles of Fire enter into it, it becomes hot.

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must have a cause; so that the 'cause of the production of Curd' is indicated by its *production*. And it is not true that "the cause of the destruction of Milk and that of production of Curd are not perceived" (as urged by the Opponent in Sū. 13).—*Bhāṣyachandra*.

* Similarly, the piece of Rock-crystal is cool at one moment, and warm the next, which shows that the former piece has disappeared and a new piece has been produced in its place.

"It is not right to say that there is entrance of Water and Fire particles; for there can be no reason for such particles entering into things in varying quantities; for instance, when during the winter pieces of wood, earth, stone and metal are exposed to the atmosphere at night, the degree of coolness found in these things is varying, the succeeding being cooler than the preceding [the metal cooler than the stone, which is cooler than the earth, which again is cooler than the wood]; and similarly when those same things are exposed to the rays of the summer sun, the degree of heat found in them is varying, the succeeding being hotter than the preceding; all this variation would (according to you) mean that varying quantities of Water and Fire particles have entered the said things [more Water and Fire particles entering into the Metal than into the Stone, and so forth]; but we find no reason (or justification) for any such assumption. From all this it follows that the right explanation of the phenomena in question is that at each different moment of time, things are produced out of the particles of the elemental substances concerned, and those things, by their very nature, imbibe, from external causes, the varying qualities mentioned.*"

Vār. P. 414.

Certainly this would not be the right explanation; for the entrance of Water and Fire particles does not set aside the 'nature of things' [so that the view that such particles enter the things is not incompatible with what the Opponent has said in connection with the 'nature of things']; so that the explanation based upon the 'nature of things' being equally available for both parties, such, 'nature of things' cannot serve as a reason (for one view or the other)†. Further,

* "When the piece of Metal is exposed to the Sun, it is not true that larger quantities of fire-particles enter into it; what happens is that out of the same constituent particles a fresh piece of Metal is produced, endowed with the additional amount of heat; and so forth."

† The reasonings put forward by the Opponent do not prove the momentary character of things. For if the divergent qualities of the metal, stone &c., were due

the reason put forward by the Nihilist (' because in the Wood, Stone, &c., there is a varying degree of qualities of coolness &c.,') is also 'contradictory': that is, if you do not admit the view that particles (of Water and Fire &c.) enter into things,—then you stultify your own doctrine that "the Elemental Substances (Earth, Water and Air) are of the nature of *hardness, viscidity, heat,* and *motion.*" "How so?" Well, (according to you) the thing that was *hard* becomes *hot* at one time, that which was *hot* becomes *hard*; so that the thing which was of one nature, comes to be one of two and three natures.* For one, on the other hand, who accepts the view that particles of substance enter into things, this absurd contingency does not arise; because when a thing (that was not hot before) becomes hot, what happens, according to this view, is that it acquires the heat subsisting in another substance which is in close contact with the former.

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to the coming into existence of new stones and new metals at each moment of time, and every diversity of character were due only to the production of new entities,—then it would be possible to perceive divergent characteristics in the single piece of wood also; as according to the Nihilist, in the piece of wood also several individual entities are always coming into existence. Hence the right view would appear to be that in the piece of wood itself, there are two such distinct qualities as serve to distinguish it from the metal and the stone; though these do not distinguish it from the several wood-pieces that go on being produced momentarily (according to the Nihilist). And these same distinct qualities would serve to account for the divergent qualities of coolness and heat, also under the theory that things are not momentary;—so that the arguments adduced do not necessarily prove the momentary character of things.—*Ṭāṭparya.*.

* According to the Nihilist, what distinguishes one elemental substance from another is that Earth is hard, the Water is viscid, Fire is hot, and Air is mobile. Now turning to the phenomenon cited by the Nihilist, when the Stone becomes hot, what happens, according to him, is that in place of the Earth, which was dry, there has come into existence, the Fire, which is hot; and when the stone becomes cool, there is produced, in place of Earth, Water; and so forth; and thus the same piece of Stone being both hot and cool and dry, all these three would be found present in the same Stone; so that the three qualities could not be regarded as mutually exclusive. And this would be directly against the Nihilist's tenets.—*Ṭāṭparya.*

There is a further 'contradiction' (or incongruity) involved in tho reason put forward by the Nihilist. "How?" Because it admits the presence of diverse peculiarities in one and the same thing: That is, according to this, one and the same thing becomes, at one and the same time, hard as well as hot, and this becomes endowed with a threefold character; so that the reason—'because we perceive peculiarities'—becomes 'contradictory,' inasmuch as it goes against a former assertion made by yourself [and this is the definition of the 'contradictory' Reason, as propounded in Sū 1-2-6] * If (with a view to escape from this difficulty) you say that—"it is not mere peculiarity that proves diversity; only such peculiarities prove diversity as are incompatible with one another (and as such cannot coexist);"—this cannot be right; for it shows that you have not grasped our meaning: We also do not say that mere peculiarity proves the diversity of things; but only such peculiarities as are not compatible with one another, and which are clearly differentiated from one another can serve as the differentia of things;—and what we mean is that these peculiarities (which go to differentiate Earth, Water, &c.,) must be incompatible with one another; if they were not so, they could not serve as differentias [so that when you say that the stone which was hard, and as such possessed of the differentia of Earth, becomes hot, and as such endowed with the differentia of Fire, it clearly means that the stone becomes the substratum of two incompatible qualities]; and further, if all three differentias *Hardness* of Earth, *Hotness* of Fire, *Viscidity* of Water and

* The explanation provided by the Nihilist is not only incompatible with his definition of the Elemental Substances, but it also contradicts his former assertion. Under Sū. 3-2-10, the *perception of peculiarities* has been urged as the reason for *diversity* (in the Rock-crystal); now it is said that the same thing—the piece of stone—is endowed with two or three peculiarities, so that the 'perception of peculiarities' is made the ground for *sameness*; and this involves 'contradiction' of what has been asserted before.

Mobility of Air) subsisted in a single Object (the piece of stone for instance), then, by what particular name would that Object be called? If it be called 'Earth,' that can not be right, for it is found to be *hot* (and heat belongs to Fire only);—if it be called 'Fire,' that also can not be right; for it is found to be *hard*;—similarly with Air also. Thus then it is clear that either the reason adduced by you is contradictory to your definition of Earth &c., or it does not prove *diversity*.

What we have said above applies also to the case of heat perceived in Water (exposed to fire); in Water also, heat, viscidity and mobility subsist at one and the same time [when for instance, Water is boiling].

Vār. P. 415.

[Against the theory that when Water becomes hot, particles of Fire enter into it, the objection has been raised that—"if Fire-particles have entered into Water, then, just as we perceive there the hot touch of Fire, so should we also perceive therein the Colour of Fire; just as we do in the red-hot ball of Iron;"—against this objection] some Naiyāyikas* have offered the answer that—'It is not right to urge the possibility of the perception of the Colour of Fire in the Water; because the Colour (though present) is suppressed.'

But this explanation is not right; for it shows that the person who offers this explanation does not know the doctrines of Nyāya: it is not the Naiyāyika's view that the Colour of Fire is suppressed by the Colour of Water; his view is that the non-perception of Colour (of Fire, in the Water) is due to the fact of Fire being of four kinds; it has already been established in the section of 'Sense-organs' that Fire is of four kinds,—that which has its Colour suppressed, and so

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* The *Bhāṣyachandra*, in quoting this passage, reads इत्येके after 'ऽभिभवात्;' we have adopted this reading, which is also in keeping with the *Tātparya*.

forth.* [Vide *Bhāṣya* under Sū. 3·3·6, where it is shown that Fire is—(1) with Colour and Touch manifested, (2) with Colour manifested and Touch unmanifested, (3) with Touch manifested and Colour unmanifested, and (4) with neither Colour nor Touch manifested; and the Fire in heated water is of the third kind, hence it is that we do not perceive its colour].

[The *Vārṭika* takes up the criticism of the Proposition put forward by the Nihilist]—What is the precise meaning of the proposition "In the rock-crystal, there come into existence diverse rock-crystals"? If it simply means that it is '*something different*', then the argument is superfluous, seeking to prove what is already established: for the Rock-crystal is certainly 'something different'—from the *Jar*, for instance, and such other things [this is admitted by all parties]. If it means that it is 'something different' from another piece of Rock-crystal,—that also is as before [for all parties admit one piece of Rock-crystal to be different from another piece]. If it means that the Rock-crystal is 'something different' from the previous Rock-crystal', (the piece of Rock-crystal which, at the previous moment, existed in the place where we see the present Rock-crystal), then we ask—which is that 'previous rock-crystal' from which it is different? Inasmuch as you cannot specify any particular 'previous rock-crystal' what is said would be meaningless; that is, in the case of such things as the Jar and the like there are certain qualities of Colour &c., which, as admitted by both parties, admit of the discussion as to their being different or non-different; in the case in question on the other hand, there is no 'previous Rock-crystal' admitted by both parties, from which the present rock-crystal could be regarded as

* This passage quoted in the *Bhāṣyachandra* reads—अनुद्भूतरूपादि तेजश्चतुर्वि-धमिति पादितमिन्द्रियप्रकरणे.

different;—if your Proposition refers to some such 'previous Rock-crystal' as is admitted by both parties, then no proof is needed. [For the only 'previous Rock-crystal' that would be admitted by the *Naiyāyika* would be some piece that existed at some previous time, and not a piece that existed in the same place as this present piece, as held by the Nihilist; so that if the Nihilist also means only the former, then both of us being agreed as to that, no arguments are needed]. If again, you accept the present piece of Rock-crystal, and assert some past piece of Rock-crystal as different from the former [*i.e.*, if your proposition is in the form 'the past Rock-crystal was different from the present one', and not in the form 'the present Rock-crystal is different from the past one'],—then, in that case, *the diversity of the qualities of cool and hot touch* (which you put forward as the probans of your argument) would not be such as subsists in the subject of that proposition; as the diversity of qualities is perceived as subsisting in the *present* piece of Rock-crystal [and does not subsist in the *past* piece]; and further, who is there that does not admit that the past Rock-crystal is different from the present one? If however it be meant that the same piece of Rock-crystal is 'different',—then this involves a clear self-contradiction: one and the same piece being *that itself* as also *something different*. Thus it is found that when we come to examine the 'diversity' (postulated by the Nihilist), it is found to be either superfluous (proving what is admitted by all parties), or contrary to the Nihilist's own doctrines.

"What the proposition—'In the rock-crystal there come into existence diverse rock-crystals'—means is that 'the rock-crystal does not become the object of several non-simultaneous cognitions'."

If such is the meaning of the Proposition, then there is no corroborative instance.

"The Lamp would be the corroborative instance: The Lamp is never the object of several non-simultaneous cognitions, and yet it is possessed of the character of *being an entity*, and so forth; and this would afford an instance in corroboration of what we assert in regard to the Rock-crystal."

Not so; it is not admitted; it is not admitted by all that
Vār. P. 416. the Lamp and such things are never the object of non-simultaneous cognitions'; this is not admitted, for the simple reason that all these things continue to exist for several moments [and as such must be the object of several cognitions], For instance [the Lamp continues to have existence during the entire series of the following processes]—(1) from its beginning to its end the Lamp is related to the presence of its cause at one moment of time,—(2) at the next moment there comes to be manifested in it the generic character of 'Lamp,'—(3) then comes the moment when the action (of disruption) is set up in its component parts,—(4) then the moment at which there is disjunction among the parts,—(5) at the next moment the conjunction among the parts is destroyed,—(6) then comes the moment at which the Lamp becomes destroyed. Just as the Lamp, so all other things, when undergoing destruction, do so either by being reduced to the condition of their constituent cause, or by the appearance of their contrary [this refers to the case of Qualities only], or by the destruction of their substratum; [which implies their continued existence for a number of moments];—a thing that has no cause can never be destroyed; according to us nothing that is without cause is ever destroyed.

"[If the case of the Lamp does not provide the required corroborative instance] we may regard the case of the Rock-crystal as analogous to that of *the action of the substance that is undergoing destruction* [*i. e.*, the action set up in the sub-

stance that is undergoing destruction is destroyed, comes to an end, immediately after it begins; similarly the individual Rock-crystal is destroyed immediately after it has come into existence]."

This also is not right, because in the first place the admission of Action involves self-contradiction (on your part), and secondly because no such Action is admitted (by us) *

"But the destruction of things is not due to any (external) cause."

If you mean by this that—"there is no (external) cause to which the destruction of a thing is due; everything is destroyed the very moment that it comes into existence,"†—this can not be right; as none of the alternatives to this theory can be maintained: He who holds that "the destruction of things is not due to any cause" should be asked the following questions:—(*A*) Is it that, since there is no cause of destruction, there is no such thing as *destruction*? or (*B*) that, since there is no cause (of destruction), destruction is eternal? According to you, *things without cause* are of two kinds—(1) they are either *eternal*, or (2)

*(*a*) The whole fabric of Nihilistic doctrine is based upon the denial of all "Action" in substances; because Action is possible in an object only when it continues to exist for at least sufficient time to be endowed with a potentiality of that action and its actual manifestation. So that the very conception of 'action' is incompatible with the Nihilistic theory. (*b*) We do not admit of any such action as is destroyed at the very moment of its existence; for even the destruction of a substance involves persistence for more than one moment at one moment there is the action set up in the substance, at the next moment comes the destruction of the substance; and then comes the destruction of the Action. So that the Action must subsist at least during *three* moments of time.—*Ṭāṭparya*.

†What the Opponent means is that what the *Siḍḍhānṭin* has been urging would be true if the destruction of things were due to the operation of some cause outside itself. As a matter of fact however the very production of the thing carries its own destruction. This argument is developed at great length in the *Ṭāṭparya*, pp. 383-384, leading up to the final conclusion—"Inasmuch as the destruction of things is involved in its very existence, and is not due to an external cause, it is only natural that everything should have only a momentary existence."

non-existent; while according to us, they are of only one kind, *eternal*. (*A*) If then, being without cause, destruction be *eternal*, then the *production* of the thing becomes an impossibility;—and the assertion, that "when the thing is produced it carries its own destruction with it," is incongruous (involving a contradiction in terms); and further, this would mean that the *existence* of a thing is not incompatible with its *non-existence* (destruction), and this would imply the *permanent existence* of the thing! [For even when its destruction has come about, its existence may continue side by side with the destruction; just as the destruction continues side by side with existence]. (*B*) If, on the other hand, (being without cause) the destruction be held to be *non-existent*, this would mean that there is no destruction of anything; so that all things would be eternal! Further, if destruction were *non-existent*, then, in the absence of destruction, any such conception as 'this is destroyed' would be impossible; for it there is no such thing as *going*, any such conception as 'this is going' is impossible. If what you mean is that—"Destruction is without cause because it is itself indestructible",—then, we ask, whence do you get at the notion that Destruction is not destroyed? "We deduce this from the fact that things destroyed are not produced again*." If you mean by this that—"if the destruction of a thing were destroyed, it would mean that the same thing is again produced",—then this is not right; for the production of the thing is not the same as the 'destruction of its destruction'; and it is only if it were so that 'the destruction of its destruction' would mean the reproduction of the thing † (as asserted by the Opponent). In

* If the destruction of the Jar were destroyed, it would mean that that same Jar is again produced; as a matter of fact however no Jar is found to be produced again; hence it follows that the Destruction of things is not destructible.

† The meaning of this passage is not quite clear. In the first place the reading in both editions is quite corrupt; we have adopted the following reading—

fact the 'production' of a thing is due to a cause; so that whenever the cause is there, there is production. Further,* the fact of the matter is that even though Destruction has a cause, it is not destroyed; and this for the simple reason that it is negative in its character; it is the characteristic of only positive entities that having causes they are destroyed. As for negative things, there is no such restriction; for it is destroyed, even though without cause; *e. g.* the Prior Negation (Previous Non-existence) of things [which, having no beginning, has no cause, and yet it comes to an end when that thing is produced]; and again, it may not be destroyed, even when it has a cause; *e. g.* that negation of things which consists of their total destruction [destruction of things is brought about by certain causes, and it never comes to an end]. "If the destruction of things is due to a cause, then the very producer of a thing becomes its destroyer; that is, the qualities due to baking are produced by the contact of fire; and this same fire-contact, in producing another set of baking-born qualities, destroys the former set of qualities; so that the producer of these qualities is also their destroyer." This is not right; as it shows want of comprehension† on your part; it is clear that you have not grasped our *Vaishēṣika* doctrine: according to our system, the fire-contact destroying the baking-born qualities is not the same that produced them; it is a different fire-contact that destroys the former Colour &c., and produces the next set of Colour and other qualities; and this

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नहि विनाशाभावो भावो यतोऽयं विनाशविनाशाद् भवेत्; and in this we have, to a certain extent, the support of the *Ṭāṭparya*. The Ṭāṭparya remarks that the Siddhântin here meets the Nihilist on his own ground: according to the Bauḍḍha Nihilist, even positive things are mere non-entities; so that for them it is all the more impossible to regard destruction as something *positive*.

* The *Siḍḍhānṭin* now offers the answer from his own stand-point—says the *Ṭāṭparya*.

† From the next explanatory sentence, it is clear that the right reading is अनवबोधात्.

goes on in each succeeding set of qualities being brought about by a different fire-contact; so that there is no possibility of the *producer* of a thing being its *destroyer*. If what you mean is that—"that which is of the same nature as the producer of a thing cannot be its destroyer",—our answer is that this is not true; for we find that the contact of water produces the sprout; and yet a similar contact of water (in the shape of a flood) also destroys that sprout; and certainly what is actually found to happen cannot be taken exception to as something incongruous. Further, there can be no answer to the objections raised above (P. 416, L. 8) against the view that "the destruction of things is without cause." From all this we are led to accept the view that the destroyer of a thing is (and may be) of the same nature as its producer.

We have pointed out above the incongruities involved in the Nihilist's proposition, with special reference to the *probandum* that "there are *diverse* rock-crystals appearing and disappearing in the same rock-crystal."

Some people seek to prove the *momentary character* of things, (*a*) on the ground of 'the perception of peculiarities' and (*b*) on the ground of 'destruction of things being without cause'; against these we urge the following argument:*

When the Nihilist declares that "*Samskāras*, (Faculty, Impulse) are *kṣaṇika*, momentary,"—he should be asked the exact meaning of the term '*kṣaṇika*': when you use the term '*kṣaṇika*,' 'momentary,' what is it that is meant? (*a*) If it means that the faculties are *liable to destruction*, then it asserts only what is already admitted (by all parties, and is as such, superfluous). (*b*) If it means that they are *liable to quick destruction*, then the epithet added (*quick*)

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* The momentary character of things has also been refuted above, yet on that occasion, '*diversity*' was the main object of our attack; while now we turn our attention mainly against *momentariness*. This is the point of difference.

makes the assertion contrary to your tenets.* (c) If it means that they are *produced and destroyed*, this also would be like the others; that is, the meaning being that
Vār. P. 418.
Faculties are *produced and destroyed*, the assertion becomes entirely superfluous (asserting what is already admitted by all parties). If the phrase 'produced and destroyed' means that they are produced and destroyed at one and the same point of time,—*i. e.*, the production and destruction are simultaneous—then there arises this absurdity that, just as there is 'production' of only such things as are *not already produced*, (and 'destruction' comes about simultaneously with production)—so the 'destruction' also would be of only such things as are *not already produced!* Then again, if the phrase 'produced and destroyed' means that *being produced, it is destroyed*,—even so, like *production*, *destruction* also should have a cause; that is, just as the *production* of a thing being an action and hence contingent on circumstances (occasional), is due to a cause, —so in the same manner (and for the same reason) the thing can undergo *destruction*, only when it undergoes the operation of the cause of that destruction; for we have already pointed out (Text, P. 416, L. 8, *et seq.*) the objections to the view that the destruction of things is without cause.

Then again, the term '*kṣaṇika*' contains the possessive affix (*thañ*, by Paṇini, 5-2-115);—how does this affix come in? If, in accordance with the *Nirukta*, '*Kṣaṇa*' stands for '*Kṣaya*', destruction,—and the term '*kṣaṇika*' means *that which has destruction*,—this cannot be right, because of the difference in time; that is, at the time that there is 'destruction,' the thing *to which it belongs* is not there (having ceased

* The qualification 'quick' applied to the destructibility of Impressions implies that the destruction of other things is *not quick*; *i.e.*, they are more lasting than Impressions; and this would be contrary to the Nihilist's doctrines, by which all things are momentary.

to exist); and the possessive affix is never found to be used in connection with things that exist at different times.* If (with a view to escaping from this difficulty) it be held that —the positive entity itself, as qualified by its *impending* destruction, is what is spoken as '*kṣaṇika*' [so that qualification by something impending not being impossible, this would form the basis of the required possessive relation],"— but even so, it is not possible for the thing, qualified by the destruction, to be spoken of as *having or possessing that destruction*; and thus also the use of the possessive affix would be unjustifiable.

"What is meant by Faculties being *kṣaṇika* is that the time of their existence is only one *Kṣana*, moment; having posited the *Kṣaṇa*' or *moment*, as the lowest conceivable measure of time, we call those things *kṣaṇika* which continue to exist only during that point of time." This also can not be right; because the Bauḍḍha admits of Time as a mere name (a mere hypothetical entity, without real existence): "O Bhikṣus, five things exist in mere name"—says the Buddhist scripture;—and that which is a mere name cannot serve as the qualification of anything.

We have already pointed out (*Text*, P. 415, l. 20 *et. seq.*) that in support of the proposition—'things are momentary' —there can be no corroborative instance; Lamp and such other things not being admitted (by both parties, as *momentary*).

As regards the reasons or premisses put forward (in support of the proposition 'all things are momentary'),—"because we perceive peculiarities at the end," and so forth,—they are either 'inadmissible' (*Asiḍḍha*), or 'otherwise explicable' (*Anyathāsiḍḍha*), or 'contradictory' (*Viruḍḍha*); and as such

*The *Possessor* and the *Possessed* must exist at the same time; otherwise the relation of possession would be impossible. Hence no possessive relation being possible between the thing and its destruction, the use of the possessive affix in *Kṣāṇika* cannot be right.

cannot be accepted as valid reasons.* Then (as regards the 'peculiarities') even granting (for the sake of argument) that things are possessed of 'peculiarities,'—your premiss is found to be 'Inconclusive' in view of the said peculiarities belonging to the *one* thing that exists at that present moment; that is to say, in order to be an effective premiss, the 'presence of peculiarities' must be such as is admitted by both parties; and this can only be when the 'peculiarities' are taken as belonging to the *one* thing that exists at the present moment; and the 'presence of peculiarities,' being thus found to be concomitant with a *single thing*, must be rejected as 'inconclusive' (in the proving of *diversity*). If the premiss is stated in the qualified form—"because we see peculiarities at the end,"—the qualification becomes futile; the exact meaning of the phrase 'at the end' is not explained; and further, it has to be explained which particular 'end' (preceding or following) is meant to be that at which the peculiarities are perceived. If 'end' stands for *destruction*, then certainly no peculiarities are ever perceived at such 'end' [The thing having been destroyed, wherein could the peculiarities be seen?]. If the *last entity* itself be spoken of as the 'end', then, inasmuch as the 'peculiarities' would be perceived in *one* entity, the probans (as concomitant with *singleness*, not *diversity*) would be 'contradictory.'

Vār. P. 419.

Another premiss (adduced by the Nihilist in support of the proposition that 'all things are momentary') is—"because there is perception and non-perception"; and the purport of this premiss is as follows:—"When such things as

* The reasons, adduced by the Nihilist are—(a) 'because there is perception, at the end, of peculiarities'; this is 'inadmissible,' since this perception cannot belong to the preceding moment;—(b) 'because things exist' and (c) 'because they are products'; both these are 'otherwise explicable' than on the basis of the momentary character of things; and further 'existence' and 'being a product' pertaining to all things at all times, are both 'contradictory' to 'momentariness.'

the Lamp are being carried, they go on being destroyed at one place and produced at the next; so that there are 'perception and non-perception' of those things [there being *perception* when the thing is produced, and 'non-perception' when it is destroyed];—similarly when the person, Dēvaḍatta, goes along, we have 'perception and non-perception' of him; which proves that this person also is undergoing destruction and production at every moment."

This reasoning however is not valid; as the 'perception and non-perception' of Dēvaḍaṭṭa and such persons is due to other causes; that is, the said 'perception and non-perception' are due to *conjunction and disjunction*, and *not* to *production and destruction*; when the conjunction of a person with a certain place has come to an end, that person is *not perceived* at that place; and when the said conjunction has come about, he is *perceived* at that place; [so that 'perception and non-perception' should be attributed to the presence and absence of conjunction; for] when, by reason of the conjunction of a thing with a place, that thing is conceived of as being present at that place, the appearance of the notion of such presence or absence must be due to the presence or absence of the said conjunction. As against the philosopher who would deny the existence of conjunction and disjunction, we have already proved before that there is such a thing as Conjunction; and the same would apply to Disjunction also. Thus it becomes established that the 'perception and non-perception' of things are due to conjunction and disjunction; they cannot be due to anything else. Then as regards your assertion that "The Lamp is produced at another place (after having been destroyed at one place),"—we do not quite understand this. "Why so?" Well, according to you, a thing is destroyed at the same place at which it is produced; so that the thing (Lamp) that would be produced next, being non-

existent at the time, cannot have any impression left upon it (by the previous entity); and without such an impression, that thing cannot come into existence at any other place. If it be held that—"even without such impression the thing can come into existence at another place,"—then our answer to the *Buḍḍha* would be that it is not possible for anything to be produced at a place other than its own. [So for this reason also it is not possible for the Lamp to be produced at another place]. "But what is affected by the impressions is the *cause* of the thing; and since the thing, as its product, subsists in that cause, it is produced exactly in accordance with that impression." This explanation also is equally untenable: (According to the Nihilist) it is as impossible for the product to leave an impression upon its Cause, as it is for it to leave it upon its product. So that according to you, the product should come into existence either *always in the same place*, or *always at a different place* [and it cannot be in the same place at one time and at another place at another time]

Vār. P. 420.

What has been said above applies also to the phenomenon of "unequal falling." The Nihilist has argued as follows:—"Things must be regarded as momentary, because there is *unequal falling*. As a matter of fact, when such things as a piece of stone and the like are falling through space without any obstruction, it is found that some things fall sooner than others; and the only possible explanation of this phenomenon is that all things being equally momentary, in the case of some things the momentary condition produced is such as has no capacity for the producing of any further downward series of conditions, while in others the conditions *are* capable of producing further downward series [and the latter take more time in falling than the former]." But this phenomenon (of unequal falling) also is capable of being explained otherwise

(than on the basis of the momentary character of all things): Even when the several things falling are equal in weight, it may happen that while the falling of one is due to such combined causes as its weight, its effort and the momentum imparted to it by a throw, that of the other is due merely to its weight, and that of the third thing is due to its weight and the effort of some person; and it is by reason of the varying causes to which the falling is due to that the things take more or less time in the falling;* and this 'unequal falling' therefore cannot be regarded as a valid reason (for regarding things as *momentary*).

Against the theory that Faculty or Impulse remains one and the same (from beginning to end) the Nihilist has raised the objection that "in that case the arrow that has been shot should never fall down (the impulse imparted to it continuing to be effective)." This objection is answered simply by the remark that we do not hold that Faculty remains one and same; that Faculty is diverse we have already explained under Sū. 2-2-35. Even if Faculty be regarded as one (as held by the *Vaishēṣika*), the diversity in its effects can be explained on the basis of the fact that on account of the force of diverse causes, that same Faculty at one time brings about forcible (and lasting) action, while at another time it brings about less forcible (and evanescent) ones; just as it happens in the case of Gravity; that is, Gravity, though one and the same, at one time leads to slower falling, by reason of the presence of other accessory agencies (which retard and coun-

* When a man on a house-top shoots his falcon upon the pigeon on the ground, —the rushing down of the falcon is due to—(1) its weight, (2) its effort urged by its desire to catch the pigeon,—(3) the momentum imparted to it by the throwing falconer. When the falcon rushes down on its own account, and is not shot by the falconer, its falling is due to the first two causes; and when the same falcon simply glides down, without the incentive of a likely prey, the falling is due to its weight only. So that the same thing may take varying amounts of time in falling; and this can be explained as being due to causes entirely different from the momentary character of things.

teract the force of gravity); and, when the retarding agency is removed, it leads to quicker falling; then again, it is found that a piece of stone dropped in the Air falls more quickly than rain-drops [though there is the same force of Gravity operating in both cases].

From all this it follows that 'unequal falling' is not a valid reason (in support of the proposition that 'all things are momentary').

"What"—asks the Nihilist—"is your reason in support of the *non-momentary* character of things?"

We have already indicated our reason, when we pointed out that the Cause and its Effect, being related to each other by the relation of container and contained, must exist at the same time, just like the cup and the jujube fruit in it.* For the following reason also [we hold that things are *not momentary*]:—

(A) 'The cognitions in question (i.e. the series of cognitions that we have in regard to the single piece of Rock-crystal), which are not simultaneous, must pertain to a single object,—because, while being co-extensive (or conterminous) with such cognitions of the thing as are not wrong, they are spoken of by means of the same words,—just like the cognition of one thing by several persons at the present one and the same moment†;—when several persons come to have cognitions in connection with the single present moment, these cognitions,—being co-extensive with such cognitions of the thing as are not wrong, and also capable of being spoken of

* The reading भावीनि, though found in both editions, is not right; the right reading भाविनी, is supplied by the *Bhāṣyachanḍra*, which has quoted this passage.

† The *Tāṭparya* explains '*avyuṭṭhāyi*' as '*abhrānṭa*'; it remarks that the clause 'while &c.' would be sufficient as a valid premiss, and the other clause, 'they are spoken of by means of the same word,' has been added only as an additional reason.

by means of the same words,—are found to pertain to a single object; in the same manner, the non-simultaneous Cognitions in question also,—being co-extensive with such cognitions of the thing as are not wrong, and capable of being spoken of by means of the same words,—must pertain to the same single object.' [This proves the continued existence of single *objects*].

(B) 'The cognitions of each single Soul cannot belong to several agents,—for, if they were so, no recognition or recollection should be possible,—just as it is not possible when the cognitions belong to Dēvadatta and other diverse individuals.' [This proves the continued persistence of the Soul].

(C) 'The cognitions of Colour, Taste, Odour and Touch must have one as well as diverse causes [the *one* cause being the Soul, and the diverse causes being, the Visual Organ in the case of Colour-cognition, the Gestatory Organ in the case of Taste-cognition, and so forth],—because they are all recognised as 'mine',—just like the cognitions of the present single moment by several such persons as have entered into an agreement with one another (and as such form a single entity, in the shape of the Composite Group of Individuals)? [This also proves the continued persistence of the Soul].

(D) 'The cognitions of yesterday and of to-day, falling within a single contiguous series—have one as well as diverse causes,—because they are recalled as 'mine',—like the cognitions of several persons just referred to.' [This also proves the persistence of the Soul].

(E) 'The cognition of things described in the Scriptures must have one as well as diverse causes,—because they are recognised—like the cognitions of several persons just referred to;—and also because there is no such recognition in the

case of the several cognitions belonging to several agents just as shown before.'

Bhāṣya on Sū. (15).

[P. 165, L. 1 to P. 166, L. 5].

To what the Bauḍḍha Nihilist has urged in Sū. 13, some one (the *Sāṅkhya*) has offered the following answer—

Sū. (15).

"OF THE MILK THERE IS NO DESTRUCTION (WHEN IT TURNS INTO CURD); FOR WHAT HAPPENS IS EITHER TRANSFORMATION OR MANIFESTATION OF NEW QUALITIES."* (Sū. 15).

"Of the milk there is *transformation*, not *destruction*,"—says one (the *Sāṅkhya*)—"and there is *transformation* when the substance remaining constant, its former character (*e. g.* that of 'milk') is destroyed and a new character (*e. g.* that of 'curd') is produced."

Another philosopher (the Neo-Sāṅkhya) says that "there is manifestation of new qualities; *i. e.* the substance remaining constant, its former qualities disappear and new ones appear".†

Both these views appear as if they were one and the same.

Vārṭika on Sū. (15).

[P. 421, Ll. 15—20.]

"*Of the milk &c. &c.*—says the *Sūṭra*. The Milk is not *destroyed*, nor is the curd *produced*; what happens is that the substance remaining constant, its former quality disappears and new qualities appear."

* The translation of the *Sūṭra* is in accordance with the interpretation of the *Bhāṣya*, the *Vārṭika* and the *Bhāṣyachanḍra*. According to Vishvanāṭha it should run thus—'*What happens is only transformation, which consists in the manifestation of new qualities.*'

† The new qualities also are not *produced*, in the sense that they come into existence for the first time; for according to the Sāṅkhya, the qualities were there all along; but only in a latent form; and they only become *manifested*; and when they are regarded as having been destroyed, they only disappear from view, they are not lost.

Both these views appear as if they were one and the same—says the *Bhāṣya*; what is the signification of the comparative particle, '*iva*', 'as if'? What it means is that there is this similitude between the two views that according to both the Substance remains constant, and yet there is this difference that, while according to one there is *appearance and disappearance* (of qualities), according to the other there is *destruction and production.*

Bhāṣya on Sū. (16).

[P. 116, L. 5 to L. 12.]

The answer to both the views (put forward in Sū. 15) is as follows:—

Sūtra (16).

[*Siddhānta*]—WHEN WE PERCEIVE A NEW SUBSTANCE BEING PRODUCED THROUGH A FRESH RECONSTITUTION, WE INFER FROM THIS THE CESSATION (DESTRUCTION) OF THE PREVIOUS SUBSTANCE. (Sū. 16).

When we see that a new Substance, in the shape of *Curd*, is produced through a fresh re-constitution or re-organisation of the component particles,—this 're-constitution' being in the form of *coagulation**,— we infer from this that the previous subtance, Milk, has been 'destroyed' through the disruption of its component particles; just as when we see the new substance—Saucer—being produced out of a fresh re-arrangement of the component particles of the Clay-lump, it is inferred that the Clay-lump has been 'destroyed' through the disruption of its component particles. And the constitutional contiguity between Milk and Curd is similar to that between Clay and things made of Clay; [that is, the component particles of the Milk continue to subsist in the Curd, just as those of Clay do in the thing made of Clay]; if there were a complete destruction of the Milk (along with its component particles; if it were completely burnt to ashes, for instance), the production of the new substance (Curd) would never be possible,—there being no connection possible (between this production and any existing substance).

* When the former constitution or arrangement of the component particles of the former substance—Milk—is upset, and a fresh arrangement—conducive to the new substance—is set in, we have what is called '*sammūrchhanam*'—*Bhāṣyachandra*.

Vārṭika on Sū. (16).

The answer to both views (set forth in Sū. 15) is stated:—*When we perceive a new substance etc. etc.*—says the *Sūṭra*. The rest is clear in the *Bhāṣya*.

Further, (as we have seen) according to one view there is 'appearance and disappearance,' and according to the other 'production and destruction' (of qualities);—and neither of these views is right; for what happens is only the relinquishment (by the substance) of its former condition. Whether the '*nivṛiṭṭi* (absorption) and *prāḍurbhāva* (emergence)' consists in 'destruction and production' or in 'disappearance and appearance,'—in any case, the substance relinquishes its former condition; for unless the thing has been totally dissociated from its former condition, there cannot be either 'appearance and disappearance' or 'destruction and production.' From all this it follows that it is not right to hold that there is transformation of the substance, while it itself remains constant.

Bhāṣya on Sū. 16.

Even admitting (for the sake of argument) that there is destruction of Milk and production of Curd without any cause, we point out the following objections against the theory (of the Nihilist):—

Sūtra (17).

INASMUCH AS IN SOME CASES THE CAUSE OF DESTRUCTION IS PERCEIVED, WHILE IN SOME IT IS NOT PERCEIVED,—WHAT IS STATED (AS THE PREMISS) IS NOT UNIVERSALLY TRUE.* Sū. 16.

It is not universally true that—"there is destruction and production of individual rock-crystals, just as there is of Milk and Curd";—"why?"—because there is no reason (in support of such a universal proposition); that is, there is no ground for asserting that "the case of the individual entities in the Rock-crystal is analogous to that of Milk and Curd,

*Vishvānaṭha reads the Sūṭra simply as क्वचिद्विनाशकारणानुपलब्धेः But everywhere else—in the *Nyāyasūṭravivaraṇa*, *Nyāyasūchīnibandha*, the Sūtra-Ms. D. and in Puri Sū. Ms.—we find it as printed in the Text.

where destruction and production are without cause,—and it is *not* analogous to that of the Jar, where there is destruction when the cause of destruction is present, so that there is no destruction and production of individual entities in the Rock-crystal simply because the causes of such destruction and production are not present."*

Further, the statement of the Example is baseless: If 'destruction and production' were ever actually perceived in the case of such things as the Rock-crystal and the like, then alone could there be any basis for the statement of the Example—"Just as in the case of the destruction of Milk and the production of Curd, the cause is not perceived" (Sū. 13);—as a matter of fact however 'destruction and production' are not perceived (in things like the Rock-crystal);—hence the statement of the Example is entirely baseless.†

Then again, when you admit the 'destruction and production' of the Rock-crystal, you tacitly admit also the cause of these [since, being effects, they must have a cause]; so that your denial (of the cause) is not right. That is to say, you cannot but admit the force of the Example (of the Jar) in the assertion—'the destruction and production of the Rock-crystal, &c., *like those of the Jar*, cannot be without cause'; for the simple reason that its force cannot be denied. On the other hand, the force of the Example cited by you—in the assertion "the destruction and production of the Rock-crystal, like those of Milk and Curd, are without cause"—can be easily denied; for the simple reason that (in all cases) 'destruction and production' are actually found to proceed

* The reading of the last part of this passage is confused; by a comparison of the readings in several manuscripts, the right reading appears to be—कुम्भस्य विनाश उत्पत्तिकारणभावाच्चोत्पत्तिरेवंस्फटिकादिव्यक्तीनां विनाशोत्पत्तिकारणाभावाद्विनाशोत्पत्त्यभाव इति

†A correct example is that which is found to be similar to the thing in question; in the present instance 'destruction and production of several entities in the Rock-crystal' is the thing in question, under dispute; so that the Example, to be correct, should be one that resembles the said 'destruction and production'; this resemblance could be known to us only if we had ever perceived such 'destruction and production in the Rock-crystal.' [Until we have perceived a thing, we cannot recognise its resemblance to anything]. As a matter of fact however as no such 'production and destruction in the Rock-crystal' is ever perceived: Hence the example cannot be a correct one.—*Tātparya.*

from causes; so that when we see 'destruction and production' in the case of Milk and Curd, we infer the presence of a cause; as the Effect is a sure indicative of the Cause.

From all that has gone before (in this section and the last) it follows that Buḍḍhi or Apprehension is *not eternal.*

Vārṭika on Sū. (17).

[P. 422, L. 8 to P. 423, L. 7.]

Even admitting that the destruction of the Milk and the production of the Curd are without cause, we urge that—*Inasmuch as &c. &c.*—says the *Sūṭra.* There is no ground for believing that ṭhe destruction and production of the entities in the Rock-crystal, like those of Milk and Curd, are without cause, and that they are *not*, like those of the Jar, due to causes.

The statement of the Example is baseless—says the *Bhāṣya.* "What is the meaning of the term '*aḍhiṣṭhāna*,' 'base'?" It means, *āshraya, substratum.* "What then is the meaning of *baselessness*?" It means that the original thing itself is non-existent; the meaning being, that as a matter of fact we do not perceive the 'destruction and production of the Rock-crystal' going on every moment; so that there can be no occasion for the arising of the question whether such 'destruction and production' are with or without cause. To one who does not admit the existence of Sound, no one could say—'just as Sound, being a product, is non-eternal, so is such and such thing also.' Similarly when the original thing itself is non-existent, no Example can be puṭ forward (in its corroboration).

Then again, when you admit the 'destruction and production of the Rock-crystal,' you tacitly admit also the cause of these; so that your denial is not right. The 'Milk and Curd' and the 'Jar'—both of these are instances in point; and the question arises—Is the case of the 'Rock-

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crystal' analogous to that of 'Milk and Curd,' or to that of 'Jar'? The truth is that it is analogous to the case of the *Jar*; because the cause of the 'production or destruction' of the Jar is actually *seen*. It is not right to regard the case of the Rock-crystal as analogous to that of *Milk and Curd*; because the cause of the 'production and destruction' of this latter are deduced by inference.

From all that has gone before it follows that Buḍḍhi is not eternal—says the *Bhāṣya*. For the following reasons also *Buḍḍhi* should be regarded as non-eternal:—(*a*) Because being a perceptible quality, it subsists in an all-pervading substance, like Sound; (*b*) because belonging to a community, it is perceptible by us and subsists (in something else), like Sound; and (c) because being of the nature of an *Instrument*, it is not perceptible by persons other than *Yogis*, like Sound.*

Section (3).

[Sūṭrās 18—41].

Buḍḍhi—Apprehension—is a quality of the Soul.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (18).

[P. 167, L. 16 to P. 168, L. 9.]

We now proceed to consider the question—From among the Soul, the Sense-organs, and the Objects of Cognition, of which one is *Buḍḍhi* the quality? † Though this fact

* Sound is an instrument in Verbal Cognition.

† It is only after the eternality of Buḍḍhi has been refuted that there is any likelihood of its being a quality of the Soul. Hence it is the latter subject that is introduced now. The purpose of this enquiry also consists in the proving of the Soul as an entity apart from the Body &c. Under Sū. 3 1-1 *et. seq.* we have proved the existence of the Soul, on the strength of Apprehension through Recognition; and now we are going to establish it on the strength of Apprehension as its quality. —*Parishuḍḍhi.*

is well known, yet it is introduced with a view to carry on further investigations on the subject. The doubt as regards Apprehension (being the quality of the Soul or of some other substance) arises from the fact that it is found to arise from the contact (of several things, Soul, Mind, Sense-organ and Object), and people fail to detect any peculiarity in any one of these (by virtue of which the quality of Apprehension could be attributed to that exclusively).

Sūtra (18).

APPREHENSION CANNOT SUBSIST IN THE SENSE-ORGAN, OR IN THE OBJECT,—SINCE IT CONTINUES TO EXIST ALSO WHEN THESE TWO HAVE BEEN DESTROYED. (Sū. 18).

Apprehension or Cognition cannot be a quality of either the Sense-organ or the Object, because even when these have ceased to exist, Apprehension continues to exist. For instance, even after the object (seen) and the Sense organ (the Eye) have been destroyed we have the cognition in the form 'I have seen'. On the other hand, after the Cogniser (the Soul) has been destroyed, there can be no Cognition at all. As a matter of fact, there are two kinds of Cognition: there is one kind of Cognition which proceeds from the contact of the Sense-organ and the Object (e.g. the ordinary perceptional cognitions), and which ceases upon the destruction of the Sense-organ and the Object; and there is the other kind of Cognition which proceeds from the Contact of the Mind and the Soul; and it is only natural that these latter should persist (even upon the destruction of the

Vardhamāna adds the following:—The connection of the present Section with the immediately preceding section on the momentary character of things lies in this that if all things are momentary, there can be no such thing as the 'constituent' cause of things; so that there would be no possibility of Apprehension subsisting, as quality, in the Soul. Hence before taking up this latter question, we have had to dispose of the former theory.. ..... Even though the fact of Apprehension being a quality of the Soul has already been put forward under Sū. 3-1-14, yet there is this difference that under that *Sūtra* we have proved the existence of the Soul, as the substratum of apprehension as a quality; while now we are going to prove the existence of Apprehension itself as a quality of the Soul. Some people think that the present section serves the purpose of adding fresh reasonings in support of the doctrine already established before, and thus strengthening the pupil's convictions. The *Tātparya*, for instance, remarks that the present section carries on further investigation into a matter already discussed before.

Sense-organ and the Object). To this latter class belongs the recollection in the form 'I have seen', which pertains to things seen before; and when the cogniser has been destroyed, it is not possible for any previous perception to be recollected; for a thing that has been perceived by one cannot be recollected by another. Even if (the existence of Soul be not admitted, and) the Mind be regarded as the *Cogniser*,—it would not be possible to prove that either the Sense-organ or the Object is the *Cogniser*.

"Well then, Cognition may be a quality of the Mind."

[The answer to this is given in the next *Sūṭra*.]

Vārṭika Sū. (18).

[P. 423, L. 8 to L. 16.]

The Apprehension that has been described above,—of what is this a quality? This is the question that we proceed in consider now. "This enquiry is not right, as it is still to be proved that Apprehension is a *quality*." But that Apprehension is a quality is proved by the fact that being non-eternal, it is not perceptible by the Eye.

The doubt as regards Apprehension (being the quality of the Soul or of some other substance) arises from this fact that it is found to arise from contact;—and on this point we notice the following peculiarity—says the *Bhāṣya*.

Apprehension cannot &c. &c.,—says the *Sūṭra*. *Even when the Object and the Sense-organs have been destroyed, we have the cognition in the form 'I have seen'*—says the *Bhāṣya*. "But the cognition *I have seen*, being a recollection, does not arise from the contact of the Sense-organ and the Object; as a matter of fact, this cognition in question is a recollection, and as such cannot arise from the Contact of the Sense-organ and the Object." Our reasoning applies with equal force to Recollection also: just as without the *Cogniser* the cognition does not come about, similarly when the original apprehender has been destroyed, there can be no Recollection, in the absence of that original apprehender.

"We may regard Apprehension as the quality of the Mind."

[The answer to this is given in the next *Sūṭra*].

Sūṭra (19).

Apprehension cannot be the quality of the Mind, (a) whose existence is inferred from the fact that the apprehension of things is not simultaneous—[or (b), because the apprehension of things is not simultaneous]—[(c) and also because the simultaneous cognition of things actually appearing in Yogis would be inexplicable if cognition belonged to the Mind.]*

Bhāṣya on Sū. (19).

[P. 168, L. 11, to P. 169, L. 4.]

(A) The fact that the apprehension of things is not simultaneous is indicative of the Existence of the Internal Organ (Mind) [as explained in Sū. 1-1-16]; and the Internal Organ (or Mind), having its existence inferred from the fact that the apprehension of things is not simultaneous,—Apprehension or Cognition cannot be a quality of that Mind.

"Of what then is it a quality?"

It is a quality of the Cognitive Agent, as it is he who is the controller.†

As a matter of fact, the *controller* is the *cogniser*, and that which is controlled is the *instrument*. So that if the Mind had Apprehension for its quality, it would cease to be an *instrument*. And from the fact that the apprehension of Odour &c., belongs to that Cognitive Agent who is equipp-

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* Two explanations of the term युगपज्ज्ञेयानुपलब्धेः are possible; both of which have been incorporated in the translation as (*a*) and (*b*). The *Bhāṣya* construes the च in the Sūṭra as implying a further reason, which we put in as (*c*). The *Bhāṣya* notices only (*a*) and (*b*).

† Though the sentence ज्ञस्य वशित्वात् is generally regarded as *Sūṭra*, it should be treated as *Bhāṣya*.—*Parishuḍḍhi*.

One who is independent, and operates by himself, is the *Cogniser*; while that which is operated upon, controlled by another, is the *instrument*; the intelligence necessary for the carrying on of activities and of operating the several instruments, bearing upon it, belongs to the Agent.—*Ṭaṭparya*.

ed with such instruments as the Olfactory Organ and the like, we infer the apprehension of pleasure &c., as also Re-collection, which belongs to that Cognitive Agent who is equipped with the instrument in the shape of the Internal Organ (Mind). Under the circumstances if it be held that that of which Apprehension is a quality is the *Mind*,—to which we give the name 'Soul'—while that which is instrumental in bringing about pleasure &c., is the *Internal Organ*—to which we give the name 'Mind'; then there is a mere difference of nomenclature (between us); and the fact remains the same [that there are two distinct entities—one of which Apprehension is a quality and the other which is instrumental in bringing about pleasure &c.] according to both of us.

(B) The particle 'cha' in the *Sūṭra* may be interpreted as implying the further reasoning that the Yogi's *simultaneous Cognition of things would be impossible*; that is to say, when the Yogi has attained the culminating point of his practices he becomes endowed with exceptional faculties of perception, and having created for himself several bodies endowed with distinct sets of organs, he apprehends several cognitions simultaneously in those bodies;—such a phenomenon could be possible if there were a single Cognising Agent permeating all those bodies; it could not be possible if the cognitions belonged to the Mind, for the simple reason that it is atomic (and as such could not be present in several bodies at one and the same time). If (with a view to escape from this difficulty) Mind be held to be all-pervading (not *atomic*), even so this could not be accepted as a valid argument against Apprehension being a quality of the Soul. For if Mind were all-pervading, then, since it is the internal Organ (of Cognition), (and is all-pervading), it could be in contact with all the sense-organs at one and the same time, and thus bring about several Cognitions at one and same time (even in the case of ordinary persons) (which is an impossibility).

Vārṭika on Sū (19).

[P. 423, L. 18 to P. 424, L. 18].

Apprehension can not be the quality of Mind &c. &c.—says the *Sūṭra*. Inasmuch as the existence of Mind is indicated by the non-simultaneous cognition of things, Apprehension cannot be regarded as its quality.

Objection:—"Since the *Bhāṣya* puts in a qualification, it would seem that there are several internal organs.*"

If you mean by this that—"When the Bhāṣya says that '*Apprehension* cannot be the quality of *that Mind whose existence is inferred from the fact that the apprehension of things is not simultaneous,*' it appears that the writer admits of several Internal Organs; for

Vār. P. 424. unless there are several internal organs there can be no sense in adding the said qualification,"

—then we deny the force of your argument; for all Sense-organs are organs of *Cognition*, '*manana*'—and being organs of '*manana*' all Sense-organs may be called '*manas*', 'Mind'; and under the circumstances the qualification is clearly called for—'*Of that Mind whose existence is inferred from the fact that Apprehensions are not simultaneous*, Apprehension cannot be a quality.'

"Even so the qualification is pointless; because it is not admitted to be the quality of any other organ; that is, if Apprehension is not the quality of the Internal Organ, then it must be the quality of some other organ; but as a matter of fact, it is not held to be the quality of any other organ [Hence there is no sense in the qualification.]"

This criticism is not right; for it is quite possible to have some such other 'organ' (as is held to possess the quality of Apprehension); that is, the character of 'Instrument of Cognition' and 'Object of Cognition' are variable, and not immutably fixed (so that even the Cognising Agent, to whom we attribute the quality of Apprehension, may, on certain occasions, appear as the 'Instrument of Cognition') and thus become liable to be called 'Organ'; *e. g.* when the Yogi perceives (the character of) one person by means of another person, the latter person becomes the 'instrument' of the cognition of the former; and certainly

* From the addition of the said qualification it appears that there is also that Mind whose existence is *not* inferred in the said manner.

this person is held by us to have* Apprehension for his quality; hence [when denying the fact of Apprehension being the quality of an organ] it is only right that we should add the qualification that it is not the quality of *that organ whose existence is inferred, etc. etc.*

For these reasons Apprehension cannot be the quality of the Mind.

"Of what then is it a quality?" It is the quality of the Cognitive Agent, as it is he who is the controller. As a matter of fact, the controller is the Cogniser and that which is controlled is the instrument,—says the *Bhāṣya*. In regard to the Cognising Agent, there is no such hard and fast rule that he must always be the *Controller;* for at times he also becomes the *controlled;* but in regard to the non-intelligent (unconscious) things (*e.g.* Instruments and Objects), it is absolutely certain that they must all be the *controlled* only; so that the Mind, being unconscious, must be the controlled,—just like the Olfactory and other organs.

If Mind had Apprehension for its quality, then this would mean a mere difference in names; *i.e.* if the 'Mind', the 'Internal Organ,' be 'that which has Apprehension for its quality', then it is merely a different name (for what we call 'Soul'). For just as for the Cogniser, *jñātṛi*, the *Sense-organs* are the *instruments of cognition,*—similarly for the *thinker, Mantṛi*, there should be a *organ of thinking* [and it is this organ which is called 'Mind,' 'Manas']. If both (Soul and Mind) were conscious (cognitive) entities, it would not be possible to ascertain which cognition belongs to which of the two. Lastly, if the Internal Organ (Mind) were all-pervading and had Apprehension for its quality, then it would be possible to have Cognitions by means of all the Sense-organs at one and the same time.

*Both editions read तत्वज्ञान, which is meaningless. The right reading is तस्तुज्ञान

Sūṭra (20).

[*Objection*]—" WHAT HAS BEEN URGED APPLIES EQUALLY TO THE CASE OF APPREHENSION BEING A QUALITY OF THE SOUL." (Sū. 20).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (20).

[P. 169, L. 6].

" The Soul, being all-pervading, would be in contact with all the Sense-organs at one and the same time; so that there would be a possibility of several Cognitions appearing simultaneously."

Vārṭika on (Sū. 20).

[P. 424, L. 21 to P. 425, L. 1].

" *What has been urged, etc., etc.*—says the *Sūtra*. For him also who holds that the Soul is all-pervading and is possessed of the quality of Apprehension,—as there would be nothing to prevent the contact (of that Soul) with all the Sense-organs,—it would be possible to have several simultaneous Cognitions."

Sūṭra (20).

[*Answer*].—THE SAID (SIMULTANEOUS) APPEARANCE OF COGNITIONS IS NOT POSSIBLE; BECAUSE THE CONTACT OF THE MIND WITH (ALL) THE SENSE-ORGANS IS NOT POSSIBLE.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (21).

[P. 160, Ll. 8—10].

In the cognition of Odour, etc., the contact of the Sense-organs with the Mind is as much a necessary cause as the contact of the Sense-organs with the objects; and inasmuch as the Mind is atomic, it is not possible for its contact with all the Sense-organs to appear at one and the same time. And by reason of the non-simultaneity of this contact (of the Mind), it is not possible for several cognitions to appear simultaneously, even though they are the qualities of the (all-pervading) Soul.

Vārṭika on Sū. (21).

[P. 425, Ll. 1-3.]

There is no possibility of Cognitions appearing simultaneously (under our theory); because there are other causes:

That is, like the contact of the Sense-organs with the objects, the contact of the Mind with the Sense-organs also is a cause (of Cognitions); and this latter contact can not be simultaneous, for the simple reason that Mind is atomic [and hence cannot be in contact with several organs at one and the same time].

Bhāṣya on Sū. (22)

[P. 169, L. 10 to L. 14.]

If it be held that—"The Cognition of Odour &c. proceeds from the Contact among Soul, Sense-organ and Object only, and the contact of Mind is not essential; [so that even though the contact of the Mind and the Sense-organ may be absent, that will not stand in the way of Cognitions appearing simultaneously; hence there is no force in the answer given in Sū. 21]."—then our answer is—

Sūṭra (22).

THIS CAN NOT BE RIGHT; FOR NO PROOF IS ADDUCED IN SUPPORT OF SUCH ORIGIN (OF COGNITIONS, WITHOUT CONTACT OF MIND).* (Sū. 22).

When you make the assertion that—"The Cognition of Odour &c. proceeds from contact among Soul, Sense-organ and Object only",—you do not adduce any proof in support of such origin,—on the strength whereof we could accept it. †

Vārṭika on Sū. 22.

[P. 425, L. 3 to L. 14.]

"If Cognition were held to be produced out of contact among Soul, Sense-organ and Object,—how would it be then?"

The answer is that *that could not be right* &c., &c.—says *the Sūṭra*. (A) 'No proof is adduced in support of the as-

* '*Kāraṇa*' stands for '*pramāṇa*', proofs, says—the Bhāṣyachandra. What the Opponent says in Sū. 21 is a mere assertion and since no proofs have been adduced in support thereof it cannot be accepted.

† Vishvanātha takes this Sūṭra also as coming from the *Pūrvapakṣin*, and meaning as follows :—" Inasmuch as the Siddhānṭin cannot point out the cause of Cognition, Cognition cannot belong to the Soul. He cannot point to *Mind—Soul Contact* as the cause ; for if this were so, then Cognition should never cease; th contact of the all-pervading Soul being always present."

sertion that Cognition proceeds from the said contact only',—such is the meaning of the Sūṭra;—Or (B) when the assertion is made that 'Cognition proceeds from the contact of Soul, Sense-organ and Object only', no other cause is shown why Cognitions should not appear simultaneously (which is the real point at issue).—Or (C) why Cognition should not appear in dead persons; for the Sense-organ (the tactile organ in the Skin of the Body, e.g.) being in contact with the outside object, and the contact of the Soul (which is all-pervading) also being there, why should there be no cognition in the dead body,—this is what has got to be explained. * (D) Further, if the Mind is denied the Soul alone by itself would be the sole cause of Recollection and such other Cognitions (as those of pleasure &c., for instance); and in that case, why should there be simultaneous recollections of several things? (E) Lastly, when the Sense-organ and the Soul are in contact with the Object at one and the same time (at the time that Cognition appears),—what is the cause of the Cognition? Is it the Sense-object contact? Or the Soul—object contact? Or the contact of Soul, Sense-organ and Object? You do not mention specifically what the precise cause (of Cognition) is.

Sūṭra (23).

[*Objection*]—"FURTHER, IF APPREHENSION SUBSISTS (IN THE SOUL), THEN, IT SHOULD HAVE TO BE REGARDED AS ETERNAL; SINCE WE DO NOT PERCEIVE ANY CAUSE FOR ITS DESTRUCTION." Sū. (23).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (23).

[P. 169, L. 16 to L. 18.]

"What is urged in this *Sūṭra* is meant to be taken along with what has been said under Sū. 20. [This is the force of the particle *cha*].

* This explanation is got at when Mind—contact is accepted as an essential fact—or in the cause of Cognitions. The Mind residing in the Body, all Cognitions of the Soul would be possible only in the Body and never outside the body.

"There are two kinds of causes whereby qualities are destroyed: (1) the destruction of the substance in which the quality subsists, and (2) the appearance of a contrary quality. Inasmuch as the Soul (which is the substance in which Apprehension subsists) is eternal, the former cause of destruction is not possible (in the destruction of Apprehension). Then, as for a quality contrary to Apprehension (whose appearance would put an end to the Apprehension), we do not find any such quality (appearing in the Soul). So that, if Apprehension is the quality of Soul, it must have to be regarded as eternal."

Vārṭika on Sū. (23).

[P. 425, L. 14 to P. 426, L. 3.]

"*Further if Apprehension &c. &c.*—says the *Sūṭra*. *What is urged in this Sūṭra is meant to be taken along with what has been said under Sūṭra* 20—says the *Bhāṣya*. If Apprehension is a quality of the Soul, then it should have to be regarded as eternal, since we do not find any cause for its destruction. 'Why so?' Because of qualities, there are two causes of destruction: the destruction of its substratum and the appearance of a contrary quality. Of these (in the case in question) the former is not possible, because the Soul (the substratum of Apprehension) is eternal; as for a contrary quality, there is no such quality; so that Apprehension should be regarded as eternal."

Vār. P. 426.

Sūṭra (24).

[*Answer*]—INASMUCH AS APPREHENSION IS (UNIVERSALLY) RECOGNISED AS NON-ETERNAL, ITS DESTRUCTION PROCEEDS FROM ANOTHER APPREHENSION; JUST LIKE SOUND. Sū. (24).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (24).

[P. 170, Ll. 2—2.]

That Apprehension is transient is recognised by all living beings in their own experience;—and as a matter of fact, (in the case of every Apprehension) we perceive a series of cognitions; and we infer from these facts that (in this series) one Apprehension is 'contrary' to the other;—just as in

every Sound there is a series of Sounds, where one Sound is contrary to the other [and hence the cause of its destruction].

Vārṭika on Sū. (24).

[P. 426, L. 5 to P. 427, L. 4.]

Inasmuch as Apprehension etc. etc.—says the *Sūṭra*. It having been proved that Apprehension is not eternal, its destruction must be taken as proceeding (a)—either from another Apprehension, or (b) from faculty (or impression). "But the two are not together." If you mean by this that—"Two cognitions never exist together, so that the latter could not destroy the former,"—then, this is not right; for we have denied the simultaneous appearance of cognitions; that is, what we have denied is only *simultaneous production of cognitions*, and not their *co-existence*; and there is nothing incongruous in two Cognitions being together (it is only not possible that they should come into existence at one and the same time) and what we hold is that, when the Effect has come into existence it puts at end to the Cause; that is, when the effect attains its form, it destroys its cause; as we find in the case of Sound; when the Sound, which is the product of a preceding Sound, has attained its form, it sets aside its cause, in the form of the previous Sound; and in the same manner Cognition also (coming into existence, puts an end to its cause, the preceding cognition). "This would not be possible in the case of the final ones." If you mean by this that—"If the preceding Sound and Cognition are destroyed respectively by the succeeding Sound and Cognition, then what would be the cause of the destruction of the final Sound and the final Cognition? So that (there being no such cause) just as the final Sound and the final Cognition are destroyed without cause, so should all other effects, also be destroyed (without cause),"—this cannot be right; because what happens is that there is no production (of further Sounds) by reason of the contact (obstruction) of

tangible (solid) substances; that is, the final Sound is obstructed (put an end to) by the contact of solid substances; when the originating (preceding) Sound comes into contact with such objects as the wall and the like, these contacts put an end to the Sound inhering in the same source as the preceding Sound; it is for this reason that the final Sound ceases to be heard. As regards the final *Cognition*, it is destroyed either when there are no causes for its continuation (in the form Merit and Demerit),—or by reason of the peculiarities of time (which is instrumental in putting an end to the said merit and demerit),—or by the appearance of Impressions (produced by the final Cognition itself).

Vār. p. 427. "How is it destroyed by the peculiarities of Time?" The cause for the continuance of the final Cognition consists of merit and demerit, hence when they have ceased to exist, the final Cognition also ceases to exist. "But why do you seek to provide such explanations? Why cannot you accept the fact that the destruction (of Cognitions) is without cause?" We do not admit this view, for the simple reason that it is open to the said objections; against the view that the destruction of cognitions is without cause we have already pointed out objections, when we were refuting the Nihilistic theory that all things are momentary.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (25).

[P. 170, L. 4 to L. 11.]

[Says the Opponent]—"If Apprehension is a quality of the Soul, several Recollections should appear at one and the same time; for innumerable impressions produced by cognitions—which are the causes of Recollections, subsist in the Soul simultaneously,—and the contact of the Mind with the Soul, which is a cause common to all Recollections, is also present; so that there is no *non-simultaneity* in the causes of Recollections [Hence it should be possible to have several Recollections at one and the same time]."

In view of this objection, some Logicians (*Ēkaḍēshins*), with a view to show that the contact (necessary for Recollections) is *not* simultaneous, offer the following explanation :—

Sūṭra (25).

"AS A MATTER OF FACT, RECOLLECTION PROCEEDS FROM THE CONTACT OF THE MIND WITH THAT PART OF THE SOUL WHICH IS PERMEATED BY (THE IMPRESSION OF) THE (CORRESPONDING) COGNITION; SO THAT SEVERAL RECOLLECTIONS CANNOT APPEAR SIMULTANEOUSLY." (Sū. 25).

"The term '*Jñāna*' in the *Sūṭra* stands for *impression brought about by cognition.* "What happens (in cases of Recollection) is that the Mind comes into contact only gradually, one after the other, with such parts of the Soul as are impressed (affected) by Cognition; hence the Recollections also, that proceed from the said contact of the Mind with the Soul, appear only gradually, one after the other (and *not* simultaneously)."

Vārṭika on Sū. (25).

[P. 427, L. 4 to L. 13].

"If the non-simultaneity of the appearance of Cognitions is held to be due to the non-simultaneity of their cause,—then what we would urge is that the cause *is* simultaneous; so that the cognitions also should appear simultaneously, just as happens in the case of Recollections."

The most important answer to this objection is as follows :—As a matter of fact, an Instrument has the power of accomplishing only one action at a time; an Instrument cannot, at one and the same time, bring about several actions [so that the Mind, being an instrument, cannot, by its very nature, bring about several cognitions at one and the same time]. As for *Recollections*, they also cannot, * like cognitions, appear simultaneously, for the simple reason that they are of the nature of definitive notions.

Others (*Ēkaḍēshins*) however, desirous of showing that the cause (of Cognitions and Recollections) is not simultane-

* The *na*, though absent in both editions, is essential: as is clearly indicated by the *Ṭāṭparya*.

ous, offer the explanation that—" *as a matter of fact, etc. etc.* (Sū. 25).

Sūṭra (26).

THIS EXPLANATION IS NOT RIGHT; BECAUSE THE MIND LIES WITHIN THE BODY. (Sū. 26).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (26).

[P. 170, L. 13—15].

As a matter of fact, when the Mind of man comes into contact with the Soul born in a body,—and this contact appears along with such Karmic residue as has begun to fructify,—this is what is called the person's 'living;' so that until the person dies (and the Soul escapes from the limitations of the Body), it is not possible for the Mind,—which lies and functions within the Body, to come into contact with such parts of the Soul as lie outside of the Body, and may be impressed by (previous) cognitions. [And as for those parts of the Soul that lie within the Body, with these the Mind is in contact at one and the same time, whereby the possibility of Cognition and Recollections appearing simultaneously remains].

Vārṭika on Sū. (26).

With a view to show that the explanation offered by the *Ēkaḍēshin is* not right, the *Sūṭra* says—*This explanation is not right, etc. etc.*

Question—" What is the meaning of the term '*vriṭṭi*,' 'lying' when you say that 'the Mind *lies* within the Body'? It cannot mean *the relation of the container and the contained* (i.e. it cannot mean that the Mind is contained, or subsists, in the Body); for the Mind does not subsist in anything. Nor can 'lying' mean capability of functioning (the meaning being that the Mind functions only within the body); for we actually find it functioning outside; when, for instance the Visual Organ, occupied by the Mind, goes out of the Body, and brings about the perception of Colour, etc.; this moving out of the Visual Organ* must be regarded as the

* The reading in both editions is defective; the meaning is clear; and the right reading appears to be चक्षुषो निःसरणं .

action of the Mind, because it takes place only when the Mind is present;—and no third kind of 'lying' (of the Mind) is possible. Hence it is not right to assert that 'the Mind lies within the Body'."

Vār. P. 428.

Our answer to the above is that the 'lying' of the Mind is not *the relation of container and contained*, nor is it the functioning within; all that is meant by the Mind lying within the body is that the Mind never functions except through the Body; that is, the Mind, without the Body, does not accomplish any purpose of man.

Sūṭra (27).

[*The Ēkadēshin objects to Sū.* 26]—"THE REASON PUT FORWARD IS NOT VALID, BECAUSE IT IS STILL TO BE PROVED." [Sū. 27.]

Bhāṣya on Sū. (27).
[P. 170, Ll. 17—18.]

"As a matter of fact, *living* consists in *fructifying Karmic residue* only; so that it is still to be proved that *the Mind lies within the Body*."

Vārṭika on Su. (27).

"It is still to be proved that without the Body the Mind is not capable of accomplishing any purpose of man."

Sūṭra (28).

[*Answer*]—THE ABOVE OBJECTION IS NOT RIGHT; BECAUSE (IN SUPPORT OF OUR CONTENTION) THERE IS THIS PROOF THAT THE RECOLLECTING PERSON RETAINS A BODY. (Sū. 28).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (28).
[P. 171, Ll. 2—5.]

When a person is desirous of recollecting something he concentrates his mind, and then, after some time, succeeds in recollecting that thing; and while he is recollecting it, he is found to be equipped with the body [which shows that in the phenomenon of Recollecting the Mind operates

in the Body; otherwise, if the Mind operated outside the Body, there would be no contact of the Mind outside with the Soul as equipped with the Body; and in the absence of this contact, no Effort would be possible; and without such Effort the *retaining of the Body* would be impossible]. The Effort due to the contact of the Mind with the Soul is of two kinds—retaining and impelling; and when the Mind of goes out of the Body, no retaining Effort (within the Body) would be possible; so that (in the absence of the retaining or sustaining Effort), the Body of the recollecting person would, through its inherent gravity, fall down.

Vārṭika on Sū. (28).

[P. 428, Ll. 6–10.]

The above objection &c. &c.—says the *Sūṭra*. It is seen that Recollecting and Retaining of the Body are simultaneous; and what is actually seen must be admitted by all. If the Mind were to go out of the Body for any length of time, the retaining of the Body would be impossible.

Sūṭra (29).

[*Another Objection*]—"WHAT HAS BEEN URGED IS NOT POSSIBLE; AS THE MIND IS QUICK IN ITS MOTION." (Sū. 29).

Bhāṣya on Su. (29).

[P. 171, Ll. 7–9.]

"As a matter of fact, the Mind is quick in moving; so that it is quite possible for it to go out of the Body and come into contact with such parts of the Soul as are outside the Body, and are impressed by Cognition; and then it quickly returns within the Body, and gives rise to the Effort (necessary for the retaining of the Body). Thus it is quite possible for the Mind to carry on both the processes (of *Contact* and of *Effort*). Or (inversely), it may be that the Mind goes out of the Body after having produced the Effort required for the retaining of the Body; and thus it is quite possible that the Body should continue to be retained (until the Mind returns to it, which it does very quickly).

Vārṭika on Sū. (29).

[P. 428, L. 12.]

"Both phenomena—of recollecting and retaining of the Body—are quite possible."

Sūṭra (30).

[*Answer*]—WHAT HAS BEEN ASSERTED CANNOT BE; BECAUSE THERE IS NO RESTRICTION AS TO THE TIME OF RECOLLECTION. (Sū. 30).

Bhāṣya on Sū (30).

[P. 171, Ll. 11—16.]

As a matter of fact, while one thing is remembered quickly, in another the process of recollection is delayed; and when the process of recollection is delayed, the Mind is held concentrated, with a desire to remember the thing, and there appears a continuous series of ideas, and when among these there appears the idea of some such thing as happens to be the distinguishing feature of the thing to be remembered, it becomes the direct cause of the desired recollection. All this phenomenon could not be possible, (under the theory of the Opponent); as it would mean the going out of the Mind for a considerable length of time.

Then again, the contact of the Mind with the Soul, cannot bring about Recollection, except when it is in contact with the Body; because it is the Body that forms the receptacle of all experience. As a matter of fact, it is the Body of the Cognitive Person which forms the receptacle of experience; so that when the Mind goes out of the Body, its mere contact with the Soul cannot bring about either Cognition, or Pleasure &c.; if it did (i. e. if Cognition, Pleasure &c. were brought about independently of the Body) then there would be no use of the Body at all.

Vārṭika on Sū. (30).

[P. 428, Ll. 12-16.]

What has been asserted etc. etc. says the *Sūṭra*. Inasmuch as the time taken by Recollection is not fixed, what has been urged (in Sū. 29) is not right. Further, when one

declares that the contact of the Mind with the Soul brings about Recollection independently of contact with the Body,—for him the Body ceases to be *the receptacle of experience*; and this cessation would mean that the Body is entirely useless.

Sūtra (31).

[*A second Ēkadēshin Logician offers the following remarks against the view of the former Ēkadēshin propounded in Sū.* 25.]—"THE PARTICULAR KIND OF CONTACT (OF THE MIND, WITH THINGS OUTSIDE THE BODY) IS NOT POSSIBLE; (A) EITHER BY THE IMPELLING OF THE SOUL, OR (B) BY CHANCE, OR (C) BY REASON OF INTELLIGENCE." —(Sū. 31.)

Bhāṣya on Sū. (31).

[P. 171, L. 18 to P. 172, L. 6.]

The contact of the Mind outside the body could be due —(a) either to the impelling of the Soul, or (b) to chance, or (c) to the intelligence of the Mind;—but as matter of fact, none of these is possible. "Why"? (a) Because the thing has still got to be recollected, and because Recollection and Cognition are not possible through mere desire. That is to say, if the said contact were due to the impelling or urging by the Soul, then it would mean that the Soul impells the Mind after having cogitated thus—'the Impression which is the cause of the Recollection of this particular thing subsists in this part of the Soul, let, therefore the Mind come into contact with this part';—and this form of cogitation (where the idea of the thing is already present) on the part of the Soul would mean that the thing is *already recollected*, and is not one *that has got be recollected*; and further 'a part of the Soul' or the 'Impression' cannot be perceptible to the Soul; so that any notion of these by the cognition of the Soul itself is absolutely impossible [and yet both of these appear in the said cogitation]. (b) As a matter of fact, the person recollects a thing only after fixing his mind upon it for some time; and it (i e., the contact necessary for Recollection) cannot be due to mere *Chance*. (c) Lastly, *Intelligence* (to which the said contact might be due) does not belong to the Mind at all; as we have already shown that Cognition does not belong to it.

Vārṭika on Sū. (32).

[P. 429, Ll 1—2.]

Other people offer the answer to the theory of the *Ēkaḍēshin* that the *particular contact* (necessary for Recollection) *is not possible either by the impelling of the Soul, or by chance, or by reason or intelligence.*

Bhāṣya on Sū. (32).

[P. 172, LL. 6—16.]

The said particular kind of contact (which has been objected to under Sū. 31)

IS SIMILAR TO THAT PARTICULAR KIND OF CONTACT WHICH CAUSES PAIN IN THE FOOT OF THE PERSON WHOSE MIND IS PREOCCUPIED (Sū. 32).

When a person, having his Mind preoccupied with some attractive scene,* is hurt in the foot by a pebble or thorn, *a particular kind of contact* of the Mind with the Soul must be admitted; for we perceive that there is actual pain and feeling of pain in such cases; and what has been urged (in Sū. 31, against the particular kind of contact postulated by the previous *Ēkaḍēshin* in the case of Recollection) would apply with equal force to the case cited. [And yet it cannot be denied that there is such contact actually present in the case]. Then as regards what the second *Ēkaḍēshin* has said in regard to *contact* being due to 'chance' (in Sū. 31),—it is open to this additional objection that as a matter of fact, no action and no contact can ever be due to mere 'chance.' [So that this part of the argument is entirely baseless].

"But in the case of the pain caused by the thorn, what causes the action (in the Mind) is the Unseen Karma (force of Destiny) which brings about all experience."

This also will be equally applicable to both cases. What you mean is that—"the Unseen Destiny, subsisting in the Person, which serves to bring about all his experiences, is what leads to the action of the Mind (and brings it into contact with the Soul), whereby there comes about pain

* Several Mss. read देशे, which should be construed with what follows, meaning —'having his foot hurt by a pebble or thorn in some place.' But दृश्ये gives better sense, as translated.

and also the feeling of pain";—but exactly the same may be the case also with the particular kind of contact that brings about Recollection.

Thus then, what has been said by the second *Ēkadēshin*, to the effect that "the particular kind of contact is not possible, either by the impelling of the Soul, or by chance, or by intelligence" (Sū. 32)—is no criticism at all (of what the first *Ēkadēshin* has put forward under Sū. 25); the real criticism of that position is what has been said by us above to the effect that '*this explanation is not right, because the Mind lies within the Body.*' Sū. (26).

Vārṭika on Sū. (32).

[P. 429, Ll. 8—10.]

What has been urged in Sū. 31 is no answer (to the argument of the first *Ēkadēshin*),—because the particular kind of contact would be similar to that contact which causes pain in the foot of a person who has his mind preoccupied. It will not be right to urge that—"the Unseen Destiny which leads to experience would form the restricting agency,"—because this also will be equally applicable to both cases. Hence the right answer is what we have put forward under Sū. 26—that 'the explanation given by the *Ēkadēshin* in Sū. 25 is not right, because the Mind lies within the Body.'

Bhāṣya on Sū. (33).

[P. 172, L. 17 to P. 173, L. 18.]

Question—"What now is the reason that Recollections are not simultaneous, even though their causes are present at one and the same time?"

Sūṭra (33).

[*Answer*]—RECOLLECTIONS ARE NOT SIMULTANEOUS, BECAUSE SUCH CAUSES AS ATTENTION, PERCEPTION OF THE SIGN AND THE REST ARE NOT ALL PRESENT AT ONE AND THE SAME TIME. (Sū. 33).

Just as the *Contact of the Soul with the Mind* and *Impressions* are the 'cause of Recollection,' so also are Attention and Perception of the Sign and such other things [detailed in Sū. 41]; and inasmuch as these latter do not appear

at one and the same time, it is to this that the non-simultaneity of Recollections is due.*

[The Opponent argues]—"Just as in the case of Intuitional Perception, so also in the case of such Recollection as is independent of Attention and the other causes, there should be simultaneity. That is, there are at times certain Recollections which, being independent of Attention and the other causes, resemble Intuitional Perception; and in such Recollections there should be simultaneity, as there is no reason (why there should be no simultaneity)."†

[*Answer*]—As a matter of fact, in the case cited also, the several causes are present; and it is because these causes fail to be perceived that people have the idea that the Recollection resembles Intuitional Perception. What actually happens is that, when there appear in the mind a number of ideas pertaining to several things, it is only some one of these several things that brings about Recollection in some man (and not in others); and this is so because he recollects that particular thing because he ponders more specially over that thing; and yet the Recollector is not cognisant of all the causes that go to bring about the Recollection; he does not review his entire memory-process by thinking that 'in this fashion has my Recollection come about'; and because he is not cognisant of the causes, he thinks that his Recollection resembles Intuitional Perception, and also that Recollection is not dependent upon *Attention* and such other causes.

Question.—"How is it in the case of Intuitional Perception?"‡

Answer—The restriction or limitation is due to the peculiarities of the person's *Karma* (past deeds); just as there is in the case of experience. What the question means is—"Why

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* Mind-Soul Contact and Impressions are not the sole cause of Recollection. So that even though these two are present, yet, inasmuch as the other causes of Recollection—Attention, &c.—are not present, several Recollections do not appear simultaneously.

† When, for instance, without any rhyme or reason, a recollection rushes in upon the Mind, all on a sudden. *Prāṭibhavaṭ, etc.*, is printed as Sūṭra. But no such Sūṭra appears either in the *Nyāyasūch'nibanḍha*, or in any of the Sūṭra-Mss. or in Vishvanāṭha's *Vṛiṭṭi*.

‡ This question has been propounded by the Author by way of introduction to the principal argument in support of his theory.—*Ṭāṭparya*.

does not Intuitional Perception appear simultaneously?"—and the meaning of the answer is that—just as the Man's past *Karma*, which brings about his experiences, does not bring about all his experiences at one and the same time,—similarly the peculiarity of man's past *Karma*, which is the cause of his Intuitional Perception, does not bring about several such perceptions at one and the same time.*

"What is said is not right, because there is no reason." This objection is not right, because an Instrument has power to bring about cognitions only one by one. That is to say, if, by your objection, you mean that—"When you say that the limitation is similar to that in the case of experiences, what you put forward is only an example,—you do not put forward any reason,"—then our answer is that this objection has no force; because as a matter of fact, an Instrument can, by its very nature, bring about cognitions only one by one; and several cognitions are never produced, at one and the same time, either with regard to one or with regard to several objects;—and from this perceived fact of cognitions appearing one by one, we infer that the capacity of *Instruments* is such (that they can bring about cognitions one by one); though there is no such restriction in regard to the *Agent*; because in the case of a person possessed of supernatural organs and powers, it is found that when (through his occult powers) he creates several bodies for himself, he does have several cognitions at one and the same time (in his several bodies).

The following is another objection that has been urged [against the view of the *Ekadeshin* that—"Recollection cannot appear simultaneously, because it proceeds from the contact of the Mind with that part of the Soul which is permeated by the cognition" (Sū. 15)]:—"Even in the case of the person who has a single body (and who is not a Yogi capable of taking several bodies), it would be possible for several cognitions to subsist in a single part of the Soul at diverse times, and [since the impressions left by all these Cognitions would inhere in the same part of the Soul] it should be possible to have the recollection of several things at one and the same time. As a matter of

* The *Tātparya* calls this answer '*abilam*,' *unsatisfactory*. The real answer comes in the next passage.

fact, it often happens that when the Agent has his body located in a certain place, several cognitions do appear * in one and the same part of the Soul, through the contact of the several Sense-organs with their respective objects;—so that when the Mind comes into contact with such a part of the Soul (bearing the impressions of several cognitions), it is only natural that there should appear, at one and the same time, the recollection of all the several things cognised before; specially because there can be no graduation or non-simultaneity in the case of the Mind's contact with a part of the Soul. Then again, the several 'parts of the Soul' not being so many distinct substances, the condition of 'subsisting in the same substance' would be fulfilled by all cognitions belonging to the several parts of any single Soul; and thus (simultaneity of cognitions being quite possible) the said Ekadeshin's explanation of the non-simultaneity of Recollections (propounded in Sū. 25) is not satisfactory."

[Our answer to the above objection is as follows]—In the case of Sound-series it is found that only that individual Sound is heard which happens to be in contact with the receptacle or substratum of the Auditory organ (and not all the Sounds; even though they all inhere in the same substratum, *Ākāsha*) in the same manner Recollection is produced by the contact of the Mind with *each individual impression* (left by the corresponding Cognition; and not with all the impressions left on the Soul); so that there can be no possibility of the several Recollections appearing at one and the same time. † Hence we conclude that the right answer to the Ekaḍēshin position (in Sū. 25) is what has been put forward before (in Sū. 26); and it is not true (as has been argued in lines 11–14 of the Text above) that "since several cognitions subsist in a single part of the Soul, it should be possible to have several Recollections at one and the same time."

* The न is not required. Since however it is found in all Mss. we should construe the passage as—अनेकं ज्ञानं एकस्मिन् आत्मप्रदेशे न समवैति इति न.

† Even though it is true that the impressions left by the several cognitions are present in the same part of the Soul,—yet, inasmuch as no Impression pervades over the entire part of the Soul, it is not possible for the Mind to be in contact with all the impressions at one and the same time; and hence no simultaneity of Recollections is possible; the Mind, in fact, can come into contact with only one impression at a time.

Vārṭika on Sū. (33).

[P. 429, L. 11 to P. 430, L. 17].

"If you do not admit the explanation offered in Sū. 25—that there can be no simultaneity of Recollections because there is no simultaneity in the contact of those parts of the Soul that are impressed by Cognitions—then the contingency of Recollections being simultaneous remains; for the simple reason that their causes appear at one and the same time."

Not so; because there are other necessary causes, which do not appear simultaneously. That is to say, Attention etc. are necessary aids to the Mind-Soul contact (in the bringing about of Recollection); and inasmuch as the said aids do not appear at one and the same time, there can be no simultaneity in the Recollections. "If simultaneous Recollections are not brought about by such Mind-Soul contact as requires the aid of such auxiliaries as Attention and the like, then there should be simultaneity in the case of those Recollections which do appear without the aid of Attention and such other auxiliaries." Certainly not; for we do not admit of any such; that is, there is no such Recollection as is independent of Attention and the other auxiliaries; what happens in certain cases is that these auxiliary causes, even though present, are not recognised. [This is what gives rise to the notion that the Recollection has appeared without those auxiliaries].

"The case of Recollections resembles that of Intuitional Perception; Intuitional Perceptions certainly can be simultaneous; for their causes are never absent."

Not so; for this has already been answered. We have already answered this argument, by pointing out that no Instrument possesses the capacity to accomplish more than one action at a time. Further, when there are several simultaneous Intuitional Perceptions,—

Vār. P. 430.

would they all pertain to one and the same object? Or to diverse objects? It could not be the former; because there would be no use (in several perceptions appearing in regard to the same object).* Nor could it be the latter; for the simple reason that there is no such capacity (in Cognitions).

Further, there is no such necessary restriction as that cognitions can never be simultaneous; for in the case of an Agent possessed of supernatural organs of perception, it is found that when he creates several bodies for himself, he does have several cognitions at one and the same time.

[Another objection has been urged by some people against the position of the *Ēkadēshin* put forward in Sū. 25]—"If Recollections do not appear simultaneously, because there is no contact with such parts of the Soul as are impressed by Cognitions,—then in the case of the person who has a single body, it would be possible for several cognitions to inhere in the same parts of the Soul (at diverse times), and since the Impressions left by these cognitions would all co-exist simultaneously in the same part of the Soul, it should be possible to have the recollections of the several things (cognised) at one and the same time. (So that the explanation offered in Sū. 25 is no explanation at all.')

It is however not right to say that—"in the case of a person who has a single body, there are certain Impressions that co-exist in the same substratum (of the Soul); for the 'parts of the Soul' are not so many different substances; so that it is not only *certain* Impressions, but *all* Impressions (or Cognitions), that co-exist in the same single substratum, (the Soul); and for that reason all Recollections should be simultaneous.

* The *Parishuddhi* suggests another explanation of '*Vaiyarthya*'—'*artha*' stands for cause; hence *vaiyarthya* means *absence of cause*; that is, *absence of means of right cognition*, that is, *absence of proof*;—the meaning thus being that there is no proof in support of the assertion that several perceptions appear in regard to the same object at one and the same time.'

[The *Bhāṣya* says—*Recollection is produced by the contact (pratyāsatti) of the Mind with each individual impression;* in regard to this the Opponent asks]—"When you say that 'it is on account of the '*pratyāsatti*' with each impression that there is no simultaneity of Recollections', what sort of '*pratyāsatti*' do you mean? Any *proximity* or *non-proximity* is not possible for Impressions, as they inhere in the same substratum ['*pratyāsatti*' only means *proximity*].'

We do not say that '*pratyāsaṭṭi*,' in the case in question, consists in *proximity*; what we mean by there being *pratyāsatti*, or Contact, of the Impressions is that there is present a combination of their auxiliary causes;—just as there is in the case of Sound: all the several Sounds appearing in a series inhere in *Ākāsha*, and yet though they inhere in the same substratum, only those of them are actually heard, the auxiliary causes of whose perception are present, and no others are heard; similarly in the case of *Impressions* also (those alone lead to Recollection which have their auxiliary causes present, even though all Impressions inhere in the same substratum, Soul).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (34).

[P. 173, L. 18 to P. 174. L. 5.]

Some people hold the theory that—"*Jñāna*, Cognition, is a property of the Soul, but Desire, Aversion, Effort, Pleasure, and Pain are properties of the Internal Organ;"*—this theory is impugned in the next Sūtra.

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* We now proceed to consider the question whether or not Cognition belongs to the same substratum as Desire and the rest. This doubt arises by reason of different views being held by the *Sāṅkhya* and the Nihilist.—*Tātparya.*

That Cognition belongs to the same substratum as Desire &c. is a fact known by ordinary experience, and is also established by reasons. Hence so long as it is no proved that Desire &c. belong to the Soul, it cannot be regarded as established that Cognition belongs to it. Such is the connection of the present question with the main subject-matter of the section.—*Parishuddhi.*

Vishvanātha puts it somewhat differently:—"Desire belongs to the Mind; Desire again is produced by Cognition; hence the two should reside in the same substratum; therefore Cognition also should belong to the Mind, not to the Soul."

Sūṭra (34).

INASMUCH AS ACTIVITY AND CESSATION FROM ACTIVITY ARE CAUSED BY DESIRE AND AVERSION OF A COGNISANT BEING [DESIRE AND AVERSION MUST BELONG TO THIS COGNISANT BEING].* (Sū. 34).

As a matter of fact, what happens is that the person *cognises* the fact of a certain thing being a source of pleasure and another thing being a source of pain to him,—then he *desires* to obtain that which gives him pleasure and *desires* to get rid of what causes him pain,—and when he is imbued with the *desire to obtain* and puts forth an Effort to obtain what gives him pleasure, this *Effort* is what is called '*activity*;' and when imbued with the desire to get rid of a thing, he avoids what gives him pain, this is what constitutes '*cessation from activity*;'— thus we find that *Cognising*, *Desiring*, *Effort*, *Aversion*, *Pleasure*, and *Pain*, all these belong to (reside in) one and the same substratum; that is, *Cognising*, *Desiring* and *Acting* have one and the same Agent, and subsist in the same substratum. From all this it follows that Desire, Aversion, Effort, Pleasure, and Pain are properties of the cognisant, intelligent thing (the Soul),—and not of a non-intelligent thing (the Internal Organ). Such 'activity' and 'cessation from activity' as has been described we actually perceive in the case of our own Souls,—and from this we infer the same in regard to other Souls.

Vārṭika on Sū. (34).

[P. 430, L. 17 to P. 431, L. 5.]

Some people have held the theory that Cognition belongs to the Soul, but Desire and the rest to the Internal Organ.

The 'theory' quoted in the Bhāṣya is thus explained by the *Ṭāṭparya*—' The intelligence of the Soul is one and immutable; in this are reflected the Internal Organ modified into the forms of the several objects of cognition; and it is by virtue of these reflections that the *one* Intelligence appears to be *diverse* and liable to production and destruction. Desire, Aversion &c. on the other hand, are by their very nature, diverse and liable to be produced and destroyed. Hence while the Cognition belongs to the Soul, Desire &c. belong to the Internal Organ.

* Vishvanāṭha has supplied two constructions of the Sūṭra.—(1) 'Activity and Cessation from Activity are due to Desire and Aversion, hence these latter are ज्ञस्थ, must belong to a Cognisant Being; and (2) 'Inasmuch as Activity and Cessation from Activity are caused by Desire and Aversion of a Cognisant Being, (these latter must belong to that cognisant being).'

This theory is impugned in the next *Sūṭra*. *Inasmuch as &c. &c.*—says the *Sūṭra*. What the *Sūṭra* means is that Desire &c. also belong to the *Cogniser*. If Desire belonged to the Internal Organs, they could not be perceived; for the Desire &c. belonging to one are not perceived by another; so that Desire &c. would ever remain imperceptible; since all qualities of the Mind must be beyond the senses.

Vār. P. 431.

Activity and Cessation being found in our own selves we infer the same in regard to others.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (35).

[P. 174, L. 5 to L. 9.]

The philosopher who holds Intelligence to belong to Material Substances (*i e*, the Materialist) says—

Sūṭra (35).

"INASMUCH AS THE SAID ACTIVITY AND ABSENCE OF ACTIVITY ARE THE SOLE INDICATIVES OF DESIRE AND AVERSION, THESE CANNOT BE DENIED IN REGARD TO THE BODIES COMPOSED OF EARTH AND OTHER MATERIAL SUBSTANCES." (Sū. 35.)

"The presence of Desire and Aversion is indicated by Activity and Absence of Activity; hence it follows that Desire and Aversion must belong to that to which Activity and Cessation from Activity belong, and to that same should belong Cognition also;—so that inasmuch as Activity and Absence of Activity are found in Bodies composed of Earth, Water, Fire, and Air,—it is these Bodies that are endowed with Desire, Aversion, and Cognition; which shows that Intelligence belongs to these material bodies."

Vārṭika on Sū. (35).

[P. 431, Ll. 6-7.]

What the *Sūṭra* means is that—"Inasmuch as Desire &c. must reside in the same substratum as Activity and Absence of Activity, they must belong to the material Body."

Sūṭra (36) and *Bhāṣya* [P. 174, L. 10 to P, 175, L. 4].

SINCE WE FIND ACTIVITY AND ABSENCE OF ACTIVITY IN SUCH THINGS AS THE AXE AND THE LIKE,—

it follows that Intelligence need not belong to the material Body. That is, if the finding of Activity and Absence of Activity in a certain thing justifies the attributing of Desire, Aversion and Cognition to it,—then, inasmuch as such Activity and Absence of Activity are found also in such *Instruments* as the Axe and the like, Intelligence should be attributed to these also. Desire &c. are attributed to the Body,—and yet we find, in the case of the Axe &c, that Activity and Cessation from Activity are not concomitant with Desire &c.;— so that it cannot be right reasoning to argue that—"because Activity and Absence of *from Activity are found in Bodies of Earth, Water, Fire and Air,* Desire, Aversion and Cognition must belong to these."

[Says the *Materialist*]—"Well, in that case, we shall put another meaning to the words—'*ṭalliṅgaṭvāṭ* &c. &c.' (Sū. 35): The 'activity' of the material substances, Earth &c., in bodies,—transitory* (of insects) and durable (of animals and men),—consists of a particular kind of action, whose presence is indicated by the aggregation or re-arrangement of the component particles of those bodies (by virtue of which the shape of the bodies undergo changes, becoming fatter or leaner &c.];—'Absence of Activity'—i. e. Inactivity—is found in such things as stone &c.; in which there is no such indication of activity;—and again, the presence of Desire and Aversion is indicated by 'Activity' and 'Absence of Activity';—so that, inasmuch as we find Activity and Absence of Activity in the Atoms of Earth &c., (as shown above), and as Desire and Aversion are concomitant with these (Activity and Absence of Activity), it follows that Cognition also belongs to those same Atoms;—and thus it becomes established that Intelligence belongs to material substances (and not to the Soul)."

* We adopt the reading त्रसत्सु for तावत्. It is found in several Mss. and is supported by the *Ṭāṭparya* which says—'त्रसत्सु' अस्थिरेषु कृमिप्रभृतीनां शरीरेषु, 'स्थावरेषु' स्थिरेषु देवमनुष्यादीनां शरीरेषु.

Bhā. P. 175. [Our *answer* to the above is as follows]—What has been put forward is not a valid reason, as it is not perceived in such things as the Jar and the like.* In the case of the Earth-molecules composing the Jar and such things also we find 'activity' in the form of a particular action which is indicated by *aggregation* or *re-arrangement* (of parts);—and we find 'absence of activity' in such things as the Sound (in which can there is no aggregation) in which every form of action is absent;—and yet even though 'Activity and Absence of Activity' are found in the Earth molecules and Sound, yet we do not find in them 'Desire and Aversion';—from this it is clear that mere presence of 'Activity and Absence of Activity in anything cannot be a valid ground for attributing to it Desire and Aversion.'

Vārṭika on Sū. (36).

[P. 431, L. 10.]

What the *Sūṭra* means is that since we find Activity and Absence of Activity in such things as the Axe and the like, the premiss put forward by the Materialist becomes *falsified*.

Sūṭra (37).

WHAT DIFFERENTIATES THE SAID DESIRE AND AVERSION (FROM THE QUALITIES OF MATERIAL SUBSTANCES, AND MARKS THEM OUT AS BELONGING TO SOMETHING OTHER THAN MATERIAL SUBSTANCES) IS UNIVERSALITY AND ABSENCE OF UNIVERSALITY (SŪ. 37).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (37).

[P. 175, L. 6 to P. 176, L. 13.]

What distinguishes the qualities of *Desire* and *Aversion* and marks them out as belonging to something other than material substances is '*niyama*' '*Universality*,' *restriction*, and '*ani-*

* This is printed as Sūṭra. But no such *Sūṭra* is found either in the *Nyāya-Sūchinibandha* or in Vishvavaṭha's Vriṭṭi 'or in any manuscript of the Sūṭra.

yama,' *Absence of Universality.* The 'activity and absence of activity,' due to the 'Desire and Aversion of the cognisant being,' are such as subsist, not in that Being, but in that on which he operates; so that the Activity and Ab ence of Activity should belong to only such material substances, Earth and the rest, as happen to be manipulated or operated upon by that Being,—and not to all substances; so that there is in this case '*aniyama,*' 'absence of universality.' For one, on the other hand, who regards the material substances themselves as *cognisant* (and as such, endowed with Desire and Aversion), the 'activity and absence of activity' due to Desire and Aversion would subsist in those substances themselves; and hence there should be '*niyama,*' 'universality.' For in the case of the other well-known qualities of material substances, it is found that the action due to a quality, as also absence of action due to the cessation or obstruction of that quality, occurs in all substances; so that, in the same manner, the action and absence of action due to Desire and Aversion (belonging to the Material Substances) should also occur in all material substances;—this however is never found to be the case;—from which it follows that while Activity and Absence of Activity subsist in the things operated upon or manipulated, Desire, Aversion and Effort belong to the *manipulator.**

* The qualities that are recognised by both parties as belonging to Material Substances are found in all material substances, and continue to exist as long as those substances exist. For instance, the Odour of Earth is found in all that is of Earth, and lasts as long as the Earth lasts. The action of falling due to the quality of gravity will occur in all material substances, and it will cease to occur only when the quality is obstructed or counteracted. This is what is meant by Universality, 'niyama.' If Desire &c. belonged to material substances, these also would have been co-existent and coeval with those substances; *i.e.*, they should have been found in all such substances; as a matter of fact however, Desire and Aversion and Effort are not found to be so; *e.g.*, Desire &c. are never found in the Jar. This is what is meant by 'Absence of Universality,' *Aniyama.* From this we conclude that Desire &c. cannot belong to Material Substances.

There is some confusion here in regard to the terms '*Niyama*' and '*Aniyama*'—The *Bhāṣya* has taken them in the sense of 'Universality' and 'Absence of Universality' respectively; the former belonging to the qualities of material substances, and the latter to the qualities of the cognisant Being. The *Vārṭika* has, as we shall see below, taken the terms to mean 'restriction' and 'want of restriction,'

Further, there can be no reason in support of the view that in each single body there are several cognisers; and yet according to the person who attributes Intelligence to material substances, inasmuch there are, in each single body, several material substances (Particles of Earth, Water &c.), every one of which is endowed with the qualities of Desire, Aversion and Effort,—this would mean that in a single body there are several Cognisers.* If the Opponent says—"Yes, be it so,"—we point out that there is no proof for such an assertion. In the case of several different bodies we infer the presence of so many different *Cognisers* from the fact that each of them is found to be possessed of distinct qualities of Cognition (Desire, Aversion, Effort, Pleasure and Pain); in the same manner, if, in each single body, every particle of material substance were possessed of its own cognition and other qualities, then alone could it follow as a necessary conclusion that these are so many distinct cognisers (in that single body). [But there is no such ground for Inference].

Further, as a matter of fact, we find that in material substances there appear several such actions as

Bhā. P. 176.

are due to the quality of something else,—and this provides the ground for inferring the same thing in other cases also. That is, in the case of such substances as are used as Instruments,—*e.g.* the axe and the like—and also in the case of such as form the constituent cause of objects—

the former applying to the qualities of the Cognisant Being, and the latter to those of material substances. This is the difference of opinion upon which Varḍhamāna asserts that the term 'niyama' may mean either *universality* or *partiality*, according to the meaning that we attach to the term; and 'aniyama' is its contrary. The sense of the argument remains the same.

* In answer to what has been said in para. 1, in regard to the possibility of Desire &c. being found in all Earthy substances, the Opponent might put forward the case of wine; grains of barley as a rule are not endowed with the power of intoxicating men; but these grains that enter into the composition of wine do become endowed with that power,—similarly only those particles of Earth are endowed with Intelligence which enter into the composition of the body of man. It is in answer to this that the *Bhāṣya* points out that even so every particle of the material substances composing the body should be imbued with intelligence; and as such form so many distinct cognisant beings in each body; just as each particle of wine is endowed with the power of intoxication.

e.g. clay and the like,—we find that there appear actions that are due to the quality of others;—and this provides the ground for inferring the same thing in other cases also;—*i.e.* in the case of such things as the transitory and durable bodies (of Insects and Men respectively); so that we infer that the action of material substances composing these bodies,—which is indicated by the aggregation and modification of their component particles [which has been put forward by the Opponent in the *Bhāṣya* on Sū. 36],—is due to the quality of something different (from the material substances).* This quality (to which the said action is due) subsists in the same substratum as *Effort*, and appears in the form of '*Saṃskāra*,' 'Faculty,' and is called 'Merit-Demerit'; like the quality of *Effort*, it bears upon all things (related to the Man), and urges to activity all material substances, for the fulfilment of that man's purpose.

The theory that Intelligence belongs to material substances may also be regarded as set aside by all those arguments that have been shown to prove the existence of the Soul, as well as by those put forward in proof of the Eternality of the Soul; and what has been said (in Sū. 3-2-18)—in regard to 'Cognition not belonging to either the Sense-organs or objects of perception, because Cognition persists also when these are destroyed'—applies with equal force to the denying of Intelligence in the material substances of the Body.†

Further, what the Opponent has urged (in Sū. 35)—to the effect that—"inasmuch as the said Activity and Absence of Activity are the sole indicatives of Desire and Aversion, these cannot be denied in regard to the bodies composed of Earth and other substances"—is on the understanding that the terms '*ārambha*,' Activity, and '*nivṛittiḥ*,' 'Absence of

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* It is not only the activity of the Body as a whole, but also the action of all its component particles that go on undergoing re-arrangement during life, that are all due to the quality (*Dharma &c.*) of the Soul ensouling the Body.

† Because even when the Objects and the Sense-organs are destroyed, Cognition remains,—it is inferred that Cognition cannot belong to them; similarly Intelligence cannot belong to the material substances in the body, because while these substances undergo changes and destruction during the life of the individual, the quality of intelligence continues to persist all along.—*Tātparya.*

Activity' (used by us in Sū. 34) stand for mere *action* and *cessation of action*; as a matter of fact, these two terms—'Activity' and 'Absence of Activity'—stand (in Sū. 34) for action of a totally different kind;* and action of this kind is never found in Earth and other substances. Hence what has been urged (in Sū. 35) to the effect that—"inasmuch as the said Activity and Absence of Activity are the sole indicatives of Desire and Aversion, these cannot be denied in regard to the bodies composed of Earth and other substances"—is not right.

Vārṭika on Sū. (37).

[P. 431, L. 12 to P. 432, L. 6.]

What differentiates, etc. etc.—says the *Sūṭra*. The '*niyama*,' *restriction*, in regard to 'Activity and Absence of Activity' is this that they pertain to only such material substances as are operated upon (by the cognisant being); *i.e.* 'Activity and Absence of Activity' are found to appear in only such Material Substances as are operated upon,—and not in all material substances. If the 'Activity and Absence of Activity' of material substances were due to their own *intelligence*, then they would be found in all substances; as is found in the case of such qualities as Gravity and the like; that is, all substances possessed of Gravity are found to fall,—this also is another '*niyama*,' 'rule,' that is found true. From all this it follows that intelligence does not belong to material substances.

There can be no reason in support of the view that in each single body there are several cognisers—says the *Bhāṣya*. He who attributes Intelligence to material substances must admit of several intelligent agents in a single body, as each body consists of several material substances. "Let there be several intelligent agents in a single body;—what harm

* What is meant by 'Activity and Absence of Activity' in Sū 34, is not mere *Action* and *Cessation of Action*, but that particular form of action which is undertaken for the obtaining of the desirable and the getting rid of the undesirable thing; and certainly no such intelligent action is ever found in material substances. Without understanding this, you have put forward your argument in Sū. 35.—*Ṭāṭparya*.

does that do to us?" This is not right; for if there were several intelligent cognisers in the same body, then this should lead us to infer that each component substance in the Body has its own distinct cognition; *—as a matter of fact however no such thing is found; as is clear from the fact that there is 'recognition' of the various Cognitions of a person; and such 'recognition' is found possible only in cases where all belong to a *single aggregate* of several causes and effects. [If each component particle of the body had its own cognition, then, since such particles are appearing and disappearing every moment, no 'recognition' of any kind would be possible, the particle to whom the original *Cognition* belonged having ceased to exist long before the appearance of the corresponding *Recognition*].

Vār. P. 432.

Further, what the terms mean is totally different. The terms 'Activity' and 'Absence of Activity' (as used by us) stand for that particular kind of action which is undertaken for the obtaining of the desirable and getting rid of the undesirable thing. You (the *Pūrvapakṣin*) on the other hand are using these terms in the sense of mere *action* and *cessation of action*, when you assert that—"Inasmuch as the said Activity and Absence of Activity are the sole indicatives of Desire and Aversion, these cannot be denied in regard to the bodies composed of Earth and other substances" (Sū. 35). That kind of 'Activity and Absence of Activity' which reside in such substances as are operated upon (by a cognisant being) belong to every material substance† (which is not the case with Desire, Aversion &c.).

* The *Tātparya* reads प्रत्ययव्यवस्था न भवेत् But in view of what follows the reading of the printed texts appears to be more satisfactory.

† The reading of this last sentence appears to be corrupt. We have tried to make some sense out of the words as they stand; it is difficult however to construe 'प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्ती' with 'प्रयुज्यमानभूताधारः,' the Feminine Dual with the Masculine Singular,

Bhāṣya on Sū. (38).
[P. 176, L. 13 to P. 177, L. 1.]

As a matter of fact, our denial of Intelligence applies equally to Material Substances, Sense-organs and Mind; but (in the following Sūtra) we speak of *Mind* only, singling it out only by way of illustration [and our reason for selecting this lies in the fact that Mind is more like the Soul than Substances or Sense-organs].

Sūṭra (38).

(A) ON ACCOUNT OF REASONS EXPLAINED BEFORE,—(B) ON ACCOUNT OF THESE BEING UNDER THE CONTROL OF SOMETHING ELSE,—AND (C) ON ACCOUNT OF THE CONTINGENCY, THAT [IF INTELLIGENCE BELONGED TO THE MIND, &C.] IT WOULD MEAN THAT THE RESULTS ACCRUING (TO MAN) ARE THOSE OF ACTS DONE BY OTHERS (THAN HIMSELF).*—(Sū. 38).

(A) The first phrase ('on account of reasons explained above') includes all that has been said, beginning from the Sūṭra 1-1-10, 'Desire, Aversion, Effort, Pleasure, Pain and Cognition are the indicatives of the Soul';—all this goes to show that Intelligence cannot belong to Material Substances, or Sense-organs, or Mind.

(B) *On account of their being under the control of something else*;—Material Substances, Sense-organs and Mind are 'under the control of something else,' in the sense that it is only under the impulse of Effort (of the Soul) that they proceed to the actions of sustaining, propelling and aggregating;† while if these were themselves intelligent, they

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* In place of (c) अकृताभ्यागमात् Vishvanātha reads स्वकृताभ्यागमात्, meaning—'on account of the fact that what accrues to man must be the results of his own acts.' The same reading is found in the Puri Sūṭra Ms., and also in Sūṭra Ms. D. The *Bhāṣya*, the *Vārṭika* and the *Ṭāṭparya* read as in the printed text.

†The *Ṭāṭparya* explains that these three actions refer only to the Body and the Sense-organs; the arguments being formulated thus—(*a*) 'The Body and the Sense-organs are under the control of something else, in the actions of sustaining, propelling and aggregating, severally,—because they are material,—like the Jar;' and (b) 'The Mind is under the control of something else,—because it is an instrument,—like the Axe.' So that it is clear that all three act only under the influence of something else.

would be independent [and this would be incompatible with the arguments that have been propounded in support of the conclusion that the Body is under the control of something else].

(C) *On account of the contingency that, if Intelligence belonged to the Mind etc., it would mean that the results accruing to Man are those of acts not done by himself.** Under Sū. 1-1-17 it has been pointed out that 'Activity consists in the operating of Mind, of Speech and of Body'—[and in the *Bhāṣya* on Sū. 1-1-2, P. 8, it is shown that *Activity*, conducive to Merit-Demerit, leads to Rebirth];- now if Intelligence belonged to the Mind, or the Sense-organs, or the Material Substances, [since the Intelligent beings must be independent agents, it would be those that would have to be regarded as the Agents of all Activity, as the *doers* of all acts;—and yet all these are destroyed at death, and the only thing that remains after death is the Soul, which, being *ex hypothesi*, *non-intelligent*, has not been the doer of any deed;—so that the results occurring in future births, from these acts, would fall upon the Soul, and not upon the Body, &c.; and] it would mean that what is experienced by the Soul (on rebirth) is the result of acts done by others (the Body, &c.). On the other hand, if the Mind, &c. are held to be *non-intelligent* [and a being other than these, i.e., the Soul, be held to be the intelligent entity, this latter, being independent, would be the Agent, the *doer* of all deeds], then all these would be the instruments under the control of the intelligent Agent, and hence it would be only right that the Person, the intelligent Agent, acting through those instruments (of the Mind &c.), should undergo (on Rebirth) the results of acts done by himself.

The actions mentioned,—those of sustaining, etc.,—appear to be such as belong to the Body only; it is the Body only that sustains or upholds things, that propells things, with the hand, f.i., and that goes on changing through the diverse aggregations of its component particles. The last however is applicable to the Sense-organs also. That is how the Ṭāṭparya has spoken of the three actions as referring *severally* to the Body and the Sense-organs.

* This argument is aimed against those persons who accept the authority of the Veda, and thereby regard the Man as one to whom the results of acts accrue, but still attribute Intelligence, not to Man, but to the Body, etc.

Vārṭika on Sū. (38).

[P. 432, L. 6 to L. 16].

As a matter of fact our denial of Intelligence applies equally to Material Substances, Sense-organs and Mind; but in the following Sūṭras we speak of Mind only, singling it out only by way of illustration—says the *Bhāṣya.*

On account of reasons explained before etc. etc.—says the *Sūṭra.* (A) The phrase—*on account of reasons explained before*—i.e., the arguments put forward in the Sūṭras 3-1-1, *et seq.*, have not been answered by the Opponent. (B) *On account of their being under the control of something else.*—As a matter of fact, the Body, the Sense-organs and the Mind are under the control of something else, and it is only through the force of Effort (of the Soul) that they operate towards the acts of sustaining, propelling and aggregation. If they were themselves endowed with Intelligence, they would be independent. (C) *On account of the contingency that if Intelligence belonged to the Mind, it would mean that the results accruing to man are those of acts done by others,*—If the Body &c. were intelligent, then it would mean that the results experienced by man are the effect of acts done by these Bodies &c., and this would involve the absurd contingency of such results accruing to man as proceeds from acts done by others. On the other hand, if the Body &c. are not intelligent, *then all these would be the instruments under the control of the intelligent agent, and hence it would be only right that the Person, the intelligent Agent, acting through these instruments, should undergo the results of acts done by himself.*

Bhāṣya on Sū. (39).

[P. 177, L. 1 to P. 178, L. 2].

The Author now sums up* the well-established reasons.

* '*Upasaṅgraha*' stands for *Upasamhāra*—says the *Ṭāṭparya.*

Sūṭra (39).

(A) ALSO BY REASON OF 'ELIMINATION' AND ALSO (B) BECAUSE THE REASONS ADDUCED BEFORE ARE FIRMLY ESTABLISHED.

[OR (B) BECAUSE OF REASONS ADDUCED BEFORE AND (C) BY REASON OF REAPPEARANCE*]—(Sū. 39).

The proposition under consideration is that 'Intelligence is the quality of the Soul.'

(A) *Parishēṣa*, '*Elimination*'.—When in regard to a quality, some likely substrata being denied and eliminated, and there being no likelihood of other substrata, we have the cognition of that likely substratum which remains undenied,—we have what is called 'Cognition by Elimination.'† In the present connection, for instance, we have the denial of 'Material Substances, Sense-organs and the Mind' (as likely substrata of Intelligence),—there is no other likely substance which might be suspected to be that substratum,—and the only substance that remains is the Soul,—so that the conclusion is that 'Intelligence is a quality of the Soul.'

(B) *Also because the reasons adduced before are firmly established*;—i.e. because all the reasons that have been adduced as leading to the Conception of the Soul—beginning with Sū. 3-1-1 onwards—have not been answered by the *Pūrvapakṣin*. The reference to *the previously adduced reasons being established* is meant to indicate (and lend support to) the aforesaid 'reasoning by Elimination' [*i.e.* it is on account of those reasons that we are led to the notion that the Soul is the only substance to which Intelligence can belong]; and it also serves to redirect attention to the direct proofs in support of the proposition under consideration.

Or, we may take the phrase '*upapaṭṭēshcha*' as putting forward an additional reason; [the meaning being as follows]:—'The Soul, which is eternal, having performed meritorious acts in one body, *reappears*, on the death of that body, in Heaven among the Gods; while having performed sinful acts, it reappears, on death of the body, in the Hells; this 're-

*This is the second interpretation of the clause *Yaṭhkṭahēṭṭūpapaṭṭēshcha*, by the *Bhāṣya* (see below).

† This passage also occurs in the *Bhāṣya* on Sū. 1-1-5, P. 19, Translation, P. 154.

appearance,' which consists in the Soul taking to other bodies, can be possible only if the Soul is a lasting entity; on the other hand, if all that existed was a mere 'series of sensations,' and there were no persisting entity in the shape of the Soul, there being no substratum for the said 'reappearance,' it would not be possible. Then again 'Samsāra,' 'series of births,' which consists of the connection of a single entity with several bodies, *is possible*,—and 'Deliverance' or 'Final Release,' also, which consists of freedom from the series of bodies, *is possible*—[only if there is a persisting entity in the shape of the *Soul*]; and if there be nothing apart from the 'series of sensations,' since there would be nothing that could traverse the long path (of Births and Rebirths), there would be nothing that could be freed from the series of bodies; so that in that case both 'Metempsychosis' and 'Final Release' would be impossible. Further, if there were nothing but a 'series of sensations,' then each individual living being would consist of several diverse entities; so that the entire phenomenon of his life would be disjointed (the act begun today and finished tomorrow being done by two distinct entities, it would *not be recognised* as the same on both days), undistinguishable [*i.e.*, not properly distinguished from what belongs to another person; the entity finishing the act to-day being as different from that which began it on the previous day as any strange person] and confused [as no discrimination of personalities would be possible, the entire business of the world would be mixed up].* And another inevitable result of this would be that there could be no Recollection; for what has been seen by one personality (which was present yesterday) cannot be recollected by another (that has
Bhā. P. 178. taken its place today); for *Recollection* is only the recognition by the same cogniser of the previously-perceived thing,—it appearing in the form 'I have known this object before'; and it is clear that in this the same cogniser re-cognises what he had known before; and this *re-cognition*

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* The *Tātparya* explains the 'confusion' as being due to the fact that every entity, according to the Bauḍḍha sensationalist, being a mere 'negation of contrary,' all persons would be the same, and no distinction as between the 'Brāhmaṇa' and the 'Kṣattriya' and so forth would be possible; so that there would be no discrimination of their duties such as the 'Brāhmaṇa alone shall perform the Soma-sacrifice,' 'the Kṣattriya alone shall perform the *Rājasūya*' and so forth.

is what is called 'Recollection'; and no such phenomenon could be possible if there were no other persistent entity save a 'series of Sensations.'

Vārṭika on Sū. (39).

[P. 432, L. 16 to P. 433, L. 5.]

The author now sums up the well-established reasons in the Sūṭra—'*also by reason of Elimination &c. &c.*' *The Proposition under consideration is that 'Cognition is the quality of the Soul'* —says the Bhāṣya.

'*Because the reasons adduced are firmly established*'—

Vār. P. 433. Since the reasons that have been adduced in this *Adhyāya* in proof of the Existence of the Soul have not been shaken.

'*By reason of Elimination*'—The quality of Cognition being denied in reference to the Body, the Sense-organs and the Mind, there being no other Substance left to which the said quality could belong, and the Soul being the only likely Substance left,—Cognition is regarded as being the quality of the Soul.

The term '*Upapaṭṭēḥ*' may be taken as embodying a separate reason for the eternality of the Soul. "Whose *Upapaṭṭi, Possibility*, is it that proves the Soul's eternality?" It is the *possibility* of Metempsychosis and Final Release. All this is clearly explained in the *Bhāṣya*.

Sūṭra (40).

RECOLLECTION (MUST BELONG) TO THE SOUL; FOR IT IS THE SOUL THAT IS ENDOWED WITH THE CHARACTER OF THE 'COGNISER.'—Sū. (40).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (40).

[P. 178, L. 4 L, to 9.]

The term '*Upapadyaṭē*,' 'must belong,' is to be supplied, to the Sūṭra; the sense being that *Recollection must belong to*

the Soul, and not to a mere Series of Sensations ;—the particle '*tu*' expressing *certitude* ('must'). "Why so?" *Because it is the Soul that is endowed with the character of the cogniser*; i.e. 'being cogniser' is the character, the peculiar characteristic, of the Soul. It is the Soul that is spoken of as 'shall know,' 'knows' and 'has known,' which shows that the Soul is related to cognitions appearing at all the three points of time ; and that the Soul has these cognitions pertaining to the three points of time is realised by each person in his own experience,—every person having such notions as 'I shall know,' 'I know' and 'I have known.' Hence it follows that he who is endowed with the said peculiar feature, to him belongs Recollection, and not to a mere Series of Sensations, apart from the Soul.

[The *Vārṭika* has nothing to say on this Sū. 40.]

Bhāṣya on Sū. (41).

[P. 178, L. 9 to P. 179, L. 20.]

It has been explained (under Sū. 33) that 'Recollections do not appear simultaneously, because the causes of Recollections do not appear at one and the same time';—and now the question arises—"From what causes does Recollection arise?"

The answer is that—Recollection arises—

FROM SUCH CAUSES AS—(*a*) ATTENTION, (*b*) ASSOCIATION, (*c*) RETENTIVENESS, (*d*) INDICATIVE, (*e*) DISTINGUISHING FEATURE, (*f*) LIKENESS, (*g*) OWNERSHIP, (*h*) SUPPORTER, (*i*) SUPPORTED, (*j*) RELATIONSHIP, (*k*) SEQUENCE, (*l*) SEPARATION, (*m*) CO-PROFESSION, (*n*) ENMITY, (*o*) SUPERIORITY, (*p*) ACQUISITION, (*q*) COVER, (*r*) PLEASURE AND PAIN, (*s*) DESIRE AND AVERSION, (*t*) FEAR, (*u*) NEED, (*v*) PROFESSION, (*w*) AFFECTION, (*x*) MERIT AND (*y*) DEMERIT. (Sū. 41).

(a) *Attention*—the fixing of the Mind, with the desire to recollect something, and the pondering of the peculiarities of the thing desired to be recalled—is a cause of Recollection. —(b) *Association*—is either (1) the arranging of several things in a connected chain, things so connected bringing about the recollection of one another, either in the order in which they have been arranged, or in some other order ; or (2) the fixing of things (in the plexuses of the Body) to

be remembered with those already known,—such connecting being done with the help of the Science of Concentration (Yoga). —(c) *Retentiveness*—the faculty produced by the repeated cognition of like things; and this quality of Faculty, belonging to the Soul, is called 'Retentiveness'; this also, like others, is a cause of Recollection.'—(d) *Indicative*—this is of four kinds —(1) conjunct, (2) inherent, (3) co-inherent in one substratum, and (4) contradictory; (1) *e.g.* smoke is the *conjunct* 'indicative' of Fire; (2) the horn is the *inherent* 'indicative' of the Bull; (3) the hand is the co-inherent 'indicative' of the feet; and as also Colour of Touch; and (4) the non-material substance is the *contradictory* 'indicative' of the material substance.— (e) *Distinguishing feature*—as found in a living being—reminds us of the race or family to which that being belongs,— in such forms as 'this belongs to the race of the Viḍas,' 'this belongs to the family of the Gargas,' and so forth.—(f) *Likeness*—the likeness of *Ḍēvaḍaṭṭa* in the pictures reminds us of Ḍēvaḍaṭṭa.—(g) *Ownership*—the master reminds us of the servant, and the servant of the master.—(h) *Supporter*—one is reminded by the landlord of his tenants.—(i) *Supported* —the servant reminds one of the landlord.—(j) *Relationship** —the pupil reminds one of the Teacher, and the Priest of the person at whose sacrificial performance he officiates.— (k) *Sequence*—as in the case of a number of acts to be done one after the other (the preceding reminds us of the succeeding). —(l) *Separation*—when one is separated from a person and feels the separation, he remembers him frequently,—(m) *co-profession*—one cutter reminds us of another cutter.— (n) *Enmity*—of two rivals the sight of one reminds us of the other.—(o) *Superiority*—reminds us of that which has produced the superiority.—(p) *Acquisition*—when one has either acquired a thing, or wishes to acquire it, he is frequently reminded of it.—(q) *Cover*—when the sword is remembered by its scabbard.—(r) *Pleasure and Pain*—remind us of what causes them.—(s) *Desire and Aversion*—remind one of what is liked and what is disliked.—(t) *Fear*—reminds one of the cause of fear —(u) *Need*—reminds one of what he needs, in the shape of food or clothing.—(v) *Profession*—the chariot-

*Some sort of 'Relationship' is involved in all that is enumerated here. Hence 'Relationship' here stands for those other than the ones specially enumerated.—*Ṭāṭparya.*

maker is recalled by the chariot.—(w) *Affection*—one frequently remembers the woman whom he loves.—(x) *Merit*—reminds one of his previous births; and Merit also enables one to retain what he reads and hears.—(y) *Demerit*—reminds one of the causes of pain suffered in the past.

These several causes of Recollection are never cognised at the same time; hence no simultaneous Recollections are possible.

The Sūtra is merely suggestive of what causes Recollection; it is by no means exhaustive.*

Vārṭika on Sū. (41).

[P. 433, L. 5 to L. 12].

It has been pointed out that Recollections are not simultaneous because the causes of Recollection do not appear at one and the same time. "From what causes does Recollection arise?" In answer to this the Sūtra (41) enumerates the causes of Remembrance with a view to show that they cannot appear at one and the same time.

From all that has been said above it follows that *Apprehension is not eternal.*

End of Section (3).

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* There are other causes also; e.g., Insanity tends to revive old memories—*Ṭāṭparya.*

Section (4).

[Sūṭras 42-45.]

Apprehension disappears soon after appearance.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (42).

[P. 179, L. 20 to P. 180, L. 15.]

Buḍḍhi, Apprehension, having been proved to be *non-eternal*, it would follow that it vanishes soon after appearance; and yet there are several *non-eternal* things* (e.g. the Jar) which continue to exist for a time more or less remote (from the time that they are produced);—hence there arises the doubt—Is Apprehension entirely evanescent (disappearing soon after appearance), like Sound?—or is it durable for some time longer, like the Jar?

We accept the view that it is totally evanescent.

"Why so?"

Sūṭra (42).

Because there is Apprehension of Motion, which is fleeting.

Because there is apprehension of Motion which is fleeting (not durable).—In the case of the arrow shot from the bow we perceive a series of motions till the arrow drops down; and since every cognition is restricted to a single object, it follows that, just as there is a series of (fleeting) motions (in the arrow), so must there be also a series of corresponding cognitions. In the case of the apprehension of (comparatively) durable things also, inasmuch

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* The printed text as well as the Puri Mss. read '*niṭyānām*'; but the sense requires '*aniṭyānām*'; the *Vārṭika* has neither *niṭyānām* nor *aniṭyānām*. The fact of *nitya*, eternal things, being such as continue to exist longer, can have no bearing upon *Buḍḍhi*, after this has been proved to be *non-eternal*. The meaning clearly is—it having been proved that Buḍḍhi is non-eternal, this would naturally imply that it is fleeting, evanescent, disappearing soon after appearance; and several non-eternal things are found to have longer duration; hence the Doubt in regard to *Buḍḍhi*, as to whether it is entirely evanescent or it has some duration.

With the reading '*niṭyānām*' the only sense that can be deduced from the passage is as follows—'If Buḍḍhi is non-eternal, it should be entirely evanescent; and if it is eternal, it should continue to exist; hence the doubt.'

as we find that the perception ceases when the thing is hidden from view, [it follows that in this case also there is a series of several evanescent cognitions]; that is, when the Jar, which is durable, is perceived, we have a series of cognitions, until something comes between (the Jar and the Perceiver); it is for this reason that as soon as something happens to intervene, the perception of the Jar ceases. If Cognition were durable (not evanescent), then the perceptional cognition of the Jar should continue even if the Jar has been hidden from view [which however is not found to be the case, and hence it follows that there is a series of several evanescent cognitions]. The phenomenon of Recollection also does not* prove the durability of Cognitions; for what brings about Recollection is the *Impression* produced by the Cognition (and *not* the *Cognition* itself). Some people have argued that—"Cognition must be regarded as durable, because we find Recollection of things apprehended by the cognition,—and no such Recollection would be possible if its cause, in the shape of the corresponding cognition, were non-eternal." But the fact put forward is no proof (of the proposition set forth). "Why?" Because what brings about the Recollection is, not the Cognition, but, the Impression produced by the Cognition; and this Impression is a quality entirely different from the Cognition.

"What is said cannot be accepted; because no reason has been adduced in its support."

[The *reason* is this]—If Cognition were something durable, then the perception itself would continue for a long time, and there would be no room for *Recollection* at all. That is, so long as the original Perception would continue to exist, the object cognised would remain 'perceptible,' and while the Perception itself is there, no 'Recollection' is possible.

The Puri Mss. read *smṛitishcha liṅgam*, 'Re-collection does prove;' in that case *buddhyavasthānē* should read as '*buddhyavyavasthānē*.' But the reading of the printed text gives better sense. Things seen now are remembered after several days; this might be regarded as indicating that the cognition of the thing has continued to exist during all these days. But the fact is that the cognition is *not* the immediate cause of Re-collection, which is directly produced by the Impression left by the cognition.

Vārṭika on Sū. (42).
[P. 433, L. 13 to P. 435, L. 4.]

Apprehension having been proved to be non-eternal, it would follow that it is totally evanescent; and yet some (non-eternal) things are found to be enduring in their character; hence there arises the doubt—as to whether Apprehension is totally evanescent, like Sound, or it is durable, like the Jar. The right view is that it is totally *evanescent.*

"What is the exact meaning of the term *uṭpannāpavargiṇi,* (used in the *Bhāṣya*)?"

What it means is that it is destroyed more quickly than ordinary transient things; it does not mean that it is destroyed immediately after it comes into existence.

"What is the reason (in support of the view that Apprehension is evanescent)?" [The reasons are the following] —(A) 'Apprehension is more fleeting in its character than other things,—because, while belonging to a definite community, and being perceptible by ordinary human beings like ourselves, it subsists in an all pervading substance (Soul), —like Sound.'—(B) And in support of the proposition that 'fresh cognitions appear at each moment,' we have the reason —'because being an Instrument,* each Cognition illumines (renders perceptible) a distinct object;—whatever is found to be an illuminator of an Individual object is always found to be fleeting in its character,—e g. the Lamp;—and as a matter of fact each individual Cognition illumines each individual thing from among such as are coming into existence and disappearing at every moment;—hence Cognition also must be fleeting in its character;—or (C) 'Apprehension is fleeting—because being a quality, it is perceptible by the internal organ of perception, —like Pleasure.'

* Cognition is an 'instrument' in the bringing about of the notions of acquiring or getting rid of the thing cognised.

It is with a view to point out all these facts that we have the *Sūtra—Because there is apprehension of motion, which is fleeting.*

Question.—"If the Cognition of fleeting objects is fleeting (as the *Sūtra* implies)—then,* when such durable things as the Jar and the like are perceived, is the cognition, then, durable, like the Jar?—or is it even then only fleeting?"

Answer—In the case of the cognition of durable things also, the Cognition must be regarded as fleeting, because there is cessation of Perception.—That is to say, when such durable things as the Jar and the like are perceived, then also Cognitions appear only in a series.—"How is this known?" —Because the perception ceases when the thing is hidden from view; if, like the Jar, its Perception also were durable, then the Perception should have continued to exist even after the Jar becomes hidden from view. As a matter of fact however, the Perception is not found to continue to exist. Hence the conclusion is that Apprehension is not durable.

"Inasmuch as there is Recollection, the Cognition must be durable. That is, if Cognition were fleeting, there could be no Recollection, for we never find Recollection appearing when there is diversity in the cognition; just as there is no Recollection of things cognised by other persons;—and yet there does appear the Recollection of things;—from which it follows that Cognition is durable."

This is not right; for from the phenomenon of Recollection itself it follows that Cognition is *not durable*: If Cognition were durable, there would be no room for Recollection; for 'Recollection' is the name of that re-cognition of things which is preceded by the cognition thereof, and *which appears on the disappearance of that cognition;* as we find in the case of the Recollection in the form 'I have seen this thing';

* '*Avasthitam*' is the right reading; not '*buddhisthitam*'.

and no such Recollection would be possible if the original Perception itself lasted during all the time. Further, Recollection proceeds from something; hence it cannot serve as a reason (for the durability of Cognitions). That is, the Recollection, that is regarded (by the Opponent) as indicative of, reason for, the durability of Cognitions, is not such an indicative at all; as it proceeds from something else; what does continue to exist is the Impression pro-

Vār. P. 435.

duced by the Cognition; and it is from this Impression, through the help of such causes as Attention and the rest (enumerated in Sū. 41), that Recollection proceeds (and not from the Cognition directly).

" But there is no reason." If you mean by this that—" What is the reason for asserting that Recollection proceeds from Impression, and not from the enduring cognitions?" —the answer is that the phenomenon of Recollection itself is the reason; i.e, if Cognition is lasting, there can be no Recollection.

Sūṭra (43).

[*Objection*]—" IF COGNITION WERE EVANESCENT, THE PERCEPTION OF THINGS WOULD BE ALWAYS INDISTINCT; JUST LIKE THE INDISTINCT PERCEPTION OF COLOUR DURING LIGHTNING-FLASH."—(Sū. 43).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (43).

[P. 180, Ll. 17-20.]

" If Cognition is evanescent, then the perception of all cognisable things should be indistinct; just as during lightning-flash, the light ofthe flash being evanescent, the perception of colour is indistinct. As a matter of fact, however, the perception of things is quite distinct. Hence the view (that 'Cognitions are evanescent') cannot be right."

Vārṭika on Sū. (43).

[P. 435, Ll. 8-10.]

" *If Cognition were evanescent &c. &c.*—says the *Sūṭra.* If Cognition is not lasting, the perception of every percepti-

ble thing should be indistinct; just as the Cognition of things illumined by a lightning-flash is always indistinct."

Sūṭra (44).

[*Answer*]—THE VERY REASON PUT FORWARD IMPLIES THE ADMISSION OF WHAT IS SOUGHT TO BE DENIED. (Sū 44).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (44).
[P. 181, Ll. to L. 21.]

What is sought to be denied (by the Opponent) is that 'Cognition is evanescent'; and this is exactly what is admitted when he asserts (in Sū. 43) that "the cognition should be indistinct like the indistinct cognition of Colour during lightning-flash." For if cognition is *indistinct*, it follows that it is also *evanescent*.

As a matter of fact, the diversity in the character (distinct or indistinct) of cognitions is due to the diverse nature of their causes, and not to any diversity in the cognition itself.* That is, the fact that Cognition is at one time distinct and at another indistinct, is due to the diverse nature of the causes of Cognitions; so that where the cause of the cognition is evanescent, the cognition is *indistinct*, while where the cause is lasting, the cognition is *distinct*; and the said distinctness or indistinctness is not due to the non-evanescence and evanescence (respectively) of Cognitions. "Why? Because 'Cognition' is the apprehension of a thing, be it distinct or indistinct, it is what is called 'cognition.' What happens is that, when the special features of a thing are not perceived,—and only its general features are perceived,—then the cognition is *distinct*, so far as the cognition of these general features is concerned;† and if a further cognition of

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* This has been printed as Sūṭra. But neither the *Nyāyasūchīnibandha*, nor Vishvanāṭha, nor any Sūṭra—Ms. reads any such *Sūṭra*.

† It appears better to read this passage as सामान्यग्रहणमात्रमव्यक्तग्रहणम्—the meaning being that 'when general features are perceived and not the special features, the cognition is '*indistinct*.' But in deference to the *Vārṭika*—and in view of the reading in all Mss.,—we have admitted the reading of the printed text, and translated it in accordance with the explanation of the *Vārṭika*.

something else (in the shape of the special features) does not appear, this is due to the absence of the necessary causes;—on the other hand, when the thing is perceived, as along with its general features, and also as along with its special features,—then the cognition is clearly distinct;—and where the special features being unperceived, the general features alone are perceived, the cognition is* clearly *indistinct*—[but only so far as the special features are concerned]. In the present context, *the presence of special features* is clearly 'something else' (*viṣayāntara*) in comparison with *the presence of general features*; and if there is no cogoition of this 'something else,' [and there is consequent *indistinctness*, this is due to the absence of the causes of that cognition,—and not to the evanescent character of the Cognition (as the Opponent seems to think). In fact a cognition that is quite in keeping with the character of its *object* is always *distinct*; so that each Cognition pertaining to its own particular object, even the cognition of generalities, should be regarded as *distinct*, so far as its own particular *object* is concerned; and similarly the cognition of peculiarities should be regarded as *distinct*, so far as its own object is concerned; for the simple reason that each cognition pertains to its own particular object. So that when the Opponent brings forward (against us) the contingency of cognitions being *indistinct*,—what is that object of which the cognition would have to be *indistinct*, on account of the *evanescence of cognitions?*

As a matter of fact, there being several features in the object perceived, there arises a diversity in the cognitions (of that object); and it is to the presence or absence of such diversity that distiuctness or iudistinctness is due. That is, every object has two kinds of features, general and special, and in regard to each of these there are diverse cognitions; if both these kinds of features are present (and perceived) in an object, then the cognitiou is *distinct*, so far as that object is concerned; if however only the general features are perceived, the cognition is *indistinct*. It is in this manner that we can explain the appearance of *distinct and indistinct* cognitions.

* In place of तद्ग्रहणं निमि, read तद्ग्रहणनिमि, as in Puri, Ms. B.

[P. 435, L. 10 to P. 436, L. 4.]

The very reason put forward &c. &c.—says the *Sūṭra.*

What has been urged by the Opponent in Sū. 43 is not right; as it involves self-contradiction. When he says—'because cognitions would be indistinct they should be regarded as lasting'—he admits the evanescent character of cognitions, which is what he has set about to traverse; and since he admits it, he contradicts his own assertion that 'Cognition is lasting.' Further the indistinctness of cognitions being due to other causes, it can not indicate their evanescence [hence it is not right to say that if cognitions are evanescent, the perception of things should be indistinct]. Whether apprehension is *distinct* or *indistinct* is not due to the *durability* or *evanescence* of the Cognitions; it is due to the difference in the causes of apprehension. Then again, what has been urged is an impossibility; that is, as a matter of fact there is no such thing as an *indistinct* Cognition;—why?—because Cognition is nothing more than the *apprehension* of the thing [*Cognition per se* being always *distinct*]; cognition consists only in the apprehension of things; and this 'apprehension of things' is twofold—one pertaining to the general features of the thing, and another pertaining to its special features. That which pertains to the general features is *distinct,* so far as the general features are concerned; so also is that which pertains to the special features (distinct in so far as the special features are concerned); and so on every cognition of a thing is *distinct,* so far as that thing is concerned. *Thus then, when the Opponent brings forward the contingency of cognitions being indistinct,—what is that object of which the cognition would have to be indistinct, on account of the evanescence of Cognitions?* (*Bhāṣya*).

"But this would go against the ordinary experience of men: If there are no *distinct* and *indistinct* cognitions, then whence do we have such expressions in ordinary usage as—'I perceive *distinctly*'?"

Vār. p. 346.

There is no force in this; as the usage is capable of another explanation. In regard to things endowed with general and special features, there is no *distinctness* or *indistinctness* in the cognitions themselves; the cognition is regarded as *indistinct* simply because the thing is cognised only in its general features, and the desire for perceiving its special features remains unfulfilled.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (45).

[P. 181, L. 21 to P. 182, L. 5.]

As a matter of fact also, mere *evanescence* either of the the *cognition* or of the *cognised object*, does not necessarily make the apprehension indistinct [as the Purvapakṣin asserts in Sū. 43].* What has been urged is not † true;—

Sūtra (45).

THE SAID PERCEPTION WOULD BE LIKE THE DISTINCT PERCEPTION OF THE CONTINUOUS SERIES OF LAMP-FLAMES.— Sū. (45.

Even if Cognition is evanescent, the perception of things must be regarded as *distinct*—why?—because it is *like the perception of the continuous series of lamp-flames*; i.e., when the flames of a lamp appear in a continuous series, every one of the perceptions thereof is evanescent; as also is every one of the individual flames perceived; and inasmuch as every perception pertains to its own individual object, there exist as many *perceptions* as there are *flames*; and yet in this case we find that the perception of each of these flames is quite distinct.

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*In Su. 44, the author has met the Pūrvapakṣa by a sort of silencer, pointing out to him that his own statement admits what he seeks to demolish. Now, in the following Sūtra, he states his real argument against the Opponent's contention.

† Vishvanātha, and also the Vārtika take this *na* as part of the *Sūtra*.

Vārṭika on Sū. (45).

[P. 436, L. 4 to L. 11.]

Further, the premiss (of the Opponent's argument) is not true; it is not quite true that whenever the cognition and the object cognised are evanescent, the perception is *indistinct.* What the Opponent alleges is not true, as *the said perception, etc., etc.*—says the *Sūṭra.* In the case of the Lamp-flames it is found that each individual flame appears in a continuous series—and thus there is evanescence of the *cognised objects,* as also of their cognitions; and yet the perception of them as 'flames' is quite distinct, and just as it happens in the case of the *Flames,* so wou d it be in the case of other things also.

Thus it is established that Apprehension is totally evanescent.

End of Section (4).

Section (5).

[Sūṭras 46—55.]

Apprehension is not a quality of the Body.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (46).

[P. 182, L. 5 to L. 9.]

Intelligence or Sentience would appear to be a quality of the Body, as it is found to be present when the Body is present, and absent when the Body is absent; but—

AS A MATTER OF FACT, IN SUBSTANCES WE PERCEIVE THEIR OWN QUALITIES AS ALSO THE QUALITIES OF OTHERS; SO THAT THE MATTER IS OPEN TO DOUBT.—(Sūṭra 46.)

The mere fact of Intelligence being present when the Body is present leaves the matter doubtful; for in water we perceive Fluidity, which is its own quality, as also *warmth,* which is the quality of another substance (Fire). Hence when we perceive Intelligence in the Body, there arises a doubt as to whether the Intelligence perceived is the quality

of the Body itself, or it is the quality of some other substance.

Vārṭika on Sū. (46).

[P. 436, L. 11 to P. 437, L. 4.]

Intelligence or Sentience would appear to be a quality of the Body,—as it is found to be present when the Body is present, and absent when the Body is absent. When one thing is found to be present during the presence of another, and absent during its absence, then it is regarded as belonging to this other thing; as we find in the case of Colour &c.

But the mere fact of Sentience being present during the presence of the Body cannot prove that it is a quality of the Body; because existence of one thing during the presence of another is possible also when one is the quality of something totally different; e g.—(*a*) Cognition, Disjunction and Faculty are not the qualities of Motion, and yet these are present only when there is Motion, and absent when Motion is absent;—(*b*) again Sound appears only when Cognition, Disjunction and Sound are there, and yet it is not a quality of these. In fact that one is the quality of another is shown only by its being perceived in the latter; i.e. when Colour &c., are actually perceived as subsisting in a certain object, they are regarded as a quality of that object. Further, if one were to seek to deduce the fact of Sentience being a quality of the Body from the fact that it is present when the Body is present,—the premiss would be one that is *not true*

Vār. P. 437. (not admitted); for all that can be said is that although Sentience is perceived, it is not perceived *in the Body;* it is open to doubt whether *Sentience* subsists in the Body, or in something else. Even admitting that Sentience is perceived in the Body, it is doubtful whether it is a quality of the Body or of something else; ***for as a matter of fact in substances we perceive, etc. etc.***—says the **Sūṭra**; the meaning of which is quite clear.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (47).

[P. 182 L. 10 to P. 183, L. 5.]

[*Siḍḍhānṭa.*]

Sentience is not a quality of the Body. "Why?" BECAUSE COLOUR AND OTHER QUALITIES CONTINUE TO EXIST AS LONG AS THE BODY EXISTS.—(Sū. (47).

As a matter of fact, the Body is never found to be without colour and such other qualities; without *Sentience,* on the other hand, it is actually found (when it is dead, for instance); in the same manner as Water is found without warmth. Hence the conclusion is that Sentience is not a quality of the Body [just as warmth is not quality of water].*

"It may be like Faculty."

That cannot be; as there is no cessation of any cause (of Sentience). In the case of Faculty, it is found that when it ceases to exist in an object, (the Body, e.g.) this object is not quite the same as what it was when the Faculty was present; for as a matter of fact, Faculty ceases to appear in an object only when the object has become deprived of those factors (such as Propulsion and the like) that were conducive to the appearance of the Faculty;—in the case in question on the other hand, when Sentience ceases to appear in the Body, the Body is exactly what is was when Sentience appeared in it [and there is no deprival of any factors, the only cause of Sentience, according to the Opponent, consisting in the Body itself, which is still intact]. Hence (the case of Sentience not being analogous to that of Faculty) it is not right to urge, in answer to our argument, that "the absence of Sentience in the Body is like the absence of Faculty."

If (in order to escape from the said difficulty) it be held that the cause of Sentience in the Body is something else (and not the Body itself), then this cause could subsist either

* The reason is formulated in the form of a Hypothetical Reasoning, by Vishvanāṭha.—'If Sentience were a quality of the Body, it would, like Colour &c., exist as long as the Body exists.' The *Parishuḍḍhi* formulates it in the form of a regular Inference: 'Sentience, &c., are not the quality of the Body,—because, like Sound, they do not exist as long as the substratum.' Colour, in this case, being treated as an Instance *per contra.*

in the Body itself, or in some other Substance, or in both (the Body as well as another Substance) And none of these can be maintained; because there would be no reason for any restriction (such as the following): (*a*) The cause of sentience subsisting in the Body itself, there would be no reason for any such restriction as that Sentience should appear therein at certain times, and not at others; —(*b*) the cause of sentience being in some other substance, there can be no reason for the restriction that while sentience appears in the Body, it does not appear in pieces of stone and such other things *;—(*c*) if the cause of sentience subsists in both (Body and the other substance), there can be no reason for the restriction that Sentience appears in the Body, and not in other substances that belong to the same category as that Body.

Bhā P. 183.

Vārṭika on Sū. (47).

[P. 437, L, 5 to P. 438, L. 4.]

Sentience cannot be a quality of the Body,—*because Colour and other qualities continue to exist as long as the Body exists*; the *Sūṭra* has cited the instance *per contra* (see *Bhāṣya*); (the argument being)—the qualities that belong to the Body continue to exist as long as the Body exists,—e g. Colour and other qualities;—Sentience however does not subsist as long as the Body lasts;—hence Sentience cannot be a quality of the Body. An instance *per similarity*, we have in the form of the *warmth of water.*

"*It may be like Faculty.*" If you mean by this that —"Just as Faculty, while being a quality of the Body, does not subsist as long as the Body lasts, so would Sentience also,"—then, our answer is that this is not right, *as there is no cessation of the cause.* Of the Faculty, the cause does not consist of the Body only; as a matter of fact, it is found to appear when there are such causes present as Propulsion and the like; so that it is only natural that Faculty should appear

* Puri Ms. B rightly reads a *na* after '*loṣṭāḍiṣviṭyaṭra.*'

in the Body when these causes are present, and should not appear when the causes have ceased to exist. No such *appearance* and *non-appearance* should be possible in the case (of Sentience) where the only cause (the Body) continues to exist. "But the cause of Sentience also may be (sometimes) absent in the Body." If you mean by this that —"Just as the cause of Faculty is (sometimes) absent, so may also the cause of Sentience be,"—this cannot be right, for none of the alternatives possible is admissible. The cause of the appearance of Sentience in the Body—does this cause subsist (*a*) in the Body? or (*b*) in some other substance? and if it subsists in the Body, does it subsist as long as the Body lasts? or is it occasional (due to some cause)? If it subsisted as long as as the Body lasts, then the Body should never be found without Sentience, the cause of Sentience being always present. If, on the other hand, it be occasional,

Vār. P. 438.

then that which is the occasion or cause of the cause of Sentience should also be sentient. (*b*) If the cause of Sentience subsists in some other substance, then it behoves you to explain the reason why the cause subsisting in some other substance produces Sentience in the Body, and not in anything else. Further, is the cause subsisting in the other substance eternal or non-eternal? If it is non-eternal, is it durable for any length of time? or transient, lasting for a moment? All these questions would arise in regard to the cause, just as they do in regard to *Sentience* itself.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (48).

[P. 183, L. 4. to L. 8.]

Some people might argue thus:—" In the case of the object possessed of the quality of dark colour (e.g. the unbaked Jar), we find that there is cessation of that Colour (while the object continues to exist); and in the same manner there may be cessation of the quality of Sentience (while the Body, of which it is a quality, continues to exist)."

Sūṭra (48).

THIS HOWEVER IS NOT RIGHT; BECAUSE (IN THE CASE OF THE OBJECT CITED) THERE IS APPEARANCE OF ANOTHER COLOUR DUE TO BAKING. (Sū. 48).

In the case of the object cited (*i.e.* the Jar) there is not a total disappearance of all Colour; all that happens is that the *dark* Colour having disappeared, another Colour, red, is produced by baking;—in the case of the Body, on the other hand, there is, at death, a total disappearance of Sentience (and nothing appears in its place).*

Vārṭika on Sū. (48).

Some people argue that—" Things are found to possess the quality of Dark Colour,—and yet such colour does not continue to exist as long as those things last." This however is not right; *because there is appearance of another Colour due to baking*—says the *Sūṭra*. When the other Colour appears (in the Jar), there is not a total destruction of the Dark Colour; the cessation of Sentience (in the dead Body) on the other hand, is absolute.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (49).

[P. 183, L. 8 to L. 14.]

Further,

INASMUCH AS QUALITIES PRODUCED BY HEAT ARE FOUND TO BE DUE TO THE PRESENCE OF COUNTER-ACTIVE FORCES, THE CRITICISM BASED UPON THE ANALOGY OF THESE CANNOT BE RIGHT. (Sū. 49).

As a matter of fact, qualities are found to be produced by heat in only such substance in which there are present forces counter-active (destructive) of the previous quality; that this is so is shown by the fact that the qualities produced by heat are incompatible with the previous qualities. In the Body, on the other hand, we do not find present any force counteractive of the quality of Sentience,—by reason of the presence whereof there could appear any new quality in-

* Vishvanātha takes this *Sūṭra* as coming from the Opponent; the meaning being—" The Siḍḍhānṭa view is not right; as we find new colours produced (and old ones destroyed) by heat, while yet the substance remains the same."

compatible with the (previous) quality of *Sentience*; and it is only from the appearance of such new quality that the counteraction (destruction) of Sentience (and hence the impossibility of its continuing as long as the Body lasts) could be inferred. Thus there being nothing to counteract the quality of Sentience, it should continue in the Body as long as the Body lasts (if it is a quality of the Body). As a matter of fact however, it does not so continue to exist. Hence the conclusion is that Sentience is not a quality of the Body.

Vārṭika on Sū. (49).

[P. 438, L. 9 to L. 17].

For the following reason also (Sentience cannot be a quality of the Body)—*Inasmuch as qualities produced by heat etc. etc.*—says the *Sūṭra.* It is only when there is destruction of the previous quality of a substance that there appears in it another quality incompatible with the former, e.g., the Red Colour appears (in the Jar) only after the destruction of the previous Quality of Dark Colour. In the Body however we do not find appearing any new quality, contrary to (incompatible with) the quality of Sentience ;- all that is found is that there is total cessation of Sentience. You might assert that —" In the Body also there does appear the new quality of *insentience.*" But that would not be right; for the exact nature of such a quality cannot be determined; the quality of 'insentience' that you speak of—is it some positive quality contrary to *sentience*? or is it a mere *negation of sentience*? If it were the former, then it could be so recognised [which it is not];—if, on the other hand, it is a mere *negation of sentience*, then it cannot be regarded as a quality (appearing in the Body, in place of sentience).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (50).

[P. 183, L. 14 to P. 184, L. 1.]

For the following reason also Sentience cannot be a quality of the Body :—

Sūṭra (50).

BECAUSE IT PERVADES OVER THE ENTIRE BODY.*

Sū. (50).

As a matter of fact, like the Body, all its component parts also are pervaded by the appearance of Sentience; and there is not a single part of the Body where Sentience does not appear; and under the circumstances, if Sentience belonged to the Body, this would mean that, like the Body, all its component parts are sentient, and hence in each single person there would be several sentient beings! So that, just as the restriction in regard to Pleasure, Pain and Cognition [that the pleasure appearing in Devadaṭṭa's body is felt by him alone, and not by Yajñada ṭa and so forth] is indicative of the fact that there are several sentient beings,—one to each individual body,—so would it also be in regard to the single body [every component part of which being endowed with sentience, it would follow that there is restriction as to the Pleasure, &c., of each such part; so that the pleasure appearing in one part of the Body would be felt by that part alone, and not by any other part of that same Body]. As a matter of fact however, no such thing actually happens. Hence we conclude that Sentience is not a quality of the Body.

Vārṭika on Sū. (50).

[P. 438, L. 19 to P. 439, L. 4].

For the following reason also Sentience cannot be a quality of the Body,—*because it pervades etc. etc.*—says the *Sūṭra*. Like the Body, the component parts of the Body also are pervaded by the appearence of Sentience. "What is the meaning of this *pervasion*?" It

Vār. P. 439.

means that no part of the Body is without Sentience; for the simple reason that (under the Opponent's

* According to the *Parishuḍḍhi*, this Sūṭra contains the following argument:—'Sentience cannot be a specific quality of the Body—because it is a quality that pervades over the whole of its substratum,—like Sound.' It goes on to remark,—This meaning of the Sūṭra was so clear and patent that the *Bhāṣyakāra* did not think it necessary to mention it, and he put down only that interpretation of it whereby it became connected with, and introductory to, the following *Sūṭras*.'

theory) all parts of the Body would be equally capable of producing Sentience; so that like the Body, these parts also would be so many Sentient beings. "Yes, we grant that the parts of the Body are sentient." That cannot be; that would lead to a restriction of cognitions; that is, if like the Body, all its component parts were so many distinct sentient beings, then there would be a restriction as to their cognitions [the cognition appearing in one part of the Body would have no connection with another part].

Bhāṣya on Sū. (51).

[P. 184, L. 1 to L. 5].

[*Objection*]—"It has been said that 'there is no part of the body where sentience does not appear;' but—

"THIS IS NOT RIGHT †; FOR IT IS NOT FOUND IN SUCH PARTS OF THE BODY AS HAIRS AND NAILS. (Sū. 51).

"In hairs and in nails we do not fail any sentience appearing; so that it is not right to say that *it pervades over the entire body.*"

Vārṭika on Sū. (51).

[P. 439, L. 5.]

"The parts of the Body cannot be regarded as sentient, for no sentience is found in the hairs and in the nails. This Sūtra is meant to be the statement of an example (against the Siḍḍhāntin's argument)."

Sutra (52).

[*Answer*]—INASMUCH AS THE BODY EXTENDS ONLY SO FAR AS THE SKIN, THERE IS NO POSSIBILITY OF SENTIENCE APPEARING IN SUCH THINGS AS HAIRS AND NAILS. (Sū. 52).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (52).

[P. 184, L. 7 to L. 9.]

'Body' has been defined as 'the substratum of Sense-organs;' so that the Body, which is the receptacle of life,

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† The *na*, appearing in the printed text as part of the *Bhāṣya*, should form part of *the Sūṭra*; such being the reading of all *Sūṭra texts*.

mind, pleasure, pain and cognition, can be regarded as extending only up to the skin; hence it is natural that no Sentience would appear in the Hairs and Nails. The presence of such things as Nails and Hairs in the Body is due to the action of certain things [and they do not form constituent parts of the Body].

Vārṭika on Sū. (52).

[P. 439, Ll. 8—9.]

Inasmuch as &c. &c.—says the *Sūṭra.* Hairs and Nails are things that are only in contact with the Body, and not its constituent parts. Hence there is no possibility (of sentience appearing in them).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (53).

[P. 184, L. 9 to L. 13.]

For the following reason also Sentience cannot be a quality of the Body:—

Sūṭra (53).

BECAUSE IT DIFFERS IN CHARACTER FROM THE QUALITIES OF THE BODY—(Sū. 53).

Qualities belonging to the Body are of two kinds—(1) Imperceptible, *e.g*, Gravity, and (2) Perceptible by the senses, *e.g.* Colour, &c. Sentience is a quality of a totally different kind from the said qualities: It cannot be regarded as *imperceptible*, because it is capable of being sensed (felt) by itself; nor can it be regarded as *perceptible by the senses*, because it is cognisable by the Mind.* From this it follows that Sentience is the quality of a substance totally different from the Body.

Vārṭika on Sū. (53).

[P. 439, Ll. 12—14.]

Qualities of the two are of body kinds—(1) Some are perceptible by the external Sense-organs, *e.g.* Colour, &c., and (2) some are beyond the senses, *e.g.* Gravity. *Sentience is a quality of a totally different kind*; it cannot be regarded as

* The correct order appears in the *Vārṭika*—see below. The right reading would appear to be नाप्रत्यक्षा मनोविषयत्वात् नैन्द्रियग्राह्या स्वसंवेद्यत्वात्.

perceptible by the external sense-organs, because it is *self-apprehended*; nor can it be regarded as beyond the senses, because it is actually perceived by means of the Mind.

From all this it follows that Sentience cannot be a quality of the Body.

Sūṭra (54).

[*Objection*]—" WHAT IS URGED IS NOT RIGHT; AS THERE IS DIFFERENCE IN CHARACTER AMONG COLOUR AND OTHER QUALITIES (BELONGING TO THE BODY)." (Sū. 54).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (54).

[P. 184. Ll. 15—16.]

" Just as, even though differing in character from one another, Colour and the other qualities do not cease to be qualities of the Body,—in the same manner, Sentience also, though differing in character from Colour and the other qualities, need not cease to be a quality of the Body."

Vārṭika on Sū. (54).

[P. 439, Ll. 24—18.]

" Colour &c., though differing from one another, yet remain qualities of the Body; similarly Sentience, though differing from Colour, could still remain a quality of the Body."

Sūṭra (55).

[*Answer*]—INASMUCH AS COLOUR AND THE OTHER QUALITIES (OF the BODY) ARE PERCEPTIBLE BY THE SENSES, THERE IS NO INCONGRUITY IN THESE (BELONGING TO THE BODY). (Sū. 55).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (55).

[P. 184, L. 18 to P. 185, L. 2.]

'*Also because they are not perceptible*'—(this should be added to the *Sūṭra*); [the meaning of the Sūṭra being] Colour &c., though differing among themselves, yet do not go beyond the limits of the two kinds (mentioned under Sū.

53); and Sentience also, differing from Colour &c., should fall within the limits of these two kinds, if it were really a quality of the Body;—as a matter of fact, however, Sentience is found (as shown under Sū. 53) to lie beyond the limits of the said two kinds;—hence it follows that Sentience cannot be a quality of the Body.

Though the fact of Sentience not belonging to the Body has already been established by what has been said above (in Section 3) in regard to Cognition not belonging to Material Substances, or Sense-organs, or Mind,—yet it has been dealt with over again (in the present section), for the purpose of stating additional arguments (such as pertain to the Body specifically); specially because the more is truth investigated the more fully established it becomes.

Vārṭika on Sū (55).

Inasmuch as Colour &c. &c.—says the *Sūṭra*. What the Sūṭra points out is the fact that the Qualities of the Body fall under two heads. In regard to the difference among Colour &c., there is not possible either any universal affirmation [such as 'all that differ from one another in being gestated or smelt &c. &c. must belong to the Body'], or any universal negation [such as 'all that differ from one another in being gestated or smelt &c., cannot belong to the Body']; hence among these there is mere 'difference of character'; and thus there is no premiss—either universal affirmative or universal negative—that could prove that Sentience is a quality of the Body. Hence the analogy put forward (in Su. 54) does not hold good.

The reasons that we can deduce from what is said in the present section are the following:—(*a*) 'Sentience cannot be a quality of the Body,—because while there appears no other cause, and there does not appear any other contrary quality, it does not continue to exist as long as the Body lasts,—just like the warmth of water.'—The fact of Sentience pervading the entire body (put forward in Sū. 50) is

not an argument (in support of the conclusion that 'Sentience does not belong to the Body'); it has been put forward only with a view to point out that the theory that Sentience belongs to the body involves the incongruity of having to admit the presence of several sentient beings in the same body. (b) 'Sentience cannot be a quality of the Body, —because it is not perceptible by means of an external organ, —like Pleasure &c.'

"What is dealt with in this Section has already been fully dealt with before; why should it have been introduced again?"

It has been re-introduced, because *the more is truth investigated the more fully established it becomes.*

End of Section (5).

Section (6).

[Sutras 56—59.]

Treating of the Mind.

***Bhāṣya* on Sū. (56).**

[P. 185, L. 2 to L. 9.]

The character of Apprehension having been examined, it is now the turn of Mind to be examined; and the question arising—Is there only one Mind in each body, or several?*—[the answer is]

THE MIND MUST BE ONE ONLY; SINCE THERE IS NON-SIMULTANEITY OF COGNITIONS. (Sū. 56).

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* It has been explained in Sū. 1-1-16 that 'the non-simultaneity of Cognitions is the indicative of Mind;' this would be true, if there were several Minds in a body, or if the Mind were of large dimensions. The present enquiry is undertaken for the purpose of finding out some means of concentrating the Mind; attempts at concentration could be fruitful only if there were only one Mind; if there were several Minds, there need be no attempt at concentration; no abstraction of the Mind or Meditation would be possible.

There are two kinds of 'non-simultaneity of cognitions' —(1) the non-simultaneity of several cognitions produced through the same Sense-organ, and (2) the non-simultaneity of cognitions of several things produced though several Sense-organs. Of these two the former is not what is spoken of as indicating the singleness of the Mind,—this 'non-simultaneity' being due to the fact that one Instrument (such as Sense-organs are) can, by its very nature, accomplish only one thing at a time;—it is the latter 'non-simultaneity' of the cognitions of several things through several Sense-organs that is regarded as indicating the singleness of Mind. "How does that non-simultaneity indicate the singleness of Mind?" If there were several Minds, it would be possible for several Sense-organs to be in contact with several Minds simultaneously; whereby there should be several cognitions appearing (through these contacts) at one and the same time;—but this never happens;—hence the conclusion is that, inasmuch as cognitions of things appear only one after another—and never simultaneously—there is a single Mind (in one body).

Vārṭika on Sū. (56).

[P. 440, L. 9 to L. 17.]

Apprehension has been duly examined; it is now the turn of the Mind, which we proceed to examine; and the question arising—Is there only one Mind to each Body, or there are several Minds?—the answer is—*The Mind must be one only &c., &c.* It is a patent fact that Cognitions appear only one after another; and this fact proves the singleness of Mind. "How?" If there were several Minds, it would be possible for each of the several sense-organs to be in contact with the Mind simultaneously; and as several objects may be lying near, it would be possible for the several cognitions of these several objects to appear at one and the same time.

That 'non-simultaneity of cognitions,' which is found in the case of the cognitions of several things by means of one sense-organ, is not what is regarded as indicating the single-

ness of the Mind; because that 'non-simultaneity' is due to other causes; that is, it is due to another cause, in the shape of the nature of the 'Instrument' (which can accomplish only one thing at a time; and the Senso-organ is an *instrument*).

Sutra (57).

[*Objection*]—"WHAT HAS BEEN ASSERTED IS NOT RIGHT; FOR AS A MATTER OF FACT WE DO PERCEIVE SEVERAL ACTIONS (COGNITIONS) ACTUALLY APPEARING SIMULTANEOUSLY."—(Sū. 57).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (57).

[P. 185, Ll. 11—14.]

"[When the pupil perceives his Teacher going in the forest] he has the following notions,—'this Teacher reads—walks—holds the water-pot—looks at the path—hears the sounds proceeding from the forest—becomes frightened—keeps on the lookout for signs of serpents or tigers—remembers the place of destination*';—he does not notice any order of sequence among these cognitions; so that all these may be regarded as appearing simultaneously;—and hence it follows that there are several Minds."

Vārtika on Sū. (57).

What has been asserted is not right, etc. etc.—says the Sūtra. The rest is clear in the *Bhāṣya*.

Sutra (58).

[*Answer*]—THE SAID PERCEPTION IS LIKE THE PERCEPTION OF THE FIRE-CIRCLE; AND IS DUE TO THE RAPIDITY OF MOTION—(Sū. 58).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (58).

[P. 185, L. 16 to P. 186, L. 9.]

In the case of the whirling fire-brand, even though there *is* sequence among the several perceptions of the fire, yet it is not perceived, by reason of the extreme rapidity of motion; and the sequence not being perceived, there arises the

* The *Tātparya* adopts the reading संस्त्यायनम् and explains it as स्थापनम्. The right reading appears to be that found in the Puri Ms. B. स्थानीयम्.

idea of the continuity (of fire in revolution), which gives rise to the notion that there is a single *circle of fire* ;—similarly in the case of cognitions also, Sequence, even though present, fails to be perceived by reason of the rapidity of the cognitions or actions ; and the Sequence failing to be perceived, there arises the notion that the actions (or cognitions) appear simultaneously.

"But is the notion of the simultaneity of cognitions due to the non-perception of sequence in them ? Or, is the perception of simultaneity due to the actual existence of simultaneity ?—You do not show any cause for accepting the one or the other view in preference to the other : [so that the matter must be open to doubt]."

We have already explained that cognitions of several things, due to the action of the sense-organs, appear one after the other ; and this cannot be denied, being directly perceptible by each man for himself. Further, whenever we think of a number of things seen or heard before, our ideas of them always appear one after the other, and never simultaneously, and from this also we can infer (that the cognitions in the case cited in Sū. 57 are not simultaneous).

In the case of the cognitions of syllables, words and sentences, and those of their meanings, sequence fails to be perceived by reason of rapidity. "How so ?" [As a matter of fact the phenomenon involves the following process] —when the several syllables composing a sentence are pronounced, there appears one auditory perception in connection with each one of those syllables,—then the hearer recognises one or several syllables as forming a *word*,—having recognised the word, he ponders over it,—by this pondering he recalls the meaning of that word,—ponders over a number of words as constituting one *sentence*,—having cognised the meanings of the words as syntactically connected, he recognises the meaning of the sentence.—Eventhough there are so many cognitions involved (in the process of our comprehension of the meaning of a sentence), yet by reason of the rapidity with which they appear, their sequence fails to be perceived. This example explains the ordinary notion of simultaneity that people have in regard to Cognitions.

[While the above facts cannot be gainsaid by either party],—in support of the contrary view—that Cognitions do

actually appear simultaneously, there is no instance which is free from doubt (and admitted by both parties), on the strength of which it could be inferred that there are several Minds in a body.

Vārṭika on Sū.(58).

[P. 440, L. 19 to P. 441, L. 5].

The following Sūṭra supplies the answer to the foregoing Sūṭra: *The said perception etc. etc.*—says the Sūṭra. Just as in the whirling firebrand, the sequence, even though present, is not perceived,—so also in the case of cognitions, the sequence, even though present, is not perceived, by reason of rapidity. There is no instance, admitted by both parties, of the simultaneous appearance of several cognitions,—on the strength whereof we could admit that there are several Minds.

Vār. P. 441.

Sūṭra (59).

FOR REASONS ALREADY MENTIONED, THE MIND MUST BE ATOMIC. (Sū. 59).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (59).

[P. 186, Ll. 11—12].

That Mind is *atomic*, and that it is *one*,—both these properties of the Mind follow from the *non-simultaneity of Cognitions.* If the Mind were something *large*, then it would be possible for it to be in contact with several sense-organs at one and the same time; and this should give rise to several Cognitions *simultaneously.*

Vārṭika on Sū. (59).

[P. 441, Ll. 7—8].

For reasons etc.—says the *Sūṭra.* That the Mind is atomic is to be deduced from those same reasons that have been put forward in support of the view that it is one only.

End of Section (6).

Section (7).

[Sūṭras 60—72.]

The Body is formed under the Influence of the Unseen Force (of Destiny).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (60).

[P. 186, L. 12 to P. 187, L. 9.]

* The Mind, along with the Sense-organs, is found to operate only within the Body, never outside the Body; of the cognising person also, all experiencing of objects, consisting of apprehension &c, is found to occur only in the Body; so also his acquiring of the desired and abandoning of the undesired thing,—and all other operations carried on by man. With regard to the Body, there is a diversity of opinion, which gives rise to the following doubt:—Is the formation of the man's Body due to his '*Karman*,' or, is it

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* Since the Mind operates only in the Body, it is only right that the exact nature of the Body should be examined after the character of the Mind has been discussed,—says the *Vārṭika*. An examination of the Mind requires an examination of its receptacle, Body, also—the *Tāṭparya* adds.

The use of the present enquiry consists in the determining the relation of a particular Soul with a particular Body, and the birth and Final Release of that Soul, as also what is called 'Death.' If we can prove that the connection of the Soul with the Body is due to the past deeds of that Soul, all those phenomena become explained; thus alone is use found for the laws relating to the duties of the several castes and conditions of man. Thus it is that all that has gone before in the Nyayasūtra becomes justified—*Parishuḍḍhi.*

Man's experiences occur in the Body; the Mind, like all Sense organs, functions in the Body; and these facts can be explained only on the basis of Man's body being due to his past deeds. Hence the necessity of the present enquiry. It would seem that the proper occasion for this investigation was the Section that dealt with the Body itself. But it comes in more naturally in connection with the Mind, which is the principal instrument of all man's pleasure, pain &c. . . . . Some people think that the Body of the child is due to the *Karman*, not of the child itself, but of the Father. But this is not right; because the Body of man must be the product of the acts of that person who regards that Body as himself, and acts for the experiences obtained through and in that Body.—*Varḍhamāna.*

the product of the material substances, independent of any '*Karman*'? We hear several opinions expressed on this point. The truth on this point is as follows :—

Sūṭra (60).

THE FORMATION OF THE BODY IS DUE TO THE PERSISTENCE OF THE EFFECT OF PREVIOUS ACTS.—Sū. (60).

The term '*purvakriṭam*,' 'previous,' stands for those deeds, or actions in the shape of the 'Activity of Speech, Cognition and Body,' that were done (by the person) in his previous body ;—the 'effect' of the said 'acts' consists of *Merit and Demerit* produced by them ;—the '*anubandha*,' 'persistente,' of that 'effect,' means the continuing of it as subsisting in the Soul ;—and the ormation of the Body is out of the material substances *as operated upon by the said* Bhā. P. 187. '*persistence of Meritd Demerit*,' and not out of the material substances by themselves. That particular Body belongs to a Soul subsisting in which the Soul regards it as I,' attached to which and desiring experiences in which that Soul obtains the various kinds of objects and acquires (brings about) Merit and Demerit; and when this Body falls off (on deah), another is brougqt into existence by the force of the 'Fuoaculty' in the shape of the said 'Merit and Depmerit' along with (and operating upon) the material substances; when this second body has come into existence, there go on again actions for the fulfilment of the man's purposes, just as in the previous body ; and the man's activities go on as in the previous btdy All this phenomenon is possible only on the basis of the assumption that the production of the Body is out of the material substances as operated upon by the Soul's acts. In the case of such objects as the chariot and the like, we find that being intended for the accomplishment of man's purpose, they are brought into existence out of such matter substances as are operated upon by man's quality in the shape of *Effort*; and on the analogy of this we can infer that the Body, being meant to accomplish the man's purposes, comes into existence out of such material substances as are operated upon by some qualities belonging to the man (such for instance as his Merit and Demerit).

Vārṭika on Sū. (60)
[P. 441, L. 8 to P. 442, L. 20.]

The Mind along with the Sense-organs, operates in the Body;* so that when we discuss the nature of the Body, it may be regarded as the discussion of Mind; hence we proceed with the discussion of the Body; the question being —Is the production of the Body brought about by material substances independently of the '*Karman*' of the Soul, or is it brought about by them, as influenced by this *Karman*? This doubt arises on account of the difference of opinion on the point; we have heard of diverse opinions expressed about it.

The truth is that—*The formation of the Body &c. &c.* —says the *Sūṭra*. *The term 'previous acts' stands for those actions, in the shape of the activity of Speech, Cognition and Body, that were done by the person in his previous Body;—the 'effect' of the said acts consists of Merit and Demerit produced by them—the 'anubandha' 'persistence' of that 'effect' means the continuing of it as subsisting in the Soul.* That there are such effects as 'Merit and Demerit' is shown by the fact that the time of fruition (appearance of the results) of man's acts is not fixed; that is, it is not certain whether the effects of a man's acts will accrue to him during the present life or in another world, and in another birth. When the material substances are influenced by the said Merit and Demerit, they bring about the Body, which is not brought about by the material substances by themselves.

How is it that *Karman*, which is called 'Merit and Demerit,' does not bring about its effect at the same time as (*i.e.*, immediately after) itself?"

Vār. P. 442.

* Both edition reads सेन्द्रियशरीरे । by which the meaning would be 'the Mind functions in the Body which is eqripped with the Sense-organs'. The *Bhāṣya* and the *Tāṭparya* both have सेन्द्रियस्यशरीरे । hence we have adopted this reading.

Who says that it does not bring about its effect? All that we mean is that the time of fruition is uncertain: When all the various causes bearing upon the thing are present, and while present they are not obstructed in any way, then certainly the act does bring about its effect immediately after itself; and in cases where the action does not bring about the effect immediately, this is due to the obstruction caused by the peculiar circumstances attending the Karmic residuum that is undergoing fruition; that is, a present act fails to bring about its effect immediately, because it is obstructed by that Karmic residuum of the man which is undergoing fruition,—*i.e.*, that Dharma and Adharma whose effects have not been already experienced;—or the non-appearance of the effects of actions at all times may sometimes be due to the obstruction caused by the fructifyiniy Karmic residuum of other living b ings, whose experiences are akin to those in question;—or again, the non-appearance of the effects may be due to the acts being obstructed by the acts of those other living beings who would be sharers in the 'Karman' of the man in question;*—or because such auxiliary causes as Merit and Demerit are not present at the time;—or Merit and Demerit do not bring about their effect at all times, as the auxiliary causes themselves are obstructed by the acts of other living beings. In fact this process of 'Karman' is incomprehensible, and it cannot be previously determined by human beings; what we have been pointing is only by way of illustration.

"What is the reason in support of the Proposition that it is only such material substances as are influenced by *Karman* and not those that are not so influenced,—that bring about the Body?"

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* *E.g.*, the effect of the good acts of a man are are apt to be nulllfied by the evil deeds of his wife or son.

We state the reason as follows:—(A) 'The Body must be the product of such material substances as are influenced by a specific quality of the Soul,—because while being a product, it is capable of fulfilling the Soul's purpose—all that is capable of fulfilling the Soul's purpose is found to be the product of such material substances as are influenced by the specific quality of the Soul,—e.g. the Chariot which is capable of fulfilling a man's purposes, is found to the product of substances influenced by the specific quality of the Man, in the shape of his effort,—the Body is also found to be just such;—hence the Body must be the product of substances influenced by something else.' Or (B) 'Because it is the source of pleasure and pain, like the Jar and such things';—(C) 'because it is a product, like the Chariot &c.';—and (D) 'because while being perceptible by an external organ of perception, it is endowed with Colour and such other qualities, like the Jar.' [For these several reasons the Body must be the product of substances influenced by the Merit and Demerit of the Man].

Bhāṣya on Sū. (61).
[P. 187, L. 9 to L. 13.]

On this point the Atheist argues as follows:—

Sūṭra (61).

"THE FORMATION OF THE BODY OUT OF MATERIAL SUBSTANCES IS EXACTLY LIKE THE PRODUCTION OF MATERIAL BODIES OUT OF MATERIAL SUBSTANCES." Sū. (61).

"From out of material substances themselves—independently of 'Karman'—are produced material bodies, in the shape of Sands, Pebbles, Stones, Orpiment and Soot; and they are taken up (by men) on account of their being capable of accomplishing the purposes of man. In the same manner the Body, being produced out of material substances independently of man's 'Karman,' would be taken up by him, of account of its being conducive to his purposes."

Vārṭika on Sū. (61).

[P. 442, L. 21 to P. 443, L. 5.]

On this point the Atheist argues as follows:—"*The formation of the Body etc. etc.—From out of material substances themselves—independently of Karma—are produced material bodies, in the shape of Sands, Pebbles, Stones, Orpiment and Soot, and are taken up on account of their being capable of accomplishing the purposes of man*, and the Body also would be similarly produced. This *Sūṭra* is meant to point out the invalidity of the premiss—'because the Body is conducive to man's purpose'—(which has been put forward by the *Siddhānṭin* in the *Vārṭika*, p. 442, Ll. 15—16)."

Suṭra (62).

THIS CANNOT BE ACCEPTED; BECAUSE WHAT IS URGED IS STILL TO BE PROVED—(Sū. 62).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (62).

Just as it is *still to be proved* that 'the formation of the Body is independent of Karman,' so is it *still to be proved* that 'the production of Sands, Pebbles, Stones, Orpiment, Soot and such things is independent of Karman'; so that being itself still to be proved, the said premiss cannot serve as a valid reason.

Vārṭika on Sū. (62).

[P. 443, L. 5 to L. 13].

If what is urged in Sū. 61 is meant to be a reason (put forward as proof of the conclusion that 'the Body is pro duced independently of Karman'), then, it cannot be admitted as a valid reason, being, as it is a mere statement of an example. If, on the other hand, the reasoning is meant to be —'material substances, independently of Karman, bring about the Body,—because they are capable of accomplishing man's purpose,—like Sand &c.',—then, *this cannot be accepted because what is urged is still to be proved.* Just as it is *still to*

be proved that the Body is produced out of material substances, irrespectively of Karman, so is it still to be proved that the production of Sand &c. is independent of Karman (Destiny). In fact, that the production of Sand &c. also is due to 'Karman' is proved by the same reason (of this being conducive to man's purposes). And in support of this conclusion we have the instance, admitted by both parties, of the Chariot which is found to be produced out of substances influenced by a specific quality of man; and there is no such instance available in support of the conclusion that the production of anything is independent of *Karman.*

Bhāṣya on Sū. (63).

[P. 187, L. 17 to P. 188, 6.]

What has been urged (in Sū. 61) in regard to the 'production of material bodies out of material substances',—any analogy between this and the case in question

THERE IS NONE; BECAUSE PARENTS ARE THE CAUSE OF FORMATION (OF THE BODY). (Sū. 63).

What has been urged by the Atheist bears no analogy to the case in question. "Why?" Because the 'material bodies' mentioned (Sands &c.) are produced without seeds; while the Body is always produced from seeds. The term 'parents' stands for *the ovule and semen*, which constitute the 'seeds' (of the Body); and what brings about the birth of the Body out of the material substances in the mother's womb are—(1) that 'Karman' of the personality himself, which is conducive to the experiences to be gone through by him in the mother's womb, and (2) the 'Karman' of the Parents which is conducive to the experiences resulting from the birth of the child. Thus it is established that there is connection with 'seeds' (in the shape of Semen and Ovule).

Vārtika on Sū. (63).

[P. 443, L. 13 to L. 19.]

What has been urged above in regard to 'the formation of material bodies out of material substances' bears no analogy

to the case in question, ' because Parents are the cause of the production of the Body.' The term ' Parents ' stands for the *ovule and semen*. The 'Karman' (Destiny) of the Parents, conducive to the experiences resulting from the birth of the child,—and the *Karman* of the personality conducive to the experiences to be gone through in the mother's womb,—both these *Karmas* conjointly bring about the birth of the Body in the mother's womb. It is in this manner that the ' connection of the seeds' is established;* and it is on account of this connection of the seed that the child born belongs to the same genus as its parents.

Sutra (64).

AND SO ALSO IS THE FOOD,—(Sū. 64).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (64), [P. 188, L. 8 to L. 14.]

' the cause of the formation of the Body '—this has to be added, being the principal clause (of the sentence of which Sūṭras 63 and 64 are component parts).

' Food' is what is eaten and drunk; and the juices, brought about by the digestion of the food, entering into the seed embedded in the mother's womb, undergo development along with that seed; and in that seed there is as much development as suffices for the accretion of the necessary aggregate;—the accretion thus formed goes on to develop into such aggregates as (1) the cell, (2) the mass, (3) the fœtus, (4) embryo,† (5) arteries, (6) head, and (7) feet &c., —and ultimately into what comes to be the substratum of the sense-organs;—when the fœtus has been formed, the juices of the food are absorbed by it through the umbilical cord, and it continues to grow till it becomes fit for being born. No such development is found to occur in the case of food lying in the dish (and not eaten by a person): From all this it follows that the development of the Body of the child is dependent upon the *karman* (Destiny of the Parents).

* तत्र चोपपत्तं is the right reading.

† From (1) to (4) are the names of the several shapes of the developing fœtus—says the *Ṭāṭparya*.

Vārtika on Sū. [64).

[P. 443, L. 21 to P. 444, L. 5.]

Also because food is the cause of the production of the Body—such is the complete sentence. It is also meant to be a circumstance that puts the case of the Body on a totally different footing from that of Sands, Pebbles &c. 'Food' is what is eaten and drunk; the digestion of

Vār. P. 444. these produces certain Juices; these go on developing in the mother's body; and aggregating into the shape of the fœtus in the womb they come to form the Cell &c, and finally develop into Hands, Feet, &c., through the accretion of material substances influenced by '*Karman*' If the material substances were not influenced by *Karman* (when developing into the fœtus), then similar development should attend the food in the dish also. There is however no such development of the food in the dish. Hence the conclusion is that in the formation of the human body, the material substances do stand in need of the influence of *Karman* or Destiny.

Sutra (65).

SPECIALLY BECAUSE, EVEN WHEN PHYSICAL CONNECTION IS PRESENT, THERE IS NO CERTAINTY (IN THE APPEARANCE OF THE EFFECT). (Sū. 65).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (65).

[P. 188, L. 16 to L. 18.]

As a matter of fact, every connection of the Parents does not bring about conception; and the only explanation of this is that there is no conception when the necessary influ-

* नतमपि is the right reading; the sense being that—'if the Destiny of the Parents had nothing to do with development of the fœtus, and this was due to the independent action of the material substances themselves,—then the food in the dish should also develop into the fœtus in the same manner as the food eaten by the mother.

ence of *Karman* (Destiny), is absent; and when this influence is present conception does take place. This is the only explanation possible of the said uncertainty of conception. If the material substances were independent (of any such influence as Destiny), there should be certainty of conception; for under that hypothesis, there would be no element wanting in the causes necessary for the formation of the Body.

Vārṭika on Sū. (65).

[P. 444, L. 7 to L. 9.]

Specially because etc. etc.—says the *Sūṭra.* If in the formation of the Body, the material substances were independent of Karman (Destiny), then, every connection of the parents should lead to the birth of a child. If, on the other hand, they are dependent upon *Karman*, the uncertainty becomes easily explained.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (66).

[P. 188, L. 18 to P. 189, L. 12.]

Further,

JUST AS KARMAN (DESTINY) IS THE CAUSE OF THE FORMATION OF THE BODY, SO IS IT ALSO OF THE CONNECTION OF THAT BODY (WITH A PARTICULAR SOUL).* (Sū. 66).

It is, as a matter of fact, impossible for the Body to be formed out of the Earth and other material substances, independently of Destiny,—the Body consisting, as it does, of an aggregation, brought about by means of an arrangement or disposition, most difficult to encompass, of such (heterogeneous) components as—(1) the arteries through which the bodily humours and life-breath flow. (2) the hum-

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* This *Sūṭra* anticipates the objection that, when a body is born, it comes into contact with all Souls—since all are equally omnipresent,—so that a body should belong to all Souls equally. The answer is that, though in a general way all Souls are in contact with the Body, yet the special connection of the body with one individual Soul is due to the Destiny of that Soul; which Destiny determines the exact body fit for the experiences in store for that Soul.

Would it not be simpler to take the *Sūṭra* to mean that 'the connection *of Parents* also is due to the Destiny of the Soul to be born of these parents.' This would be more in keeping with the context.

ours of the body culminating in the semen, (3) the Tendon, Skin, Bones, Veins, Muscle, embryo and fœtus, (4) head, arms and belly, (5) the thighs, (6) the Wind, Bile and Phlegm permeating the Body, and (7) the mouth, throat, chest, stomach, intestines and bowels;—consequently we conclude that its formation is due to Destiny. In the same manner if among the causes (bringing about the body) there is nothing that is related to any particular Soul, the Earth and other material substances that would constitute the body would be equally related to all the Souls—among whom there would be nothing to distinguish one from the other,—and there being nothing in the Earth &c. themselves that would connect them with any one Soul, and with the rest, the Body formed out of these would be the common substratum for the pleasure, pain and cognition of all the Souls;—as a matter of fact however, each Body is found to be connected with only one particular Soul; and the only explanation of this restriction is that *Karman* (Destiny) is a cause that brings about the formation of the Body; so that the Karmic residuum of each Soul being restricted to itself, it produces a Body fit for being the substratum of the experiences of that particular Soul in which the residuum subsists, and connects that body with that Soul. Thus it is found that just as *Destiny is the cause of the formation of the Body, so is it also of the connection of that Body with a particular Soul.* What we mean by 'connection' is the relation that each Body bears to an individual Soul.

Vārṭika on Sū. (66).

[P. 444, L. 8 to P. 445, L. 9.]

Objection:—"The connection with all Souls being equal, they should all have a common body,—there being nothing to restrict a body to any one Soul only."

Answer:—If what you mean by this is that—"One Body is related to all Souls, through conjunction brought about either by conjunction or by motion; and in the Body itself there is nothing that could restrict it to any one Soul; nor is there any thing in the Soul whereby any one Body could be the means of the experiences of that Soul only; and yet such

restriction is actually found to exist; hence it behoves the *Siddhāntin* to explain this restriction (of one Body to one Soul),"—then our answer to this is provided in the next *Sutra*:

Just as Destiny etc. etc.—says the *Sūtra*. That same Destiny which brings about the Body also serves to restrict the connection of that Body. If the formation of the Body were not due to Destiny, then we would have the incongruities already noted above. "But to what is due the subsistence of the Destiny in a particular Soul?" If you mean by this that—" even if Destiny is what restricts the formation of the Body, whence does the restriction of Destiny arise?"—then our answer is that it is due to the restriction of the bringing about of its own connection; that is, when one Soul becomes connected with one Body, the Destiny resulting from this connection belongs to that Soul. "But whence the restriction in regard to the *connection?* This question shall persist in the same manner as that relating to the restriction of the *Destiny.*" Not so; for Mind is the cause of restriction; that is, the connection brought about by the Mind belongs to that Soul to whom the Mind belongs. "The same question arises in regard to the Mind also; the Mind being equally related to all Souls, whence the restriction?" Destiny itself is the cause of this restriction; the Mind belongs to that particular Soul with whose Destiny it is bound up. "How does this come about at the beginning of creation (when there is no Destiny)?" This objection has no force, since we do not admit of any such thing as the 'beginning of creation;' the world is without a beginning, as has been proved under Sutra 3-1-19; and the objection urged is applicable only if the world has a beginning, and not if it has none.

Vār. P. 445.

Sūṭra (67).

BY WHAT HAS BEEN SAID IN THE PRECEDING SŪṬRA THE ABSENCE OF UNIVERSALITY HAS BEEN EXPLAINED [*i.e.*, SHOWN TO BE IMPOSSIBLE, INEXPLICABLE UNDER THE PŪRVA-PAKṢA (Su. 67)].*

Bhāṣya on Sū. (67).

[P. 189, and 14 to P. 190, and 15.]

What is called '*aniyama*', 'absence of universality', has been explained—by what has been said in the preceding Sūṭra,—'just as Destiny is the cause of the formation of the Body so is it also of the connection of that Body with a particular Soul,'—as impossible and inexplicable under the theory that the formation of the Body is *not* due to Destiny.†

Q. "What does, *Niyama*, 'Universality,' mean here?"

A. What is called 'Universality' here is the idea that *the body of one Soul is the same as that of all Souls*; so that what is meant by '*aniyama*,' 'absence of Universality,' is *diversity, distinction, peculiarity*,—*i.e.*, the idea that *the body of one Soul is different from that of another.*‡

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* All the commentaries explain this Sūṭra as aimed against the following Sāṅkhya-doctrine :—"The formation of the Body is not due to Destiny; it is due to the functioning of Primordial Matter; this Primordial Matter, through its own inherent activity, independently of Merit, Demerit &c., evolves the several products."

The Sūṭra has been rendered according to the explanation provided by the Commentators. Would it not be simpler to render it as follows—'What has been said disposes of the objection that there could be no restiriction as to which Soul should have which Body.'

† We have adopted the reading—योऽयमकर्मनिमित्तसर्गे मते अनियम ...... कर्मेत्यनेन प्रत्युक्तः which has been adopted by the *Tāṭparya*; according to which and the *Vārtika*, this sentence should be construed that :—योऽयमनियम इत्युच्यते अयं अकर्मनिमित्तसर्गे मते......प्रत्युक्तः The *Tāṭparya* explains the purport as follows—'The absence of Universality—*i.e.*, the fact that no single Body can be common to all Souls—that has been described in the preceding Sūṭra—*has been explained*—*i.e.*, shown to be impossible under the theory that the formation of the Body is brought about by material substances independently of any such influence as that of Destiny.'

‡ '*Niyama* stands for *Universality*, the idea of all Souls having a common body; '*Aniyama*' means *non-universality*, the idea that one Soul has one body and another a totally different one—*Tāṭparya*.

As a matter of fact, we actually find such diversity or distinctions in the birth of bodies as (*a*) one is born in a high family, another in a low family, (*b*) one is praiseworthy and another blameworthy, (*c*) one is full of diseases while another is free from diseases, (*d*) one is complete while another is maimed, (*e*) one is full of suffering while another is full of happiness, (*f*) one is endowed with excellent characteristics of man while another is quite the contrary, (*g*) one is endowed with good properties while another possesses bad properties, (*h*) one has efficient and another weak sense-organs. [These are the cruder differences ordinarily perceptible] there are several subtler differences, which are innumerable. All this diversity in the birth of Bodies can be due only to the Destiny attaching to each individual Soul (which determines the character of the Body into which that Soul is going to be born). On the other hand, if there were no such diverse Destinies, attaching to individual Souls, (as influencing the birth of the Body), then—there being no difference among the Souls themselves, and the Earth and other material substances (as constituting Primordial Matter) being the same in all cases, and there being nothing in these substances to lead to any restriction,—it would come to this that all bodies belong to all Souls. As a matter of fact however, the life of Souls is not found to be so (that is, such as all bodies belong to all Souls). Hence the conclusion is that the formation of the Body cannot but be due to the influence of Destiny.

Further, the separation (freedom) of the Soul from the Body is also rendered possible by the possibility of the exhaustion of *Karman* (Destiny). * That is to say, when the formation of the Body is due to Destiny, it becomes possible† for the Soul to become separated (freed) from that body.—" How ? "— *Through the possibility of the exhaustion of Destiny*. It is possible for Destiny to be exhausted in the following manner :—Right Knowledge having destroyed Illusion, the person becomes free from all attachment,—he

* This appears as *Sūṭrā* in the printed text. But no such Sūṭra is found in the *Nyāyasūchī-nibanḍha*, nor in Sutra Mss. C. and D., nor in Vishvanāṭha's Vṛiṭṭi.

† For उत्पन्न read उपपन्न as found in Puri Ms. B.

commits no further deeds, by body, speech, or mind, which could lead to his re-birth; so that there is no further accumulation of Destiny, and all past accumulation becomes exhausted by his passing through the experiences resulting therefrom; thus (in the absence of Destiny) there being nothing to bring about a further Body, when the present Body falls off, no further Body is formed, and hence there is no further bondage (for that Soul). If the formation of the Body were *not* due to Destiny,—as of the material substance (Primordial Matter) itself there can be no destruction,—there would be no possibility of the Soul ever becoming freed from the Body.

Vārtika on *Sū*. (67).

[P. 445, L. 11 to L. 19.]

By what has been said &c. &c.—says the *Sūtra*. "What is meant by *Niyama*?" '*Niyama*' stands for the notion that 'just as one body belongs to one Soul so does it belong to all Souls'; so that *aniyama*, 'absence of Universality' stands for diversity, distinction, the notion that 'the body of one Soul is totally different from that of another.'

As a matter of fact, living beings are found to have distinct bodies of varying kinds; this could not be possible if the formation of bodies were due to material substances independently of Destiny; while (if it were due to Destiny), inasmuch as there is diversity in the Destinies of men, a diversity in the bodies would be only natural.

The separation of the Soul from the Body is also rendered possible by the possibility of the exhaustion of Destiny. There are two causes of the Body—*manifested* and *unmanifested*; of the Unmanifested cause, which is called 'Destiny,' there is exhaustion due to the experiencing of its results; and when Destiny has been exhausted, material substances (the *manifested* causes), even though present, do not produce another body; and hence Final Release becomes accomplished. If

Destiny had no influence (over the substances forming the Body);—the cause of the Body, in the shape of the material substances, being eternal (indestructible), the destruction of what would render the Souls free and hence released?

Sūṭra (68).

* IF IT BE ASSERTED THAT—"THE FORMATION OF THE BODY IS DUE TO 'ADṚIṢṬA' [(A) 'NON-PERCEPTION,' OR (B) UNSEEN QUALITY]"—THEN [OUR ANSWER IS THAT] IN THAT CASE, EVEN AFTER FINAL RELEASE THERE WOULD BE LIKELIHOOD OF A BODY BEING PRODUCED. (Sū. 68).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (68).

[P. 190, L. 17 to P. 191, L. 15.]

[A] "It is *aḍarshana*, 'non-perception,' that is spoken of as *aḍṛiṣṭa*, (in the *Sūṭra*). As a matter of fact, the formation of the Body is brought about by 'non-perception.' That is, as long as the Body has not been formed, the perceiver, being without a receptacle (abode), *cannot perceive* things, the things to be *perceived* by him being of two kinds—(*a*) the *object* (Sound, Taste, Odour &c.) and the *diversity* or *difference* between the *Unmanifested* (Primordial Matter) and the *Soul*;—and it is (in view of this 'non-perception,' and) for this purpose (of accomplishing the *perception* of these two kinds of things) that the Body is brought into existence. Hence when the said *perception* (of both kinds of things) has been accomplished, the material substances have done all they had

* The printed text, as also the *Nyāyasūchīnibandha*, includes this clause also under the Sūṭra. But neither Vishvanatha nor any Sūṭra Ms. reads the Sūṭra so; according to these the form of the Sūṭra is simply '*punasṭaṭprasaṅgo*' *pavargē*. But from the *Bhāṣya* (P. 191, Ll. 10 &c.) it is clear that the text of the Sūṭra is as printed.

The *Vārṭika* and the *Tāṭparya* explain this objection as proceeding from the *Sankhya* (A). The *Bhasya* latter on, P. 191, L. 10, offers another explanation, whereby the objection is represented as coming from the Jaina (B).

The *Tāṭparya* has explained the term 'Aḍṛiṣṭa' of the Sūṭra, which the Bhasya says, is synonymous here with '*aḍarshana*,' non-perception,'—to mean the non-perception of such objects of enjoyment as Sound and the like, as also the non-perception of the distinction between Soul and Matter.

to do (in connection with that perceiving Soul) and consequently do not produce any other Body for him; and in this manner the 'separation from Body' becomes possible."

If you hold the above view, then our answer is that —*in that case, even after Final Release, there would be likelihood of a further Body being born.* That is, there would be likelihood of another Body being produced for that Soul. According to you, there is one 'non-perception'—*i.e.*, impossibility of perception—while the Body has not been formed; and there is 'impossibility of perception' after the Body has ceased to exist,—which also is another 'non-perception;'—and between these two 'non-perceptions' there is no difference; so that, even after Final Release, inasmuch as 'non-perception' [which, according to you, is the sole cause of the production of the Body] would be there, there would be every likelihood of another Body being produced.

"But the fact of *the purpose of the Body-production having been accomplished* forms the point of difference (between the two 'non-perceptions)."*

This cannot be right; because as a matter of fact, we find production or accomplishment as well as non-accomplishment. That is, if what you mean to urge is that— "When perception (of ordinary things, and of the difference between Soul and Matter) has been accomplished, the material substances have their purpose fulfilled, and as such, do not go to form another Body; and this forms the point of difference [wherein one kind of 'non-perception,' that due to the cessation of the Body upon Final Release, differs from the other kind of 'non-perception,' that due to the non-existence of the Body, before it has been produced],"—then, our answer is that this cannot be right; because we find production on accomplishment as well as on non-accomplishment; that is, as a matter of fact we find that Bodies are produced again and again (for the non-released Soul), even though the material substances have their purpose fulfilled by the Soul's *perception* of the things of the world; and inasmuch as the Bodies produced again and again do not (always) bring about the *perception*

* This is printed as Sūṭra. But no such Sūṭra is found anywhere.

of difference between Soul and Matter (which is the only purpose left to be accomplished for the Soul by these subsequent bodies), the production of all these bodies must be regarded as purposeless.

From all this it is clear that, under the theory that the creation of things is not due to Destiny, the formation of the Body *cannot* be regarded as being for the purposes of 'Perception;' while under the theory that the said creation is due to Destiny, the formation of the Body can be rightly regarded as being for the purposes of 'Perception;' as (under this latter theory) 'Perception' consists in *experience*, which is the result of deeds done (i e. Destiny).

[B] The clause '*taḍaḍriṣṭakāriṭam*' may be taken as representing the theory of other philosophers:—" *Aḍriṣṭa* is the name of a particular quality of Atoms, which brings about action or motion; it is when urged by this quality that the Atoms combine and bring about the Body; whereupon this Body is entered by the Mind, which also is urged to it by its own quality of '*Aḍriṣṭa*'; and when the Body has become entered by the Mind then the Perceiver begins to have his perceptions."

The answer to this theory also is that—'*there is likelihood of another Body being produced*'—since the Mind is not destroyed; that is, even after Final Release, there would be likelihood of a further Body being produced, as '*Aḍriṣṭa*,' the quality of Atoms, is indestructible (and hence persists even after Release).

Vārṭika on Su. (68).

[P. 44 , L. 1 to P. 448, L. 8.]

It may be asserted that—it is due to *aḍriṣṭa*; that is, the formation of the Body is due to *aḍriṣṭa*,—the world '*aḍriṣṭa*' meaning *aḍarshana, non-perception*. That is, at the beginning of creation, Primordial Matter becomes active by reason of the Soul's purpose; and becoming thus active it brings about the Body undergoing modifications from the *Mahat* onwards; and it is only when the Body has been produced that the Perceiver perceives the things to be per-

ceived;—*things to be perceived* being of two kinds: (1) *Objects* and (2) difference between Soul and Matter; and when this *perception* has been accomplished, Primordial Matter, having its work accomplished, does not act any further. Thus then, it is 'non-perception' (of Objects and of the difference between Soul and Matter) that should be regarded as the cause of the formation of the Body, since it comes about only when the former is present.

In accordance with this theory,* *even after Final Release there would be likelihood of a Body being Produced.* According to the above there are two kinds of 'non-perception;' (1) † that which is regarded as the *impossibility of perception,* before the activity of Primordial Matter, and (2) that *impossibility of perception* which comes subsequently, after the formation of the Body has ceased;—now there is no difference between these two 'non-perceptions;' so that if the formation of the Body be attributed to 'non-perception,' then it should come to this—just as Primordial Matter becomes active for the accomplishment of man's purpose, before he has *perceived* the difference between Soul and Matter [this activity being due to 'non-perception' of difference between Soul and Matter],—so in the same manner, even after the Final Release of the Man, that matter should become active (by reason of 'non-perception' which is still there, in the shape of the *impossibility of perceiving the objects of perception*). But no such activity (after Final Release) is admitted (by the Sāṅkhya). Hence the formation of Body cannot be attributed to 'non-perception.'

"But there will be this difference between the two 'non-perceptions' that in the case of one the work has been accomplished."

* Read सत्सु दर्शने for सत्त्वदर्शने

† निवृत्तिरदर्शनाभिमता is the right reading.

This cannot be right;* because as a matter of fact we find material substances active, when their work has been accomplished as well as when it has not been accomplished: E.g. the first Body of the Soul having accomplished the work of the perception of Colour and such other objects of perception, the second and subsequent Bodies could not be the means of bringing about the perception of Colour &c. (since this perception has been already accomplished); but this second and other subsequent bodies are actually found to be the means of the perception of Colour, Sound &c.;—and from this it is clear that material substances are active also after their work has been accomplished. Then again, the formation of the Body being for the accomplishment of the Soul's purpose,—and this 'purpose' consisting of the perception of the difference between Soul and Matter,—since the second and subsequent Bodies do not accomplish this purpose, the formation of these must be regarded as purposeless.

"What we mean by 'non-perception' (as the cause of Body-formation) is a particular kind of *desire to perceive.*"

If you mean by this that—"*Non-perception* does not mean *absence of perception*, it means only the *desire to perceive*, and no such desire can arise when Primordial Matter has accomplished its work in regard to the Person,"—this is not right; because before the activity of Primordial Matter has set in, the said desire cannot appear; until Primordial Matter has actually evolved into *Mahat* &c., there

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can be no *desire to perceive*; how then can any such *desire* be the cause of the said activity (of Primordial Matter)? "By reason of omnipotence, it is there at that time also." If you mean by this

* The right reading is न युक्तम् यदि

that—"Primordial Matter is endowed with *all* causal potencies, and endowed with these potencies, which constitute its own essence, Primordial Matter is omnipresent; and since it is omnipresent, there is *desire to perceive* in the Matter, even before its activity has set in,"—then, this cannot be right; as in that case there would be no possibility of Final Release. Just as the *Desire to Perceive* is there (before activity), so also would the 'Perception of Difference between Soul and Matter' be there (by reason of the omnipresence of Primordial Matter); so that (if during the activity of Matter also, the said Perception is there) there would be no Final Release at all. In fact while the *Perception of Difference* is there, there should be activity of Primordial Matter;' and your theory involves the further incongruity that even when the *Perception of Difference* is there, the *Desire to Perceive* does not cease. Further, according to you that which exists never loses its being, so that where the *Desire to Perceive* exists (it can never cease), whence could there be Final Release? Then again, *Desire to Perceive* and *Perception of Difference* being mutually contradictory, how could they exist at one and the same time?

If the Opponent were to say that what he means by 'non-perception' is *ajñāna, Ignorance,*—he should be met with the following alternative :—"What is '*ajñāna*,' 'Ignorance'? Is it *absence of knowledge*? Or *wrong knowledge*? "What do you mean by this?" If it is mere *absence*, then no Final Release is possible, for before the activity of Primordial Matter, as also after its work has been accomplished, this *absence of knowledge* will be there.* If, on the

* Before the activity of Primordial matter there is *absence of knowledge*, of difference between Soul and Matter, and after Primordial Matter has done its work, there is *absence of knowledge*, of ordinary things.

other hand, '*ajñāna*' stands for *wrong knowledge*, that cannot be right; as before the activity of matter, no such wrong knowledge is present [there being no objects that could be known]. "Why should the *wrong knowledge* be absent (before the activity of Matter)?" For the simple reason that (according to the *Sāṅkhya*) *wrong knowledge* is a quality of *Buddhi* (which is not present before the activity of Primordial Matter). Further, after Primordial Matter has done its work, *Buddhi* would cease to exist; how then could its quality, *wrong knowledge*, remain?" "But in accordance with the theory that Products are ever existent, the *Wrong Cognition* is always present." By saying this you set aside Final Release entirely. "Why?" Because to hold that *Wrong Knowledge* is ever present means that *Right Knowledge* (which leads to Release) is ever absent. Further [if it be urged that Right Knowledge also is ever present, according to the Sāṅkhya theory of every Product being ever-existent], Right Knowledge and Wrong Knowledge (being contradictories) can never exist at the same time; hence it cannot be right to hold that activity (which is preceded by *Wrong Knowledge, ex-hypothesi*) is for the accomplishment * of *Right Knowledge*. According to your theory there is nothing that is *non-existent*,—and what is existent never loses its being; so that all things being always existent, it behoves you to explain for the sake of what thing should Primordial Matter become active. If you hold that the activity of Primordial Matter is for the purpose of *manifesting* (what already exists in an unmanifested form),—then the question remains as before: Is this *manifestation* existent before the said activity? or non-existent? "What is meant is that what was *unperceived* before (activity) becomes

* तादर्थ्यं, not तादात्म्य, is the right reading.

perceived (after)." When a thing becomes perceived, is there any fresh quality produced in it? or does it become perceived without any such quality being produced? If you hold that it is perceived *after* a particular quality has been *produced* in it, then this involves a self-contradiction on your part. * If, on the other hand, you hold that it is perceived without any fresh quality being produced in it, then, it behoves you to explain why in that case, it is *not perceived* before (activity of matter). In fact howsoever much you may try, you can never explain the production of any fresh quality; while if you deny the production of a fresh quality, you cannot explain the *perceptibility* and *imperceptibility* of the thing.

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If, on the other hand, the formation of the Body is due to Destiny, then it is only right that for the purpose of bringing about the perception, material substances are influenced by the quality of the man (in the shape of his effort) and thus bring into existence his Body:—for unless the Body is produced, the Perceiver, being without an abode, cannot perceive things.

Others have explained *adṛiṣṭa* (to which the formation of the Body is attributed) as a quality of Atoms. In the case of these people also, *there would be likelihood of a Body being produced, also after Final Release*, as what brings about the Body is a quality of Atoms (which is ever present); so that even after Final Release there could be a possibility of Bodies being produced.

Sūṭra (69).

THERE SHOULD BE NO SEVERANCE OF CONNECTION,—THIS BEING DUE TO THE ACTION OF MIND.† (Sū. 69).

* The idea of anything being produced after is not compatible with the Sāṅkhya theory of 'manifestation.'

† This Sūṭra is not found in the Purī Sūṭra-Ms.; it is found everywhere else.

Bhāṣya Sū. (69).

[P. 191, L. 17 to P. 192, L. 3.]

[Another objection against the Jaina view, referred to in the latter part of the *Bhāṣya* on Sū. 68.]

If the mind enters (into the Body) by virtue of '*adṛiṣṭa*,' the Unseen Quality of the Mind, there should be no severance of connection (between the Mind and the Body). For under this view,* to what could the moving out of the Mind from the Body be due? Under our theory the said moving out (of the Mind from the Body, at death) is due to the fact that one set of Karmic Residuum (to which the dead Body owed its existence) having been exhausted, another set of Karmic residuum (to which the next Body would be due) sets up its fruition.† "The moving out of the Mind would be due to the unseen quality (*Adṛiṣṭa*); that same unseen quality which has been the cause of *entrance* (of the Mind into the Body) will also be the cause of its *exit*." This cannot be right; for one and the same thing cannot be the cause of both *life* (which is what the *entrance* of Mind means) and *death* (which is what is meant by the Mind's *exit*); according to your view the same Unseen Quality would be the cause of both life and death; and this is absurd.

Vārṭika on Sū. (69).

[P. 448, L. 10 to L. 15.]

There should be no severance of connection etc. etc.—says the *Sūṭra*. [The view traversed here is as follows]—" Atoms combine, among themselves, by reason of their Unseen Quality, and having combined, they bring into existence the Diad and other products, down to the Body; and this Body is entered by the Mind, through its own Unseen Quality."

Our answer to this is that what leads to the entrance of the Mind into the Body [*i.e.* the Unseen Quality] being eternal, by what could its exit (from the Body) be brought about?

* तत्र is better than तस्य

† तदिदं दृष्टान्तरस्य.........दृष्टान्ते—These words have no connection with the present context. They are not found in the Puri Mss., nor in any other manuscript save one.

According to our theory, it is only right that upon the exhaustion of the (former) Karmic residuum, *exit* should be brought about by the (next) Karmic residuum and death should ensue. It will not be right to assert that the Unseen Quality of the Mind would be the cause of both (its *entrance* and *exit*);—because one and the same thing cannot be the cause of both life and death.

Sūṭra (70).

INASMUCH AS DEATH WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE, THE BODY SHOULD HAVE TO BE REGARDED AS EVER-LASTING. (Sū. 70).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (70).

[P. 192, L. 5 to L. 8.]

When, on the experiencing of the fruits (of all deeds) there is exhaustion of Karmic residuum and the Body falls off, it is called 'death'; and under the influence of another Karmic residuum there is 'rebirth.' Now, if the formation of the Body were due to the material substances themselves, independently of Destiny, what is it the exhaustion whereof could lead to the fall of the Body, which is called 'death'? And there being no death we understand that *the Body should have to be regarded as ever-lasting*. For if Death were due to mere chance, (and not to a specific cause relating specifically to the individual), then there could be no difference in the manner of death (in several persons).*

Vārṭika on Sū. (70).

[P. 448, L. 15 to L. 18.]

Inasmuch as Death etc. etc.—says the *Sūṭra*. What we mean by saying that 'the Body should have to be regarded as eternal' is that Death would not be possible; because, as we have already explained (Text, L. 448, L. 12) 'the Unseen

*Some persons die in the womb, some as soon as they are born, and so forth. If death were not the effect of a specific cause, it should be either *eternal*, like *Ākāsha*, or an absolute *non-entity*, like the sky-lotus.—*Ṭāṭparya*.

Quality, which is the cause of the entrance of the Mind, is eternal, and there is no such Unseen Quality as would be the cause of its exit.' If Death were due to mere chance, there would be no difference in the manner of Death.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (71).

[P. 192, L. 8 to L. 11.]

The Opponent,—with a view to criticise what has been urged against him, to the effect that 'there would be likelihood of another Body being produced' (Su. 68),—argues as follows:—

"IT WOULD BE LIKE THE ETERNALITY OF THE DARK COLOUR OF THE ATOM."* (Su. 71).

"Just as the dark colour of the Atom (of Clay) is eternal, and yet when it is obstructed (set aside) by fire-contact (in baking), it does not appear again,—in the same manner the Body though formed by the Unseen Quality (of the Atoms), would not appear again, after Final Release."

Vārṭika on Su. (71).

[P. 449, Ll. 1—3.]

"*It would be like etc. etc.*"—says the *Sūṭra*; this is the answer that they give to what has been urged against them. "Just as the dark colour of the Atom is eternal, and yet it is set aside by fire-contact, in the same manner the Unseen Quality of the Atom and of the Mind (even though eternal) would be set aside by *Right Knowledge.*"

Sūṭra (72).

THAT CANNOT BE; AS THIS WOULD INVOLVE (A) THE ADMISSION OF WHAT IS NOT SUPPORTED (BY REASONING OR FACT)† [(B) OR, THE ACCRUING OF WHAT IS NOT EARNED.] (Su. 72.)

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*This *Sūṭra*, though not found in Sūṭra Ms. C, is found everywhere else.

†The *Ṭāṭparya* construes the Sūtra thus:—*pramāṇēna aviṣayīkṛiṭam 'akṛiṭam'—praṭyuṭa praṭyakṣāgamaviruḍḍham—ṭasya 'abhyāgamaḥ' abhyupagamaḥ ṭaṭprasaṅgāṭ*. This is the interpetation that has been adopted in the translation; as also a second interpretation (B), put forward in the *Bhāṣya*.

Bhāṣya on Su. (72.)

[P. 192, L. 13 to P. 193, L. 22.]

(A) The instance cited (in Su. 71) cannot be right;—"Why?"—*because this would involve the admission of what is not supported.* The term 'supported' stands for *not compatible with any right Cognition*; the '*abhyāgama*' of that means its acceptance, avowal; the meaning thus is that he who believes what has been said (in Su. 71) would be avowing what is incompatible with all right notion. Hence the instance cited cannot be right; since what is asserted is neither perceptible, nor cognisable by inference. Thus what the *Sutra* (72) urges is the fact that what has been cited by the Opponent is something *still to be proved.*

(B) Or, the Sūtra may be explained to mean that—*That cannot be, as this would involve the accruing of what is not earned.* A person who, on the basis of the example of the Dark Colour of the Atom, seeks to support the view that the formation of the Body is not due to Destiny, draws upon himself the incongruity of *the accruing of the unearned.* That is, the theory would involve the contingency that pleasure and pain accrues to the man without his having done the acts leading up to that pleasure and pain. If, in answer to this, you say "yes, be it so;"—then our answer is that this would be contrary (*a*) to Perception, (*b*) to Inference and (*c*) to Scripture:

(*a*) To Perception it would be contrary in the following manner:—That the Pleasure and Pain experienced by each individual Soul is distinct is a fact perceptible to all persons. "What is the distinction?" The distinctions are such as *strong and weak, belated and quick, diverse and uniform,* and so forth. (Under the Opponent's theory) there can be no speciality in the causes bringing pleasure and pain to each individual Soul separately; and unless there is some speciality in the cause there can be none in the effect. If, on the other hand, the advent of pleasure and pain is due to Destiny,—inasmuch as it is possible (*a*) for the acts of diverse personalities to be strong or weak &c., (*b*) for their Karmic residuum to be correspondingly more or less potent, and (*c*) for their acts to be of diverse or uniform character,—it is only right that there should be a corresponding distinction in the

Pleasure and Pain resulting from those acts. And since no such distinction *in the cause* would be possible on the theory of the Opponent, there should be no distinction in the resultant pleasure and pain :—and this would be incompatible with (contrary to) a fact known by Perception.

(*b*) The Opponent's theory would be contrary to Inference in the following manner :—The distribution of Pleasure and Pain among persons is found to follow from the distribution of their qualities; e.g. when an intelligent person, having recognised a certain pleasure as brought about by a certain means, *desires* that pleasure, he makes an *effort* to obtain that means, and thereby obtains the pleasure; and he does not obtain it otherwise [i.e. if he does not put forth the said effort];—similarly, when a person, having recognised a certain pain as brought about by a certain means, *desires* to avoid that pleasure, he makes an *effort* to avoid that means, and thereby avoids that pain; and not otherwise. Now in the case in question, we find that there are certain pleasures and pains that accrue to a person without any effort on his part [such for instance as the sufferings due to a mis-shaped body]; and on the strength of the well-known facts just mentioned, we *infer* that the distribution of these pleasures and pains also must be due to some other quality of the intelligent being (if not his direct *effort*) [and this other quality is *Merit-Demerit* constituting the person's Destiny.] This inference would be contradicted if the accruing of pleasure and pain were held to be not due to Destiny. The said 'other quality' (Merit-Demerit), being imperceptible, is called '*adṛiṣṭa*' (Unseen Force, Destiny), and since the *time* of its *fruition* is not *definitely fixed, it is regarded as indefinite**; while Apprehension and the other qualities *of the* Soul are perceptible and evanescent.

(*c*) The Opponent's theory would be contrary to Scripture in the following manner :—There are several Scriptures written by sages, containing the instructions imparted by those sages, in regard to the performance and avoidance of actions; and the effect of such instruction we find in the

* We have translated the reading *avyavasṭhiṭam*; though to keep up the contrast with the 'evanescence' of Buḍḍhi, spoken of in the next sentence, '*vyavasṭhiṭam*,' permanent 'lasting,' would appear to be the better reading.

shape of activities of men consisting of performance in due accordance with their respective castes and conditions of life, as also in the shape of cessation from activity, consisting of avoidance of action. Both these kinds of actions, good and evil, would be impossible, under the philosophy of the *Pūrvapakṣin*; so that this philosophy is contrary to the view (in consonance with Scriptures) that the accruing of pleasure and plain to persons is due to Destiny.

Thus the conclusion is that the doctrine—that "the formation of the Body is not due to Destiny, and the accruing of Pleasure and Pain is not due to Destiny"—is clearly wrong and is maintained only by the worst sinners.

Thus ends the *Bhāṣya* on

Adhyāya III.

Vārṭika on Sū. (72).

That cannot be etc. etc.—says the *Sūṭra.* The term '*akṛiṭābhyāgama*' means the avowal of a view in support of which there is no proof;—this is what the *Sūṭra* means.

Or, the *Sūṭra* may be taken literally as it stands; the meaning being that the theory involves the absurdity of a man suffering the consequences of what he has not done. This has been explained in detail in the *Bhāṣya.*

'Soul, Body, Instrument, Objects, Apprehension and Mind,—every one of these things has been described in this discourse in its true form.'

Thus ends the *Vārṭika* on

Aḍhyāya III.
